JUDGMENT Hon'ble KATJU, J.— Civil Appeal Nos. 9321-9322 of 2010 1. Leave granted. 2. These appeals have been filed against the impugned judgments of the Orissa High Court dated 24.9.2008 in LPA No.7 of 2008 and dated 25.10.2008 in LPA No.8 of 2008. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. The facts have been mentioned in the impugned judgment of the High Court and hence we are not repeating the same here. 5. The short question in the case is whether a Letters Patent Appeal (for short 'LPA’) is maintainable before the Division Bench against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court. Dated 6.8.2008. Since there was conflict of opinion between different Division Benches of the High Court on the point whether the LPA was maintainable in view of the amendment of Sec. 100A CPC the Full Bench was constituted, and by the impugned judgment it was held that the LPA was not maintainable in view of Section 100-A CPC. 6. It may be mentioned that the proceedings arose out of an interim order dated 9.9.2005 passed by the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court No.III, Bhubaneswar in Civil Suit No.498 of 2004. The Civil Suit is still pending, but against the aforesaid interim order dated 9.9.2005 a first appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 being FAO No.386 of 2007 was filed before a learned Single Judge of the High Court who decided it on 6.8.2008. Against the judgment of this learned Single Judge dated 6.8.2008 the LPA was filed. It has been held to be not maintainable by the impugned judgment. 7. Before deciding the question involved in this case we may refer to the relevant provisions in the C.P.C. 8. Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called `the Code’) was inserted by Amendment Act 104 of 1976. It has been held to be not maintainable by the impugned judgment. 7. Before deciding the question involved in this case we may refer to the relevant provisions in the C.P.C. 8. Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called `the Code’) was inserted by Amendment Act 104 of 1976. The said Section initially read as follows: Section 100- A : No further appeal in certain cases : Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of such single Judge in such appeal or from any decree passed in such appeal.” The said Section was amended by Amendment Act 46 of 1999 as follows: Section 100- A : No further appeal in certain cases : Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, (a) Where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided. (b) Where any writ, direction or order is issued or made on an application under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution, by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of such single Judge.” This amendment was however not given effect to. Again Section 100-A of the Code was amended by Act 22 of 2002 and the amended Section reads as follows:- Section 100- A : No further appeal in certain cases : Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original, or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such single Judge.” 9. The Full Bench by the impugned judgment has held that after the introduction of Section 100-A with effect from 1.7.2002, no Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against the judgment or order passed by a learned Single Judge in an appeal. The Full Bench has held that the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in Birat Chandra Dagra vs. Taurian Exim Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (vide page 5) 2006(11) OLR 344 does not lay down the good law while the decision of Division Bench in V.N.N. Panicker vs. Narayan Patil & Anr. 2006(2) OLR 349 lays down the correct law. The Full Bench has further held that after the amendment of Section 100-A w.e.f. 1.7.2002 no LPA shall lie against the order or judgment passed by a learned Single Judge even in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. 10. It has been held in a catena of decisions of this Court that an appeal is a creature of a statute and not an inherent right vide Garikapati Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry & Ors. AIR 1957 SC 540 . This right of appeal can be taken away or curtailed by a subsequent enactment vide in Kamal Kumar Dutta & Ors. vs. Ruby General Hospital & Ors. 2006 (7) SCC 613 . 11. The validity of Section 100-A C.P.C. has been upheld by the decision of this Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu vs. Union of India AIR 2003 SC 189 = RLW 2007(3) SC 2531. 12. The Full Benches of the Andhra Pradesh High Court vide Gandla Pannala Bhulaxmi vs. Managing Director, APSRTC & Anr. AIR 2003 AP 458 , the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Laxminarayan vs. Shivlal Gujar & Ors. AIR 2003 MP 49 , and of Kerala High Court in Kesava Pillai Sreedharan Pillai vs. State of Kerala & Ors. AIR 2004 Ker 111 have held that after the amendment of Section 100-A in 2002 no litigant can have a substantive right for a further appeal against the judgment or order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court passed in an appeal. We respectfully agree with the aforesaid decisions. 