JUDGMENT Nirmaljit Kaur, J.:- The present petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR No.170 dated 05.10.2008 under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC registered at Police Station Noormahal, District Jalandhar, as well as, charges framed on 11.08.2009 and all consequent proceedings arising therefrom against petitioner who is Massi (maternal aunt). 2. Brief facts of the case as put forwarded by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is an aged widow lady and is resident of Basti Gujjan, Jalandhar. She is residing with her family and they are separate in household from her sister Kiran Bala i.e. the mother-in-law of the complainant-respondent No.2. The sister of the petitioner, namely, Kiran Bala (mother-in-law of respondent No.2) is a resident of Village Sawhni, Tehsil Phagwara, District Kapurthala, whereas, the petitioner is resident of Basti Gujjan, Jalandhar and there is a distance of about 40-50 kms. between the houses of the petitioner and her sister Kiran Bala. On 21.11.2005, petitioner’s sister son Vishal @ Happy married to respondent No.2 i.e. Sandeep Kumari @ Pallavi daughter of Harmesh Lal resident of Village Rajowal, Police Station Noormehal, District Jalandhar as per Hindu Rites and Ceremonies at Basant Palace, Noormahal. Being the relative of Vishal, petitioner attended the marriage of respondent No.2. After the marriage, Vishal left for abroad so that he could earn a better livelihood for himself and for respondent No.2. After departure of Vishal for Dubai, the respondent No.2 and Vishal remained in contact with each other through phones and internet callings. Vishal started trying his level best efforts by which he could be able to get visa for respondent No.2 to Dubai so that respondent No.2 and Vishal could live together at Dubai. But due to delay or some unforeseen reasons, not to the knowledge of petitioner, some misconceptions arose between Vishal and respondent No.2, and they started hot exchange arguments with each other on telephone. Lateron, the said exchanged words resulted into developing temperamental difference between Vishal and respondent No.2. When all that was happening between Vishal and respondent No. 2, the petitioner was residing with her family at Jalandhar and she was not aware of any fact regarding personal disputes of Vishal and respondent No. 2. 3. Lateron, the said exchanged words resulted into developing temperamental difference between Vishal and respondent No.2. When all that was happening between Vishal and respondent No. 2, the petitioner was residing with her family at Jalandhar and she was not aware of any fact regarding personal disputes of Vishal and respondent No. 2. 3. However the case put up by the respondent and the allegations in the FIR, are:- “My in-laws family and Massi have given me beatings on the above issues and Massi said that we have done mistake by marrying our boy with blackish girl of bad family; there were 20 other proposals for the boy and I was thrown out of house. At the time of birth of my child, my mother-in-law asked me to bring golden kangan to child and motorcycle which you father had not given. But I could not fulfill those demands. But still my parents have spent lot of money on sending me to my in-laws house, but my in-laws remained unsatisfied and remained intact on their demand. I begged that my father has already given much as per your demand, he cannot fulfill your illegal demands. Upon this, Massi Suraj Rani @ Gogad, mother-in-law, both the sister-in-law and my husband started giving me beatings and pulled me by catching from my hair, whereas, father-in-law started speaking in filthy language and I was pushed out of house. On 13.09.2007, panchayats of both the parties had got entered a compromise but the acts of torturing, atrocities continued upon me and were asking me to fulfill the demand of motorcycle and other demands. Thereafter on 15.09.2007, I was given beatings and thrown out of house, upon which a written compromise was entered into the Police Station Gawal Pindi, Kapurthala. But they did not mend their ways. My in-laws send my husband to Dubai on 29.12.2007 without telling me and my mother-in-law, sisters-in-law and massi said that our boy is not liking a blackish girl like you.” 4. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that all the accused, including the petitioner, had been harassing the complainant and has misappropriated the dowry articles and had given her beatings. He further submitted that the charge stand framed and, therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that all the accused, including the petitioner, had been harassing the complainant and has misappropriated the dowry articles and had given her beatings. He further submitted that the charge stand framed and, therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed. He relied on the judgments of Hon’ble the Apex Court, rendered in the cases of Manjula Sinha v. State of U.P. [2007(3) LAW HERALD (SC) 2272] : 2007(3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 778 and Mahesh Choudhary v. State of Rajasthan [2009(2) LAW HERALD (SC) 1032] : 2009(3) R.C.R (Criminal) 717, to substantiate the said argument. 5. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard. 6. Before proceeding to deal with the contention that the FIR cannot be quashed once the charge is framed, I would like to first consider the allegations in the FIR and the contention of the charge sheet. 7. The entire family i.e. mother-in-law, father-in-law, husband, sister-in-law and her husband, as well as, brother-in-law have been enroped. The primary allegation levelled by the respondent against the present petitioner in the FIR is “whenever massi of husband living in Jalandhar visited us, she used to taunt me that we have committed a mistake by marrying our boy with blackish girl.” 8. Moreover, there is no allegation with respect to entrustment of dowry articles to the petitioner nor is there any allegation of any specific demand of dowry. Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in the case of Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2005(3) S.C.C. 507, in para 6, held as under :- “ 6. Before we proceed to deal with the two contentions relating to limitation and territorial jurisdiction, we would like to consider first the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant-Gowri Ramaswamy. Looking at the allegations in the FIR and the contents of charge-sheet, we hold that none of the alleged offences, viz., Sections 498-A, 406 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are made out against her. She is the married sister of the informant’s husband who is undisputedly living in Delhi with her family. Looking at the allegations in the FIR and the contents of charge-sheet, we hold that none of the alleged offences, viz., Sections 498-A, 406 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are made out against her. She is the married sister of the informant’s husband who is undisputedly living in Delhi with her family. Assuming that during the relevant time, i.e., between March and October, 1997, when the 6th respondent (informant) lived in Mumbai in her marital home, the said lady stayed with them for some days, there is nothing in the complaint which connects her with an offence under Section 498-A or any other offence of which cognizance was taken. Certain acts of taunting and ill-treatment of informant by her sister-in-law (appellant) were alleged but they do not pertain to dowry demand or entrustment and misappropriation of property belonging to the informant. What was said against her in the FIR is that on some occasions, she directed the complainant to wash W.C and she used to abuse her and used to pass remarks such as “even if you have got much jewellery, you are our slave.” It is further stated in the report that Gowri would make wrong imputations to provoke her husband and would warn her that nobody could do anything to her family. These allegations, even if true, do not amount to harassment with a view to coercing the informant or her relation to meet an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. At the most, the allegations reveal that her sister-in-law Gowri was insulting and making derogatory remarks against her and behaving rudely against her. Even acts of abetment in connection with unlawful demand for property/dowry are not alleged against her. The bald allegations made against her sisterin- law seem to suggest the anxiety of the informant to rope in as many of the husband’s relations as possible. Neither the FIR nor the charge-sheet furnished the legal basis to the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offences alleged against the appellant Gowri Ramaswamy. The High Court ought not to have relegated her to the ordeal of trial. Accordingly, the proceedings against the appellant Gowri Ramaswamy are hereby quashed and her appeal stands allowed.” 9. Neither the FIR nor the charge-sheet furnished the legal basis to the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offences alleged against the appellant Gowri Ramaswamy. The High Court ought not to have relegated her to the ordeal of trial. Accordingly, the proceedings against the appellant Gowri Ramaswamy are hereby quashed and her appeal stands allowed.” 9. Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in the case of Bhaskar Lal Sharma v. Monica reported in [2009(5) LAW HERALD (SC) 3175] : 2009(3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 866, in somewhat similar allegations held that any gift made to the bridegroom or his parents and absence of any entrustment will not constitute any offence under Section 405 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code and further while listing out the allegation, held in para 46 as under :- “46. The allegations relating to the place where the marriage took place has nothing to do with an offence under Section 498A of the IPC. Allegations that appellant No.2 kicked the respondent with her leg and told her that her mother to be a liar may make out some other offence but not the one punishable under Section 498-A. Similarly her allegations that the appellant No.2 poisoned the ears of her son against the respondent; she gave two used lady suits of her daughter to the complainant and has been given perpetual sermons to the complainant could not be said to be offences punishable under Section 498A. Even threatening that her son may be divorced for the second time could not bring out the offence under Section 498A of the IPC.” 10. This Court, in the case of Anisha Bhandari vs. State of Haryana reported in 2005(2) R.C.R.(Criminal) 429, while quashing the FIR against the unmarried sister by holding that it is unbelievable that she was entrusted with dowry articles separately and she harassed bride in connection with the demand of dowry. There is growing tendency to come out with inflated and exaggerated allegations, roping in each and every relation of the husband and the women are abusing beneficial provisions of Section 498-A, wherein, FIR was quashed against the relatives of the husband as under :- “6. A few cases are referred here in which the First Information Reports were quashed against the relatives of the husband. A few cases are referred here in which the First Information Reports were quashed against the relatives of the husband. In Harjinder Kaur and others v. State of Punjab 2004(4) RCR (Criminal) 332, criminal complaint was filed under Sections 498 and 406, Indian Penal code against the husband, his parents and five sisters (one minor and one already married). The proceedings were quashed qua sisters. It was observed that the allegations against the sisters were vague. There is growing tendency to come out with inflated and exaggerated allegations, roping in each and every relation of the husband. Things have now taken a reverse trend and the women are abusing beneficial provisions of Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. In the case of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and others, 2000(2) RCR(Crim.) 695 (SC) : AIR 2000 Supreme Court 2324; the Apex Court observed that a tenancy has developed for roping in all the relations in dowry cases and if it is not discouraged, it is likely to affect case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. The efforts for involving the other relations ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused. In the case of Anita and others v. State of Punjab, 2003(4) RCR (Criminal) 313, the First Information Report was lodged by the wife under Sections 498-A and 406, Indian Penal code against the entire members of family of the husband. First Information Report against four unmarried sisters and brother was quashed, exercising the powers under Section 492 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was observed that it is not believable that the unmarried sisters or unmarried brother of the husband would be entrusted with any article of dowry separately. There is a tendency to involve all the relatives of the husband when the relations between the husband and the wife become strained.” 