Judgment : 1. Questioning the liability fastened on the appellant-Insurance Company to pay compensation and then to recover from the owner of the offending vehicle, the present Appeal has been preferred. The negligent aspect has not been disputed. 2. Assailing the finding of the Tribunal fastening liability, Mr. K.S. Narasimhan, learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company submitted that the Tribunal has failed to apply the judgment of the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gian Chand, 1997 ACJ 1065 and ought to have drawn an adverse inference against the owner and exonerated the appellant-Insurance Company. He further submitted that Article 142 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked by the Tribunal and when the Supreme Court itself has thought it fit to refer the matter to a large Bench for consideration, as to whether any and recover could be ordered, the Tribunal ought not to have directed the appellant-Insurance company to pay the compensation to the injured and then to recover from the insured. In this context, he also placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Sardari 2008 (1) TN MAC 294 and Oriented Insurance Company Limited v. Raj Kumari and others, 2008 (1) TN MAC 1: 2007 AIR SCW 7149. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company further submitted that the judgment of the Division Bench made in United India Insurance Company, Salem District v. s. Saravanan (infirmity) represented by his wife NF.S. Lalitha and another, 2009 (2) TN MAC 103 (DB), cannot be made applicable to the present case, as a precedent and that the observation of Court cannot be treated as precedent. He further submitted that the Tribunal has erred in applying ‘6’ multiplier in computing the dependency compensation. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the material available on record. 5. Before the Tribunal, the respondents 1 and 2 examined themselves as P.W. 2 and PW.1 respectively and reiterated the manner of accident. Ex. P1-FIR, Ex. P2-Post-mortem Certificate and Ex. P3-Legal Heir Certificate were marked on the side of the respondents/claimants. RWs.1 to 3 were examined on behalf of the appellant-Insurance Company and Exs.R1 and R2-ICICI Insurance Certificate, Ex.R3-Returned cover, Ex.R4-Consent receipt, Ex.R5-Investigation report and Ex.R6-Crime report were marked. 6. Before the Tribunal, the appellant-Insurance Company, by placing reliance on decision in Surina Duravasulu (died) by L.Rs. P3-Legal Heir Certificate were marked on the side of the respondents/claimants. RWs.1 to 3 were examined on behalf of the appellant-Insurance Company and Exs.R1 and R2-ICICI Insurance Certificate, Ex.R3-Returned cover, Ex.R4-Consent receipt, Ex.R5-Investigation report and Ex.R6-Crime report were marked. 6. Before the Tribunal, the appellant-Insurance Company, by placing reliance on decision in Surina Duravasulu (died) by L.Rs. v. Bhava Narayana Murthy and others, 2008 ACJ 654 and Sanjay Kumar Saraf v. Jitbahan Mahto and others, 2008 ACJ 1208 , has disputed the liability to pay compensation on the ground that the driver of the offending vehicle, Tractor bearing registration No. TN-46-E-0022 did not possess a valid and effective licence, at the time of accident, which occurred on 22.08.2007. Per contra, the respondents/claimants in support of their contention that the Insurance Company is liable to pay compensation to them, have submitted following judgments: (i) National Insurance Company Limited v. Swaran singh and others, 2004 (1) TN MAC 104 (SC) : 2004 (1) TAC 321 (SC): (ii) United India Insurance Company Limited v. Lehru and others, 2004 (1) TN MAC 340 (SC) : 2003 (2) TAC 1 (SC); (iii) Kaushal Kishore Sing v. Govinda Singh and others, 2008 (3) TAC 22 (All); and (iv) Muthayammal and others v. Martin jovialdass and another, 2008 (4) TAC 471 (Mad). Following the decisions cite by the respondents/claimants, the Tribunal has directed the appellant-Insurance Company to pay compensation and then recover from the owner of the vehicles. 7. In Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Raj Kumari and others, 2008 (1) TN MAC 1 (SC) : 2007 AIR SCW 7149, the Supreme Court held as follows: Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judges decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates (i) findings of material facts direct and inferential. The only thing in a Judges decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates (i) findings of material facts direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to be legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is in authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See: State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and other,AIR 1968 SC647 and Union 0f India and others Shanwanti Devi and others, 1996 (6) SCC 44 ). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495 (H.L.). Earl of Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. Courts should not place on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact-situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s Theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s Theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussion but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define, Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton, 1951 AC 731 at p.761, Lord Mac Dermot observed. “The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge” 8. In Sardari and others, 2008 (1) TN MAC 294: the Supreme Court held that where the breach of conditions of contract is ex facie apparent from the record, the Court will not fasten the liability on the Insurance Company and sometimes, the Court, while fastening the liability on the owner of the vehicle, may direct the Insurance Company to pay and recover the same from the owner. 9. Though the issue as to whether, under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court can direct the Insurance company to pay the compensation and then recover the same from the owner has been referred to a largest Bench of the Supreme Court, for its consideration, no decision has been arrived at so far. 9. Though the issue as to whether, under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court can direct the Insurance company to pay the compensation and then recover the same from the owner has been referred to a largest Bench of the Supreme Court, for its consideration, no decision has been arrived at so far. Though, I have taken a decision in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd v. Sivammal, 2007 (6) MLJ 384 that if the vehicle was not driven with a requisite licence at the time of accident, the insurance company is not liable to pay compensation and that the power exercisable under Article 142 of the constitution of India cannot be exercised by the Tribunal Court, I am bound by the recent decision of a Division Bench of this Court in United India Insurance Company, Salem District v. S. Saravanan (infirmity), represented by his wife NF.S. Lalitha and another 2009 (2) TN MAC 103 (DB), where, this Court, after considering a plethora of decisions, including Sardari and others v. Sushil Kumar and others, 2008 (1) TN MAC 294: relied on by the learned counsel for the appallent, at paragraph No.25, held that, -- “We are of the firm opinion that the Insurer must pay the amount so far as third party risks are concerned and then recover the same from the insured, if so advised.” 10. In view of the above, the directions of the Tribunal, directing the appellant-Insurance Company to pay compensation to the respondents/claimants and then, recover the same from the insured cannot be said to be manifestly illegal, warranting interference. 11. As regards quantum of compensation, perusal of the order of the Tribunal shows that the deceased was aged 65 years, at the time of accident. According to the first respondent, the deceased was engaged in agricultural work and earned Rs.100/- per day. Therefore, the Tribunal, by fixing his monthly income of the deceased at Rs.1,800/-and after deducting 1/3rd towards his Personal Expenses and applying 6 multiplier, computed the dependency compensation at Rs.86,400/-. That apart, the Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.25,000/- for Loss of Love and Affecting and Rs.2,000/- for Funeral Expenses. The compensation awarded under the head funeral expenses is inadequate. Though a consolidated claim of Rs.3,00,000/-has been made, the Tribunal ought o have awarded a reasonable compensation for transportation. That apart, the Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.25,000/- for Loss of Love and Affecting and Rs.2,000/- for Funeral Expenses. The compensation awarded under the head funeral expenses is inadequate. Though a consolidated claim of Rs.3,00,000/-has been made, the Tribunal ought o have awarded a reasonable compensation for transportation. Considering the above aspect, the total quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal at Rs.1,13,400/-, with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, cannot be said to be a bonanza to the respondents/claimants. The contention that a higher multiplier has been applied is not accepted, for the reason that the total compensation awarded, in my considered view, is just and reasonable, for the death of a elderly person in the family, whose guidance the family has lost. 12. In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is also dismissed.