JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, A.C.J.—This appeal is arising out of an order dated 14th December, 2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3324 of 2009 (Pradeep Kumar v. Mohd. Saiful Ezaz Alam Khan and another). 2. The fact remains that the appellant, the petitioner in the writ petition, happens to be a tenant of a shop situated in Mohalla Bhadwarganj, (Dhawan Book Depo) Station Road, Qasba Ujhani, District Budaun, of which the boundaries are that towards East- Government Road, West- Shop Rajiv Medical Store, North- Railway Road and South- Shop Redgal Photo Studio, which has got a dimension of 12Ft. x 7.5 Ft. On the upper storey of the shop, in which the appellant is a tenant, there is a vacant room, which belongs to the landlords-respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It has got a dimension of 20 Ft. x 10.5 Ft. The dimension of the room on the upper storey is bigger than the dimension of the shop of the appellant on account of the fact that for constructing the room on the upper storey the balcony was also used. Concealing the dimensions of the room upon the upper storey of the shop, in which the appellant is a tenant and other accommodations belonging to the respondents’ mother Smt. Nighat Fatima, an application was filed by the respondents for the ejectment of the appellant from the shop in dispute under Section 21(1) (a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (hereinafter in short called as the ‘Act’), which was numbered as R.C.C. No. 1 of 2001. The application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority vide order dated 2nd January, 2008, against which the appellant filed a rent appeal, being Rent Appeal No. 12 of 2008, before the appellate authority under Section 22 of the Act. When the appeal was pending, the appellant came to the knowledge that the respondents had concealed the existence of several accommodations in which they could open their shop for the sale of the photostat copies machine, computer, etc. The appellant further came to the knowledge that the mother of the respondents Smt. Nighat Fatima has also been shown to be the owner of one big accommodation, which is to the south of the premises, in which the appellant happens to be a tenant. The appellant further came to the knowledge that the mother of the respondents Smt. Nighat Fatima has also been shown to be the owner of one big accommodation, which is to the south of the premises, in which the appellant happens to be a tenant. He further knew that in the name of a sister of the respondents, namely Wasim Nighat, who was a widow and was a teacher in Asarfi Devi Nagar Palika Kanya Inter College, Ujhani, Budaun, a land was purchased by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and on the said land two shutters’ shops were constructed when the appeal itself was pending before the appropriate authority. After coming to know aforesaid facts, the appellant subsequently filed an application, being numbered as 28 Ga, for the admission of some evidence as an additional evidence, to which a reply was also filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and this was numbered as 39 Ga. The appellant also filed an application for adducing some additional evidence, which was numbered as paper No. 51 Ga. The appellant also filed a list of evidence, which was numbered as paper No. 53 Ga. A reply to the appellant’s application numbered as 51 Ga for adducing additional evidence was also filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, to which a replication was also filed by the appellant. The appellant also filed an application for issuing a commission in order to ascertain the dimensions of the room, which exists on the upper storey of the shop, in which the appellant is a tenant, and also for inspecting a shop, which apparently belongs to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 but has been cleverly shown to be of the mother of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, Smt. Nighat Fatima. A reply to the appellant’s application for issuing a commission was filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, which was numbered as paper No. 44 Ga, against which a replication was also filed by the appellant, which was numbered as paper No. 49 Ga. In short, the appellant’s case has been that he had no knowledge of the fact earlier that there were other shops belonging to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, which were in vacant position and further they were having substantial dimensions in which the respondent Nos. In short, the appellant’s case has been that he had no knowledge of the fact earlier that there were other shops belonging to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, which were in vacant position and further they were having substantial dimensions in which the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 could have opened their shops for the sale of photostat copies machine, computer etc. and thus, there was no bona fide need of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Even if the affidavit of the appellant was admitted as an evidence then the case of the appellant would have been fully proved and it would have been clear that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had absolutely no bona fide need and they purposely concealed the existence of certain accommodations, which were erroneously and cleverly shown to be