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2010 DIGILAW 1839 (PAT)

Lata Kumari v. State Of Bihar

2010-08-13

NAVANITI PRASAD SINGH

body2010
JUDGEMENT 1. The petitioner challenges the order passed by the District Teachers Appointment Appellate Authority, Lahesriasarai. District- Darbhanga in Appeal Case no. 470 of 2009 being order dated 6.7.2010 2. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State, in view of the facts, which stands admitted, with their consent this case is being disposed of at this stage itself. 3. The petitioner was duly selected and appointed as Panchayat Teacher in the year 2007. One Madhu Kumari challenged her selection first before the Block Development Officer, who in terms of rule 18 of the Bihar Primary Panchayat Teacher (Appointment and Service of Condition) Rules, 2006 is the statutory authority to receive the complaint. Block Development Officer enquired into the matter and dismissed her complaint. The said Madhu Kumari then upon the Block Development Officer being replaced by the tribunal in the year 2009 filed the present appeal before the tribunal as also application before the Lokayukta, Bihar complaining about the same. The tribunal heard the matter and after examining the matter, by order dated 30.11.2008 dismissed her complaint once again though in the opinion of the Court the tribunal could not have entertained the complaint at all because it had earlier been dealt with by the Block Development Officer, who was the authority under Section 18 of the rules prior to the tribunal. Then pursuant to complaint, as made before the Lokayukta, office of Lokayukta asked the District Magistrate to enquire into the matter. The District Magistrate enquired into the matter and submitted a report that the selection of the petitioner was proper. Office of Lokayukta directed the tribunal to re-open the matter and re-hear the matter. It is pursuant to that the tribunal has reviewed its order and passed order dated 6.7.2010 by which the tribunal has now cancelled the appointment of the petitioner and directed one Priyanka Kumari, who was not even the applicant before the tribunal to be reinstated in place of the petitioner. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order of the tribunal itself is a final order. It is not subject to appeal or superintendence of any authority being a statutory quasi judicial authority except by way of superintendence by this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order of the tribunal itself is a final order. It is not subject to appeal or superintendence of any authority being a statutory quasi judicial authority except by way of superintendence by this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. He further submits that the tribunal being a statutory quasi judicial authority had no power of review. Thus on both the counts the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction. 5. Having considered the matter, in my view, the submissions, as made by learned counsel for the petitioner, are correct. Once the tribunal decided the matter it become functous officio. It is a statutory quasi judicial tribunal. No appeal or review is provided against the order of the tribunal nor the tribunal being conferred with power of review. Thus, the order of the tribunal is final subject to judicial review by this Court and not by any other authority. In this connection I may refer to notification no.3716, dated 23.10.2008 issued by the department of Human Resources Department, Govt. of Bihar, wherein having constituted the tribunal, the State Government provided for various functions and matter related to the tribunal. In the said notification, it is clearly pointed out that under clause Kh(xv) that the order passed by the tribunal is final and is not appeal-able before any authority. That being the position, the tribunal having decided the matter, it could not be reviewed by the tribunal except by this Court upon remand to reconsider the matter. The second point is also well taken that the tribunal being a statutory quasi judicial authority. It is well settled that substantive review is a power that can be conferred only by statute and in absence thereof there is no power of review. This matter has been dealt with by the Apex Court in the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd., V/s. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal & ors. Since reported in AIR 1981 SC 606 and in particular para 13 thereof. That being so, the impugned order of the tribunal dated 6.7.2010 passed on review in Case no. 470 of 2009, as aforesaid, is set aside. The writ application is accordingly allowed.