JUDGMENT Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J.—The present writ petition arises out of suit No. 17/123/337/944 of 1996 instituted by the respondent Nos. 2 to 9 herein against the petitioners under Section 229 B of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act in respect of the plot No. 2579 (old), new number 1553 situate in village Tumurki, Tehsil Sahabad, District- Hardoi. The said plot was sold by the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in favour of the petitioner Nos. 4 to 12 by means of sale-deed dated 18th of February, 1969. The plot in question is a grove. The background facts of the case may be noted in brief. 2. The petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and the contesting private respondents were the co-tenants of number of plots namely 2579, 2914, 2615, 2462, 2468, 2412, 2902. During the consolidation operation, the parties entered into a compromise on 30th of June, 1965 whereby they agreed with regard to the allotment of the plots to the extent of their shares. With respect to the plot in dispute i.e. the old plot No. 2579, the common case of the parties is that under the said compromise it was agreed upon that the names of Munne Khan, Wahidullah Khan and Ismail Khan, the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 be expunged and the name of other co-tenure holders may remain recorded. The Consolidation Officer while delivering the judgment in the light of the compromise instead of ordering the expunction of name of petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 ordered that the names of other co-tenure holders i.e. the contesting private respondents herein, be expunged from the record of the said plot. It consequently passed order on 30.6.1965, the date when the compromise was filed. CH Form 41 and 45 were prepared in the light of the order of the Consolidation Officer and the consolidation proceedings in the village were denotified by the notification sometimes in the year 1967. The petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 herein on 18th of February, 1969 executed the sale-deed in respect of the said plot in favour of the petitioner Nos. 4 to 12. 3. After about one month, a suit for declaration by the private respondents herein of their title with respect to plot in dispute, on the basis of compromise giving rise to the present writ petition was filed. 4 to 12. 3. After about one month, a suit for declaration by the private respondents herein of their title with respect to plot in dispute, on the basis of compromise giving rise to the present writ petition was filed. They came out with the case that by mistake or omission, instead of ordering the expunction of the names of the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 herein, it ordered the expunction of the names of the plaintiffs who are contesting respondents herein. The plaintiffs were under the belief that the order dated 30th of June, 1965 has been passed in conformity of the compromise and they came to know later on about the discrepancy in the order. It was pleaded by them that in pursuance of the error in the order dated 30th of June, 1965, the mutation entries in the revenue record were recorded wrongly, against the spirit of the compromise. 4. Two sets of the written statements were preferred by the defendants. The petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 filed a written statement stating that it was wrongly mentioned in the compromise that they have no concern with the disputed land or the disputed plot exclusively belongs to the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 5 and 9. In CH Form 45 their names have been recorded which is final document as a result of consolidation. 5. The another set of written statement was preferred by the petitioner Nos. 4 to 12, the purchasers, on the pleas inter alia that in the compromise it was agreed upon that the grove plot No. 2579 may be given to the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in exchange of grove plot No. 2564. The petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are illiterate persons and had no knowledge about the terms of the agreement and they intended that in the compromise it may be mentioned that the plot in dispute be exclusively given to them. The Consolidation Officer’s order is correct. There being no error in the order of the Consolidation Officer, the said order cannot be challenged in any Court. The suit is barred under Section 49 of the CH Act and they are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration of Rs. 800/- (Rupees Eight Hundred). 6. The parties led evidence in support of their respective cases. There being no error in the order of the Consolidation Officer, the said order cannot be challenged in any Court. The suit is barred under Section 49 of the CH Act and they are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration of Rs. 800/- (Rupees Eight Hundred). 