13. In Kamala Devi vs. Khushal Kanwar & Anr. AIR 2007 SC 663 , this Court held that only an LPA filed prior to coming into force of the Amendment Act would be maintainable. 14. We respectfully agree with the aforesaid decisions. 13. In Kamala Devi vs. Khushal Kanwar & Anr. AIR 2007 SC 663 , this Court held that only an LPA filed prior to coming into force of the Amendment Act would be maintainable. 14. In the present case the LPA was filed after 2002 and hence in our opinion they are not maintainable. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that Section 100-A does not bar a LPA against a judgment of the learned Single Judge who had decided an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 against an interlocutory order of the District Judge. He submitted that Section 100-A after its amendment in 2002 requires that the judgment of learned Single Judge should be a judgment and decree of such Single Judge. He further submitted that in the present case the learned Single Judge was hearing an appeal against an interlocutory order of the learned Additional District Judge and hence when the learned Single Judge decided the appeal he was not passing any decree because the suit was still pending. 16. Learned counsel submitted that there is a difference in the language of Section 100A as initially inserted in 1976, and the language of the provision as substituted in 2002. While the former barred an L.P.A. even against a judgment, decision or order of a learned single Judge which was not a decree, the latter bars only a judgment which is also a decree. Since the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 6.8.2008 was not a decree he submitted that the L.P.A. against that judgment was not barred. 17. While at first glance this argument may appear plausible but when we go deeper into it, we will realize that it has no merit. 18. It would be strange to hold that while two appeals will be maintainable against interlocutory orders of a District Judge, only one appeal will be maintainable against a final judgment of the District Judge. 19. It may be noted that there seems to be some apparent contradiction in Section 100-A as amended in 2002. 18. It would be strange to hold that while two appeals will be maintainable against interlocutory orders of a District Judge, only one appeal will be maintainable against a final judgment of the District Judge. 19. It may be noted that there seems to be some apparent contradiction in Section 100-A as amended in 2002. While in one part of Section 100-A it is stated “where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court”, in the following part it is stated “no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge”. Thus while one part of Section 100-A refers to an order, which to our mind would include even an interlocutory order, the later part of the Section mentions judgment and decree. 20. To resolve this conflict we have to adopt a purposive interpretation. The whole purpose of introducing Section 100-A was to reduce the number of appeals as the public in India was being harassed by the numerous appeals provided in the statute. If we look at the matter from that angle it will immediately become apparent that the LPA in question was not maintainable because if it is held to be maintainable then the result will be that against an interlocutory order of the District Judge there may be two appeals, first to the learned Single Judge and then to the Division Bench of the High Court, but against a final judgment of the District Judge there can be only one appeal. This in our opinion would be strange, and against the very purpose of object of Section 100-A, that is to curtail the number of appeals. 21. It is well settled that the modern method of interpretation is purposive vide Directorate of Enforcement vs. Deepak Mahajan & Anr. (1994) 3 SCC 440 , Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. Ashok Vishnu Kate & Ors. (1995) 6 JT 625 (vide page 631) and Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation vs. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation (1985) 4 SCC 71 . 22. We are of the opinion that the apparent contradiction in Section 100A as amended in 2002 was only due to bad drafting, and not much can be made out of it once we understand the purpose of Section 100A. 23. 22. We are of the opinion that the apparent contradiction in Section 100A as amended in 2002 was only due to bad drafting, and not much can be made out of it once we understand the purpose of Section 100A. 23. For the reasons given above we are of the opinion that the Full Bench of the High Court has taken a correct view. Thus there is no force in these appeals, which are accordingly dismissed. No costs. Civil Appeal Nos. 9323-9324 of 2010 24. Leave granted. 25. These appeals have been filed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 6.8.2008 in first appeal from order no.386 of 2007 of the Orissa High Court. The appeal before the learned Single Judge arose out of an interlocutory order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court-III in a suit which is still pending. 