Indian Garnet Sand Company Pvt. Ltd. , rep. By its Managing Director v. State of Tamil Nadu rep. By its Secretary Industries Department Chennai
2010-04-20
P.JYOTHIMANI
body2010
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The writ petition is directed against the order of the second respondent dated 23.10.2009, by which the second respondent granted mining lease for garnet to an extent of 2.08.0 hectares in Appanallur Village, Thottiam taluk, Trichy District in favour of the fourth respondent for a period of 20 years. The relevant survey numbers and extent as per the order reads as follows: Village S.F.No. Extent Appanallur 57/10F 0.11.5 58/8E1 0.14.5 58/8E4 0.05.5 58/8E5 0.17.5 59/1E 0.28.5 59/1F 0.16.0 59/3C 0.07.5 59/2E 0.82.0 59/3A 0.25.5 Total 2.08.0 2. The petitioner, a company registered under the Companies Act carrying on the business of mining of garnet sand in patta and Government lands, has applied for the grant of mining lease for garnet sand in the said village and Poolancheri village in Trichy District in the year 1996. After making necessary survey and obtaining a report from the Geologist, no lease was granted and hence, the petitioner approached this Court earlier and there was a direction to consider the application of the petitioner and even thereafter, the application was not considered which resulted in filing a contempt application and when the contempt application was pending, the first respondent returned the application of the petitioner. a) In the said contempt application, on filing a sub-application by the petitioner, the order of return was set aside and this Court directed the first respondent to grant lease. It is stated that against the said order, the first respondent filed an appeal before the Division Bench, which directed the respondents to consider the application of the petitioner and pass orders. It was, thereafter, on 16.8.2005, the lease was granted, under which the petitioner commenced the mining operations. b)It is the case of the petitioner that the 4th respondent is a rival company, against whom certain complaints were given and public interest litigations were filed on the basis that the 4th respondent was disturbing the lawful mining operations of the petitioner in various places like, Tuticorin and Trichy. The petitioner has realized that the 4th respondent applied for mining operations in the land to an extent of 2.07 hectares in Appanallur village and 2.08.5 hectares in Poolancheri village in Trichy District and the said applications were hurriedly considered by the second respondent, who granted the clearance in respect of Appanallur village lands.
The petitioner has realized that the 4th respondent applied for mining operations in the land to an extent of 2.07 hectares in Appanallur village and 2.08.5 hectares in Poolancheri village in Trichy District and the said applications were hurriedly considered by the second respondent, who granted the clearance in respect of Appanallur village lands. c) It is stated that the mining plan has been approved by the third respondent and the lease is yet to be granted by the District Collector, who has to execute the lease deed. In those circumstances, the petitioner made a representation to the respondents stating that if the 4th respondent is granted mining lease in the adjacent land, there would be every possibility for the 4th respondent to interfere with the mining operations of the petitioner which may result in law and order problems. d) Even though such a representation was made by the petitioner, the first respondent without adhering to the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 granted clearance to the 4th respondent in respect of the non-garnet areas overlapping three private lands belonging to the petitioner. It is stated that in respect of the lands, there has been some dispute regarding ownership with one M/s.Beach Minerals Company which has taken over the 4th respondent with an ulterior motive to prevent the lawful mining operations of the petitioner. e) It is stated that the 4th respondent has artificially diverted the water flow of the river course into their patta land and in respect of 201.65.5 hectares mining lease was granted in favour of the sister concern of the petitioner, by name, M/s. Southern Enterprises in Thottiyam and Musiri taluk, Trichy District. 3. The grant of lease in favour of the 4th respondent is challenged on the ground that the application filed by the 4th respondent for 1.05 hectares is not maintainable since the minimum area must be 2 hectares and the garnet sand is not available in 1.05 hectares.
3. The grant of lease in favour of the 4th respondent is challenged on the ground that the application filed by the 4th respondent for 1.05 hectares is not maintainable since the minimum area must be 2 hectares and the garnet sand is not available in 1.05 hectares. It is also the complaint of the petitioner that the mining lease granted in favour of the 4th respondent is relating to the lands which are well within the boundaries of the lands in respect of which lease was granted to the petitioner and there is absolutely no scope for the deposit of garnet sand far away from the water course and therefore, the second respondent should have rejected the application. The impugned order of lease which has been passed against the law in favour of the 4th respondent is challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the first respondent has failed to consider and give reasons to differ with the findings of the third respondent, the competent authority and thatthe lease has been granted in gross violation and without consideration of the valid objection raised and as per the Mining Rules, before passing the impugned order, it has to be ascertained that the safety distance of 7.5 metres is provided from the adjacent patta lands, that the mining lease has been granted in respect of 2.08 hectares of lands, abetting the river which is under the control of Public Works Department. No safety distance of 50 metres has been provided in the river bank as per the Rules, that there is no possibility of existence of garnet outside the river bank, that the mining lease has been granted by the first respondent against the finding of fact that no garnet sand is available and that the inclusion of non-mineral area is to cover the minimum area of 2 hectares against the provisions of law, apart from many other grounds. 4. In the counter affidavit filed by the third respondent, it is stated that the writ petition is not maintainable since the petitioner has got a right of revision before the Central Government against the order of the second respondent as per section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act, 1956 read with the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.