6. The parties led evidence in support of their respective cases. As many as nine issues were framed by the Trial Judge and the suit was dismissed mainly on the ground that it is barred by Section 49 of the U.P.CH Act, by judgment and decree dated 19th of October, 1972. The said decision was carried in appeal being appeal No. 189 (72-73): Sadiq Husain and others v. Munne Khan etc. before the Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Lucknow who by its judgment and decree dated 26.6.1974 allowed the appeal and decreed the suit with costs on the finding that the suit is maintainable as the consolidation Court has become extinct on account of the denotification under Section 52 of the Act. The said judgment and decree has been confirmed by the Board of Revenue in second appeal No. 135 of 1973-1974 dated 16th of November, 1976. 7. Questioning the legality and validity of the judgments of the two Appellate Courts, the present writ petition has been filed. 8. Sri Manoj Misra, the learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the order dated 30th of June, 1965 passed by the Consolidation Officer is an independent order, independent of compromise entered into between the parties. The compromise has not been made part of the order. The CH Forms 41 and 45 were prepared in pursuance of the order dated 30th of June, 1965 but without any exception by the plaintiffs. In the year 1967 the village was denotified by issuing notification under Section 52 of the U.P. CH Act. The plaintiffs were fully aware about the contents of the order of the Consolidation Officer and they did not take any step to get the mistake rectified, if any, in the order as such they accepted the order constructively. The petitioner Nos. 4 to 12 are the bona fide purchasers for value without notice from the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and as such they are entitled to get the plot in dispute notwithstanding any other thing. The petitioner Nos. 4 to 12 are the bona fide purchasers for value without notice from the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and as such they are entitled to get the plot in dispute notwithstanding any other thing. The suit is barred by Section 49 of the CH Act even if for the sake of argument, it is assumed that the order dated 30th of June, 1965 of the Consolidation Officer is erroneous. In contra, Sri B.B. Paul, the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondents, on the other hand, submits that it is a case of mistake on the part of the Consolidation Officer and they should not be made to suffer for the same. Elaborating the argument, he submits that the provisions of Section 49 of the CH Act is no bar to such suits as the consolidation operation, admittedly, had come to an end by the time the suit was instituted. 9. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The facts are not much in dispute between the parties. The compromise dated 30th of June, 1965 is not in dispute. A copy of the said compromise application has been annexed as C.A. 1 to the counter affidavit. It is nobody’s case that the said compromise is vitiated in any manner because of fraud, coercion or duress etc.. The learned counsel for the petitioner did not urge that the terms of compromise were not correctly recorded in the application. None of the Courts below have arrived at any such conclusion. It is not a case of either parties that some other compromise subsequent to the compromise in dispute on different terms and conditions was arrived at between the parties. In short, both the parties accepts the compromise dated 30th of June, 1965 as it is on the record. 10. Its bare perusal would show that at the bottom of the compromise it is mentioned with the prefix note that names of Munne Khan, Wahidullah Khan and Ismail Khan (Petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3) be expunged from plot No. 2579 area one bigha and the names of other co-sharers shall remain as it is. Being grove, it may not be partitioned and the names of Ismail Khan (minor) will remain under the guardianship of Munne Khan. The compromise may be recorded accordingly. 1, 2 and 3) be expunged from plot No. 2579 area one bigha and the names of other co-sharers shall remain as it is. Being grove, it may not be partitioned and the names of Ismail Khan (minor) will remain under the guardianship of Munne Khan. The compromise may be recorded accordingly. In other words, the compromise unequivocally provides that the names of the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 be expunged from plot No. 2579. The said compromise was presented before the Consolidation Officer on the same day and he passed the order forthwith. It is also true that the said order of the Consolidation Officer is a detailed one. The Consolidation Officer has independently in its own language noted the terms of the compromise. 