26. In our opinion, though the judgment of the learned Single Judge is a final judgment, it is in another sense an interlocutory order as it is well settled that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. Since the original order of the learned Additional District Judge was an interlocutory order, hence the appeal against that order and the judgment of learned Single Judge in that sense was also interlocutory. 27. It is well settled that this Court does not ordinarily interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution with interlocutory orders. 28. For the reasons given above, we dismiss these appeals without going into the merits of the case. However, we direct the learned Additional District Judge to decide the suit expeditiously. No costs. [Citation 2011(2) RLW 1061 (Raj.)] (Rajasthan High Court) Jaipur Bench ICICI Prudential L.I.C. Ltd. Vs. State of Raj. (Bhandari, J.) HON'BLE M.N. BHANDARI, J. ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Co. Ltd. Versus State of Rajasthan & Ors. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1592 of 2011, decided on 07.02.2011 Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, Sec. 22(c)(d)(e) and Sec. 22(8) — Jurisdiction of Permanent Lok Adalat — Not extending benefit of insurance policy — Absence of consent of the petitioner to give jurisdiction to permanent Lok Adalat — Permanent Lok Adalat issued notice to the petitioner — Held — No consent is required — Lok Adalat will first take up the matter for conciliation — If it is not carried out Lok Adalat will proceed in the matter as per law. (Para ) Writ petition dismissed. fof/kd lsok izkf/kdj.k vf/kfu;e] 1987] /kkjk 22¼x½¼?k½¼+M+½ ,oa /kkjk 22 ¼8½ & LFkk;h yksd vnkyr dh vf/kdkfjrk & chek ikWfylh dk ifjykHk ugha nsuk & LFkk;h yksd vnkyr dh vf/kdkfjrk nsus ds fy, izkFkhZ dh lgefr dk vHkko & LFkk;h yksd vnkyr us izkFkhZ dks uksfVl tkjh fd;k & vfHkfu/kkZfjr & lgefr dh vko';drk ugha & loZizFke yksd vnkyr fopkjkFkZ ysxh & ;fn bldk dk;kZUo;u ugha fd;k tkrk gS rks bl ekeys esa yksd vnkyr fu;ekuqlkj dk;Zokgh djsxhA ¼in la- ½ ;kfpdk [kkfjt dhA Case Law Referred (Para No.) United India Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Ajay Sinha & Anr. ( (2008) 7 SCC 454 ) 4 Popular Carriers vs. the Chairman Permanent Lok Adalat (S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.1433/2006, decided on 10.04.2008) 4 Advocates Appeared Prateek Kasliwal, for Petitioner Hon'ble BHANDARI, J.—By this writ petition, a challenge has been made to the order dated 30.11.2010. 2. It is a case where Permanent Lok Adalat was approached by the respondents when they were not extended the benefit of insurance policy. The insurance policy was issued by the petitioner in favour of the respondent's husband. Regular premium was paid and during the period of insurance, respondent's husband died on account of heart attack. When the claim made by the respondent was not settled, rather vide the order dated 29.09.2009, her claim was rejected, she approached Permanent Lok Adalat. 3. Permanent Lok Aadalat issued notice to the petitioner herein. The petitioner thereupon made an application raising objection regarding jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Aadalat. It was stated that no agreement or consent exists to give jurisdiction to Permanent Lok Aadalat. It was narrated that without consent of the petitioner, Permanent Lok Aadalat cannot proceed in the matter. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that as per the provisions of Section 22(c), (d) and (e) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (for short “the Act of 1987”) the Permanent Lok Adalat cannot proceed in the matter without consent of the parties. Since the petitioner had not given consent to proceed in the matter, the rejection of the application is per se illegal. He has supported his arguments by referring judgement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of United India Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Ajay Sinha & Anr. Since the petitioner had not given consent to proceed in the matter, the rejection of the application is per se illegal. He has supported his arguments by referring judgement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of United India Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Ajay Sinha & Anr. reported in (2008) 7 SCC 454 and also the judgement of this Court in the case of Popular Carriers vs. the Chairman Permanent Lok Adalat (S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.1433/2006) decided on 10.04.2008. 5. It is further submitted that even petitioner is not ready and give consent for settlement of dispute between the parties rather petitioner is not inclined to participate for conciliation of the dispute. Accordingly, a challenge on the aforesaid ground has been made. 6. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for petitioner and scanned the matter carefully. 7. Perusal of the order reveals that after service of notice, petitioner made an application raising objection of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat. It was precisely on the ground that a consent has not been given to the Permanent Lok Adalat to proceed in the matter. The application was dismissed after holding that no such consent is required. As per the provisions of the Act of 1987, what is required is to first make an endeavour to amicably settle the matter and if agreement is arrived at between the parties, to pass order accordingly. In case of failure to settle, to decide the dispute. In the instant case, learned counsel for petitioner candidly made a statement that petitioner is not inclined even to participate for conciliation of dispute. This is in absence of his consent. According to him, consent is required even to take up the matter for conciliation. 