belonging to their mother or their sister. The appellant earlier had absolutely no knowledge about the existence of the other accommodations with the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and further the accommodations in regard to the shop, which existed in the name of the sister of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, were constructed after the decision by the Prescribed Authority. If an inspection would have been done by the Amin Commissioner then everything would have been clear. However, the appellate Court vide order dated 14th January, 2009 held that the question as to whether the additional evidence could be filed or not and the inspection of the accommodations in possession of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by the Amin Commissioner could be done, will be decided at the time of hearing of the appeal itself. According to the appellant, the view of the appellate authority is absolutely erroneous. It was necessary for the appellate authority to have obtained a report in regard to the existence of all the accommodations belonging to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 before hearing and decision of the appeal. If a commission is issued after hearing of the appeal and if it is found that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are in possession of additional accommodations then it would be of no use to the appellant. In such circumstances, the Commission has to be issued by appellate authority before hearing the appeal filed by the appellant. It was also necessary for the admission of the additional evidence before hearing of the appeal. 1 and 2 are in possession of additional accommodations then it would be of no use to the appellant. In such circumstances, the Commission has to be issued by appellate authority before hearing the appeal filed by the appellant. It was also necessary for the admission of the additional evidence before hearing of the appeal. The admission of the additional evidence could not wait till the hearing is done. After hearing was done then the additional evidence, which the appellant wanted to lead as additional evidence, would be of no utility. In such circumstances, it was necessary for the appellate authority to consider as to whether the additional evidence was to be led and admitted before hearing of the appeal. The appellate authority thus erred in not considering the same. It was also necessary for the appellate Court to know the actual accommodations available with the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 after getting a report from the Amin Commissioner before hearing and decision of the appeal. Till this date the appeal has not been heard and decided and it is still pending. 3. Against this background, the appellant preferred Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3324 of 2009 before this High Court, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by its order dated 14th December, 2009. The operative portion of the order of the learned Single is as follows: “I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and have perused the record. As contended by the petitioner that in view of Section 38 of Act No. XII of 1972, the Act will have over-riding effect upon the Transfer of Property Act and Civil Procedure Code. But from the perusal it is clear that it will have over-riding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith, meaning thereby if any provision is inconsistent with Act No. Act No. XIII of 1972, then in that case the Rent Control Act will have over-riding effect. But the contention of the petitioner to this effect that Order 41 Rule 27 will have no effect in a proceeding under Act XIII of cannot be accepted in view of the settled principles of law as discussed in the order impugned. In 2008 (7) SC 136, M/s Eastern Equipment and Sales Ltd. v. Ing. But the contention of the petitioner to this effect that Order 41 Rule 27 will have no effect in a proceeding under Act XIII of cannot be accepted in view of the settled principles of law as discussed in the order impugned. In 2008 (7) SC 136, M/s Eastern Equipment and Sales Ltd. v. Ing. Yash Kumar Khanna, the Apex Court while considering the provisions under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. It has been held that in case some additional evidence is filed before the appellate Court, it has to be decided with the appeal. In 2000 (2) ARC 431, Punjab & Sindh Bank v. VII Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr, this Court has held that in appeal under section 22 of Act No. XIII of 1972, the appellate Court has to follow the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. In such view of the matter, the appellate Court has considered the submissions of the petitioner and has held that the application for additional evidence of the petitioner will be considered at the time of hearing of the appeal. