ORDER 1. Shri R.L. Jain, learned Senior Advocate with Ms. Veena Mandlik, counsel for Appellant. I.A. No. 1040/10 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 2. This appeal is barred by 8 days and the Appellant has filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing appeal. The law is well-settled that in an appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act' for short), delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned. 3. A Division Bench of this Court in Asstt. CIT v. Shubhash Traders [2009]318 ITR 402considered the similar controversy, held thus: 4. Section 260A of the Act provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed by the Tribunal. As the main thrust is on the said provision, it is consign to reproduce the same: '260A. Appeal to High Court.--(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal before the date of establishment of the National Tax Tribunal, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) The Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner or an Assessee aggrieved by any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court and such appeal under this Sub-section shall be (a) filed within one hundred and twenty days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by the Assessee or the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner: (b) ** ** ** (c) in the form of a memorandum of appeal precisely stating therein the substantial question of law involved. (3) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (4) The appeal shall be heard only on the question so formulated, and the Respondent s shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this Sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. (5) The High Court shall decide the question of law so formulated and deliver such judgment thereon containing the grounds on which such decision is founded and may award such cost as it deems fit. (6) The High Court may determine any issue which-- (a) has not been determined by the Appellate Tribunal; or (b) has been wrongly determined by the Appellate Tribunal, by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Sub-section (1). (7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), relating to appeals to the High Court shall, as far as may be, apply in the case of appeals under this section. 5. On a scrutiny of the aforesaid provision, it is clear as noon day that no provision for condonation of delay is prescribed in Section 260A which stands in contradistinction to Sections 245 and 253. 9. Before we advert to the other decisions, it is imperative to understand the ratio laid down in the three-Judge Bench decision Hongo India Private Limited (supra). In the said case, the question arose whether the High Court has power to condone the delay in presentation of reference application under Section 35H(1) of the Unamended Central Excise Act, 1944 beyond the prescribed period by application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Be it noted, the matter was referred to a Larger Bench as a two-Judge Bench had expressed its doubt with regard to the decision in CCE and Customs v. Punjab Fibres Ltd. (2008) 3 SCC 73 . Their Lordships referred to the provisions under Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and dealt with the contention whether in the absence of specific prohibition in the said enactment for condoning delay, the High Court has power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay beyond the period prescribed under the main statute. The Apex Court took note of the fact that in the case of appeal to the High Court under Section 35G and reference to the High Court under Section 35H of the 1944 Act, 180 days have been provided for preferring the appeal and revision and beyond that, there is no further clause empowering the High Court to condone the delay. Their Lordships referred to Sections 5 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act and took note of the decisions rendered in M.V. Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment and Trading (P.) Ltd. 1993 Supp. (2) SCC 433, M.M. Thomas v. Stale of Kerala [2008] 1 SCC 666, Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar [2002] 3 SCC 705 and Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. [2001] 8 SCC 470 and eventually held as under 30. In the earlier part of our order, we have adverted to Chapter VI-A of the Act which provides for appeals and revisions to various authorities. Though parliament has specifically provided an additional period of 30 days in the case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent about the number of days if there is sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in the case of revision by the Central Government has been provided. However, in the case of an appeal to the High Court under Section 35G and reference application to the High Court under Section 35H. Parliament has provided only 180 days and no further period for filing an appeal and making reference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act. 31. In this regard, it is useful to refer to a recent decision of this Court in Punjab Fibres Ltd. The Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise, Noida was the Appellant in this ease. While considering the very same question, namely, whether the High Court has power to condone the delay in presentation of the reference under Section 35H(1) of the Act, the two-Judge Bench taking note of the said provision and the other related provisions following Singh Enterprises v. CCE concluded that: (Punjab Fibres Ltd.'s Case, SCC p. 75, para 8). '8. The High Court was justified in holding that there was no power for condonation of delay in filing reference application.' 32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35B, 35EE, 35G and 35H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35B, 35EE, 35G and 35H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the Legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days. 33. Even otherwise, for filing an appeal to the Commissioner, and to the Appellate Tribunal as well as revision to the Central Government, the Legislature has provided 60 days and 90 days respectively, on the other hand, for filing an appeal and reference to the High Court larger period of 180 days has been provided with to enable the Commissioner and the other party to avail the same. We are of the view that the Legislature provided sufficient time, namely, 180 days for filing reference to the High Court which is more than the period prescribed for an appeal and revision. 34. Though, an argument was raised based on Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming that Section 29(2) would be attracted, what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this section are expressly excluded in the case of reference to the High Court. 