8. I have considered the aforesaid submissions in the light of the provisions referred to above. It would be gainful to quote provisions of Section 22C, D and E of the Act of 1987 for ready reference: “22C. This is in absence of his consent. According to him, consent is required even to take up the matter for conciliation. 8. I have considered the aforesaid submissions in the light of the provisions referred to above. It would be gainful to quote provisions of Section 22C, D and E of the Act of 1987 for ready reference: “22C. Cognizance of cases by Permanent Lok Adalat - (1) Any party to adispute may, before the dispute is brought before any court, make an application to the Permanent Lok Adalat for the settlement of dispute: Provided that the Permanent Lok Adalat shall not have jurisdiction in respect of any matter relating to an offence not compoundable under any law: Provided further that the Permanent Lok Adalat shall not have jurisdiction in the matter where the value of the property in dispute exceeds ten lakh rupees: Provided also that the Central Government, may, by notification, increase the limit of ten lakh rupees specified in the second proviso in consultation with the Central Authority. (2) After an application is made under sub-section (1) to the Permanent Lok Adalat, no party to that application shall invoke jurisdiction of any court in the same dispute. (3) Where an application is made to a Permanent Lok Adalat under sub-section (1), it-- (a) shall direct each party to the application to file before it a written statement, stating therein the facts and nature of dispute under the application, points or issues in such dispute and grounds relied in support of, or in opposition to, such points or issues, as the case may be, and such party may supplement such statement with any document and other evidence which such party deems appropriate in proof of such facts and grounds and shall send a copy of such statement together with a copy of such document and other evidence, if any, to each of the parties to the application; (b) may require any party to the application to file additional statement before it at any stage of the conciliation proceedings; (c) shall communicate any document or statement received by it from any party to the application to the other party, to enable such other party to present reply thereto. (4) When statement, additional statement and reply, if any, have been filed under sub-section (3), to the satisfaction of the Permanent Lok Adalat, it shall conduct conciliation proceedings between the parties to the application in such manner as it thinks appropriate taking into account the circumstances of the dispute. (5) The Permanent Lok Adalat shall, during conduct of conciliation proceedings under sub-section (4), assist the parties in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of the dispute in an independent and impartial manner. (6) It shall be the duty of every party to the application to cooperate in good faith with the Permanent Lok Adalat in conciliation of the dispute relating to the application and to comply with the direction of the Permanent Lok Adalat to produce evidence and other related documents before it. (7) When a Permanent Lok Adalat, in the aforesaid conciliation proceedings, is of opinion that there exist elements of settlement in such proceedings which may be acceptable to the parties, it may formulate the terms of a possible settlement of the dispute and give to the parties concerned for their observations and in case the parties reach at an agreement on the settlement of the dispute, they shall sign the settlement agreement and the Permanent Lok Adalat shall pass an award in terms thereof and furnish a copy of the same to each of the parties concerned. (8) Where the parties fail to reach at an agreement under sub-section (7), the Permanent Lok Adalat shall, if the dispute does not relate to any offence, decide the dispute. 22-D. Procedure of Permanent Lok Adalat - The Permanent Lok Adalat shall, while conducting conciliation proceedings or deciding a dispute on merit under this Act, be guided by the principles of natural justice, objectivity, fair play, equity and other principles of justice, and shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(5 of 1908) and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872(1 of 1872). 22-E. Award of Permanent Lok Adalat to be final - (1) Every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act made either on merit or in terms of a settlement agreement shall be final and binding on all the parties thereto and on persons claiming under them. (2) Every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court. (2) Every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court. (3) The award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be by a majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat. (4) Every award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. (5) The Permanent Lok Adalat may transmit any award made by it to a civil court having local jurisdiction and such civil court shall execute the order as if it were a decree made by that court.]” 