In the counter affidavit filed by the third respondent, it is stated that the writ petition is not maintainable since the petitioner has got a right of revision before the Central Government against the order of the second respondent as per section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act, 1956 read with the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. That apart, on merits, it is stated that the 4th respondent made an application on 17.1.2002 to the Government through the District Collector, Tiruchirapalli for mining garnet sand from the patta land measuring an extent of 1.07.5 hectares in S.F.Nos.59/2E and 59/3A of Appanallur village, Thottium Taluk, Trichy District for a period of 30 years and subsequently, an order was passed under section 26(1) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act, 1957 (in short, "the Act") rejecting the application on the ground that the minimum required area for mining lease is 2.00.0 hectares as per Rule 22D of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. a)It is stated that the 4th respondent acquired additional extent of lands to cover the required 2 hectares of land and thereafter, sought for the grant of mining lease to the total extent of 2.08.0 hectares of patta lands in S.F.Nos.57/10F, 58/8E, 58/E4, 58/8E5, 59/1E, 59/1F, 59/3C, 59/2E and 59/3A in Appanallur village, Thottium Taluk, Trichy District. It is, after spot inspection and on the recommendations of the third respondent-District Collector, the second respondent by a communication dated 29.5.2009, informed his decision for the grant of mining lease for garnet sand and required the 4th respondent to furnish the mining plan for approval by the Government of India, through Indian Bureau of Mines. b) Thereafter, the 4th respondent prepared the mining plan and submitted the same for approval by the Controller of Mines (South Zone), Indian Bureau of Mines, Bangalore, who, after inspection, approved the plan on 13.10.2009.
b) Thereafter, the 4th respondent prepared the mining plan and submitted the same for approval by the Controller of Mines (South Zone), Indian Bureau of Mines, Bangalore, who, after inspection, approved the plan on 13.10.2009. It is stated that the Government by G.O.Ms.No.133, Industries Department dated 4.5.1998 delegated the powers to the second respondent for the purpose of granting mining lease in respect of the patta lands for major minerals, by virtue of the powers under section 26(2) of the Act, 1957 and it was, thereafter the second respondent under the impugned order dated 23.10.2009, granted the mining lease to the 4th respondent in respect of 2.08 acres in S.F.Nos.57/10F, 58/8E, 58/8E4, 58/8E5, 59/1E, 59/1F, 59/3C, 59/2E and 59/3A in Appanallur village, Thottium Taluk, Tiruchirapalli District for the period of 20 years. c) Thereafter, the third respondent required the 4th respondent to remit a sum of Rs.10,000/- towards security deposit and Rs.4160/-towards surface rent and also to furnish non-judicial stamp papers to the value of Rs.45,960/-for the execution of lease deed and to produce bank guarantee for Rs.1 lakh. It is stated that the 4th respondent complied with all the requirements and the lease deed as per the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 also came to be executed between the District Collector/third respondent and the 4th respondent on 27.10.2009 and registered as document No.3132 of 2009 in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Musiri and upon execution of the lease deed, the 4th respondent has commenced the mining operations from 2.11.2009. d)It was, suppressing the above facts, the petitioner filed the writ petition and obtained an ex parte order in this Court on 8.12.2009 by giving false information as if the District Collector was yet to execute the lease deed. It is stated that V.V. Minerals, Beach Minerals and the 4th respondent are different entities and the 4th respondent was constituted as a company in the year 2002 and Mr.S.Sukumar and Tmt.S.Kalaiarasi, who were holding the management of the 4th respondent have not continued and stepped down and the present management assumed charge and is running the management of the company. e) It is stated that M/s.Beach Mineral Sands Company is not the sister concern of the 4th respondent. While the application was made in the year 2002 by the 4th respondent, it was on 29.5.2009, only after seven years, the second respondent approved the precise area clearance.
