PRAKASH KRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, a private limited company, by means of the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has challenged the demand notice issued by the Deputy Commissioner (Assessment)11, Trade Tax, Ghaziabad demanding a sum of Rs. 2,61,912/- towards interest from the petitioner for the assessment year 1986-87 (provincial ). ( 2 ) ADDITIONAL tax liability for the assessment year 1986-87 (provincial) was created by the assessing officer. Being dis-satisfied with the assessment order, the matter was carried in appeal and further appeal and ultimately to this Court in str No. 1253 of 1991. The said STR was dismissed by the judgement dated 22-8-2003. On account of failure of the petitioner in the proceedings, referred to above, the department sought to recover the disputed balance amount towards trade tax liability as also the interest accrued thereon. Disputing its liability to pay the interest on the outstanding trade tax liability, the present writ petition has been filed on the allegations that the petitioner had already deposited full amount of disputed tax on 27-6-2000 and therefore, question of payment of any interest on the disputed amount does not arise. Reliance has been placed on certain decisions, such as, M/s J. K. Synthetics Limited v. C. T. O. , 1994 NTN (SC) 49, commissioner of Sales Tax v. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation, 1999 NTN Vol (14) 197 and Annapurna Biscuits Manufacturing Company v. State of U. P. and others, 1980 UPTC 1320. Besides the above, it has been further stated that in view of the Government order dated 22-3-2003, filed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition, the petitioner is not liable to pay any interest as it has deposited the principal amount of tax before 31-3-2002 and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled for grant of waiver of interest and penalty under the said G. O. ( 3 ) ACOUNTER-AFFIDAVIT has been filed on behalf of the respondents disputing the claim of the petitioner on the ground that the liability to pay the interest is statutory liability of the petitioner. A sum of Rs. 95,197/- is the balance amount of interest for the assessment year 1986-87. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition disputing its liability to pay the interest amounting to Rs. 2,61,912/- for the assessment year 1986-87 (provincial ). The said amount of interest was counted on the tax amount of the admitted turnover. A sum of Rs. 95,197/- is the balance amount of interest for the assessment year 1986-87. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition disputing its liability to pay the interest amounting to Rs. 2,61,912/- for the assessment year 1986-87 (provincial ). The said amount of interest was counted on the tax amount of the admitted turnover. It has been further stated that the controversy in the present writ petition stands concluded between the parties by the judgment given in STR Nos. 1253 and 1254 of 1991 decided on 22-8-2003. The present writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner should have filed special leave petition before the Apex Court against the judgment delivered in str Nos. 1253 and 1254 of 1991 whereby the revisions filed by the petitioner were dismissed. There is no bonafide dispute between the parties. The recovery certificate has been issued after the decision rendered in STR No. 1253 of 1991 for the interest amount of Rs. 2,61,912/ -. The Government order No. 1503 dated 22-3-2003 is applicable to only those dealers who have deposited the principal amount or part thereof during the period of the scheme. The waiver of interest is admissible only when the petitioner would have deposited the principal amount or part thereof during 22-3-2003 to 30-6-2003 or during expended period from 1 -1 -2004 to 29-2-2004. The present petition has been filed on untenable grounds. In the rejoinder affidavit, the contents of the writ petition have been reiterated. ( 4 ) HEARD Sri Bharatji Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Sri U. K. Pandey, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. ( 5 ) SRI Bharatji Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is not liable to pay any interest; firstly, because it raised bonafide dispute regarding classification of the goods in question. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Hindustan aluminium Corporation, 1999 NTN (Vol. 14) 197. Secondly, in view of the G. O. dated 22-3-2003, the petitioner having deposited the disputed amount even before issuance of the said G. O. , the petitioner is entitled for grant of waiver of interest. ( 6 ) WE have given careful consideration to the aforesaid submissions of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, but do not find any substance in either of them. ( 6 ) WE have given careful consideration to the aforesaid submissions of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, but do not find any substance in either of them. ( 7 ) THE question of payment of interest in the present writ petition relates to the assessment year 1986-87 (U. P.) Whether the petitioner is liable to pay interest or not, should have been challenged in the proceedings which had arisen out of the assessment order upto this Court in STR No. 1253 of 1991. The said plea could have been and ought to have been raised in those proceedings. Having been unsuccessful therein, the filing of the present petition disputing the liability to pay the interest against the demand notice is wholly misconceived one and it amounts to abuse of process of the Court. No satisfactory reply was given as to why the said point was not urged before this Court or before any of the authorities, below to the High Court, giving rise to STR Nos. 1253 and 1254 of 1991. The payment of interest on unpaid or outstanding trade tax amount is statutory liability of a dealer under the provisions of U. P. Trade Tax Act. If the petitioner had any grievance in this regard, it should have raised for its redressal in the proceedings which ultimately culminated in STR No. 1253 of 1991. Having failed to do so, the present writ petition is not maintainable as the order demanding interest has already attained finality so far as this Court is concerned in STR Nos. 1253 and 1254 of 1991. No writ or direction can be issued in the subsequent proceedings by means of a fresh writ petition. ( 8 ) EVEN otherwise also on merits, we do not find any substance in the writ petition. The decision given by the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of sales Tax v. Hindustan Aluminimum Corporation (supra) cannot be applied to the facts of the present case due to lack of necessary pleadings and material in the present case. The petitioner, for the reasons best known to it, has not cared to annex the copies of