9. Perusal of the provisions quoted above shows that Permanent Lok Adalat will first try to conciliate the matter and if any agreement is arrived at between the parties, to pass the order accordingly. In case, no agreement is arrived at then to adjudicate the matter in view of provision of Section 22C(8). There is no condition to seek consent of the parties for conciliation and in case of failure of settlement, to decide the matter. In fact proceedings for conciliation starts after getting written statement of other party. In this case, petitioner did not file written statement, but maintained application, questioning the jurisdiction of the Court and now learned counsel for petitioner refused to participate even in the conciliation proceedings. It is mainly on the ground that without consent of the parties, even conciliation proceedings cannot be undertaken. The argument raised aforesaid cannot be accepted as is not coming out from provisions of the Act of 1987. 10. So far as the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union India Insurance Company Ltd. (Supra) is concerned, it is held that Permanent Lok Adalat should exercise its power with due care and caution. It must not give an impression to any of the disputants that it, from very beginning has an adjudicatory role to play in relation to its jurisdiction. Para 41 of the said judgment has been referred by learned counsel for petitioner, thus is quoted hereunder: “41.We must guard against construction of a statute which would confer such a wide power in the Permanent Lok Adalat having regard to sub-section (8) of Section 22-C of the Act. The Permanent Lok Adalat must at the outset formulate the questions. Para 41 of the said judgment has been referred by learned counsel for petitioner, thus is quoted hereunder: “41.We must guard against construction of a statute which would confer such a wide power in the Permanent Lok Adalat having regard to sub-section (8) of Section 22-C of the Act. The Permanent Lok Adalat must at the outset formulate the questions. We, however, do not intend to lay down a law, as at present advised, that Permanent Lok Adalat would refuse to exercise its jurisdiction to entertain such cases but emphasis that it must exercise its power with due care and caution. It must not give an impression to any of the disputants that it, from very beginning has an adjudicatory role to play in relation to its jurisdiction without going into the statutory provisions and restrictions imposed thereunder.” 11. If the case in hand is looked into, then Permanent Lok Adalat has not shown its inclination to adjudicate the matter. In fact, the order under challenge was passed when petitioner made an application challenging the jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat. This is precisely in absence of consent of the petitioner. The Court dealt with the issue accordingly and referring to the provisions, came to the conclusion that no consent is required. On Dismissal of the application now Permanent Lok Adalata will proceed in the matter as per law. It will first take up the matter for conciliation so that if parties arrived at a compromise, the order can be passed accordingly. Though, from the statement of learned counsel for petitioner, it is clearly coming out that petitioner is not inclined to participate in the conciliation proceedings. The aforesaid attitude of the petitioner is not in conformity to the provision of the Act of 1987 rather such an attitude of the petitioner has to be deprecated. In view of the aforesaid, judgment referred to above has no application. 12. Looking to the provisions of the Act of 1987, I do not find any error in the impugned order. 13. So far as the judgment in the case of Popular Carriers (Supra) is concerned, para 6 of the aforesaid judgment provides that Permanent Lok Adalat should first undertake the process for amicable settlement of dispute. There cannot be a dispute on the aforesaid preposition. 13. So far as the judgment in the case of Popular Carriers (Supra) is concerned, para 6 of the aforesaid judgment provides that Permanent Lok Adalat should first undertake the process for amicable settlement of dispute. There cannot be a dispute on the aforesaid preposition. In fact, it is coming out from bare perusal of Section 22C of the Act of 1987 itself. The difficulty is that petitioner is not even inclined to participate in the conciliation proceedings. If the provisions of Section 22C is looked into, the conciliation proceedings are to be started after getting written statement of the party. Petitioner has not even submitted his written statement. In the light of aforesaid, though I agree with the preposition laid down by the Coordinate Bench in the case of Popular Carriers but it has no application in the facts of this case. Challenge to the impugned order is nothing but gross abuse of the process. The writ petition is dismissed, accordingly in limini.