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2010 DIGILAW 1885 (PNJ)

Phumman Singh v. Sukhwinder Kaur

2010-06-30

HEMANT GUPTA

body2010
Judgment Hemant Gupta, J. 1. Challenge in the present petition is to the order passed by the learned trial Court on 22.5.2009, whereby the respondent has been permitted to amend the suit so as to challenge the decree dated 1.9.2005 passed in Civil Suit No. 273 of 2004 and also sale deed dated 22.12.2005 executed in pursuance of such decree. 2. The plaintiff-respondent filed suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 7.5.2003 on 13.5.2004 against Swaran Singh, the owner of the land measuring 7 kanals 7 marlas. On the other hand, defendant No. 2- Phuman Singh, the present petitioner, filed Civil Suit No. 273 of 2004 on 11.6.2004 for specific performance of the alleged agreement dated 17.4.2003. In the said suit, an exparte decree has been granted on 1.9.2005. In pursuance of such decree, the sale deed in favour of the petitioner has been executed by the vendor Swaran Singh on 22.12.2005. Since the decree has been granted after the filing of the suit and the sale deed has been executed thereafter, the plaintiff-respondent has been permitted to amend the plaint so as to challenge the said decree and the sale deed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the plaintiff has been permitted to amend the plaint, after the trial has commenced. Such amendment could not be granted in view of the amended provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure vide Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra, 1995(1) R.R.R. 660 : 1995(3) SCC 147, to contend that the petitioner cannot be permitted to be impleaded as party in the suit for specific performance. 4. In the aforesaid case, a consent decree was suffered by the vendor in favour of his sons and wife. It was the sons and the wife of the vendor, who were sought to be impleaded as the defendants in the suit. The Court found that the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10 CPC are not applicable for the reason that such transfer is not during the pendency of the suit. The Court also found that the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 CPC cannot be invoked as such transferees are not party to the agreement. The Court found that the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10 CPC are not applicable for the reason that such transfer is not during the pendency of the suit. The Court also found that the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 CPC cannot be invoked as such transferees are not party to the agreement. The said judgment provides little assistance to the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In that case, the transfer was within close relations and prior to the filing of the suit. The judgment of the Honble Supreme Court reported as Lala Durga Prasad and Anr. v. Lala Deep Chand & Ors, 1954 SCR 360, was referred to. The said judgment arises out of a suit for decree for specific performance, wherein the subsequent purchaser was held to be a necessary party. 5. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 , contemplates enforcement of a contract against either party thereto; any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money good faith and without notice to the original contract. In terms of clause (b) of Section 19 of the Act, the petitioner is claiming title through his vendor. The question whether he is a transferee in good faith and without notice of the contact, are the disputed questions of fact, which can be examined only after opportunity of leading evidence is granted to the parties. The plaintiff has sought amendment to incorporate the subsequent facts to the filing of the suit on 13.5.2004. Therefore, the petitioner is not only a proper party, but also a necessary party as his vendor has transferred right in favour of the petitioner and for an effective decree for specific performance, he is bound to join his vendor in execution of the sale deed, if the plaintiff succeeds in his suit for specific performance. 6. Consequently, I do not find any parent illegality or material irregularity in the impugned order, which may warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Hence, the present revision petition is dismissed.