Vinod Prasad, J. - Challenge in this Habeas Corpus Writ Petition by the detenu petitioner Shahzad s/o Hazi Istiyaque R/o Nagla Baari, P.S. Ramgarh, dis­trict Firozabad, is his detention order dated 30.6.2008, passed by Detaining Authority District Magistrate, Firozabad, respondent No. 2, in exercise of his power under sec­tion 3 (3) of National Security Act 1980 (Act No. 65 of 1980) annexure 1, to this Habeas Corpus Petition. 2. A ghastly and mind boggling in­cident occurred on 14.5.2008, on which date Km. Nisha alias Guddi, an adolescent girl aged about 11 years, daughter of Pramod Kumar Kushwaha, left her house at 9.00 a.m. to purchase hair band in a locality shop. While she was passing in front of Salam Waris alias Gattey's house in Mohalla Bari Chhapaiti, within the area of P.S. South, district Firozabad, she (Nisha alias Guddi) was dragged inside his house by said Salam Wans alias Gattey, who not only ravished her chastity but thereafter murdered her, thrusted his corps into a plastic bag and disposed it off in a sewer­age drain. The dead body of the unfortu­nate deceased girl was recovered on 16.5.2008, which resulted in lodging of a FIR of Crime No. 209 of 2008 by Smt. Kanti Devi, mother of the deceased, on the same day at P.S. South, district Firozabad, under section 364,302,201IPC. 3. Registration of crime commenced the investigation, during the course of which statements of witnesses Man Singh, Chandra Bhan Singh, Vijai Anand, Mahesh Kumar were penned clown. Post Mortem Report was copied, statement of doctor who had conducted the autopsy on the body was noted and such investigation re­vealed the complicity of Salam Waris alias Gattey as the main perpetrator of the afore­said crime. Investigation also revealed complicity of Jainul as socio criminis in the said dastardly cowardice act of murder and concealment of dead body, as the role of aforesaid Jainul was to help Salam Waris alias Gattey in putting the corps of the de­ceased in a bag and disposing it off in a sewerage drain at Chandrawar gate, from which place the dead body was recovered on 16.5.2008. 4. 4. Salam Waris alias Gattey when was arrested on 21.5.2008 in connection with the said crime that the detenu petitioner along with his 50-60 associates formed an unlawful assembly and led a demonstration protesting against the arrest of Salim Waris alias Gattey and in that protest attacked Laxmi Narayan Kushwaha at 12 noon by blunt object and also resorted to murderous assault by firing at him. FIR of the said assault was lodged on the same day i.e. 21.5.2008 at 1 p.m. at P.S. South, district Firozabad by Laxmi Narayan Kushwaha himself, mentioning the detenu petitioner and seven other persons, as the malefactors, which FIR by was registered as Crime No. 218 of 2008, under sections 147,148,149,307,323,506,336, 504,382 IPC and section 7 of Criminal Law Amendment Act. The activity of the detenu petitioner along with the co-accused persons breached and disturbed public order and pervaded communal tension. In the afore­said crime recorded statements of Laxmi Narayan Kushwaha, Pramod Kumar Kushwaha and Kanti Devi indicated that because of daring activity of the petitioner with his associates a sense of terror and insecurity imbibed in the minds of the public, shops were closed, doors and win­dows of the houses were closed and even tempo of the public life, public peace and tranquility were shattered. To maintain public order, extra police force and PAC were requisitioned from various police stations and were deployed in the said area Ban Chapaiti, which fact was also recorded in GD No. 21 dated 21.5.2008 at 10 a.m. 5. Because of the above mentioned activity FIR of Crime No. 219/08, under sections 147,148,149, 356, 353-A, 353 and 7 of Criminal Law Amendment Act was also lodged by Station Officer, P.S. South Firozabad on the same day, at 8.45 p.m. against the petitioner along with eight others named with 50-60 unnamed accused per­sons. Against the petitioner detenu another FIR of Crime No. 220 of 2008, under section 2/3 Gangster Act was also registered on the same day at 11.45 a.m. at the same po­lice station with S.O. P.S. South Firozabad being the informant. Both the aforesaid FIRs of Crime No. 219/08 and 220/08 have been appended as annexures 4 and 5 to this Habeas Corpus Writ Petition. Along with the FIR under Gangster's Act, a gang chart in detenu's respect has also been ap­pended. 6. Both the aforesaid FIRs of Crime No. 219/08 and 220/08 have been appended as annexures 4 and 5 to this Habeas Corpus Writ Petition. Along with the FIR under Gangster's Act, a gang chart in detenu's respect has also been ap­pended. 6. In both Crime No. 218/08 and 219 of 2008 petitioner detenu with his other co-accused Mohd. Sualeen and Shahnawaz were allowed bail by Sessions Judge, Firo­zabad on 2.6.2008 vide annexure 7 and 8 to this petition. 