11. Recently in R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta & ors. [2008 (14) SCALE 85], this Court laid down the law in the following terms : “9. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions are : (1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions are : (1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence. (2)For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence. (3)Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus. (4)If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue.” 10. It is furthermore well known that no hard and fast rule can be laid down. Each case has to be considered on its own merits. The Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, although would not interfere with a genuine complaint keeping in view the purport and object for which the provisions of Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been introduced by the Parliament but would not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction in appropriate cases. One of the paramount duties of the Superior Courts is to see that a person who is apparently innocent is not subjected to persecution and humiliation on the basis of a false and wholly untenable complaint.” 12. Thus, in the absence of any specific allegation regarding the entrustment of any particular article of dowry/streedhan to the petitioner, she cannot be convicted for an offence under Sections 406 of the IPC. The allegation against cruelty is with respect to the comment made qua complexion of the complainant. The said comments are not in pursuance to the demand of dowry and thus, cannot be covered under Section 406 and 498-A of the IPC. Only vague allegations against all family members are jointly alleged. Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in the case of Ramesh (supra), quashed the FIR on observing that the allegations only reveal that her sisterin- law was insulting and making derogative remarks against her. Only vague allegations against all family members are jointly alleged. Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in the case of Ramesh (supra), quashed the FIR on observing that the allegations only reveal that her sisterin- law was insulting and making derogative remarks against her. The said were held to be not sufficient to relegate her to the ordeal of trial. Similar allegations are made against the petitioner in the present FIR, which do not constitute an offence under Sections 406 and 498-A to force her to go through the trial. 13. Taking up the argument of learned counsel for the respondent that the charges have been framed and, therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed, it would be appropriate to go through the charge sheet. The charge sheet is placed on record as P-2 is formal with no detail. It simply reads as under :- “ CHARGE SHEET I, Amandeep Singh, PCS, Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Phillaur do hereby charge above named accused as under :- That you Vishal Bhardwaj (since P.O.) being the husband and other accused being relatives of Vishal Bhardwaj (since P.O.) treated Sandip Kumar alias Palvi with cruelty for bringing more dowry after her marriage on 21.11.05 with Vishal Bhardwaj (since P.O.) and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC and within my cognizance. Secondly, you all the accused committed crl. Breach of trust by misappropriating the Istri Dhan of Sandip Kumari which was given to her by her parents at the time of her marriage and after the marriage and by not returning the said istri dhan to Sandip Kumari, you have committed an offence punishable under Section 406 IPC and within my cognizance. I hereby direct you be tried on the aforesaid charge.” 14. Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in the case of G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., 2000(1) RCR (Criminal) 707, in paras 7 and 8, held as under :- “7. It was submitted by Mr. Lalit, learned counsel for the second respondent that the appellants have already filed an application in the Court of Additional Judicial Magistrate for their discharge and that this Court should not interfere in the criminal proceedings which are at the threshold. We do not think that on filing of any application for discharge, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. We do not think that on filing of any application for discharge, the High Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. In this connection, reference may be made to two decisions of this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ashok Chaturvedi v. Shitul H. Chanchani wherein it has been specifically held that though the Magistrate trying a case has jurisdiction to discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against them when no offence has been made out against them and still why must they undergo the agony of a criminal trial. 8. Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has to be exercised with great care. In exercise of its jurisdiction the High Court is not to examine the matter superficially. It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this Section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 15. While relying on the said judgement, this Court, in the case of Lakhwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in 2000(4) RCR (Criminal) 104, held in para 9 as under :- “9. Clearly then, there is no absolute bar to the entertainment of a petition under Section 482 code of Criminal Procedure only on the ground that charges have been framed. Each case shall have to be examined on its own facts. In the present case, the petitioner came to the Court at the first possible opportunity. He did not wait to present the petition till after the police had completed the investigation, as in Minakshi Bala’s case (supra). Each case shall have to be examined on its own facts. In the present case, the petitioner came to the Court at the first possible opportunity. He did not wait to present the petition till after the police had completed the investigation, as in Minakshi Bala’s case (supra). In that case, when the petition was filed, police had completed the investigation, and had filed the charges in court. In view of the above, I am unable to accept the submission of Mr. Ghuman that the petition deserves to be dismissed, merely because the charges have been framed.” 16. Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in the case of Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra 2009(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 677, while relying on the aforesaid judgement, held:- “This Court therein noticed a large number of decisions to opine that whenever the High Court comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of court and that the ends of justice require that the proceedings should be quashed, it would not hesitate to do so.” 17. As noted above, learned counsel for the respondent has relied on the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, rendered in the case of Mahesh Choudhary (supra) to state that the FIR cannot be quashed as the charge sheet had been famed. However, on reading of para 16 of the judgement makes it clear that the charge sheet in that case disclosed commission of offences and the Hon’ble Apex Court came to the conclusion that a fair investigation had been carried out and the offence was made out against the appellant in that case. It was further held that the charge sheet was a detailed one and that the Magistrate had passed a detailed order after taking cognizance of the allegations. It was in the facts of that case that the Court did not think it proper to exercise power under under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of the FIR. 18. Whereas in the present case, a perusal of charge sheet shows that the same is formal, short and cryptic. No details reasoning is given. The petitioner has duly challenged the same. 19. 18. Whereas in the present case, a perusal of charge sheet shows that the same is formal, short and cryptic. No details reasoning is given. The petitioner has duly challenged the same. 19. Similarly, in the case of Manjula Sinha (supra) as relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent, Hon’ble the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the question of quashing the FIR, does not arise as the charge sheet had been filed and the same was not in question, whereas, in the present case, the charge sheet has been duly challenged. 20. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Manjula Sinha (supra) in spite of the filing of the charge sheet, quashed the FIR under Section 498-A of IPC and concluded in para 11 as under:- “11. There are allegations contained in the FIR relating to the applicability of Section 406 IPC. If ultimately the prosecution is unable to substantiate the plea, the results would follow. It is a case where the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C cannot be exercised so far as the allegations relating to Section 406 IPC are concerned. But as noted, the position is different so far as Section 498-A IPC is concerned. Therefore, proceedings stand quashed so far as it relates to the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC.” 21. Thereby, confirming the view that each case shall have to be examined on its own facts. It is, therefore, evident that the Courts have consistently put an end to criminal proceedings which are an abuse of the process of Court, whether it is at the initial stage or at the summoning stage or even the charges have been framed. This Court, in the case of Lakhwinder Singh (supra) further held in para 19 as under :- “19. It, thus, becomes fairly evident that the courts have consistently put an end to criminal proceedings which are an abuse of the process of Court. At the initial stage, at the summoning stage and even after charges have been framed, the High Court has the inherent power to quash proceedings and to pass such orders as are necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. At the initial stage, at the summoning stage and even after charges have been framed, the High Court has the inherent power to quash proceedings and to pass such orders as are necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure contains a nonobstante clause to the effect that nothing in the Code of Criminal Procedure shall be deemed to limit the powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of Court. Therefore, filing of the charge-sheet in Court does not in any manner affect the amplitude of the wholesome jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure. The only rider being, that greater the power, greater the care and caution in exercise thereof.” 22. In the present case, it is evident as already discussed above that the petitioner has been enroped merely because she is the relative of the husband of the complainant. From the perusal of the above, it is evident that the allegations against the present petitioner is with respect to the comment made on the dark complexion of the complainant. The other allegations are general against all the accused. No specific allegation of demand of dowry is attributed to the present petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner is the Massi (aunt). She is married since long and staying separately. She is enroped only because she is the relative and sympathised with the in-laws of the complainant. It has become nature to enrope the entire family as a pressure tactic. Hence, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it would be just and expedient to quash the FIR No.170 dated 05.10.2008 under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC registered at Police Station Noormahal, District Jalandhar qua the present petitioner only and the Order dated 11.08.2009, vide which, the charge was ordered to be framed against the present petitioner. 23. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed. The FIR No.170 dated 05.10.2008 under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC registered at Police Station Noormahal, District Jalandhar and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom qua the present petitioner are, hereby, quashed. ----------------