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner relate regarding that in case the application is rejected for additional evidence, in that circumstances, the Apex Court has held that it was not justified and the application ought to have been decided with the appeal. As regards the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding appointment of Commissioner to inspect the premises of the landlord, all the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner relate to when the application was filed at the initial stage. This is not the case of the petitioner that as regards the availability of the premises, if any fact subsequent to filing the application was not in his knowledge, it came after filing the appeal. Further it is to be noted that apart from all the submissions made by the petitioner, this writ petition can be treated to be premature in view of the fact that applications of the petitioner for appointment of the commissioner as well as the additional evidence is still pending for consideration and the appellate Court has passed an order that it will be considered at the time of hearing. Therefore, in my opinion, it can easily be inferred that the writ petition can be treated to be premature without any order impugned. Therefore, in my opinion, it can easily be inferred that the writ petition can be treated to be premature without any order impugned. In view of the aforesaid fact the writ petition being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed. No order is passed as to costs. The appellate Court is directed to decide the appeal filed by the petitioner within a period of six months from the date of production of certified copy of this order before him.” 4. Being aggrieved from the aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge, the appellant has filed the present special appeal stating that unless and until the subsequent events, which could affect the decision of the appeal, were brought on the record first, no arguments could be advanced in an effective manner. Mere reference of the subsequent events without being backed by the evidence on the record would be only a formality. The applications for adducing the additional evidence and for issuing a Commission were based upon Section 34 of the Act, as the Appellate Court was free to take evidence as if it was trying a regular suit. It was incumbent upon the appellate Court to get the subsequent facts established and then hear the appeal. Adducing of the evidence and issuing of the Commission both could not be done at the same time. The applications for adducing the additional evidence and for issuance of the Commission were filed on account of the fact that the new facts came into existence after the decision of the case by the Prescribed Authority on 2nd January, 2008. 5. Mr. S.R. Pandey, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents- landlords, has raised a preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the special appeal. He submitted that the present special appeal is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter in short called as the ‘Rules of the Court’). There is also a office report to the effect that the appeal is not maintainable. In support of his contentions, Mr. He submitted that the present special appeal is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter in short called as the ‘Rules of the Court’). There is also a office report to the effect that the appeal is not maintainable. In support of his contentions, Mr. Pandey has relied upon various judgments Sadarshan Singh Bedi v. Additional District Magistrate/Rent Control & Eviction Officer, Varanasi and others, 1993 (2) AWC 916; Vajara Yojna Seed Farm, Kalyanpur (M/s.) and others v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court-II, U.P., Kanpur and another, 2003 (1) UPLBEC 496 : 2003 (1) ESC 492; Hasib Ahamad v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (6) ADJ 757 and Sheet Gupta v. State of U.P. and others, 2010 (1) ADJ 1 (FB). 6. In Sadarshan Singh Bedi (supra) a Division Bench of this Court has held that the maintainability of the special appeal depends upon the answer to the question as to whether the Rent Control and Eviction Officer acts as a tribunal while he determines the question regarding vacancy of a building under the provisions of the Act. After vivid discussion, it was further held that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has to determine the objections as provided under Rule 8 (2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972. The provisions of determination casts duty upon the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to act judicially after considering the pleadings of the parties and after affording them opportunity to lead evidence and further to pass a reasoned order. From the scheme of the Act and the functions and duties cast upon the Rent Control and Eviction Officer leaves no doubt that he acts as a tribunal, therefore, the special appeal is not maintainable. In Vajara Yojna Seed Farm, Kalyanpur (supra) it was again held by a Division Bench of this Court that as per U.P. High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1962, as amended in 1981, and Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court, special appeal is excluded from the followings: “(i) Judgment of one Judge passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the Superintendence of the Court. (ii) Judgment of one Judge in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. (ii) Judgment of one Judge in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. (iii) Judgment of one Judge made in the exercise of its power of Superintendence. (iv) Judgment of one Judge made in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. (v) Judgment of order of one Judge made in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award of a Tribunal, Court or Statutory Arbitrator made or purported to be more in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in