11. At this stage, the argument of the petitioners that the order dated 30th of June, 1965 is an independent order and it has nothing to do with the terms of the compromise, may be considered. The said argument at a flash appears to be attractive but on deeper scrutiny it has no legs to stand. The very opening sentence of the order is that the case was called out and the parties have entered into the compromise. The sequence of the events do also negate the above submission. The compromise was filed on 30th of June, 1965 and the order was passed in the terms of compromise on the same day, therefore, it is difficult to accept that the order of the Consolidation Officer is an independent order. The order has been passed simultaneously as soon as the compromise application was filed. It may be true that the Consolidation Officer has not said so in express words that the terms of the compromise shall form part of his order but this omission is of little consequence when one examines the facts of the case closely. It would have been better, as usual in such matters, if the terms of the compromise would have been made part of the judgment, order or decree. But it does not necessarily mean that in absence of any such indication in the order, the order is an independent order. The very opening sentence of the order noticed herein above, negates the plea put forward by the petitioners. 12. But it does not necessarily mean that in absence of any such indication in the order, the order is an independent order. The very opening sentence of the order noticed herein above, negates the plea put forward by the petitioners. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioners wants that the order dated 30th of June, 1965 should be read in isolation but it is difficult to agree with him. 13. The variance in the compromise deed and the order dated 30th of June, 1965 is writ large. Under the compromise it was agreed upon that the name of the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 be deleted from the plot in dispute. But the name of the plaintiff respondents were ordered to be deleted instead. 14. A question now arises as to whether the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 can take an advantage of the said mistake or not. The second aspect of the case is as to whether the petitioner Nos. 4 to 12 can claim themselves as bona fide purchasers for value. 15. After all a mistake is a mistake. A mistake may be either of law or fact. This is a case of mistake of fact. The mistake has been committed not by the parties but by the Consolidation Officer who was under legal obligation to decide the right, title or interest of the parties with respect to the holding without committing any mistake. To err is human. The mistakes are mistakes and they can always be corrected by following due procedure of law as said by the Apex Court in Union of India and another v. Narendra Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 750 . In the case on hand, by the time the mistake was detected, the consolidation operation was over in the village. 16. The authorities below have accepted the plea of the plaintiff respondents that they came to know of the mistake only after the sale-deed was executed by the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in favour of the remaining petitioners. It is a question of fact and the explanation given by the plaintiff respondents is plausible one. Now, a question arises as to whether the plaintiff respondents should suffer for the mistake of the Consolidation Officer. 1, 2 and 3 in favour of the remaining petitioners. It is a question of fact and the explanation given by the plaintiff respondents is plausible one. Now, a question arises as to whether the plaintiff respondents should suffer for the mistake of the Consolidation Officer. To me the answer is very simple and the answer is provided by “Actus curiae neminem grabavit” a maxim, purporting that an act of Court should do no harm to a litigant. It is a well known maxim of law. The said maxim is part of the mode of administering the justice, as mentioned in Broom’s Legal Maxim. 17. It has been said, time and again, that the above maxim is founded upon justice and good sense, and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of law as was said by CRESS WELL J. in Freeman v. Tranah (12 C.B. 406). An unintentional mistake of the Court which may prejudice the cause of any party must and alone could be rectified. In Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1047 , it was observed that the arithmetical mistake is a mistake of calculation, a clerical mistake is a mistake in writing or typing whereas an error arising out of or occurring from accidental slip or omission is an error due to careless mistake on the part of the Court liable to be corrected. To illustrate this point it was said that in a case where the order contains something which is not mentioned in the decree, it would be a case of unintentional omission or mistake as the mistake or omission is attributable to the Court which may say something or omit to say something which it did not intend to say or omit. No new arguments or re-arguments on merits can be entertained to facilitate such rectification of mistakes. The provision cannot be invoked to modify, alter or add to the terms of the original order or decree so as to, in effect, pass an effective judicial order after the judgment in the case. 18. The Apex Court in Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey, JT 1987 (3) SC 555; Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, JT 1996 (1) SC 647; Mohammod Gazi v. State of M.P. and others, JT. 18. The Apex Court in Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey, JT 1987 (3) SC 555; Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, JT 1996 (1) SC 647; Mohammod Gazi v. State of M.P. and others, JT. 2004 (4) SC 55; South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P. and others, 2003 (8) SCC 648 and Krishna Swami S. Prasad and another v. Union of India and others, 2006 AIR SCW 1046, has approved the applicability of the above maxim. 