JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ram Autar Singh, J.—These Criminal Revision Nos. 760 of 2000 and 761 of 2000 have been directed against the orders dated 29.11.1999 and 18.4.2000 passed by Civil Judge, Junior Division, Tirwa, District Kannauj in Criminal Cases No. 1265 of 1999 and 1264 of 1999 (Dharmendra Mishra v. Naresh Dubey and others), whereby the revisionists have been summoned to face trial and objections moved by them against above summoning orders have been rejected. 2. The Criminal Misc. Application (under Section 482 Cr.P.C.) No. 625 of 2004 has been moved by Jitendra Mishra @ Sanjay, Dharmendra Misra, Ajit Doharey and Shyam Sunder Gupta against State of U.P. and Anil Mishra with prayer to quash charge-sheet submitted in Case Crime No. 966 of 1999, under Sections 364, 147, 148, 149, 323 I.P.C., P.S. Kotwali Farrukhabad, District Farrukhabad. 3. It transpires from the record that Criminal Case No. 1265 of 1999 was instituted by respondent No. 2, Dharmendra Mishra against the revisionists Naresh Dubey and Brijesh Kumar Dubey in the Court of Munsif Magistrate, Kannauj under Section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act with this allegation that respondent No. 2 had deposited his amount in Farrukhabad Investment Company, Branch Kannauj and on its maturity a cheque No. 077152 dated 6.5.1999 of Bank of India, Kayamganj Branch for sum of Rs.8750/- was issued by Director of above Company in his favour. The respondent No. 2 deposited said cheque for payment in his account of Central Bank of India, Vishnupuri Extension, Lucknow and the said bank informed him through cheque return memo on 23.7.1999 with this remark that no sufficient amount was available for payment in the said account and thus the said cheque was bounced. The revisionists thus committed cheating by issuing the said cheque which was dishonoured due to insufficient fund in their account. The respondent No. 2 then sent a notice dated 9.8.1999 to the revisionists asking them to pay the said amount but the revisionists did not receive the said notice and returned the same. 4. The revisionists thus committed cheating by issuing the said cheque which was dishonoured due to insufficient fund in their account. The respondent No. 2 then sent a notice dated 9.8.1999 to the revisionists asking them to pay the said amount but the revisionists did not receive the said notice and returned the same. 4. The Criminal Case No. 1264 of 1999 was also instituted by respondent No. 2, Dharmendra Mishra against the revisionists Naresh Dubey and Brijesh Kumar Dubey in the Court of Munsif Magistrate, Kannauj under Section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act with this allegation that respondent No. 2 had deposited his amount in Farrukhabad Investment Company, Branch Kannauj and on its maturity a cheque No. 44980 dated 16.6.1999 of State Bank of India, 80 Feet Road, Kanpur for sum of Rs. 7.00 lacs was issued by Director of above Company in his favour. The respondent No. 2 deposited said cheque for payment in his account of Central Bank of India, Vishnupuri, Extension Branch, Lucknow and the said bank informed him on 24.7.1999 through cheque return memo with this remark that no sufficient amount was available in the said account for payment and thus the said cheque was bounced. The revisionists thus committed cheating by issuing the said cheque which was dishonoured due to insufficient fund in their account. The respondent No. 2 then sent a notice dated 9.8.1999 to the revisionists asking them to pay the said amount but the revisionists did not receive the said notice and returned the same. 5. In above criminal cases the statement of revisionist was recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and he also filed above cheques duly signed by the Director of Farrukhabad Investment Company in original and other documents. The learned Magistrate on the basis of oral and documentary evidence found a prima facie case under Section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act made out against the revisionists and summoned them to face trial vide order order dated 29.11.1999, against which the revisionist filed objections alleging that the Courts below did not consider the evidence on record before passing the impugned orders, because the complainants did not deposit any amount in Farrukhabad Investment Company Limited, Kannauj nor investment company issued the disputed cheques in favour of complainants as no amount was due towards them on account of alleged maturity. The complainant did not show in their complaints as to what amount was deposited by him in the said company and what amount of interest accrued thereon. The complaints were filed against two persons, while cheques were signed by only one person, which was not disclosed in the complaints. The complaints being barred by limitation are liable to be dismissed. The alleged cheques dated 6.5.1999 and 16.6.1999 are alleged to have been issued by investment company, which have been bounced first of all on 25.5.1999 and thereafter on 23.7.1999 as well as on 19.6.1999 and 23.7.1999 respectively, but no notices have been served on the revisionists nor the same have been received by them, as a result of which the complaints filed by respondent No. 2 are not maintainable in view of legal provisions of law. These objections have been dismissed by the Court below on 18.4.2000 in above cases. 6. The revisionists have challenged above summoning order dated 29.11.1999 and order dated 18.4.2000 passed on objections, in these Crl. Revision Nos. 760 of 2000 and 761 of 2000. The learned counsel for the revisionists has contended that the orders have been passed by the Court below against law without assigning any reason and the Court below has not considered the entire documentary evidence. The Court below has also not considered that the revisionists have neither received any notices allegedly sent by respondent No. 2 through registered post nor they have refused to take the notices sent by him. It is also contended that the learned Court below without obtaining opinion of handwriting expert regarding the revisionist’s signatures on the cheques has summoned the revisionists in above cases and rejected the objections raised by the revisionists. 