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2010 DIGILAW 1919 (RAJ)

Lal Chand Gupta v. State of Rajasthan

2010-11-15

M.N.BHANDARI

body2010
JUDGMENT Hon'ble BHANDARI, J.—By this writ petition, a challenge has been made to order dated 11.8.2010 with a further prayer that respondents be restrained to initiate action pursuant to aforesaid order. 2. It is a case where a vehicle bearing No. RJ-17-U-0275 was found involved and seized for an offence under the provisions of the Rajasthan Excise Act. Petitioner was found to be registered owner of the said vehicle, thus a letter was issued by respondent - Department on 11.8.2010 requesting Vigilance Cell of the Excise Department for filing challan against petitioner. On receipt of copy of aforesaid letter, petitioner sent a reply stating that vehicle has already been sold to one Shri Ashish Harjani on consideration. Thus, has no where related to the said vehicle now. After filing reply, when nothing come out either in favour of petitioner or against him, this writ petition has been filed to challenge letter dated 11.8.2010. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that letter dated 11.8.2010 has been issued in ignorance of the definition of 'owner' as provided under Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act of 1988'). According to him, definition of 'owner' provides transfer of vehicle under an agreement apart from agreement for hire-purchase, lease or hypothecation. Since petitioner executed an agreement to sale, he is not falling in the definition of 'owner'. Ignoring aforesaid, impugned letter has been issued. 4. I have considered submissions of learned counsel for petitioner and gone through the record carefully. 5. Main thrust of argument of challenge impugned letter dated 11.8.2010 is agreement to sale of vehicle and definition of 'owner' as provided under Sec. 2(30) of the Act of 1988. Perusal of record does not show an agreement to sale between petitioner and person to whom it is said to have been sold. During the course of arguments, learned counsel was specifically asked about document, which can be said to be an agreement to sale. It was admitted that there exists no agreement to sale herein. He, however, relied on Annexures-1 & 2, which learned counsel admitted not to be an agreement to sale. It was further asked as to whether Annexure-1 & 2 have been submitted with the Transport Department. It was admitted that there exists no agreement to sale herein. He, however, relied on Annexures-1 & 2, which learned counsel admitted not to be an agreement to sale. It was further asked as to whether Annexure-1 & 2 have been submitted with the Transport Department. It is admittedly by learned counsel that due to mischievous act of the purchaser, those documents have not been submitted and thereby vehicle still stands in the name of petitioner. The fact aforesaid demonstrates that admittedly there is no agreement to sale and even documents (Forms - Annexures 1 & 2) have not been submitted for transfer of vehicle. In the aforesaid background, the very basis of argument does not exists. 6. Further fact remains that even if it is presumed that there exists agreement to sale between two parties, whether by such agreement, other person can be treated as 'owner' or not? For this purpose, reference of the provisions of Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988 is relevant and thus quoted hereunder:- "30. "owner" means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement." 7. Perusal of the definition quoted above recognizes only three types of agreements i.e., hire-purchase agreement, lease agreement and hypothecation agreement with the rider that person should be in possession of vehicle. Definition does not speak about agreement to sale. 8. In para 8 of writ petition, word 'agreement' is shown to be independent to word 'hire-purchase'. Thus, aforesaid ground in para 8 of the writ petition seems to have been taken by definition of 'owner' given in the Bare act published by Universal Law Publishing Company Private Limited, Delhi with addition to punctuation mark "comma" between hire-purchase and agreement' whereas, in the original act and even in the gazette notification, punctuation mark "comma" does not exist between word 'hire-purchase' and 'agreement'. There, it is a hire-purchase agreement without punctuation mark "comma". Accordingly, definition of 'owner' has not rightly been taken by petitioner, which is quoted herein:- "30. There, it is a hire-purchase agreement without punctuation mark "comma". Accordingly, definition of 'owner' has not rightly been taken by petitioner, which is quoted herein:- "30. "owner" means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement, or an agreement of lese or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement." 9. Perusal of the aforesaid shows adding of punctuation mark "comma" between hire-purchase and agreement, which does not exist in the Original Text. Accordingly, even second ground urged by learned counsel cannot be accepted. 10. Petitioner has given a reference of judgment of Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of New Indian Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Amar Chand and others reported in 2005 ACJ 1233. Perusal of aforesaid judgment shows that issue as to whether one becomes owner with an agreement to sale has been decided in reference to the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 ignoring the definition of 'owner' as provided under the Act of 1988. This is more so when it is arising out of the case governed by the provisions of the Act of 1988. In view of aforesaid and with due respect, judgment referred to above cannot be applied in this case otherwise definition of 'owner' as provided under Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988 would be treated as re-written by us. Such a jurisdiction does not exist with the Courts. It is a settled law that statutory provisions cannot be ignored and, at the same time, meaning different than what has been provided therein cannot be given by giving reference of other Act, which is even contrary to the provision applicable to the case. The judgment supra does not even touch he definition of 'owner' as given under the Act of 1988 as the Act of 1988 recognizes only three types of agreement already mentioned earlier. Hence, punctuation mark "comma" shown between hire-purchase and agreement in the Bare Act published by the Universal Law Publishing Company Private Limited, Delhi cannot be accepted. In view of aforesaid also, I am unable to accept the view taken by the Hon'ble Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case supra. 11. Hence, punctuation mark "comma" shown between hire-purchase and agreement in the Bare Act published by the Universal Law Publishing Company Private Limited, Delhi cannot be accepted. In view of aforesaid also, I am unable to accept the view taken by the Hon'ble Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case supra. 11. In view of discussion made above, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. Accordingly, same is dismissed. A copy of this order may be sent to Universal Law Publishing Company Private Limited, Delhi so that they may make necessary correction in the definition of 'owner' as provided under Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988 in their publication of the year 2005. Registry may carry out the direction forthwith.