e) It is stated that M/s.Beach Mineral Sands Company is not the sister concern of the 4th respondent. While the application was made in the year 2002 by the 4th respondent, it was on 29.5.2009, only after seven years, the second respondent approved the precise area clearance. The mining plan has to be approved by the Controller of Mines, Bangalore, Indian Bureau of Mines and not by the District Collector who is not the authority. It is stated that the lease granted to the petitioner is in respect of Government poramboke land bearing S.F.Nos. 55,60 and 61 measuring 7.02.0 hectares, whereas the permission granted to the 4th respondent is relating to patta lands and the distance between the petitioner’s lands and the patta lands of the 4th respondent is 25 metres and there is a bund at a height of 12 ft. in between the patta lands of the 4th respondent and the lease-hold poramboke lands of the petitioner and the bund is strengthened and supported by stones and there is absolutely no possibility for the 4th respondent to prevent the right of mining by the petitioner and there is no overlapping of the lands of the petitioner. f) It is stated that the 4th respondent originally applied for mining garnet in the lands to an extent of 1.07.5 hectares on 17.1.2002 and that was not considered for the reason that it was less than the minimum extent as required under Rule 22D of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 and therefore, a notice was issued under Rule 26(1) of the Mineral Concession Rules to comply with the requirements and thereafter the 4th respondent acquired additionally the patta lands to an extent of 1.00.5 hectares of patta land in S.F.Nos.57/10F, 58/8E1, 8E4, 8E5, 59/1E, 1F and 3C in Appanallur village and fulfilled the minimum area requirement and the mining lease was then granted to the 4th respondent by the second respondent after going through the entire records based on the orders of the Indian Bureau of Mines, Bangalore. g) It is stated that there are various inherent reasons such as, high tide, cyclone, heavy rain flow and other natural calamities etc. which may promote the deposit of minerals in the lease hold land of the 4th respondent and the lease was granted for 20 years and not for 25 years.
g) It is stated that there are various inherent reasons such as, high tide, cyclone, heavy rain flow and other natural calamities etc. which may promote the deposit of minerals in the lease hold land of the 4th respondent and the lease was granted for 20 years and not for 25 years. It is stated that various litigations stated by the petitioner with regard to the sister concerns which relates to Vembar Village, Tuticorin District. It is stated that necessary safety distance has been left out and it is only the petitioner who wants to create a monopoly and with that view, the present writ petition has been filed. 5. After the said counter affidavit was filed by the 4th respondent wherein the 4th respondent has stated that the third respondent-District Collector has already executed the lease deed on 27.10.2009, the petitioner filed M.P.No.2 of 2010 for amendment of the prayer so as to include the lease deed dated 27.10.2009 executed by the third respondent-District Collector in favour of the 4th respondent consequent to the impugned order of the second respondent dated 23.10.2009. In this miscellaneous petition, the 4th respondent in the writ petition filed a counter affidavit stating that the mining lease application of the 4th respondent has satisfied all the conditions required for the grant of mining lease in respect of the area applied for. The 4th respondent has also denied the various allegations raised by the petitioner in the reply affidavit. It is stated in the mining plan approved by the Controller of Mines (South Zone), Indian Bureau of Mines, Bangalore that the minable reserve estimated in the applied area is 1,75,216 tonnes. It was only after considering the same, the second respondent granted the lease. The approved mining plan is the sine quo non for granting mining lease which has been followed in this case and therefore, it is stated by the 4th respondent that the petitioner cannot challenge the subsequent lease deed dated 27.10.2009. 6.
It was only after considering the same, the second respondent granted the lease. The approved mining plan is the sine quo non for granting mining lease which has been followed in this case and therefore, it is stated by the 4th respondent that the petitioner cannot challenge the subsequent lease deed dated 27.10.2009. 6. Mr.V.Shanmugam, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, while referring to the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act, 1957, especially section 5 read with rule 22D of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, would submit that when the minimum area required for mining lease is 2 hectares, since the 4th respondent admittedly filed application for mining lease in respect of 1.07.5 hectares, that application ought to have been rejected for the entire extent and the action of the 4th respondent in subsequently purchasing some other extent of land to make it as if the mining lease was sought for 2 hectares of land is not correct and according to him, it would amount to violation of the rules. It is submitted that when the application for mining of lesser extent of land was rejected and no lease was granted for more than 2 hectares, it is not open to the 4th respondent to claim that he is entitled to go for mining operations in respect of 2.08.0 hectares. It is his contention that the construction of the rules should be made in the sense that if an application is made for a minimum extent of land, it must be proved that the entire extent of land of minimum requirement contains the minerals. It is his submission that the mere existence of alternative remedy is not a rule of law and it is a rule of discretion, by relying upon the judgment in Voltas Volkart Employees Union vs. Voltas Limited [ 2000(1) CTC 184 ]. 7. On the other hand, it is the contention of Mr.V.Sanjeevi, learned counsel for the 4th respondent that in the absence of violation of the principles of fundamental rights, natural justice or for want of jurisdiction, the proper remedy for the petitioner is to file a revision which is available as per section 30 of the Act.
