JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Petitioner preferred this contempt petition for dis-obedience of the order of this Court dated 3rd November, 1992, with a prayer that non-petitioners/contemnors may be punished for committing contempt of Court for dis-obeying the order dated 3rd November, 1992 for taking possession of the suit property and they be directed to hand over the possession of the same to the petitioner. 3. Original plaintiff Ponnya Ram (now deceased and represented by his legal representatives-non-petitioners) filed a suit for possession in respect of disputed property against original defendant Durga Prasad, which was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 6th September, 1983 passed by the Additional Civil Judge No.2, Alwar. Being aggrieved with the same, the plaintiff preferred regular Appeal No. 4/84 which was also dismissed by the Additional District Judge No.1, Alwar. Thereafter, the plaintiff preferred Second Appeal No. 20/88 before this Court, along with stay petition. This Court passed stay order dated 10th August, 1989, directing the respondents in the Second Appeal to maintain status-quo in respect of the property in dispute. 4. Subsequently, the applicant (respondent in the second appeal) filed an application for modification of the stay order dated 10th August, 1989 contending that the plaintiffs (appellants in second appeal) want to dispossess the applicant from the property in dispute forcibly and they intend to sell the property in dispute, therefore, appellants be restrained from selling the property in dispute during pendency of the appeal and also to maintain status-quo in respect of property in dispute. 5. This Court vide order dated 3rd November, 1992 modified the earlier order dated 10th August, 1989 and directed both the parties to maintain the 'status-quo in respect of property in dispute, during pendency of the appeal. Order dated 3rd November, 1992 is re-produced as under : "The property which is the subject matter of the suit out of which this appeal has arisen, is admittedly in the possession of the respondent-defendant, who is the applicant in this application. On an application having been made and on the admission of the learned counsel for the applicant, an order dated 10th August, 1989 was passed by N.C. Sharma, j., directing the applicant to maintain the status-quo in respect of the property in dispute. On an application having been made and on the admission of the learned counsel for the applicant, an order dated 10th August, 1989 was passed by N.C. Sharma, j., directing the applicant to maintain the status-quo in respect of the property in dispute. The applicant has moved this application for modification of the above-said order passed by N.C. Sharma, J. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record of the case. During the course of arguments, Shri Ranjan, the learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the appellants-plaintiffs want to dispossess the applicant from the property in dispute forcibly, and also that the appellants intend to sell the property in dispute, and has prayed that the appellants should be restrained from selling the property in dispute, during the pendency of the appeal and also to maintain the status-quo in respect of the possession thereof. Both these prayers have been opposed by Shri Dilip Singh, learned counsel for the appellants. As noted above, it is the admitted case of the parties that the applicant has been in possession of the property in dispute, and for that reason only, the appellants had filed a suit for possession against the applicant. There is no reason as to why only the applicant should maintain the status-quo, whereas the appellants should be allowed to disturb the status-quo and to take forcible possession of the property in dispute ...............it to someone else, its purchaser would be bound by the result of these proceedings and would acquire only such right in the property as the applicant himself has therein. Consequently, there is no necessity of passing any order restraining the appellants from transferring the property during the pendency of the appeal. In view of the above discussion, I modify the order dated 10th August, 1989, to the extent that both the parties are directed to maintain the status-quo in respect of the property in dispute, during the pendency of the appeal. The stay application stands disposed of accordingly." 6. In view of the above discussion, I modify the order dated 10th August, 1989, to the extent that both the parties are directed to maintain the status-quo in respect of the property in dispute, during the pendency of the appeal. The stay application stands disposed of accordingly." 6. Present contempt petition was preferred by the petitioner (originally defendant in the suit and respondent in the second appeal), wherein it has been pleaded that on 1st December, 1993 when the petitioner went to his property, he saw that the boundary wall had been demolished and his locks and key had been removed and non-petitioners No. 1 and 2 were there. He enquired from them that how they were there, as there was status quo order by the Hon'ble Court and these portions were in his possession under his lock and key. They said that they had taken possession and demolished the boundary wall on 23rd November, 1993, a day previous to the marriage in their house and scolded the petitioner that they are not bothered about the stay order. They have taken possession and the petitioner may do whatever he liked. The possession of the room is with them and they would not hand over the same to the petitioner even if the Court directs them. The petitioner has thus, pleaded that non- petitioners have disobeyed the order of this Court dated 3rd November, 1992 by taking possession of the property in dispute. 