7. The police of Police Station South Firozabad was of the opinion that the ac­tivity of the petitioner had got the poten­tiality of disturbing peace order and tranquility of the society therefore it prepared a dossier for detention of the petitioner un­der National Security Act, 1980 and sub­mitted it before the District Magistrate, Fi­rozabad, respondent No. 2, through its higher officers. District Magistrate after going through the said dossier formed an opinion that there were sufficient grounds to believe that the activities of the peti­tioner were such, which had got the poten­tiality of disturbing public peace and nor­mal life, that he passed the detention order of the petitioner under National Security Act, 1980 (herein after referred to as the Act) exercising his power under sub­section (3) of section 3 of the Act on 30.6.2008 vide Annexure 1 to this petition. 8. Grounds of detention which are incorporated in Annexure 2 to this Habeas Corpus Petition, were served on the petitioner same day and a perusal of the same indicate that the detention of the petitioner was made because his activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and his activities had disturbed the tempo of public life and normalcy of public order had shattered. For the sake of brev­ity, we do not register the grounds of de­tention in detail but record a synopsis of the same herein below: - 9. Ground No. 1 contains the neces­sary facts regarding the murder of Km. Nisha alias Guddi on 14.5.2008 by Salam Waris alias Gattey and concealment of her dead body in a bag and disposing it off in a sewerage drain. It further mentions the re­covery of the dead body and lodging of the murder FIR on 16.5.2008 by the mother of the deceased. 10. Nisha alias Guddi on 14.5.2008 by Salam Waris alias Gattey and concealment of her dead body in a bag and disposing it off in a sewerage drain. It further mentions the re­covery of the dead body and lodging of the murder FIR on 16.5.2008 by the mother of the deceased. 10. Ground No. 2 mentions the fact regarding the investigation conducted in pursuance of the aforesaid murder FIR (crime No. 209/08) and recording of state­ments of witnesses and deciphering of the complicity of Salam Waris alias Gattey in the aforesaid crime as the main accused with Jainul as the co-accused. It also men­tions the fact of lodging of FIR by the mother of the deceased and the factum of arrest of Salam Waris alias Gattey on 21.5.2008. This ground further mentions that the petitioner detenu had resisted the arrest of Salam Waris alias Gattey and had assaulted Laxmi Narayan along with his associates by resorting the firing, brick bats, and use of blunt objects regarding which FIR of Crime No. 218/08 was registered at the police station. The said ground further records that the statements of Laxmi Narayan Kushwaha, Pramod Kumar Kushwaha and Smt. Kanti Devi were re­corded under section 161 Cr. P.C. who had supported the dare devil activities of the petitioner along with his associates. They had further stated that such activities had created a sense of terror and insecurity in the minds of general public resulting in closure of shops, business establishments, doors and windows of the houses of the locality and total disturbance of tranquility of public life. 11. Ground No. 3 records the distur­bance of public order and the fact of deployment of PAC and additional police force for maintaining public order in the locality which fact was recorded in GD No. 21 dated 21.5.2008 at 10 A.M. 12. Ground No. 4 disclosed that be­cause of the activities of the petitioner, the market of Lal Chowk, Ban Chapaiti and oth­ers business and commercial places were closed. A sense of insecurity and terror en­gulfed these localities and the even tempo public life was dislocated. Ground No. 4 disclosed that be­cause of the activities of the petitioner, the market of Lal Chowk, Ban Chapaiti and oth­ers business and commercial places were closed. A sense of insecurity and terror en­gulfed these localities and the even tempo public life was dislocated. Ground No. 5 records that the peti­tioner detenu was arrested on 21.5.2008 and was in district jail Firozabad from where he was endeavouring to be released on bail, as 3rd July 2009, was the date fixed before the Special Judge, Gangster Act for hearing of his bail application and there was every likely hood of the detenu peti­tioner being released on bail. It further mentioned that, if released on bail, there is every likely hood of the detenu being again indulge in such activity to disturb the pub­lic order and therefore it was essential to stop him from acting in any manner preju­dicial to the maintenance of public order or dislocate even tempo of public life and further that it is not in the public interest as well as in the interest of public tranquility to keep the petitioner detenu free. 13. Ground No. 6 records that for the above referred to reasons, collectively and severely, the Detaining Authority (District Magistrate) had reached subjective satis­faction that the petitioner must be detained under the Act and therefore he had passed the detention order of the petitioner. This Ground No. 6 further mentions that detenu was informed regarding vesting of right in him to make