19. In my considered view, by invoking the above maxim to the facts of the present case, the plaintiff respondents cannot be denied their legitimate claim of the plot in question as was understood by the parties under the compromise, for the fault on the part of the Consolidation Officer. As said by the Apex Court, in the case of South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. (supra) there is nothing wrong with the parties demanding being placed in the same position in which they would have been had the Court not intervened. In a compromise, the Court puts its seal on the compromise, legally entered into by the parties. 20. The Apex Court in Nagraj and others v. State of Karnatak and others, 1993 Supp. 4 SCC 595, has observed as follows : “It is the duty of the Court to rectify, revise and recall its orders as and when it is brought to its notice that certain of its orders were passed on a wrong or mistaken assumption of facts and that implementation of those orders would have serious consequence. As act of Court should prejudice none “of all these things respecting which learned men dispute”, said, Cicero,” there is none more important than clearly to understand that we are born for justice and that right is founded not in opinion but in nature.” This very idea was echoed by James Madison (The Federalist, No. 51 at p.352). He said: Justice is the end of the Government, it is the end of the civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained or until liberty be lost in pursuit.” 21. Now, the plea of Section 49 of the U.P. CH Act that the suit is barred which was put in forefront by the petitioners may be examined. 22. Section 49 of the CH Act bars the civil jurisdiction. It ever has been and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained or until liberty be lost in pursuit.” 21. Now, the plea of Section 49 of the U.P. CH Act that the suit is barred which was put in forefront by the petitioners may be examined. 22. Section 49 of the CH Act bars the civil jurisdiction. It opens with a non - obstanate clause and provides that the declaration and adjudication of the rights of tenure - holders in respect of land lying in an area for which a notification has been issued under sub-section (2) of Section 4 or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. CH Act. No civil or Revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act. In other words, the Section prohibits the institution of any civil or revenue suit or proceeding during the consolidation proceedings, regarding which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act. 23. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that in view of the clear language of the Section 49 of CH Act, the suit could not have been entertained by the Revenue Court or Civil Court at all. Elaborating the argument, it was submitted that the CH Form 45 is the final record of the rights of the parties which is prepared at the close of the consolidation operation. The petitioners are the recorded grove holder of the plot in question in the CH Form 45 and as such no further adjudication with regard to the said plot can be undergone by any Court civil or revenue. 24. Reliance was placed on Rishal Singh v. Board of Revenue, 1970 RD 413; Rakesh Kumar v. Board of Revenue and others, 1972 RD 326; Zafar Khan and others v. Board of Revenue and others, AIR 1985 SC 39 ; and Sita Ram v. Chhota Bhondey and others, AIR 1991 SC 249 , in support of his argument. 24. Reliance was placed on Rishal Singh v. Board of Revenue, 1970 RD 413; Rakesh Kumar v. Board of Revenue and others, 1972 RD 326; Zafar Khan and others v. Board of Revenue and others, AIR 1985 SC 39 ; and Sita Ram v. Chhota Bhondey and others, AIR 1991 SC 249 , in support of his argument. It is not necessary to discuss them individually as they are besides the point at the hand. There is no quarrel that Section 49 bars adjudication of the rights of the tenure holders through a suit, as was held in the case of Rishal Singh (supra). 25. Similar view has been taken in the case of Rakesh Kumar (supra) which provides that Section 49 by its first clause declares that adjudication of rights of a tenure holder shall be done in accordance with the provisions of the Consolidation of Holdings Act while the second clause thereof bars the civil or revenue Courts from entertaining any suit or proceeding with respect to the rights which could or ought to have been so adjudicated. 