JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, ACJ.—This special appeal is arising out of an order dated 15th February, 2010 passed by a learned Single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 29615 of 2009, whereby he dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant-writ petitioner holding that no case for grant of any discretionary relief has been made out. 2. Since in the present case, the question of law is involved, the parties have agreed to advance their arguments irrespective of filing their affidavits, even at the admission stage. 3. The facts of this case, in brief, are that the appellant-writ petitioner was appointed as a Helper in the B.R.D. Medical College, Gorakhpur on 21st December, 1985 and he worked as such till 15th July, 1991. His service was orally terminated by the Principal, B.R.D. Medical College, Gorakhpur on 16th July, 1991. After lapse of about 14 years, on 2nd February, 2005, the appellant-writ petitioner made an application to the Principal for reinstating him in service by saying that the persons junior to him are still working in the College and he had been terminated without assigning any reason. The appellant-writ petitioner again sent an application on 28th April, 2005 to the Principal for his reinstatement. When the request of the appellant-writ petitioner was not considered by the Principal, he again made an application on 27th May, 2005. Thereafter the appellant-writ petitioner again made applications to the Principal for his reinstatement on 10th July, 2007 and 25th August, 2007 saying that since his juniors are continuing in service, he may also be allowed to work. 4. When the prayer of the appellant-writ petitioner for his reinstatement in service was not considered by respondent No. 2, he filed an application on 6th November, 2007 before respondent No. 1-The Regional Conciliation Officer (Labour Court Department) under Section 2-A of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, to initiate the conciliation proceedings and in case of failure of the same, the dispute should be referred to the competent Court for adjudication. Besides the said prayer, the appellant-writ petitioner also made a prayer that the delay in filing the application for initiation of conciliation proceedings may be condoned. 5. Respondent No. 1 issued notices to the parties including respondent No. 2 for considering the question of delay in filing the application for initiation of conciliation proceedings. Besides the said prayer, the appellant-writ petitioner also made a prayer that the delay in filing the application for initiation of conciliation proceedings may be condoned. 5. Respondent No. 1 issued notices to the parties including respondent No. 2 for considering the question of delay in filing the application for initiation of conciliation proceedings. Although on 10th December, 2007, a representative of respondent No. 2 appeared before respondent No. 1 without any authority, but respondent No. 2 did not file any written statement or objection against the delay in making the application for initiation of conciliation proceedings by the appellant-writ petitioner. Although thereafter several dates were fixed in the matter but respondent No. 2 did not appear in the matter. The respondent No. 1 heard the appellant-writ petitioner and perused the entire documents filed by him and rejected the application of the appellant-writ petitioner filed under Section 2-A of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, vide order dated 26th February, 2008. 6. The contention of the appellant-writ petitioner is that the order dated 26th February, 2008 was never served upon him and when ultimately he approached respondent No. 1, he did not give him any order and then he approached to a Office Clerk, who informed him that his application was rejected on 26th February, 2008. The appellant-writ petitioner further contends that he received his entire file from his representative in the second week of October, 2008 and thereafter, he came to the learned Counsel, who was then suffering from various ailments, and as such it is only in the second week of January, 2009, the writ petition was prepared and filed in the month of March, 2009. He contends that there is no provision in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules providing any limitation for filing an application before respondent No. 1 to initiate the conciliation proceedings to make reference of the Industrial Dispute to competent Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. He further contends that the industrial dispute cannot be dismissed on the ground of alleged delay. 7. However, the writ petition was filed in the month of March, 2009 challenging the order dated 26th February, 2008 passed by the Regional Conciliation Officer. Delay in filing the writ petition had also been explained. 8. He further contends that the industrial dispute cannot be dismissed on the ground of alleged delay. 7. However, the writ petition was filed in the month of March, 2009 challenging the order dated 26th February, 2008 passed by the Regional Conciliation Officer. Delay in filing the writ petition had also been explained. 8. The order of the learned Single Judge dated 15th February, 2010, is as follows: “Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, I am not inclined to interfere in the present writ petition which is directed against the order dated 26.2.2008 passed by the Conciliation Officer. By the impugned order, the Conciliation Officer has refused to permit the petitioner to raise industrial dispute after sixteen years. The learned counsel for the petitioner has place reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in Shahaji v. Executive Engineer, P.W.D., 2007 (115) FLR 675 (SC). The said decision has no application to the facts of the present case. No case for grant of any discretionary relief has been made out. The writ petition is dismissed summarily.” 9. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner made his submission on the strength of various judgments. However, first of all, he wanted to explain the ratio of the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in Shahaji (supra). We find from the ratio of the judgment that the Supreme Court relied upon its earlier judgment in Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-op. Marketing-cum-Processing Society Ltd., 1999 (82) FLR 137 (SC). The moot point of referring this judgment on the part of the appellant-writ petitioner is that no industrial dispute can be rejected on account of delay. In the case of Shahaji (supra), we find that a question was there before the concerned Labour Court whether it can answer the reference in negative merely on the ground that it had made by the appropriate Government after a period of several years. Against this background, the Court factually held that there was no ground of delay urged by the Management. Moreover, even if there was delay in making the reference to the Labour Court, if it came to the conclusion that the termination was illegal, it could have suitably moulded the relief to be granted to the workman in view of the delay. In such cases, the award of back wages may either be not permitted, or curtailed. Moreover, even if there was delay in making the reference to the Labour Court, if it came to the conclusion that the termination was illegal, it could have suitably moulded the relief to be granted to the workman in view of the delay. In such cases, the award of back wages may either be not permitted, or curtailed. In Ajaib Singh (supra), the fact remains that the service of the workman was terminated on 16th of July, 1974 and he had issued notice of demand only on 8th of December, 1981 after about seven years and consulted with the Management at the belated stage when it might have been difficult for the employer to prove the guilt of the workman. However, there was no dispute before the Court that no plea regarding delay appears to have been taken by the Management before the Labour Court. It is also acknowledged that Article 137 of the Limitation Act has not been specifically made applicable to the proceedings under the Act seeking reference of industrial disputes to the Labour Court. He has further relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P. State Electricity Board and others, 2001 (90) FLR 754, to establish before this Court that the Government’s power to refer an industrial dispute for adjudication has thus one limitation of time and that is, it can be done only so long as the dispute exists. In other words, the period envisaged by the enduring expression “at any time” under Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 similar to Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 terminates with the eclipse of the industrial dispute. It, therefore, means that if the dispute existed on the day when the reference was made by the Government, it is idle to ascertain the number of years, which elapsed since the commencement of the dispute to determine whether the delay would have extinguished the power of the Government to make the reference. On a different part, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner, further relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh and another v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1989 SC 1565 , to establish before the Court that the reference of industrial disputes under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is an administrative function of the Government. It is neither judicial, nor quasi judicial in nature. Lastly, he relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, 2010 (124) FLR 700 , to establish that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations. The High Courts are bound to interpret them keeping in view the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution and provisions contained therein. 10. Against this background, learned Standing Counsel, appearing for the respondents has contended before us that factually the matter was presented before the Conciliation Officer. Neither the Conciliation Officer has forwarded to the State Government nor the State Government made any reference to the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court. Therefore, whether the power of reference by the State Government is administrative, or quasi judicial, or judicial in nature, is not a matter of adjudication in the present proceeding. Moreover, the dispute is with regard to the termination of service 16 years back. Relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and others, AIR 2000 SC 839 , he has submitted that law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its power under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive the matters, which had since been stalled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. No rational basis can be available to exercise the powers by the Government in the case after lapse of about seven years of order dismissing one from service. At the time reference was made, no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute, which is stale could not be the subject matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act. There was no dispute pending factually therein when the reference, in question, was made. The only ground advanced was that two other employees, who had been dismissed from service, were reinstated. When the matter has become final, it appears to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act. There was no dispute pending factually therein when the reference, in question, was made. The only ground advanced was that two other employees, who had been dismissed from service, were reinstated. Under what circumstances, they were dismissed and subsequently, reinstated in service, is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised for industrial dispute was ex-facie bad and incompetent. Whenever a workman raises some dispute, it does not become industrial dispute and appropriate Government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming as industrial dispute. The Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under Section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. 