7. On the other hand, it is the contention of Mr.V.Sanjeevi, learned counsel for the 4th respondent that in the absence of violation of the principles of fundamental rights, natural justice or for want of jurisdiction, the proper remedy for the petitioner is to file a revision which is available as per section 30 of the Act. He would refer to the judgment in Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai [ AIR 1999 SC 22 ] Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., [ (2003) 2 SCC 107 ], N.Narayanan vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) [ 2009 (8) MLJ 960 ] and State of Goa vs. M/s. A.H.Jaffar and Sons [ AIR 1995 SC 333 ] to substantiate his contention that the facts are not admitted and under the disputed factual position, the writ petition would not lie. He would also refer to the merits of the case and referring to section 5(2)(a) of the Act dealing with the availability of minerals in the land in question, his contention is that the quantity may be less or more and it is not necessary that every part of the land should have the minerals in entirety especially when the variation is a natural one. It is his submission that the documents which are relied upon by the petitioner are all relating to the period in which the permission was granted. It is his submission that the provisions of Rule 22(4) have been fully complied with by the 4th respondent and according to him, under rule 26(3) any mistake can be rectified and omission can be supplied. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents and perused the entire records and given my anxious thoughts to the issue involved in this case. 9. Pursuant to the impugned order of the second respondent dated 23.10.2009, the lease deed was executed in favour of the 4th respondent in the writ petition on 27.10.2009 for a period of 20 years in respect of 2.08.0 hectares for mining the land and it is not in dispute that the 4th respondent, pursuant to the lease, is carrying on the mining operations. Admittedly, the impugned mining lease has been granted to the 4th respondent in respect of his patta lands. 10.
Admittedly, the impugned mining lease has been granted to the 4th respondent in respect of his patta lands. 10. The complaint of the petitioner, however, is that he has been the mining operator in respect of Government Poramboke lands which are stated to be situate adjacent to the patta lands of the 4th respondent. It is the case of the petitioner that the impugned order of granting quarry lease and licence in favour of the 4th respondent is against the Act as well as the Rules, whereas it is the case of the 4th respondent that the writ petition itself is filed by the petitioner who is a rival operator of mining in poramboke lands only to prevent the 4th respondent from carrying out the terms of the lease somehow or other. 11. On the admitted fact of execution of lease deed in favour of the 4th respondent in respect of 2.08.0 hectares in S.F.Nos.59/3A, etc. in Appanallur village, Thottiyam taluk, Trichy District, the issues to be decided are, as to whether the present application in which the lease has been granted is maintainable, particularly when an application made earlier by the 4th respondent on 17.1.2002 for mining a lesser extent of land of 1.07.5 hectares in the same land was rejected, that too, after the rule 22-D came to be introduced by way of amendment in the year 2003, stipulating the minimum extent of land required for mining shall be 2 hectares and whether the impugned order passed granting the mining lease after the 4th respondent fulfilling the requirement of minimum extent of land by acquiring the adjacent lands is valid or not. 12. Before going into this aspect, since the 4th respondent has raised a preliminary issue regarding the maintainability of the writ petition on the basis of availability of alternative remedy of filing a revision, it is necessary to traverse to the said jurisdiction issue first which requires a reference to various provisions of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act, 1957 and the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. 13. It is true that at the time when the 4th respondent applied for permission to quarry garnet sand on 17.1.2002, there was no condition in existence to the effect that the lands in respect of which quarrying operation was sought for, should be more than 2 hectares.
13. It is true that at the time when the 4th respondent applied for permission to quarry garnet sand on 17.1.2002, there was no condition in existence to the effect that the lands in respect of which quarrying operation was sought for, should be more than 2 hectares. When the proposal was pending, rule 22-D of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 came to be introduced with effect from 10.4.2003 stipulating 2 hectares as minimum extent of land in respect of mining of beach sand or other placers and the said rule 22-D is as follows: “Rule 22D. Minimum size of the mining lease.- Minimum area for grant of mining lease shall not be less than- (a) One hectare, in respect of small deposits (not fragmented portions of larger ones), shallow in nature, isolated and not exceeding more than 200 metres in strike length. These deposits are small by virtue of either origin or mode of emplacement or dislocation due to geological disturbances. Small deposits shall also include float deposits (transported) formed due to mechanical weathering and deposition, alluvial or eluvial placers (buried or otherwise), which generally have peculiar configurations excepting beach sands or placers; (b) Two hectares, in respect of beach sands or placers. Beach sands or placers are mono or multi-mineral concentrations, including the dunes occurring on and off the coastal shore line. These deposits are the products of ebb and flow of tides, waves and inshore currents, and at places semi-consolidated to consolidated in nature; (c) Four hectares, in respect of all mineral deposits other than those specified under clauses (a) and (b):] [Provided that in the case of renewal of mining lease, the restrictions of minimum area for grant of mining lease shall not be applicable.]” 14. Rule 26 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 is as follows: “Rule 26. Refusal of application for grant and renewal of mining lease.- (1) The State Government may, after giving an opportunity of being heard and for reasons to be recorded in writing and communicated to the applicant, refuse to grant or renew a mining lease over the whole or part of the area applied for.