State List or Concurrent List. (vi) Judgment or order of one Judge made in exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award by the Court or any officer or authority made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act.” 7. From Hasib Ahamad (supra) we find a Division Bench of this Court has held that the special appeal having been filed against a judgment of learned Single Judge arising out of a writ petition in which appellate order passed by the Commissioner was challenged which appellate order was passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under an Act is not maintainable under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. In Sheet Gupta (supra) a Full Bench of this Court following the various judgments ultimately held that no special appeal would lie against an order passed in an appeal under paragraph 28 of the U.P. Scheduled Commodities Distribution Order, 2004. 8. In rebuttal to the preliminary objections raised by Mr. Pandey, Mr. S.K. Varma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, has contended before this Court that the British Parliament has passed the High Courts Act or the Charter Act, 1861 on 6th August, 1861. By virtue of Section 16 of such Act Her Majesty was empowered to issue Letters Patent for the establishment of the High Courts in India. The Letters Patent was issued by the Queen on 17th March, 1866, by means of which the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad came into existence. By virtue of Section 16 of such Act Her Majesty was empowered to issue Letters Patent for the establishment of the High Courts in India. The Letters Patent was issued by the Queen on 17th March, 1866, by means of which the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad came into existence. Clause 10 of the Letters Patent issued by the Queen provided for the filing of an appeal against a judgment and order passed by a Single Judge to a Division Bench. Clause 35 of the Letters Patent provided that the competent Legislature could alone amend the provisions of the Letters Patent. The Government of India Act, 1915 and the Government of India Act, 1935 preserved all the provisions of the Letters Patent. In the year 1948, the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 (hereinafter in short called as the ‘Amalgamation Order’) was issued under Section 229 of the Government of India Act, 1935 by the Governor General of India. By virtue of Clause 17(a) of the Amalgamation Order, the Letters Patent ceased to have any effect. However, in view of the provisions of Clauses 7 and 9 of the Amalgamation Order the provisions of the Letters Patent were preserved. After coming into force the Constitution of India, by virtue of its Article 225 the Letters Patent in its original form was preserved. Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court, in fact, is reproduction of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, as has been observed by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in The Notified Area Committee and another v. Sri Ram Singhasan Prasad Kalwar, AIR 1970 All 561 and Jwala Prasad v. Jwala Bank Ltd., AIR 1961 All 381 . The amendments done by the Uttar Pradesh Legislation have also been incorporated in the Rules of the Court. Article 225 of the Constitution of India merely preserves the rules in regard to the functioning of the High Courts as they existed before coming into force of the Constitution. Such Article does not modify or affect Clause 10 of the Letters Patent but it only preserves it. In this regard, reference has been made by Mr. Varma to the judgments in Board of Governors St. Such Article does not modify or affect Clause 10 of the Letters Patent but it only preserves it. In this regard, reference has been made by Mr. Varma to the judgments in Board of Governors St. Thomas School and others v. A.K. George and another, AIR 1984 Cal 208 ; Chunilal Basu and another v. The Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court at Calcutta and others, AIR 1972 Cal 470 and K. Venkata Subbayya v. District Collector, Chittoor and another, AIR 1969 AP 381 . The object of Article 225 of the Constitution is to preserve all the powers possessed by the High Court at the time of commencement of the Constitution of India and also later on amended by any law passed by a competent Legislature. Unfortunately, the State of Uttar Pradesh passed four Amendment Acts i.e. U.P. Act Nos. 14 of 1962, 33 of 1972, 31 of 1975 and 12 of 1981. By the U.P. Act No. 31 of 1975 a special appeal, which could have been filed against the judgment and order passed by a Single Judge against the appellate or revisory jurisdiction of the District Judge and some others, was barred. All these amendments have been reproduced in Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. In the present case, learned Single Judge confirmed the judgment and order passed by the appellate Court. The office has reported that no special appeal lies against the order of the learned Single Judge. Such office report has been given in view of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Hakim Singh v. Shiv Sagar and others, AIR 1973 All 596 . Vajara Yojna Seed Farm, Kalyanpur (supra) also relies upon various judgments of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Seventh Schedule to Article 246 of the Constitution of India has got three lists, which delineate the respective authority