7. A notice to show cause was given to the non-petitioners and they have filed their written reply on 3rd May, 1994. In Para Nos. 5 and 6 of their reply to contempt petition, the non-petitioners submitted that they never flouted the order of this Court dated 3rd November, 1992. Whole story had been concocted to exert pressure on the non- petitioners, so that they may eschew their legal rights over the property in dispute in favour of the petitioner. It was specifically mentioned that non-petitioners never demolished the boundary wall and broke open the locks. They have not taken possession of the suit property. 8. It appears that the second appeal pending before this Court was transferred to the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. Learned Counsel for both the parties admitted that the second appeal filed by the plaintiffs (present non- petitioners) has been dismissed vide judgment dated 17th August, 2010. 9. They have not taken possession of the suit property. 8. It appears that the second appeal pending before this Court was transferred to the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. Learned Counsel for both the parties admitted that the second appeal filed by the plaintiffs (present non- petitioners) has been dismissed vide judgment dated 17th August, 2010. 9. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in the order dated 3rd November, 1992 it has specifically been observed that the present petitioner was admittedly in possession of the property in dispute. This Court also observed that the suit of the plaintiffs is for possession, therefore, it is clear that the defendant (respondent in second appeal) Is in possession of the property in dispute, therefore his right has to be protected and consequently, modified the order dated 10th August, 1989 and directed both the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the property in dispute, vide order dated 3rd November, 2002. 10. Mr. J.K. Singhi, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed certain documents on record before this Court on 27th October, 2010, including one report dated 3rd August, 1999 of the S.H.O., Police Station, Kotwali Alwar sent to the Registrar, High Court of Delhi, New Delhi and on that basis he argued that from this report it is clear that the non-petitioners were in possession and raising construction over the property in dispute and they put one gate after raising construction of two pillars. He, therefore, contended that the facts mentioned by the non-petitioners in their reply to the contempt petition are incorrect and the non-petitioners flouted the order of this Court, therefore, non-petitioners are not only liable to be punished for disobedience of the order of this Court but possession of the petitioner over the property in dispute is also liable to be restored. In support of his contention, learned counsel has referred the judgment of the Apex Court in the case Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. and another , (1996) 4 SCC 622 . 11. Learned counsel for the non-petitioners argued that he has already filed written reply to the contempt petition, wherein he has specifically mentioned that non-petitioners never demolished the boundary wall and they never took possession of the suit property. (P) Ltd. and another , (1996) 4 SCC 622 . 11. Learned counsel for the non-petitioners argued that he has already filed written reply to the contempt petition, wherein he has specifically mentioned that non-petitioners never demolished the boundary wall and they never took possession of the suit property. He argued that, no doubt, the suit was for possession, therefore, the petitioner was In possession of the suit property and as per reply to the contempt petition,non-petitioners are not in possession. He fairly and frankly contended that in case the non- petitioners are found In possession of the suit property, then they are liable to be dispossessed as they violated the order of this Court dated 3rd November, 1992. 12. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. The plaintiffs who are non-petitioners in this contempt petition, filed a suit for possession in respect of property in dispute and the suit was dismissed by the trial Court, first appellate Court and finally by the High Court also. This Court in its order dated 3rd November, 1992 specifically mentioned that admittedly the petitioner is in possession of the property in dispute. From the report of S.H.O., Police Station, Kotwali, Alwar dated 3rd August, 1999, placed on record by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it appears that the present non-petitioners were in possession and raising construction over the property in dispute and they were restrained by the police on the basis of the stay order passed by the High Court for further construction. In these circumstances, it is necessary to pass an order for restoration of possession of the property in dispute, in favour of the present petitioner in case he has been dispossessed forcefully by the non-petitioners despite the stay order granted by this Court on 3rd November, 1992. 13. The Hon'ble Apex Court considered similar controversy in D.D.A. v. Skipper Construction Co. (supra) and held that contemnor ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/or keep the fruits of his contempt is well settled. The Hon'ble Apex Court considered its earlier judgment in Mohd. Idris v. Rustam Jehangir Babuji, (1984) 4 SCC 216 and other judgments including Full Bench Judgment of Madras High Court and Division Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court in para 19 and 20 of the judgment, Para Nos. 17 to 21 are reproduced as under : "17. The Hon'ble Apex Court considered its earlier judgment in Mohd. Idris v. Rustam Jehangir Babuji, (1984) 4 SCC 216 and other judgments including Full Bench Judgment of Madras High Court and Division Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court in para 19 and 20 of the judgment, Para Nos. 17 to 21 are reproduced as under : "17. The principle that a contemnor ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/or keep the fruits of the contempt is well settled. In Mohd. Idris v. Rustam Jehangir Babuji, (1984) 4 SCC 216 , this Court held clearly that undergoing the punishment for contempt does not mean that the Court is not entitled to give appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its orders. The petitioners therein had given an undertaking to the Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A learned Single Judge held them guilty of contempt and imposed a sentence of one month's imprisonment. In addition thereto, the learned Single Judge made appropriate directions to remedy the breach of undertaking. It was contended before this Court that the learned Judge was not justified in giving the aforesaid directions in addition to punishing the petitioners for contempt of court. The argument was rejected holding that "the Single Judge was quite right in giving appropriate directions to close the breach (of undertaking)". 