representations to the State Government, Advisory Board, Central Government and for that purposes detenu can send such representations through Su­perintendent, District Jail. He was also in­formed that representation to the Advisory Board can be handed over to the Superin­tendent Jail to be dispatched to the Advi­sory Board and representation to the Union of India can be addressed to the Secretary, Government of India', Ministry of Home (Internal Security Department), North Block, New Delhi. The detenu was also in­formed that under section 10 of the Act his matter will be referred to the Advisory Committee within three weeks and if above referred representation is received later then it will not be considered. The detenu petitioner was also informed that he has got a right of personal hearing as well un­der section 11 (1) of the Act and for that purpose, if the detenu desires, he can make a specific prayer in his representation. 14. The detenu petitioner was also informed that he has got a right of personal hearing as well un­der section 11 (1) of the Act and for that purpose, if the detenu desires, he can make a specific prayer in his representation. 14. From the counter affidavit filed by the District Magistrate, State Government, Jail Superintendent and Union of India, it transpires that the petitioner detenu after being served the grounds of detention on 30.6.2008, made a representation on 7.7.2008, Annexure 9 to this Habeas Corpus Petition. The said representation was served in the office of the District Magis­trate, Firozabad on the same day. The Dis­trict Magistrate called for the comments from the sponsoring authority, Senior Su­perintendent of Police, Firozabad, who submitted his comments on the following day i.e. on 8.7.2008 and there after the De­taining Authority prepared para wise comments and forwarded it to the State Government through special messenger on the same day. He also dispatched it to the Central Government through speed post on that day itself. The Detaining Authority considered detenu's representation on 8.7.2008 and rejected it on the same day. According to the counter affidavit of the Detaining Authority, detenu's case was considered by the Advisory Board by giv­ing him personal hearing and after receiv­ing its opinion, the State Government had confirmed the detention of the petitioner on 22.8.2008. 15. It transpires from the counter affi­davit filed by the State Government that petitioner's representation dated 7.7.2008 was received to the State Government on 10.7.2008 and after preparation of para wise comments the same was sent to the Advisory Board and to the Central Gov­ernment on 10.7.2008 through two separate letters albeit, Central Government was in­formed through speed post. 16. Concerned section of the State Government examined the matter and pre­pared a detailed note on 11.7.2008 and the Under Secretary, Home (Confidential) examined it on 11.7.2008 itself. 12th and 13th July 2008 were holidays and therefore the Joint Secretary, State Government, exam­ined it on 15.7.2008. Subsequent thereto the Secretary examined the representation on 16.7.2008 and after due, consideration, the State Government rejected petitioner's rep­resentation on 16.7.2008. Since 17.7.2008 being birthday of Hazrat Ali, was a holi­day, therefore the rejection of detenu's rep­resentation was communicated to him on 18.7.2008 by the State Government through a radiogram. Subsequent thereto the Secretary examined the representation on 16.7.2008 and after due, consideration, the State Government rejected petitioner's rep­resentation on 16.7.2008. Since 17.7.2008 being birthday of Hazrat Ali, was a holi­day, therefore the rejection of detenu's rep­resentation was communicated to him on 18.7.2008 by the State Government through a radiogram. State Government's counter affidavit further mentions that detention order dated 30.6.2008 along with connected papers forwarded by the District Magis­trate were received to it on 1.7.2008 and the State Government after examining every aspect had approved the detenu's deten­tion on 4.7.2008, in consonance with section 3 (4) of the Act which was communicated to the detenu vide radiogram dated 7.7.2008, within 12 days. The said counter affidavit further indicates that the State Government observed section 3 (5) of the Act by informing the Central Government by speed post on 8.7.2008 within seven days of its approval regarding petitioner's detention. State's counter further brings on record that Advisory Board considered petitioner's case on 4.8.2008 and its opinion was received in the concerned section of the State Government through Registrar U.P. Advisory Board (detention's) vide fet­ter dated 14.8.2008. The State Government thereafter examined the case of the peti­tioner afresh and after forming an opinion that there were sufficient reasons to detain the petitioner confirmed the detention or­der of the petitioner who was to be de­tained for a period of 12 months from the date of his actual detention i.e. 30.6.2008. The said confirmation under section 12 of the Act was informed to the detenu peti­tioner. 