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2010 DIGILAW 183 (MP)

Prakash Chandra Gupta v. Jitendra Kumar Jain @ Jinendra

2010-02-11

S.L.KOCHAR

body2010
JUDGMENT : 1.This petition under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code has been filed bythe applicant/accused for quashing the proceedings pending before learnedJudicial Magistrate First Class, Bhopal ,in Regular Trial No. 972/2005, complaint case filed by non-applicant No. 1. 2.Learned Counsel for the applicant has submitted that according to theallegations levelled by complainant/non-applicant No.1 herein, in the complaint, cheque was produced forencashment and returned back by the bank on the ground of insufficiency of thefunds. Thereafter, on 3-11-2003, notice was given to the non-applicant No. 1 asper provision under Section 138 (b) of Negotiable Instruments Act. On16-12-2003, it is said that the applicant made a request to non-applicant No. 1for again production of cheque and same will be honoured whereupon non-applicant No. 1 presented the cheque on 10-1-2004, which was again returned back on thesame ground on 19-1-2004 and second notice dated 28-1-2004 was served upon theapplicant hum dust by non-applicant No. 1. Thereafter, complaint was filed tin10-3-2004 and cognizance was taken by the learned Trial Court on 2-4-2004. 3.Learned Counsel for the applicant has submitted on the basis of Supreme Courtjudgment passed in the case of Prem Chcmd Vijay Kumar Vs. Yashpal Singh and another, (2005) 4 SCC 417 , that once the notice was given and it wasserved upon the accused, the complaint should have been filed within stipulatedperiod as prescribed under the provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act andlimitation will run from that date and not from issuance and service of secondnotice, therefore, complaint is not maintainable because same was filed aftercompletion of period of limitation from the date of service of first notice. 4.On the other hand, learned Counsel for the non-applicant No. 1 has supportedthe impugned orders passed by both the Courts below. 5.Having heard the learned Counsel for parties and on perusal of the record aswell as the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Prem Chand Vijay Kumar (supra),this Court finds substance in the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for theapplicant. Almost on similar facts, the Supreme Court has held as under inParagraphs 11 to 15 : - "11.The period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the dayimmediately following the day on which the period of fifteen days from the dateof the receipt of the notice by the drawer expires. Almost on similar facts, the Supreme Court has held as under inParagraphs 11 to 15 : - "11.The period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the dayimmediately following the day on which the period of fifteen days from the dateof the receipt of the notice by the drawer expires. 12.As noticed in Sadanandan Bhadran case, once a notice under clause (b) Section 138 of the Act is"received" by the drawer of the cheque , thepayee or holder of the cheque forfeits his right toagain present the cheque as cause of action hasaccrued when there was bfailure to pay the amountwithin the prescribed period and the period of limitation starts to run whichcannot be stopped on any account. 13.One of the indispensable factors to form the cause of action envisaged inSection 138 of the Act is contained in clause (b) of the proviso to thatsection. It involves the making of a demand by giving a notice in writing tothe drawer of the cheque "within fifteen days ofthe receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid". If no such notice is given withinthe said period of 15 days, no cause of action could have been created at all. 14.Thus, it is well settled that if dishonour of a cheque has once snowballed into a cause of action it is notpermissible for a payee to create another cause of action with the same cheque . 15.In SIL Import, USA Vs. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, itwas held that the language used in Section 142 admits of no doubt that theMagistrate is forbidden from taking cognizance of the offence if the complaintwas not filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arose.Completion of the offence is the immediate forerunner of rising of the cause ofaction. In other words, cause of action would arise soon after completion ofthe offence and period of limitation for filing of the application startsrunning simultaneously." 6.In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position, the cause of action aroseimmediately after 15 days after service of first legal notice to the applicantand non-applicant No. 1 should have filed a complaint within the period oflimitation, but the same was not filed though cause of action arose. 7.In this view of the matter, this application is allowed. 7.In this view of the matter, this application is allowed. The proceedingspending before the Trial Court in Regular Trial No. 972/2005 is hereby quashed.