Refusal of application for grant and renewal of mining lease.- (1) The State Government may, after giving an opportunity of being heard and for reasons to be recorded in writing and communicated to the applicant, refuse to grant or renew a mining lease over the whole or part of the area applied for. (2) An application for the grant or renewal of a mining lease made under rule 22 or rule 24A, as the case may be, shall not be refused by the State Government only on the ground that Form I or Form J, as the case may be, is not complete in all material particulars, or is not accompanied by the documents referred to in sub-clauses (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) of clause (i) of sub-rule 22. (3) Where it appears that the application is not complete in all material particulars or is not accompanied by the required documents, the State Government shall, by notice, require the applicant to supply the omission or, as the case may be, furnish the documents, without delay and in any case not later than thirty days from the date of receipt of the said notice by the applicant.” 15. While sub-rule (1) of Rule 26 enables the State Government to give opportunity if it is decided to refuse to grant mining lease as enumerated above, rule26(3) enables the Government to ask for more particulars if the application is bereft of certain information giving 30 days’ time.It is seen that based on the said powers, there was some correspondence between the Government and the Department of Geology and Mining on the point as to whether the entire extent of 2 hectares of land should contain the trace of minerals applied for, when the 4th respondent purchased additional land and gave particulars so as to make the total extent of land as 2.08.0 hectares.In thecommunication of the Director of Geology and Mining to the first respondent dated 31.3.2006, it was clarified that it is not absolutely necessary that the entire applied area should contain the minerals applied for mining and it is sufficient if traces of minerals or barren are available which would not affect the eligibility of the area for the grant of mining lease. 16.
16. It appears that a question was raised during the course of pendency of the above said proceedings and certain clarifications were called for regarding the contradiction between the report of the District Collector and the report of the Commissioner of Geology and Mining, and the Government wanted to find out as to whether the mining lease in patta land, if granted, would affect the Eri. It was subsequently after inspection of the area by the Assistant Director of Geology and Mining, it was found that S.F.Nos.55,60 and 61 of Appanallur village, which are all vari poramboke, for which licence was granted to the petitioner are situate 25 metres away from the patta lands for which the 4th respondent applied for mining lease and the Eri is about 200 metres away from the said area and therefore, it was informed that there was no possibility of any illegal mining by the 4th respondent in the poramboke area comprised in S.F.Nos.55, 60 and 61, for which mining lease was granted to the petitioner. The report also states that there is no possibility of illegal mining by the 4th respondent in the Appanallur Eri and vari. It was based on such report, the second respondent passed the impugned order on 23.10.2009 after analyzing the entire aspects of the matter. The impugned order came to be passed after considering the mining plan approved by the Indian Bureau of Mines dated 13.10.2009, which is in conformity with the requirements of rule 22(4) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 which is as follows: “Rule 22(4) On receipt of the application for the grant of a mining lease the State Government shall take decision to grant precise area for the said purpose and communicate such decision to the applicant. On receipt of communication from the State government of the precise areas to be granted, the applicant shall submit a mining plan within a period of six months or such other period as may be allowed by the State Government, to the Central Government for its approval. The applicant shall submit the mining plan, duly approved by the Central Government or by an officer duly authorised by the Central Government, to the State Government to grant mining lease over that area.” 17. In fact, as per rule 22(4), the mining plan is to be approved by the competent authority, viz., the Indian Bureau of Mines.
The applicant shall submit the mining plan, duly approved by the Central Government or by an officer duly authorised by the Central Government, to the State Government to grant mining lease over that area.” 17. In fact, as per rule 22(4), the mining plan is to be approved by the competent authority, viz., the Indian Bureau of Mines. Once the approval is granted, the same would be available for the duration of lease period, which means that the said authority has decided about the viability of mining operations based on the application made by the 4th respondent which has been forwarded along with the approved plan. Rule 22(6) is as follows: “Rule 22(6) The mining plan once approved shall be valid for the entire duration of the lease: Provided that any modification or modifications of the mining plan shall be approved by the competent authority and such approval of the modified mining plan shall remain valid for the balance duration of the mining lease.” Then, the mining lease is granted by the State Government or the second respondent, on delegation of powers. 18. Section 5(2) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act, 1957, is as follows: "5. Restrictions on the grant of prospecting licences or mining leases.- (1) xxxxx (2) No mining lease shall be granted by the State Government unless it is satisfied that- (a) there is evidence to show that the area for which the lease is applied for has been prospected earlier or the existence of mineral contents therein has been established otherwise than by means of prospecting such area; and (b) there is mining plan duly approved by the Central Government, or by the State government, in respect of such category of mines as may be specified by the Central Government, for the development of mineral deposits in the area concerned." The above said section only puts an embargo on the State Government that before issuing mining lease the State Government should satisfy about the evidence of existence of mineral contents and the mining plan that has been approved. On the facts of the present case, having satisfied that the mining plan has been duly approved by the authority competent, the impugned order granting permission has been passed by the second respondent, the Commissioner of Geology and Mining by exercising the delegated powers from the Government. 19.