18. The above principle has been applied even in the case of violation of orders of injunction issued by civil court. In Clarke v. Chadhurn, (1985) 1 All ER 211 , Sir Robert Megarry V.C. observed : "I need not cite authority for the proposition that it is of high importance that orders of the court should be obeyed. Wilful disobedience to an order of the court is punishable as a contempt of court, and I feel no doubt that such disobedience may properly be described as being illegal. If by such disobedience the persons enjoined claim that they have validly effected some charge in the rights and liabilities of others, I cannot see why it should be said that although they are liable to penalties for contempt of court for doing what they did, nevertheless those acts were validly done. Of course, if an act is done, it is not undone merely by pointing out that it was done in breach of the law. Of course, if an act is done, it is not undone merely by pointing out that it was done in breach of the law. If a meeting Is held in breach of an injunction, it cannot be said that the meeting has not been held. But the legal consequence of what has been done in breach of the law may plainly be very much affected by the illegality. It seems to me on principle that those who defy a prohibition ought not to be able to claim that the fruits of their defiance are good, and not tainted by the Illegality that produced them." 19. To the same effect are the decisions of the Madras and Calcutta High Courts in Century Flour Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah, AIR 1975 Mad 270 and Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun, AIR 1986 Cal 220 . In Century Flour Mills Ltd., it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that where an act is done in violation of an order of stay or injunction, it is the duty of the court, as a policy, to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrongdoing. The inherent power of the court, it was held, is not only available in such a case, but it is bound to exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest of justice. That was a case where a meeting was held contrary to an order of injunction. The Court refused to recognise that the holding of the meeting is a legal one. It put back the parties in the same position as they stood immediately prior to the service of the interim order. 20. In Sujit Pal, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has taken the same view. There, the defendant forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff in and took possession of the property. The Court directed the restoration of possession to the plaintiff with the aid of police. The Court observed that no technicality can prevent the court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent powers. It held that the object of Rule 2A Order 39 will be fulfilled only where such mandatory direction is given for restoration of possession to the aggrieved party. This was necessary, it observed, to prevent the abuse of process of law. 21. It held that the object of Rule 2A Order 39 will be fulfilled only where such mandatory direction is given for restoration of possession to the aggrieved party. This was necessary, it observed, to prevent the abuse of process of law. 21. There is no doubt that this salutary rule has to be applied and given effect to by this Court, if necessary, by overruling any procedural or other technical objections. Article 129 is a constitutional power and when exercised in tandem with Article 142, all such objections should give way. The Court must ensure full justice between the parties before it." 14. The Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly held that the Court must ensure full justice between the parties before it. Division Bench judgment of Calcutta High Court in Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun, AIR 1986 Cal. 220 was considered by the Apex Court in para 20 of the judgment by referring the fact that Court had directed restoration of possession to the plaintiff with the aid of police. The Court observed that no technicality can prevent the Court from doing justice in exercise of its Inherent power. 15. In these circumstances, it has become necessary to pass an appropriate order for restoration of possession of the petitioner, if the non-petitioners have dispossessed him, as per the report of SHO, Kotwali, Aiwar. 16. Consequently, it is directed that non-petitioners will rat put any hindrance In the possession of petitioner Jagdish Prasad Avasthl over the property in dispute. If non-petitioners/contemnors are found in possession over the property In dispute, then the SHO, Police Station, Kotwaii, Aiwar is directed to restore the possession of the petitioner by dispossessing the non-petitioners from the property in dispute. 17. The SHO is directed to submit report about the possession of the parties and the compliance report as per above directions, within a period of two weeks from today. 18. A copy of this order will be submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner before the SHO, Police Station Kotwali, Aiwar. 19. Registry is also directed to send a copy of this order to the SHO, Police Station Kotwali, Aiwar for compliance.Put up for further orders and compliance report on 25th November, 2010.SHO Directed to Submit Compliance Report - Case to be Put Up For Orders On 25.11.2010. *******