17. Counter affidavit filed by Union of India indicates that Union of India has considered the case of the petitioner with­out any unreasonable delay and had re­jected his representation on 21.7.2008. De­tenu's file was received back in the con­cerned section on 28.7.2008 and thereafter detenu was informed about the rejection of his representation through wireless mes­sage on the same day which was succeeded by a letter dated 30.7.2008 for the said pur­pose. 18. Counter affidavit filed by Deputy Jailer indicates that the petitioner detenu was admitted in District Jail, Firozabad on 22.5.2008 in pursuance of remand and custody warrant ordered by CJM, Firoza­bad in Crime No. 218/08. 18. Counter affidavit filed by Deputy Jailer indicates that the petitioner detenu was admitted in District Jail, Firozabad on 22.5.2008 in pursuance of remand and custody warrant ordered by CJM, Firoza­bad in Crime No. 218/08. It further records that the detention order was served upon the petitioner along with the grounds and all other relevant materials on the same day, on which it was received in jail i.e. 30.6.2008 and the contents of the same were read over and explained to the detenu and he was also informed regarding his rights in respect of his representation. Counter affidavit of Dy. Jailer further indicates that the State Government had approved the detention on 7.7.2008, which communica­tion was received through radiogram dated 14.7.2008 and the petitioner was informed about the same day. Rejection of the repre­sentation by District Magistrate was also informed to the petitioner detenu on the same day. It further mentions that the de­tenu was sent to Lucknow for personal hearing before Advisory Board and order of confirmation was communicated to the detenu petitioner on 23.8.2008. 19. On the above facts, we have heard Sri Umesh Chandra Mishra, learned Coun­sel in support of this Habeas Corpus Peti­tion, Sri J.K. Sisodia, learned AGA on be­half of Detaining Authority, State Govern­ment and Jail Superintendent and Sri Triloki Singh, advocate learned Standing Counsel representing Union of India, re­spondent No. 4. 20. Sri U.C. Mishra learned Counsel for the petitioner challenged the detention order only on one ground viz the activity of the petitioner was relatable only to law and order and not public order. Sri Mishra contended that the petitioner detenu was the Secretary of Lokjan-Shakti political party and he had no criminal history and therefore detaining authority had exercised his power under the Act maliciously due to political reasons. Sri Mishra vehemently argued that it is a case of no injury and the FIR lodged by Laxmi Narayan Kushwaha was a false one. Sri Mishra also submitted that exercise of power by Detaining Authority was vindictive in nature. Sri Mishra vehemently argued that it is a case of no injury and the FIR lodged by Laxmi Narayan Kushwaha was a false one. Sri Mishra also submitted that exercise of power by Detaining Authority was vindictive in nature. It was further submitted that the detention order was used as tool to restrain the petitioner from coming out of jail after being released on bail, as on the same day i.e. 21.5.2008, the other two First Information Reports were also registered against the petitioner, at the same police station, both lodged by Station House Officer, at 8.15 p.m. and the other at 11.45 p.m. vide Annexures 4 and 5 to this petition. The former FIR was regis­tered under section 147, 148, 149, 356, 353A, 353 IPC and section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, whereas the latter one was registered under section 2/3 Gangster Act. Sri U.C. Mishra submitted that the act of the police in submitting the dossier to the Detaining Authority and sub­sequent order without any second thought indicates that the whole exercise of power by Ihe Detaining Authority was vindictive and malicious. Sri Mishra argued that since nobody had received any injury and activ­ity of the petitioner can be bracketed only as law and order problem and not public order consequently exercise of power of detention under the Act is illegal and de­tention order be quashed. 21. Learned AGA, as well Standing Counsel on behalf of Union of India, per contra, contended that the activity of the detenu petitioner was relatable only to public order. They harangued that activity of the detenu was to resist by armed force of half a century persons the arrest of such a accused person, who had not only raped the adolescent girl aged about 11 years but had even murdered her, concealed her body in a bag and had disposed it off in a sewerage drain. Both the learned counsels submitted that the act of the petitioner in forcing the release of such an arrested accused of rape and murder case, only be­cause of caste and religious affinity, had disturbed the tempo of even social life and therefore, District Magistrate was well within his right to detain the petitioner de­tenu. They contended that this Court can not go behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority before whom there were sufficient materials to detain the petitioner. They contended that this Court can not go behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority before whom there were sufficient materials to detain the petitioner. Both the Counsel submitted that this Habeas Corpus petition is meritless and deserves rejection. 