On the facts of the present case, having satisfied that the mining plan has been duly approved by the authority competent, the impugned order granting permission has been passed by the second respondent, the Commissioner of Geology and Mining by exercising the delegated powers from the Government. 19. Section 30 of the Act enables the Central Government to revise such orders made by the State Government or other authority exercising the powers in respect of minerals other than minor minerals. The said section 30 is as follows: "30. Power of revision of Central Government.- The Central Government may, of its own motion or on application made within the prescribed time by an aggrieved party, revise any order made by a State Government or other authority in exercise of the powers conferred on it by or under this Act with respect to any mineral other than a minor mineral." 20. The filing of such revision to the Central Government and the procedures to be followed are contemplated under rules 54 and 55 of the Minor Concession Rules, 1960 which are as follows: "54. Application for revision.- (1) Any person aggrieved by any order made by the State Government or other authority in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Act or these rules may, within three months of the date of communication of the order to him, apply to the Central Government in triplicate in Form N, for revision of the order. The application should be accompanied by a Bank Draft for five thousand rupees on a nationalised bank in the name of Pay and Accounts Officer, Department of Mines payable at New Delhi or through a treasury challan for five thousand rupees under the Head of Account – 0853 – Non-ferrous Mining and Metallurgical Industries-102 Mineral Concession Fees, Rents and Royalties: Provided that any such application may be entertained after the said period of three months if the applicant satisfies the Central Government that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within time. (2) In every application under sub-rule (1) against the order of a State Government refusing to grant a prospecting licence or mining lease was granted in respect of the same area or for a part thereof, shall be impleaded as party.
(2) In every application under sub-rule (1) against the order of a State Government refusing to grant a prospecting licence or mining lease was granted in respect of the same area or for a part thereof, shall be impleaded as party. (3) Along with the application under sub-rule (1), the applicant shall submit as many copies thereof as there are parties impleaded under sub-rule (2). (4) On receipt of the application and the copies thereof, the Central Government shall send a copy of the application to each of the parties impleaded under sub-rule (2) specifying a date on or before which he may make his representations, if any, against the revision application. 55. Orders on revision application.- (1) On receipt of an application for revision under rule 54, copies thereof shall be sent to the State Government or other authority and to all the impleaded parties calling upon them to make such comments as they may like to make within three months from the date of issue of the communication, and the State Government or other authority and the impleaded parties, while furnishing comments to the Central Government shall simultaneously endorse a copy of the comments to the other parties. (2) Comments received from any party under sub-rule (1) shall be sent to the other parties for making such further comments as they may like to make within one month from the date of issue of the communication and the parties making further comments shall send them to all the other parties. (3) The revision application, the communications containing comments and counter-comments referred to in sub-rules (1) and (2) shall constitute the records of the case. (4) After considering the records referred to in sub-rule (3), the Central Government may confirm, modify or set aside the order or pass such other order in relation thereto as the Central Government may deem just and proper. (5) Pending the final disposal of an application for revision, the Central Government may, for sufficient cause, stay the execution, of the order against which any revision application has been made." 21. It is relevant to point out that a detailed procedure has been established by the rules including the period of limitation within which such revision can be filed. In fact, the Central Government as a revisional authority has the power to stay the execution of the order against which the revision has been made.
It is relevant to point out that a detailed procedure has been established by the rules including the period of limitation within which such revision can be filed. In fact, the Central Government as a revisional authority has the power to stay the execution of the order against which the revision has been made. Therefore, the revisionary power of the Central Government to revise the order of the State Government regarding the grant of licence for minerals other than minor minerals being regulated by the statute and the same is to be exercised in the manner known to law, certainly, it is not open to the petitioner to state that he would by-pass the revisional authority on any other grounds. 22. The judgment rendered by the Hon’ble First Bench of this Court in Voltas Volkart Employees Union vs. Voltas Limited [ 2000(1) CTC 184 ] on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no application to the facts of the case. First of all, that was a case under the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (National and Festival Holidays) Act, 1958 in the context of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and particularly, section 9-A which deals with the conditions of service relating to declaration of holidays on the factual backdrop that the holidays already in existence were restricted and an issue was raised by the Union on the ground that it would alter the service conditions and could not be given effect to without notice and the management raised the question of maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act. In that case, there was a violation of statutory provision which resulted in the consequential violation of the principles of natural justice, especially when the accustomed holiday for Good Friday was sought to be taken away along with the wages for that day, and in such circumstances, the Hon’ble First Bench of this Court consisting of K.G.Balakrishnan, CJ. (as His Lordship then was) and K.P.Sivasubramaniam, J. has held that it is not reasonable to expect that the Union shall raise an industrial dispute in those circumstances. The relevant portion of the judgment in that regard is as follows: "21. The last issue which remains to be considered is the question of maintainability of the writ petition.