26. In these cases, it was held that under the specified circumstances, “adjudication of rights” has been held to be barred by Civil Courts or Revenue Courts. The words “adjudication of rights of tenure holders” are the keywords. Then Section 49 will not apply in a situation where adjudication of rights of tenure holder is not in issue. In a case as the present one, where there is no issue with regard to the adjudication of rights, Section 49 will not come into play. Here, the plaintiff respondents have not come forward with the plea that their rights with respect to the plot in question be adjudicated upon. Rather their case is that there has been already adjudication in their favour through the order of the Consolidation Officer dated 30th of June, 1965, but the said order suffers with unintentional or clerical mistake. The point which I am trying to bring home is that in the present case, no adjudication of right is involved and therefore, the Section 49 on its plain and simple language, will not at all be attracted. The point which I am trying to bring home is that in the present case, no adjudication of right is involved and therefore, the Section 49 on its plain and simple language, will not at all be attracted. For the same reason, the argument of the petitioners that even erroneous or wrong decision by the consolidation authorities is binding on civil and revenue Courts will not detain us for simple reason that legality, validity or propriety of the order of the Consolidation Officer is not a matter of issue in these proceedings. The pith and substance of the plaintiff respondents’ case is that it is a case of mistake by the Consolidation Officer who did not correctly notice the contents of undisputed compromise in its order. It is a case of sheer accidental mistake of an admitted fact in the order. It is not a case of going behind the order of the Consolidation Officer nor looking into any claim of the plaintiff respondents which could or ought to have been adjudicated upon during the consolidation. The claim having been correctly adjudicated has not been correctly recorded in the order, is the case herein. The plaintiff respondents, as a matter of fact, has sought, by way of the suit giving rise to the present petition, rectification of a mistake in the order of the Consolidation Officer. Rectification of mistake does not fall within the parameters of Section 49 of the CH Act. This being so, Section 49 does not bar the proceedings. No other provision was brought to the notice of the Court by the petitioners which may bar such proceedings. 27. A distinction between an accidental mistake and an erroneous decision has to be borne in mind. While in the former case, there is no fresh adjudication of rights of parties, but the mistake is corrected. But in the later case, the matter on merits is examined afresh and the decision is set right. The distinction is fine but substantial one. 28. Lastly, the petitioners submits that the petitioner Nos. 4 to 12 are bona fide purchasers for value from the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and therefore, they are entitled to protect their sale-deed, the fact that their vendor had no title notwithstanding. It does not appear that the said plea was pressed before any of the authorities below. The pleadings of the petitioner Nos. 4 to 12 are bona fide purchasers for value from the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and therefore, they are entitled to protect their sale-deed, the fact that their vendor had no title notwithstanding. It does not appear that the said plea was pressed before any of the authorities below. The pleadings of the petitioner Nos. 4 to 12 may be noted first. In this regard, only paragraph-26 of the written statement is important. In the said paragraph it has been pleaded that they have purchased the land bonafidely for a sum of Rs. 800/- as per the entry made in the record of the Consolidation Officer. There does not appear even a whisper in the pleadings that they had no knowledge about the compromise etc.. In para 23 of the written statement it has been stated that in lieu of the plot No. 2579 which is also a grove, it was agreed upon that the disputed plot shall be given to the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 exclusively, a plea which was not set out even by their vendors to justify. This plea runs counter to the plea of bona fide purchase for value. To put it differently, there is absolutely no pleading that the vendees (petitioner Nos. 4 to 12) were not aware about the fact situation or they purchased the plot in dispute simply on the basis of the revenue entry in CH Form 45. That is the reason, no such plea was put forward before the two Courts below. As many as nine issues were struck by the trial Court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties but no such issue which is sought to be raised herein was put forward before the Courts below. In absence of any plea or evidence that the petitioner Nos. 4 to 12 purchased the property without any notice, it is too late for them to contend that they are bona fide purchasers for the value of Rs. 800/-. The vendors, petitioner Nos. In absence of any plea or evidence that the petitioner Nos. 4 to 12 purchased the property without any notice, it is too late for them to contend that they are bona fide purchasers for the value of Rs. 800/-. The vendors, petitioner Nos. 4 to 12 and the vendees of the other petitioners are jointly fighting the litigation,as is apparent, also leads to the conclusion that they all are in league with each other and the vendors taking the advantage of the mistake in the order of the Consolidation Officer exploited the situation by executing a sale-deed may be for name’s sake in favour of the petitioner Nos. 4 to 12. It is not necessary to say any further in this regard. 