11. He further cited a three Judges’ Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 1217 , to establish that it is true that there is no limitation prescribed for reference of disputes to an Industrial Tribunal; even so it is only reasonable that disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed, particularly so when disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale. He further relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ministry of Textiles v. Murari Lal Gupta and another, (2008) 5 SCC 759, to establish that when a writ petition has been filed after about five years in connection with an industrial dispute, the High Court directed for reconsideration of the matter and did not, in fact, direct reference to be made. Except in certain unexceptional cases, the Court should not direct reference to be made. It is within the domain of the Government to decide as to in which case reference is to be made and in which case reference is not to be made. He also distinguished Shahaji (supra) taking the same point as mentioned above. In that case, delay was on the part of the State in making the reference unlike the present case and it was not in dispute therein that no plea regarding delay appears to have been taken by the Management before the Labour Court and as such no issue was framed before it. 12. In that case, delay was on the part of the State in making the reference unlike the present case and it was not in dispute therein that no plea regarding delay appears to have been taken by the Management before the Labour Court and as such no issue was framed before it. 12. Upon hearing the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, we are of the view that the stage of dispute of this matter and stages of all other referred matters are different. In the instant case, question of delay arose only before the Conciliation Officer, who is supposed to mediate, promote the settlement of industrial disputes on the basis of documents relevant for the purpose, therefore, the role of the Conciliation Officer cannot be held to be mere administrative one or like post office. He has to apply his mind judiciously to resolve the disputes, failing which he will refer the matter to the State Government for the purpose of making reference to the Labour Court or Tribunal. Therefore, the Conciliation Officer is not powerless to hold whether any dispute is existing or apprehended to recommend to the State Government, to forward the same to the Labour Court or Tribunal. It is true to say that the State Government might be acting administratively but not in judicial or quasi judicial manner, but the Conciliation Officer is appointed by the State Government for such purpose, therefore, in recommending the matter, the opinion of the Conciliation Officer plays a vital role. 13. Now it is required to be seen whether the Conciliation Officer acted only on the ground of delay or laches. We find that the Conciliation Officer held that no recommendable or referable dispute exists to forward to the State Government for recommending the same to the Labour Court or Tribunal. Admittedly, the dispute arose long 16 years back and various grounds were taken by the appellant-writ petitioner to avoid the laches, but no sincere effort has been seen to be made by him at any point of time to raise the dispute. The only ground taken by the appellant-writ petitioner that the services of his junior workmen were regularised, but he was terminated. What was the cause of such termination and whether the word ‘termination’ can be strictly applicable in respect of service of the appellant-writ petitioner before regularisation, no fact was available before the Conciliation Officer. The only ground taken by the appellant-writ petitioner that the services of his junior workmen were regularised, but he was terminated. What was the cause of such termination and whether the word ‘termination’ can be strictly applicable in respect of service of the appellant-writ petitioner before regularisation, no fact was available before the Conciliation Officer. No supporting document was available to the Conciliation Officer to remove his doubt about the existing or apprehended industrial dispute. Therefore, factually the case of the appellant-writ petitioner is nearer to the judgment of The Nedungadi Bank Ltd. (supra) where only grievance on fact was that two other employees, who had been dismissed from service, were reinstated, therefore, he has a case for reference of industrial dispute. The Supreme Court in that judgment clearly indicated that such type of ground cannot be held to be a dispute. Moreover, this case stands on a much better factual footing because the Conciliation Officer himself decided that there is no referable dispute unlike the referred case. 14. Now the question before us is whether question of delay or laches will prevail upon the question of existence of dispute or not. According to us, if there is no dispute arose as per the Conciliation Officer, no question of delayed dispute, if any, arose. 15. Having cumulative effect of the discussion, we cannot hold and say that the learned Single Judge committed any mistake in dismissing the writ petition. Hence, the special appeal stands dismissed, however, without imposing any cost. Hon’ble Shabihul Hasnain, J.—I agree. ————