(as His Lordship then was) and K.P.Sivasubramaniam, J. has held that it is not reasonable to expect that the Union shall raise an industrial dispute in those circumstances. The relevant portion of the judgment in that regard is as follows: "21. The last issue which remains to be considered is the question of maintainability of the writ petition. As a result of the finding that there is non-compliance of Section 9-A of the Act, it follows that there is gross infringement of a statutory provision and also the consequential violation of principles of natural justice which should be sufficient to eliminate the objections on the ground of alternative remedy, vide the judgment of the Supreme court in Whirlpool Corpn. vs. Registrar of Trade Marks 1998 (8) SCC 1 . To the same effect is the judgment of K.Govindarajan,J., rendered in South Arcot Dist. Central Co.operative Bank Ltd., Employees Assn. v. Deputy Commissioner of Labour 1998 (III) CTC 143 . The submission that if the Union was aggrieved, an industrial dispute could be raised by the Union, cannot also be countenanced. The situation has been brought about by the unilateral action of the management and ignoring its statutory obligation under Section 9-A of the Act. The need to remedy the situation is emergent and grave enough from the point of view of the Union who have not only been deprived of the accustomed holiday for Good Friday, but also are deprived of wages for that day. As a result of the managements unilateral action of including Saturdays and Sundays, the employees have lost five holidays. It would not be reasonable to expect that the Union should raise a dispute and await indefinitely for the ultimate conclusion of the proceedings. Therefore, we are unable to sustain the objection based on alternate remedy." Certainly, the facts and circumstances of the present case can never be equated to the one decided by the Hon’ble First Bench as stated above. 23. The Supreme Court in State of Goa vs. M/s.A.H.Jaffar and Sons[ AIR 1995 SC 333 ] has dealt with section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act, 1957.
23. The Supreme Court in State of Goa vs. M/s.A.H.Jaffar and Sons[ AIR 1995 SC 333 ] has dealt with section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act, 1957. In that case, a submission was made that since the period of limitation prescribed for the purpose of filing revision under section 30 of the Act has expired, the revision might not be entertained, and the Supreme Court held that when the grant of lease is regulated by the statute, the proper remedy is either to challenge the lease granted or order not granting the lease can be only by filing a revision and not by a writ petition, especially when the Central Government is empowered to condone the delay if it is satisfied that the revision could not be presented with the time for sufficient cause. The Supreme Court has specifically held as follows: "3. The appeal has been argued at length. Sri Siraj Sait has attempted to support the judgement with industry and precision. But it does not appear necessary to decide whether the finding recorded by the High Court that the order of Commissioner being administrative in nature it could be reviewed by the State Government or it is necessary to decide whether the Minister could exercise any power where the grant of lease is regulated by the Statute as in our opinion the remedy of revision having been provided by Section 30 of the Act, the proper course for the respondent was to approach the Central Government and not the High Court. Learned counsel for the respondent expressed apprehension that the period for limitation provided in Rule 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 having expired, the revision might not be entertained. The proviso to the rule, however, empowers the revising authority to condone delay if it is satisfied that the revision could not be presented for sufficient cause within time. Since the respondent was pursuing its remedy in High Court bona fide, it would be sufficient cause to condone the delay and we trust that the revision if preferred within four weeks from today shall not be dismissed as being barred by time." 24.
Since the respondent was pursuing its remedy in High Court bona fide, it would be sufficient cause to condone the delay and we trust that the revision if preferred within four weeks from today shall not be dismissed as being barred by time." 24. It is no doubt true that the alternative remedy may not be a rule of law, but it is a discretion and that is not applicable in cases where the statutory lease like that of mining lease which is more in the form of Governmental contract is regulated by law, especially when such law enables an effective remedy. In Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai [ AIR 1999 SC 22 ], while discussing elaborately about the jurisdiction of the High Court under the Constitution of India when an alternative remedy is available, it was held that it was a self-imposed restriction on the High Court not to entertain a writ petition except under three contingencies viz., enforcement of fundamental rights, violation of the principles of natural justice and where orders are wholly without jurisdiction or ultra vires. The Hon’ble Apex Court, having referred to plethora of judgments on the issue ever since from AIR 1950 SC 163 (Rashid Ahmad vs. Municipal Board, Kairana), held that in spite of the fact that much water has since flown beneath the bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect. The above said established principles are elicited in the following paragraphs: "15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order of proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.
There is a plethora of case-law on this point put to cut down this cricle of forensic Whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field. 16. Rashid Ahmad vs. Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR 1950 SC 163 , laid down that existence of an adequate legal remedy was a factor to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs. This was followed by another Rashid case, namely, K.S.Rashid & son v. The Income-tax Investigation Commissioner, AIR 1954 SC 207 , which reiterated the above proposition and held that where alternative remedy existed, it would be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226. This proposition was, however, qualified by the significant words, "unless there are good grounds therefor", which indicated that alternative remedy would not operate as an absolute bar and that writ petition under Article 226 could still be entertained in exceptional circumstances. 17 to 19. xxxxx 20. Much water has since flown beneath the bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect on these decisions which though old, continue to hold the field with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in spite of the alternative statutory remedies, is not affected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation." 25. That view has been consistently followed as it is seen in the judgment rendered in Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., [ (2003) 2 SCC 107 ].Of course, in that case, the Supreme Court rejected the entertainment of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the basis that in contractual matters relating to termination of dealership in respect of petroleum products for which licence was granted, by following its earlier judgment in Whirlpool case (cited supra).The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows: "7.