29. This Court examined, the above issue to meet the argument of the petitioners’ counsel based on a decision of this Court in Beche Lal and others v. Hem Singh and others, AIR 1953 Alld. 485. It was a case under Section 152 of C.P.C. wherein it has been observed that where a decree does not agree with the express terms of a judgment the power of correction can be exercised even when the decree is executed and ostensibly fully satisfied. An error in a decree arising from any accident, a slip or omission may at any time be corrected without appeal. The emphasis was led on the sentence - The only limitation upon this power of the Court is to be found in the cases where third parties have acquired rights under the erroneous judgment in interval. The emphasis was led by the learned counsel for the petitioners who submits that vendees’ interest has been intervened. It may be noted that the same counsel is representing the interest of both the vendors and vendees. There being no iota of evidence that the vendees purchased the property without notice, a constructive or actual knowledge will be imputed on the vendees. The terms of compromise having not been denied by the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3, they obviously had no right, title or interest over the plot in dispute and as such they could not execute any sale-deed. Even if they had executed the sale-deed, the vendees will not acquire any better title than their vendees. It is also acknowledged legal position that a person cannot give a better title than he himself had. Even if they had executed the sale-deed, the vendees will not acquire any better title than their vendees. It is also acknowledged legal position that a person cannot give a better title than he himself had. The general proposition of law that no person can confer any better title than he himself acquires as said in Shanti Budhiya Vesta Patel and others v. Nirmala Jaiprakash Tiwari and others, JT 2010 (4) SC 196, is fully applicable herein. No other point was pressed. 30. It is apposite to notice the following observation of the Apex Court though given in a different context but is fully applicable to the present fact situation in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 : “It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” 31. The other aspect of the case is that writ jurisdiction is not akin to appellate jurisdiction in the sense that a discretion not to interfere in a matter, specially when substantial justice has been done, vests in the writ Court. The petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 having agreed upon for expunction of their names from the plot in question cannot turn around and be permitted to take the advantage of an obvious mistake committed by the Court with the resort of legal engineering. To put it differently, it is a case where the interest of justice will be served by refusing to interfere in the present writ petition. 32. Law, as administered by Courts, transforms into justice. “definition of justice mentioned in justinian’s Corpus Juris Civils (adopted from the Roman jurist Ulpian) states ‘Justice is constant and perpetual will to render to everyone that to which he is entitled.’ Similarly, Cicero described justice as ‘the disposition of the human mind to render everyone his due’”. The law does not remain static. It does not operate in a vacuum. As social norms and values change, laws too have to be reinterpreted, and recast. Law is really a dynamic instrument fashioned by society for the purposes of achieving harmonious adjustment, human relations by elimination of social tensions and conflicts. Lord Denning once said: “Law does not stand-still, it moves continuously. It does not operate in a vacuum. As social norms and values change, laws too have to be reinterpreted, and recast. Law is really a dynamic instrument fashioned by society for the purposes of achieving harmonious adjustment, human relations by elimination of social tensions and conflicts. Lord Denning once said: “Law does not stand-still, it moves continuously. Once this is recognized, then the task of a judge is put on a higher plain. He must consciously seek to mould the law so as to serve the needs of the time.” [(See B.P. Achala Anand v. S. Appi Reddy and another, JT 2005(2) SC 233] 33. Before parting with the case, it may be noted that there was a dispute with regard to the possession over the plot in question. But this Court while entertaining the writ petition did not grant any interim order in favour of the petitioners. 34. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any merit in the present writ petition. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed with cost of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand), payable by the petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the contesting private respondents. —————