22. We have cogitated over rival con­tentions and have gone through the record of this Habeas Corpus Petition. The ground which has been harangued before us lies in determination of a single issue as to whether the activities of the detenu peti­tioner lies within the realm of "Law and Order" or "Public Order". 23. The two concepts of "Law and Order" and "Public Order" are different from each other and therefore have to be understood in that context. Every contra­vention of Law or any activity which is not a damnum, is a "Law and Order" problem which has got widest amplitude in its application. "Law and Order" problem can be in personum or can be in rem or section thereof. It can affect a single individual or it can affect a section of society or society at large. "Public Order", however, is such a species of "Law and Order" which has got the potentiality of disturbing the public life or a section of society or society at large. It does not take into it's purview a single in­dividual. It affects a conglomeration of people, far and near, collectively or sever­ally. The distinction between the two lies in the potentiality of the act in it's reach. The outcome and effect of the nature of the act on the society is the determinative aspect of "Public Order" and not so much the activ­ity itself. The potentiality of it's affect on the society or a section thereof is what is important and determinative factor in de­ciding "Public Order" in contradiction with "Law and Order". Every unlawful activity is infringement of "Law and Order" but not "Public Order". Breach of "Public Order" is necessarily breach of "Law and Order" but not vise versa. An unlawful act which does not disturb even tempo of social life of a society or section thereof falls outside the scope of "Public Order". It can safely be said that "Law and Order" is a genus of which "Public Order" is a species. Concep­tually, this distinction has been recognized by ail the Courts where this aspect of the matter was mooted for it's consideration. It can safely be said that "Law and Order" is a genus of which "Public Order" is a species. Concep­tually, this distinction has been recognized by ail the Courts where this aspect of the matter was mooted for it's consideration. Without burdening this judgement we refer the decision of the Apex Court on Ms aspect of the matter i.e. Collector and District Magistrate v. S. Sultan, AIR 2008 SC 2096 wherein the apex Court has held as follows: - "11. So far as the question as to whether the public order was involved, the grounds of detention elaborately described the acts which created dangerous and terrorized situa­tions in the village and frequently disturbed public peace and public order because of the acts of vio­lence and danger was caused to the lives of the villagers. In all these instances deadly weapons were used causing injuries to various persons. 12. The crucial issue, therefore, is whether the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to public order. While the expression 'law and or­der' is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order. 'Public order' has a nar­rower ambit, and public order could be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the ' even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a speci­fied locality. The distinction be­tween the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' is one of the de­gree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the commu­nity which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public or­der. If a contravention in its .effect is confined only to a few individu­als directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise problem of law and or­der only. It is the length, magni­tude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting 'public order' from that concerning 'law and order'. The question to ask is: "Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed" ? The question to ask is: "Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed" ? This question has to be faced in every case on its facts. 13. "Public order" is what the French call 'order publique' and is some­thing more than ordinary mainte­nance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the soci­ety undisturbed? (See Kanu Biswas v. State of West Bengal) AIR 1972 SC 1656 . 14. "Public order" is synonymous with public safety and tranquility: "it is the absence of disorder involving breaches of local significance in contradistinction to national up­heavals, such as revolution, civil strife, war, affecting the security of the State". Public order if dis­turbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were dis­turbing public order Disorder is no doubt prevented by the mainte­nance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum, which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic hap­penings. (See Dr. Ram Manohar Io­nia v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1966 SC 740 .) 