Judgment : V. C. Daga, J. 1. This petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the nomination of the councillors as members of the Standing Committee of Akola Municipal Corporation, Akola ("The Corporation" for short) and seeking further declaration that the act of respondent No. 3 in declaring them as nominated is void and illegal and in breach of the provisions of section 31A of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act ("the Act" for short). It is further prayed that the minutes of meeting dated 26-2-2010 be declared as fabricated as such bad and illegal with further declaration that the business transacted in the meeting itself stood vitiated in the eye of law. The foundation of challenge in the petition is the alleged absence of consultation with the Leader of the House and Leader of the Opposition and the leader of such party or group as contemplated under subclause (2) of section 31A of the Act. Factual Matrix : 2. The factual matrix on which the petition is based is that Akola Municipal Corporation was constituted in the elections held in the year 2007. The first meeting of the Corporation was convened and Standing Committee of 16 members was constituted under section 20 of the Act. The Corporation consists of 71 elected councillors and in addition to them 5 are nominated councillors. In the meeting of general body of the Corporation held on 26-2-2010, 8 members were nominated on the Standing Committee since 8 members of the previous Standing Committee were due to retire on 1-3-2010. 3. In the above meeting respondent No. 3, the Mayor of the Municipal Corporation, Akola declared respondents No. 4 to 7 as members nominated on the Standing Committee. According to the petitioners, the Mayor had no right to nominate the members of the Standing Committee in the absence of consultation as contemplated under sub-clause (2) of section 31A of the Act. 4. Petitioner No. 1 claims to be a group leader of Akola Vikas Aghadi consisting of 43 members, including 19 members of Indian National Congress, 12 Members of National Congress Party, 5 independent and 7 others coming from small parties. According to petitioner No. 1, he had suggested names of three councillors of Congress Party for nominating them as members of the Standing Committee to respondent No. 3. According to petitioner No. 1, he had suggested names of three councillors of Congress Party for nominating them as members of the Standing Committee to respondent No. 3. Whereas, the petitioner No. 2 claiming to be a group leader of Bhartiya Janta Party had given name of petitioner No. 3 for nomination on the Standing Committee on behalf of his party, supported by 7 councillors. Petitioner No. 5 claims to be group leader of Shiv-Sena and claims to have given his own name for nomination as member of the Standing Committee on behalf of Shiv-Sena. All of them are alleging infraction of section 31A(2) of the Act. So far as petitioner No. 4 is concerned, he claims that as suggested by the Group Leader he ought to have been nominated on the Standing Committee. Submissions : 5. Mr. Samarth, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner placing reliance on sub-section (2) of section 31A heavily relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Kailas vs. State of Mah., reported in 2009(6) Mh.L.J. 490 and pressed into service paragraphs 22 and 23 thereof. In his submission the said provision is mandatory and the said issue can be judicially examined by this Court. 6. Per contra, Mr. P. C. Madkholkar, learned counsel appearing for respondents No. i and 2 heavily relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Vishnu vs. City of Akola Municipal Corporation, reported in 2003(5) Mh.L.J. 526, Databhau vs. State of Mah., reported in 2007(3) Mh.L.J. 76 and Sujata vs. Akola Municipal Corpn., reported in 2010 (3) Mh.L.J. 230 to contend that exercise of right to elect or nominate the councillor on the Standing Committee being a 'political question', the Courts are not expected to undertake judicial exercise so as to exercise powers of judicial review. Alternatively, he submits that at any rate, in view of the judgment in the case of Sujata (supra) the process of consultation with the Leader of House and Leader of Opposition is bare consultative and directory in nature. It is not decisive of the name of the person to be nominated/deleted. 7. Mr. Madkholkar went on to submit that if one turns to the minutes of meeting it would be seen that there was a consultation with petitioner No. 2 Haribhau Kale, petitioner No. 3 Sanjay Badone, petitioner No. 4 Abdul Munaf Abdul Rashid. It is not decisive of the name of the person to be nominated/deleted. 7. Mr. Madkholkar went on to submit that if one turns to the minutes of meeting it would be seen that there was a consultation with petitioner No. 2 Haribhau Kale, petitioner No. 3 Sanjay Badone, petitioner No. 4 Abdul Munaf Abdul Rashid. So far as petitioner No. 5 is concerned he submits that the said petitioner has handed over a copy of the affidavit in Marathi, to be filed before this Court, stating therein that he does not want to proceed with the petition. He thus, submits that Petitioner No. 1 being present in the meeting and considering the consultation with petitioners No. 2, 3 and 4 as can be seen from the minutes it cannot be said that there was no consultation with petitioner No. 1. At any rate, he submits that the requirement of consultation being directory, looking to the substantial compliance thereof, this Court should not enter into a political question to examine it in exercise of power of judicial review. He further submits that no objections were raised by any of the petitioners including petitioner No. 1 either during the course of meeting or after the meeting raising any challenge to the nominations of the councillors on the Standing Committee. As such the present petition is nothing but an afterthought. This Court, therefore, should not entertain this petition. 