of the Central Parliament and the State Legislatures. List I-Union List provides a list of subjects, on which enactments could be done by the Parliament, whereas List II-State List provides a list of subjects, on which legislations could be done by a State Legislature. List-III is the concurrent list. The relevant provisions for the purposes of this case are Item Nos. 77, 78 and 95 of List-I, Item No. 18 of List- II and Item Nos. 11A and 13 of List-III. List-III is the concurrent list. The relevant provisions for the purposes of this case are Item Nos. 77, 78 and 95 of List-I, Item No. 18 of List- II and Item Nos. 11A and 13 of List-III. The constitution of the High Courts and their procedure were included in the term “Constitution and Organization” as is provided under Item No. 78 of List-I. List-II does not speak about constitution and organization of the High Courts. List-III under its Item No. 11-A concerns the administration of justice, constitution and organization of all Courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Such Item No. 11-A of List III will not mean that there could be any legislation passed by the State Legislature concerning the Supreme Court and the High Courts in the garb of ‘administration of justice’. The ‘Constitution and Organisation’ have been included in Item No. 78 of List-I. In Item No. 11-A of List-III it has been mentioned only to emphasise that constitution and organization of the Supreme Court and the High Courts could not be done by any legislation of the State Legislature. Mr. Varma has further submitted that in the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Hakim Singh (supra) subject matter was concerned with the land, on which legislation could be done by the State Legislature. There could be a legislation done by a State Legislature in regard to filing of an appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge. The legislation concerning the deletion of the provision of special appeal is not a legislation concerning “land” and is not covered under Item No. 18 of List-II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention, Mr. Varma has relied upon the minority view of the judgment of Hakim Singh (supra). In Karan Singh and others v. Bhagwan Singh (Dead) by L.Rs. and others, JT 1996 (1) SC 618, it has been observed that the appeal is a continuation of the suit/ original proceeding. In Udai Bhan Singh and others v. The Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad and others, AIR 1974 All 202 (FB), it has been observed by a Full Bench of this Court that an appeal against an order passed by a learned Single Judge exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India partakes the nature of the writ jurisdiction. Since no amendment could be done to Article 226 of the Constitution of India by a State Legislature, the provisions of appeal against an order passed by learned Single Judge can also not be amended. The test is as to whether the State Legislature could pass the original enactments by which the Letters Patent appeal was provided. As pointed out earlier, the Letters Patent appeal came into existence on account of an Act of the British Parliament authorizing the Crown to issue a Letters Patent for the creation of the Allahabad High Court. The appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. This, in effect, means that the special appeal partakes the colour of a writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Full Bench in Udai Bhan Singh (supra) has categorically held that the subject matter of the appeal is covered by Item No. 78 of List-I of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Thus, the amendments made by the State Legislature were ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution. Mr. Varma further submitted that as far as the Supreme Court decisions are concerned, they are either per incurium or were pronounced on the concession made by the counsel and thus, they could not be deemed to be binding decisions under Article 141 of the Constitution. In this regard reference has been made to the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and another v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and another, 1991 (4) SCC 139 ; Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan and another, 1998 (6) SCC 538 and K.I. Pavunny v. Assistant Collector (HQ), Central Excise Collectorate, Chochin, 1997 (3) SCC 721 . In Ram Adhar Singh v. Ramroop Singh and others, AIR 1968 SC 714 , it has been held that Section 5 (2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act does not apply to the proceedings of the special appeal filed under Article 136 of the Constitution. The State of Bombay v. Narottamdas Jethabhai and another, AIR 1951 SC 69 , also does not consider the Item No. 78 of List-I of the Seventh Schedule. It only deals with the jurisdiction of the Bombay Civil Court. The State of Bombay v. Narottamdas Jethabhai and another, AIR 1951 SC 69 , also does not consider the Item No. 78 of List-I of the Seventh Schedule. It only deals with the jurisdiction of the Bombay Civil Court. In view of Item No. 13 of List-III of Seventh Schedule, amendments could be done in the jurisdictions of the High Courts as well as of the District Courts, provided they do not touch the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution. The procedure and limitation provided by the Code of Civil Procedure and the Limitation Act have got nothing