15. 'Public Order', 'law and order' and the 'security of the State' fictionally draw three concentric circles, the largest representing law and order, the next representing public order and the smallest representing se­curity of the State. Every infraction of law must necessarily affect order, but an act affecting law and order may not necessarily also affect the public order. Likewise, an act may affect public order, but not neces­sarily the security of the State. The true test is not the kind, but the po­tentiality of the act in question. Every infraction of law must necessarily affect order, but an act affecting law and order may not necessarily also affect the public order. Likewise, an act may affect public order, but not neces­sarily the security of the State. The true test is not the kind, but the po­tentiality of the act in question. One act may affect only individuals while the other, though of a similar kind, may have such an impact that it would disturb the even tempo of the life of the community. This does not mean that there can be no over­lapping, in the sense that an act can­not fall under two concepts at the same time. An act, for instance, af­fecting public order may have an impact that it would affect both pub­lic order and the security of the State. [See Kishori Mohan Bera v. The State of West Bengal. 1972 (3) SCC 845 . Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal. 1969 (2) SCR 635 . Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal. 1970 (3) SCR 288 . Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal. AIR 1972 SC 1749 . 16. The distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has been pointed out succinctly in Arun Ghosh's case (supra). According to that decision the true distinction between the areas of 'law and or­der' and 'public order' is "one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question upon society". The Court pointed out that "the act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different". (See Babul Miira alias Anil Mitra v. State of West Bengal and others. 1973 (1) SCC 393 = AIR 1973 SC 197 . Milan Banik v. State of West Bengal). 1974 (4) SCC 504 . 17. The true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the de­gree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only, and there­fore touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only, and there­fore touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact on society, it may be very different. 18. The two concepts have well de­fined contours, it being well estab­lished that stray and unorganized crimes of theft and assault are not matters of public order since they do not tend to affect the even flow of public life. Infractions of law are bound in some measure to lead to disorder but every infraction of law does not necessarily result in pub­lic disorder. Law and order repre­sents the largest scale within which is the next circle representing pub­lic order and the smallest circle represents the security of State. "Law and order" comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order" just as "public order" comprehends dis­orders of less gravity than those af­fecting "security of State". [See Kuso Sah v. The State of Bihar and otters. 1974 (1) SCC 185 . Harpreet Kaur v. State of Ma­harashtra, 1992 (2) SCC 177 . T.K. Gopal v. State of Karnataka. 2000 (41) ACC 111 (SC). State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub). 1980 (2) SCR 1158 . 24. On such a exposition of law, when we critically appreciate the facts of present Habeas Corpus petition, we find mat the detenu petitioner took law in his hand armed with fire arms and various other weapons, to overawe the police force, who was discharging its legal responsibility of confining in custody an arrested accused of rape and murder offences. The deceased belonged to another religion and commu­nity whereas the accused, the petitioner and his associate other members of unlaw­ful assembly belonged to other community. The activity of the detenu in endeavouring to get an arrested accused of rape and murder offence freed by forming of an un­lawful assembly armed with fire arms and in that process resorting to firing and causing injuries to a person of other com­munity ternished the peace and tranquility of public life to such an extant that even tempo of social life was completely de­stroyed. Additional police force was de­ployed with PAC to bring normalcy to the public life. We add a note here, that in determining whether the activity is purviewed within the ambit of "Public Order" or not? surrounding and attending cir­cumstances, can be legitimately taken into consideration as only those circumstances can indicate result and ambit of the activity on the public life. The effect