8. In rejoinder Mr. Samarth, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, urged that assuming for the sake of argument that there was a consultation with petitioners No. 2, 3 and 4, but no such consultation is to be found with petitioner No. 1. He reiterated reliance on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Kailash vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), to emphasize that this Court can very well factually examine the question relating to consultation and if the consultation is found to be absent than the entire process of nomination of the councillors on the Standing Committee needs to be set aside. Consideration : 9. Having heard the rival counsel for respective parties in extenso, without going into the factual aspects which are seriously in dispute, we are of the considered view that the consultation is a part of process of nominating the councillors on the Standing Committee. Consideration : 9. Having heard the rival counsel for respective parties in extenso, without going into the factual aspects which are seriously in dispute, we are of the considered view that the consultation is a part of process of nominating the councillors on the Standing Committee. The mode and manner of consultation has not been laid down by the legislature. It is left to the choice of the parties with a view to leave it to the political parties to workout their modalities. 10. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vishnu vs. State (cited supra) to which one of us (Daga, J) is party, has dealt with the issue of "political questions" doctrine. In that case a question posed before (he Court was, whether refusal by the party having greatest numerical strength to shoulder responsibility of the Leader of Opposition, the party having next higher numerical strength in the house could be permitted to set up their candidature for the post of Leader of Opposition. This Court came to the conclusion that there was nothing wrong in recognizing the elected councillor belonging to a party having next higher numerical strength as Leader of Opposition, in the circumstances, where the party having greatest numerical strength in the house refuses to shoulder such responsibility. The Court while determining the issue regarding "political questions" doctrine, in paragraph 32 of the judgment, has observed thus : "32. As already noticed hereinabove, it is now well settled that the Courts are expected to decline jurisdiction over all "political questions". One of the important corollary of Court's refusal to exercise judicial powers is the doctrine of "political questions". In exercise of its powers of its judicial review; time and again it has been pointed out by various courts that certain powers are vested in the legislative or executive departments of the Government to be exercised in a purely discretionary manner, and that whether they have been constitutionally exercised or not is a "political question " which the Court is not expected to undertake to decide, [see Luther vs. Borden, 7 Harward 1:2 L. Ed. 581 (1849)]" (Emphasis supplied) The aforesaid judgment is followed by the Division Bench in the case of Dattabhau vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), wherein the question of recognition of Leader of Opposition in place of existing leader was involved. 581 (1849)]" (Emphasis supplied) The aforesaid judgment is followed by the Division Bench in the case of Dattabhau vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), wherein the question of recognition of Leader of Opposition in place of existing leader was involved. The Court refused to go into that question holding it to be a 'political question'. 11. In the case of Sujata vs. Akola Municipal Corporation (cited supra), this Court while dealing with the provisions of section 31A(2) of the Act, observed as under : "8. Perusal of Judgments discloses that these cases arose out of the matter of election of the Leader of Opposition. As per the law applicable, it was a case of numerical counting, and does not govern the situation as emerging in present case. 9. The language used in section 31A(2) authorises 'nomination of Councillor on the Committee' in following two stages : First -ascertaining proportion or number of members to be nominated, based on the strength of each registered or recognised party or group. Second - 'consulting Leader of House, the Leader of Opposition and the Leader of each such party or group' to nominate the councillors on Standing Committee. 10. The term 'each such party or group' seen in first stage indicated in the foregoing para shall have to be construed to be the rule directing the procedure for ascertaining number of nominations available per party or group. This is certainly a numerical job. 11. Second stage in paragraph No. 9 relates to the process of actual nomination. 12. What is seen contemplated for second stage in section 31A(2) is the consultation as contemplated therein which reads as follows : "After consulting the Leader of the House, the Leader of Opposition and the leader of each such party or group." This process of consultation, thus, lays down that the nomination is upon indication of a name to be a member of the Committee nominated/ assented by the 'Leader' of the 'group' or 'party' concerned. 13. It is seen from what has emerged from analysis of first stage is that the consultation with Leader of House and Leader of Opposition is bare consultative, and directory in nature. It is not decisive of name of the person to be nominated/ deleted." 12. 13. It is seen from what has emerged from analysis of first stage is that the consultation with Leader of House and Leader of Opposition is bare consultative, and directory in nature. It is not decisive of name of the person to be nominated/ deleted." 12. Thus, taking overall view of the matter, in our considered view, the consultation being part of process of nominating councillors on the Standing Committee as such whether that right has been constitutionally exercised or not is a 'political question' which this Court is not expected to decide in exercise of power of judicial review. In the result, for the reasons recorded herein, the petition is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.