So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice to it observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of available of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1 ).The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings." 26. As stated above, even in the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it was held that in respect of the three celebrated principles, Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be exercised, and by applying the said principles to the facts of the present case, especially taking note of the specific judgment of the Supreme Court on the issue in State of Goa vs. M/s.A.H.Jaffar and Sons [ AIR 1995 SC 333 ], it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that on the facts of the present case, the writ petition should be entertained. Therefore, as correctly submitted by the learned counsel for the 4th respondent, the writ petition has to be rejected on the basis of availability of an effective alternative remedy of filing revision which is regulated by the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act, 1957 read with the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, particularly rules 54 and 55 and on that score, the writ petition is liable to be rejected. 27.
27. As held by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above, the proviso to rule 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 enables the Government to entertain revision even after the expiry of three months, if sufficient cause is shown. In the present case, the impugned order granting permission to the 4th respondent came to be passed on 23.10.2009 and after making some representation, the petitioner has chosen to approach this Court on 2.12.2009 and the matter has been pending till date and therefore, it is always open to the petitioner to show the sufficient cause for the delay in filing revision. 28. It is true that as submitted by the learned counsel for the 4th respondent, by construing various rules, especially rule 22-D, it can be safely presumed that while considering the availability of mineral, it is not necessary that the entire extent for which the application has been made for mining operation should contain the traces of mineral. That apart, on construction of rule 26(3) of the Mineral Concession Rules, it can be construed that any omission in the original application filed for mining permission can be supplied by way of rectification. Apart from that, the rules, especially the conditions with which the mining permission is to be granted contain various safeguards to protect the neighboring lands whether they are agricultural lands or other mining lands, as in the present case that the petitioner doing mining operations in the Government poramboke lands is to see that such operations are not affected. 29. On facts, it is found by the authorities that the place of mining operations to which the petitioner has been granted lease is far away from the place for which the mining permission has been granted to the 4th respondent under the impugned order. These are all facts which are found by the authorities competent under the law, especially when it is the case of the 4th respondent that the mining plan has been duly approved by the authority competent under the Act.
These are all facts which are found by the authorities competent under the law, especially when it is the case of the 4th respondent that the mining plan has been duly approved by the authority competent under the Act. Even if the approval of mining plan by the authority competent under the Act is disputed by the petitioner, the petitioner has got a right of revision against such approval of mining plan granted by the Chief Controller of Mines, Indian Bureau of Mines, to the Controller General, Indian Bureau of Mines within a period of 30 days from the date of granting of such approval for mining plan, and it is open to the revisional authority to condone the delay, if any sufficient cause is shown, as it is found in rule 22-BB(4) of the Rules, which is as follows: "22BB.(4) Any person aggrieved by an order made or direction issued by the Chief Controller of Mines, Indian Bureau of Mines, concerning approval of mining plan may within thirty days of the communication of such order or direction, apply to the Controller General, Indian Bureau of Mines for a revision of such order or direction and his decision thereon shall be final: Provided that any such application may be entertained after the said period of 30 days, if the applicant satisfies the Controller General, Indian Bureau of Mines that he had sufficient cause for not making the application in time." 30. On the facts of the present case, the Controller of Mines (South Zone), Indian Bureau of Mines, Bangalore, Ministry of Mines, Government of India, after inspection of the place of the 4th respondent which are patta lands, approved the mining plan by order dated 13.10.2009. Thereafter, by virtue of the powers delegated by the Government of Tamil Nadu in G.O.Ms.No.133, Industries (MMA-1) Department, dated 4.5.1998 regarding patta lands for major minerals under section 26(2) of the Act, the Commissioner/Director of Geology and Mining granted the mining lease to the 4th respondent in respect of 2.08.0 hectares in S.F.Nos.57/10F, 58/8E, 58/8E4, 58/8E5, 59/1E, 59/1F, 59/3C, 59/2E and 59/3A in Appanallur village, Thottium taluk, Trichy District for a period of 20 years. Therefore, prima facie I am of the view that there is no statutory violation in granting licence to the 4th respondent under the impugned order.
Therefore, prima facie I am of the view that there is no statutory violation in granting licence to the 4th respondent under the impugned order. In any event, as I have held, the petitioner’s remedy is only by way of revision under section 30 of the Act to the Central Government. The above observation has to be necessarily made for the purpose of sustaining the impugned order till the petitioner exercise its right of revision under the above said provision. 31. In such view of the matter, the writ petition stands dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of filing revision under the Act. It is made clear that if the petitioner files such revision, within the period of 10 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order to the competent authority under section 30 of the Act, along with an application for condoning the delay, it is for the revisional authority to consider the reason for such delay, also taking note of the pendency of this writ petition from 2.12.2009 before this Court and pass appropriate orders on merits and in accordance with law. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.