of any activity is a non- tangible abstract aspect which has to be gathered from attending circum­stances and therefore while judging dis­ruption and effect on public life of any ac­tivity for breach of "Public Order", normal behaviour of people and normal code of human conduct can be pressed into consid­eration to determine real outcome of the activity and it's effect on the society. Here, in the present case, there was a danger of riots between the two communities. Anger and tempers run so high that normal life of the society was thrown out of gear. The activity of the detenu petitioner of making murderous assault on the person of other community in an endeavour to get freed arrested accused by the police, promiscu­ously, without any if and but, had the po­tentiality of affecting public life. This aspect was also registered by the police in the General diary of the police station which are incorporated in the grounds of deten­tion. It was the activity of the detenu that created Public Order problem. Had the detenu not taken to streets armed with fire arms with 50-60 other hoodlums and did rioting, probably the situation would have been otherwise. In our view this rioting was done by the detenu, in conjunction with main accused which was well per­vaded with the concept of disturbance of "Public Order". We find ourselves unable to countenance the argument raised by Sri Misra, learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the activity of the petitioner lies only within the realm of "I am and Order" prob­lem and not "Public Order". No material has been brought before us to think that the grounds mentioned by the Detaining Authority do not contain correct statements of facts and therefore, we find that the ma­terial placed before the Detaining Author­ity was sufficient enough to come to a sub­jective satisfaction that there were sufficient grounds to detain the petitioner. No material has been brought before us to think that the grounds mentioned by the Detaining Authority do not contain correct statements of facts and therefore, we find that the ma­terial placed before the Detaining Author­ity was sufficient enough to come to a sub­jective satisfaction that there were sufficient grounds to detain the petitioner. Detenu, who was attached with a political party gave the colour of law and order situation to public order problem by coalescing frac­tional fanatics to take law in their own hands. In this respect we refer the decision of the apex Court in Golam Hussain Alias Gama, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and others, AIR 1974 SC 1336 . In para 12 of the said judgement Apex Court has held as fol­lows: - "12. Shri Chatterjee took up the further position that the detention in the case on hand was founded on pre­vention of public disorder while the acts imputed to the petitioner ex facie were aimed at a particular person, and not the public gener­ally. Lohia's case, (1966) 1 SCR 709 = AIR 1966 SC 740 and other rulings were said to reinforce this stance. The law is plain and the decided cases are concordant. A criminal act hitting a private target such as indecent assault of a woman or slapping a neighbour or knocking down a pedestrian while driving, may not shake up public order. But a drunk with a drawn knife chasing a woman in a public street and all women running in panic, a Hindu or Muslim in a crowded place at a time of communal tension throwing a bomb at a personal enemy of the other religion and the people, all scared; fleeing the area, a striking worker armed with a dagger stabbing a blackleg during a bitter strike spreading terror these are invasions of public order although the motivation may be against a particular private individual. The nature of the act, the circumstances of its complaint the impact on people around and such like factors constitute the pathology of public disorder. We cannot isolate the act from its public setting or analyses its molecules as in a laboratory but take its total effect on the flow of or­derly life. It may be a question of the degree and quality of the activity, of the sensitivity of the situation and the psychic response of the involved peo­ple. We cannot isolate the act from its public setting or analyses its molecules as in a laboratory but take its total effect on the flow of or­derly life. It may be a question of the degree and quality of the activity, of the sensitivity of the situation and the psychic response of the involved peo­ple. To dissect further is to defeat the purpose of social defence which is the paramount purpose of preventive de­tention." (Emphasis supplied). 25. The residue of the above discus­sion is that the activity of the detenu peti­tioner was relatable to "Public Order" and since his activities had dislocated and dis­turbed the "Public Life", Detaining Authority, District Magistrate, Firozabad, respondent No. 2, was fully justified in de­taining him under the NSA for mainte­nance of public order. 26. This Habeas Corpus Petition being bereft of any merit is dismissed. Petition Dismissed.