7. In Crl. Misc. It is also contended that the learned Court below without obtaining opinion of handwriting expert regarding the revisionist’s signatures on the cheques has summoned the revisionists in above cases and rejected the objections raised by the revisionists. 7. In Crl. Misc. Application No. 625 of 2004 moved under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. the applicants have prayed to quash the charge-sheet submitted in Case Crime No. 966 of 1999 under Sections 364, 147, 148, 149, 323 I.P.C., P.S. Kotwali Farrukhabad on the ground that respondent No. 2, Anil Mishra lodged this F.I.R. regarding abduction of his brother-in-law, namely, Pradeep Dubey against unknown persons on 7.8.1999 and the alleged abductee himself reached police station on 11.8.1999 wherein he did not name any person in his statement and thereafter he reached Kannauj whereat he nominated the present applicants, because abductee was relative of Managing Director of above Finance Limited and he misappropriated crores of rupees belonging to retired persons and daily wagers etc, including Rs.20.00 lacs belonging to Dharmendra Mishra, in respect of which several F.I.Rs. were lodged against these persons. The documents of investment made by Dharmendra Mishra in this investment company of the uncle of abductee have also been filed alongwith this application. The abductee knew that applicant No. 1 was instrumental in registration of F.I.R. against him and thus after due consultation with Naresh Chand Dube, Pradeep Dubey nominated the applicant and others afterwards in order to avoid the payment due towards Naresh Chand Dube, he used his nephew Pradeep Dube (abductee) and forced him to nominate the applicants. The applicant No. 1 was major investor in the investment company of the uncle of abductee. The investigating officer tried his level best for getting statement of abductee recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. but it was avoided by abductee on one or the other pretext and ultimately his statement could not be recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and without proper investigation of the case the charge-sheet was submitted. Moreover neither the ransom was demanded nor the abductee was kidnapped with intention to kill him and thus no offence was made out against the applicants. 8. Moreover neither the ransom was demanded nor the abductee was kidnapped with intention to kill him and thus no offence was made out against the applicants. 8. A counter-affidavit of Anil Kumar Mishra was filed with this averment that he lodged the F.I.R. at case crime No. 966 of 1999 at P.S. Kotwali Farrukhabad, District Farrukhabad against unknown persons for kidnapping of Pradeep Dube and thereafter the police investigated the case, as a result of which, accused persons moved application to Government of U.P. for transfer of the case from Civil Police to C.B.C.I.D. and thereafter the case was investigated and the charge-sheet was submitted against them. The abductee Pradeep Dube named the applicants as well as other persons in the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as the applicants committed the offences, which were found to be prima facie made out against them and charge-sheet was also submitted in the case. 9. So far as this criminal miscellaneous application moved under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is concerned, the offences Sections 364, 147, 148, 149, 323 I.P.C. are prima facie made out against the applicants on the basis of F.I.R., statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and evidence collected by the investigating officer and thus no ground for quashing charge-sheet submitted by C.B.C.I.D. is found. Consequently, this application moved under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is liable to be dismissed, because the law should take its own course and the applicants should be put to trial in the competent Court. 10. On perusal of original record of Criminal Case No. 1265 of 1999, it transpires that the cheque dated 6.5.1999 was deposited by respondent No. 2 for payment in his account of Central Bank of India, Vishnupuri Extention, Lucknow and the bank returned the same to him through “cheque return memo dated 23.7.1999” and then respondent No. 2 sent notice dated 7.8.1999 to the revisionists with this averment that he received the said memo on 26.7.1999 with this remark that no sufficient fund was found in the account of the revisionists for payment of such cheque. Thus respondent No. 2 sent the said notice within 15 days from the date of receipt of memo of bank in this case and he instituted a complaint on 14.9.1999 before the Court below within a period of one month. 11. Thus respondent No. 2 sent the said notice within 15 days from the date of receipt of memo of bank in this case and he instituted a complaint on 14.9.1999 before the Court below within a period of one month. 11. In another Criminal Case No. 1264 of 1999 cheque dated 16.6.1999 for sum of Rs.7-00 lacs was deposited by the respondent No. 2 for payment in his account of State Bank of India, Kanpur, but he received “cheque return memo dated 24.7.1999” on 26.7.1999 and then he sent a registered notice to the revisionists on 9.8.1999 and thus he sent the said notice of demand within a period of 15 days. The respondent No. 2 also instituted complaint on 14.9.1999 within a period of one month from the date of issuance of notice dated 9.8.1999. 12. In Sivakumar v. Natarajan, (2010) 1 SCC (Crl) 1147, the Division Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court held that the respondent issued a legal notice to the appellant calling upon him to pay the amount in question within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. The appellant neither sent a reply to the said notice nor paid the said amount. By reason of Section 138 of the Act, a legal presumption in regard to commission of a crime has been raised. The proviso appended thereto, however, states that nothing contained in the main provision would apply unless conditions specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof are complied with. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the proviso, therefore, lay down conditions precedent for applicability of the main provision. Section 138 being penal in nature, warrants strict construction. 13. The provisions of Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act are reproduced below for convenience : “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc, of funds in the account. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the proviso, therefore, lay down conditions precedent for applicability of the main provision. Section 138 being penal in nature, warrants strict construction. 13. The provisions of Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act are reproduced below for convenience : “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc, of funds in the account. Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless : (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.” 14. In the present cases the cheques were dishonoured with the remarks “insufficient funds” on 23.7.1999 and 24.7.1999. Information there about was received by respondent No. 2 on 26.7.1999. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.” 14. In the present cases the cheques were dishonoured with the remarks “insufficient funds” on 23.7.1999 and 24.7.1999. Information there about was received by respondent No. 2 on 26.7.1999. The respondent No. 2 issued legal notices to the revisionists on 9.8.1999 calling upon them to pay the amount in question within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. Admittedly the revisionists neither sent reply to said notices nor paid the amount due. The respondent No. 2 thereafter filed these complaints against the revisionists under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881. The learned Court below on the basis of statement under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and other documentary evidence summoned the revisionists to face trial and thus the complaints filed by the respondent No. 2 could not be said to be not maintainable in view of above legal provisions. The learned Court below did not commit any illegality or material irregularity in passing the orders under revision in above criminal cases. No jurisdictional error has been committed in passing impugned orders against which these revisions have been referred. The cheques were presented to the bank within six months from the date of issuance. At the very outset it may be noticed that both clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso appended to Section 138 of the Act employed the term “within a period”, whereas clause (a) refers to presentation of the cheque to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn, clause (b) provides for issuance of notice “”to the drawer of the cheque” within 15 days (“within thirty days” in new law) of the receipt of information. The words “within thirty days of the receipt of information” are significant. Indisputably, intimation was received by the respondent No. 2 from the bank on 26.7.1999. 15. Parliament advisedly did not use the words “from the date of receipt of information” in Section 138 of the Act. The words “within thirty days of the receipt of information” are significant. Indisputably, intimation was received by the respondent No. 2 from the bank on 26.7.1999. 15. Parliament advisedly did not use the words “from the date of receipt of information” in Section 138 of the Act. It is also of some significance to notice that in terms of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, whereupon reliance has been placed by the Apex Court, the statue is required to use the word “from” and for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the words “to”. The departure made from the provisions of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act by Parliament, therefore, deserves serious consideration. 16. Kerala High Court in the case of K.V. Muhammed Kunhi v. P. Janardhanan, 1998 Crl LJ 4330, construing clause (a) of the proviso appended to Section 138 of the Act, the Court held that in our view, the High Court committed material irregularity in not referring to the aforesaid evidence which was recorded by the Metropolitan Magistrate. Section 138(b) of the Act inter alia provides that the payee has to make demand for the payment of money by giving a notice to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. So fifteen days are to be counted from the date of receipt of information regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. In the present case, it is the say of the complainant that the cheques were presented for encashment these were returned to the bank on 23.7.1999 and 24.7.1999 respectively. The learned counsel fairly pointed out that in the complaints it has been stated that the complainant had received intimation with regard to the return of the said cheques from his banker on 23.7.1999 and 24.7.1999, however, he submitted that this is an apparent mistake and for explaining that mistake the respondent No. 2 has to lead the evidence before the trial Court. 17. A comparative study of both the sections in the Act and the General Clauses Act significantly indicate that the period of limitation has to be reckoned from the date on which the cheque or instrument was drawn. 17. A comparative study of both the sections in the Act and the General Clauses Act significantly indicate that the period of limitation has to be reckoned from the date on which the cheque or instrument was drawn. The words ‘from’ and ‘to’ employed in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act are evidently clear that in cases where there is an ambiguity or suspicion with reference to the date of commencement of period of limitation in any Act or special enactment, the words ‘from’ and ‘to’ employed in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act can be pressed into service. 18. I have failed to persuade myself to agree with the submissions made on behalf of the revisionists in these revisions. Undoubtedly, the revisionists have a fundamental right of liberty in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Liberty of the revisionists, therefore, cannot be taken away except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Principles of “estoppel” or “waiver” would not, therefore, apply in these revisions. However, no illegality or irregularity has been found in the impugned orders passed by the Court below. No ground to interfere with the impugned orders is found. Consequently, these revisions being devoid of merits are liable to be dismissed. Thus Crl. Revision Nos. 760 of 2000 and 761 of 2000 are dismissed. The Crl. Misc. Application No. 625 of 2004 is also dismissed. —————