assessment order, order of first appellate authority or that of second appellate authority to show the nature of dispute involved in the earlier proceedings. The petitioner, for the reasons best known to it, has not cared to annex the copies of assessment order, order of first appellate authority or that of second appellate authority to show the nature of dispute involved in the earlier proceedings. On the other hand, we find that in para-6 of the writ petition, a passing reference has been made that demand of tax under U. P. Trade Tax Act as well as Central Sales Tax for the assessment year 1986-87 was created on the ground that the petitioner has failed to furnish requisite declaration form. ( 9 ) A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Annapurna Biscuits manufacturing Company v. State of U. P. and others (supra) has held that non furnishing of declaration form to entitle a dealer to claim exemption from or payment of lower rate of tax, amounts the admitted tax liability and the interest is, therefore, chargeable. ( 10 ) SHANKAR Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat, AIR 1970 sc 1 is the authority for the proposition that if a revision has been dismissed by the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, a fresh petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. The order of the authority below sought to be revised in the revision merges in the judgment of the High court delivered in the revision. It has been held that when aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the court below. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider, and larger sense. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider, and larger sense. It has been further held that even on the assumption that the order of the appellate court had not merged in the order which disposed of the revision petition, a writ petition ought not to be entertained, by the High Court when the petitioner had already chosen the remedy under Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure. If there are two modes of invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court and one of those modes has been chosen and exhausted it would not be a proper and sound exercise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of proceedings in respect of the same order of the subordinate court. ( 11 ) THE principle delineated above by the Apex Court is fully attracted on the facts of the present case. By filing revision under section 11 of U. P. Trade Tax Act, the petitioner invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. Having invoked revisional jurisdiction of this Court, it would not be sound exercise of discretion to entertain the present petition or grant any relief to the petitioner in view of the principle of law, as discussed above. ( 12 ) BESIDES the above, by means of the present petition, the petitioner has sought quashing of notice of demand of interest. It has not sought quashing of any order. Presumably, the petitioner was conscious that the order which had attained finality could not be challenged in the writ petition. Awrit petition against a notice of demand is not entertainable for the reason that a demand notice is consequential to an order. If an order cannot be challenged for one reason or the other, by no stretch of imagination, a consequential order could be challenged in a writ petition. ( 13 ) IN view of the above, on merits also, we do not find any substance in the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. ( 14 ) THE next and the last point urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that in view of the GO. dated 22-3-2003, the petitioner is entitled for waiver of the interest amount. ( 14 ) THE next and the last point urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that in view of the GO. dated 22-3-2003, the petitioner is entitled for waiver of the interest amount. In the case on hand, it may be noticed that the petitioner did not deposit the trade tax in pursuance of the said G. O. On the contrary in para-13 of the writ petition it has been stated that the petitioner had deposited the disputed amount of tax much before cut off date as provided in the said G. O. ( 15 ) ON a plain reading of the G. O. dated 22-3-2003, it would show that the said G. O. is applicable only in respect of the dispute on the outstanding tax liability during the period 1-1-2004 to 28-2-2004. The very opening clause of the said G. O. provides that it shall be applicable in respect of such outstanding dues which were due as on 31 -3-2002. In other words, the scheme was issued only in respect of those dealers who were in tax arrears on 31-3-2002. By the scheme, it has been provided that payment of outstanding liability within the specified period in the specified manner will attract the remission from interest as specified in the scheme. Indisputably, according to own showing of the petitioner, it was not in arrears of tax on 31-3-2000. The petitioner had deposited the outstanding dues between 24-12-1991 to 27-6-2000 as per its application, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-5 to the writ petition. To put it differently, on the date of commencement of the said G. O. , the petitioner was not in tax arrears and, therefore, the view taken by the respondents that the said G. O. is not applicable to the petitioner is perfectly justified and calls for no interference. ( 16 ) NO other point was pressed. ( 17 ) NO doubt, the present writ petition has been resorted to as as a "buying-time" tactic. More realistic approach relating to costs may be the need of the hour. The petitioner has obtained a conditional stay order on 13-9-2004. The order provides that on deposit of Rs. 1,75,000/- within one month from the date of the order, the operation of the impugned demand contained in the letter dated 25-9-2004 through the petition shall remain stayed. More realistic approach relating to costs may be the need of the hour. The petitioner has obtained a conditional stay order on 13-9-2004. The order provides that on deposit of Rs. 1,75,000/- within one month from the date of the order, the operation of the impugned demand contained in the letter dated 25-9-2004 through the petition shall remain stayed. It is also equally settled that if the petition is being dismissed, the petitioner should restore back the advantages which it had obtained under the interim order. It is, therefore, provided that the petitioner will be liable to pay interest by way of additional sum over and above the amount which may be payable under U. P. Trade Tax Act at the rate of 6% simple interest per annum on the balance amount for the period from 13-9-2004 (the day on which the stay order was obtained) to the date of actual payment. ( 18 ) WITH the aforesaid condition, the writ petition is dismissed. .