to do with the writ jurisdiction. There could be an enactment done by the State Legislature providing the jurisdiction and procedure of Courts if the same are governed by the Civil Procedure Code. Law of Limitation can also be legislated under Item No. 13 of List-III of Seventh Schedule. They do not concern the constitution and organization of the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The Union of India v. The Mohindra Supply Co., AIR 1962 SC 256 merely considers as to whether Section 39 (2) of the Arbitration Act bars the filing of an appeal and that in effect will also apply to the filing of the special appeal. This proposition of law was not accepted in Vinita M. Khanolkar v. Pragna M. Pai and others, 1998 (1) SCC 500 where it has been held that the Letters Patent appeal stands on a different footing even if there is a bar in the filing of an appeal under some other statute. It has further been held that in order to bar a Letters Patent appeal there has to be an amendment made by a competent Legislature in regard to curtailment of special appeal. Further, now the High Court as well as the Supreme Court have held that even though no appeal lay against an order discharging the accused under the Contempt of Courts Act but under the Letters Patent Act an appeal would lie. Mr. Varma further said that the judgments of Sadarshan Singh Bedi (supra) and Sheet Gupta (supra) do not deal with the vires of the amendments made by the State Legislature. Mr. Varma further said that the judgments of Sadarshan Singh Bedi (supra) and Sheet Gupta (supra) do not deal with the vires of the amendments made by the State Legislature. Sadarshan Singh Bedi (supra) is to the effect that the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is an order passed by the tribunal and thus, in view of the amended Letters Patent no appeal would lie, whereas Sheet Gupta (supra) is to the effect that the appeal heard by the Commissioner in pursuance of an order issued under the Essential Commodities Act would be in fact a hearing done by an appellate authority under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act and thus, in view of the amended Letters Patent provision no appeal would lie. Therefore, both these judgments do not in any manner deal with the vires of the amendments done by the State Legislature. 9. According to us, the Rules of the Court came into force in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 225 of the Constitution of India and all other powers enabling it in that behalf. Provision of special appeal was inserted under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court by the notification dated 6th November, 1963 published in the U.P. Gazette, Part II, dated 5th December, 1964. Once such Rule has become part and parcel of the Rules of Court on the basis of the power conferred upon the High Court under Article 225 of the Constitution, the question of reference, if any, by the State for the purpose of incorporation is an academic argument. A Full Bench of this High Court in The Notified Area Committee (supra) has already held that Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court is reproduction of Clause-10 of the Letters Patent. This Court, sitting in the Division Bench, cannot take any contrary view in connection thereto after a period of 40 years. Moreover, the Court of special appeal is not a forum for adjudication whether the procedure of intra Court appeal is under the special appeal alone or the remedy under the Letters Patent is yet open. It is to be remembered that the appellant himself has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of special appeal for the purpose of adjudication of the matter. It is to be remembered that the appellant himself has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of special appeal for the purpose of adjudication of the matter. Vires of the U.P. High Court (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1972 cannot be challenged for the first time before the Court of appeal hearing the special appeal and after long lapse of time and having support of several Full Bench and Division Bench judgments of this High Court. Such Act, 1972 was amended in the year 1981. Hence, an argument only for the sake of argument cannot be allowed to continue. The Court is not meant for the academic discussion only. Moreover, the present proceeding, from which the writ petition arose, is arising out of a proceeding of appeal under Section 22 of the Act i.e. U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The appellant-petitioner is a tenant. Learned Single Judge in its judgment has observed that not only there is no merit in the writ petition but also it is premature since the applications of the appellant for appointment of Commissioner as well as for adducing the additional evidence are still pending for consideration and the appellate Court has passed an order that it will be considered at the time of hearing, thereby the writ petition was dismissed as premature. The whole purpose of making this appeal appears to be dilatory tactics to frustrate the purpose of eviction, which is a usual defence on the part of the tenants, who are in defaulting mode. 10. Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed with a token cost of Rs.1020/- to indicate displeasure of the Court about wastage of time on academic discussion on the settled principles of law. Hon’ble Ashok Srivastava, J.—I agree. ————