35. It was contended before us that the words "expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 - 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court. 36. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 supports the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 35H(1) to make a reference to the High Court is absolute and unextendable by a court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well-settled law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Thereafter the Division Bench concluded its opinion in paras 19 to 23, thus: 19. At this juncture, we may note with profit the decision rendered in Ravulu Subba Rao v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras AIR 1956 SC 604 wherein Their Lordships have held as follows: To sum up, the Indian Income Tax Act is a self-contained code exhaustive of the matters dealt with therein and its provisions show an intention to depart from the common rule, qui facit per alium facit per se. Its intention again is that a firm should be given benefit of Section 23(5)(a), only if it is registered under Section 26A in accordance with the conditions laid down in that section and the rules framed thereunder. And as those rules require the application to be signed by the partner in person, the signature by an agent on his behalf is invalid. 20. We have referred to the said decision to hold that even after coming into force of the 1961 Act, it has to be construed as a self-contained code and hence, paragraphs 33 and 35 of the Hongo India Private limited (supra) would get attracted. We may hasten to clarify that there need not be mandatory exclusion of the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act by special law and there can be necessary exclusion by the language in which the provision is couched and regard being had to the intendment of the Legislature. On a scanning of the anatomy of the provisions of the Income Tax Act relating to condonation of delay, we have no doubt that Section 260A does not allow the High Court to condone the delay regard being had to the scheme of the Act and the period which has been stipulated in the said provision. We are disposed to think so because Section 260A permits the Assessee or the revenue to prefer an appeal within 120 days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by the Assessee. The receipt of the order passed by the Assessee has its own signification. By no stretch of imagination, its significance can be marginalised. Two aspects, namely, the period and the date from which it is computed, have to be given their due weight age and on conferral of such weightage, the only conclusion which can be arrived at in the backdrop of Hongo India Private Limited (supra) is that this Court has no power to condone the delay. 21. We would be failing in our duty if we do not refer to the citation brought to our notice by Mr. Nema rendered by the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Grasim Industries Limited [Income-tax Appeal (L) No. 3592 of 2008]. The learned Counsel has commended us to paragraph 6 of the said judgment. It reads as follow: 6. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. Nema rendered by the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Grasim Industries Limited [Income-tax Appeal (L) No. 3592 of 2008]. The learned Counsel has commended us to paragraph 6 of the said judgment. It reads as follow: 6. We have carefully considered the rival submissions. It is not in dispute that Section 35G of the Excise Act is pari materia with Section 260 of the Income Tax Act. Section 260A(7) of the Income Tax Act as well as Section 35G(9) of the Excise Act provide that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 relating to appeals to the High Court as far as may be, apply to the appeals filed under the respective provisions. No such provision is to be found in Section 35H of the Excise Act. Therefore, the argument advanced by the counsel for the revenue that Section 35G and Section 35H of the Excise Act are materially different cannot be said to be wholly without substance. However, once the Apex Court has held that the High Court has no power to condone delay in filing appeal under Section 35G of the Excise Act, we have no option but to hold that this Court has no power to condone delay under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act because Section 260A of the Income Tax Act is pari materia with Section 35G of the Excise Act. 22. In our considered opinion, the applicability of the Code of Code of Civil Procedure to appeals to the High Court under Section 35G of Excise Act and Section 260A(7) of the Income Tax Act is really of no assistance inasmuch as that only postulates that the provisions of the Code of Code of Civil Procedure relating to appeals to the High Court shall apply to appeals under the provisions of Section 260A of the Income Tax Act to the High Court. The said provision cannot be construed to confer power on the High Court to condone delay. That apart, as has been noticed earlier, the Apex Court in Chaudharana Steels (P.) Ltd. (supra), while dealing with the appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944, held that the decision rendered in Hongo India Private Limited (supra) shall have full application to an appeal under Section 35G. That apart, as has been noticed earlier, the Apex Court in Chaudharana Steels (P.) Ltd. (supra), while dealing with the appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944, held that the decision rendered in Hongo India Private Limited (supra) shall have full application to an appeal under Section 35G. The decision is binding on the High Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and hence, we conclude and hold that the principle shall apply on all fours to an appeal preferred under Section 260A of the Act. 23. In the result, we are of the considered opinion that this Court has no power to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 beyond the prescribed period and, therefore, the appeals inevitably have to pave the path of dismissal and we so direct. [Emphasis supplied] In view of settled position of law, delay in filing this appeal cannot be condoned and this application is accordingly dismissed. 4. At this stage, learned Counsel for Appellant submitted that in the ensuing session of Parliament it is expected that an amendment in Section of the Act may be introduced, by which a specific provision would be made for condonation of delay in filing appeal with retrospective effect. 5. While dismissing this appeal as barred by limitation, it is observed that in case any such provision is made by the Parliament in this session, with retrospective effect, the Appellant may move an appropriate application before this Court for revival of this appeal. 6. With the aforesaid liberty, this appeal is dismissed as barred by limitation, with no order as to costs.