JUDGEMENT 1. The petitioner challenges the order passed on 17.11.2009 in Appeal No 529 dated 22.06.2009 by the District Teachers Appointment Appellate Tribunal, Kishanganj. By the said order, the appellate Tribunal has cancelled the appointment of petitioner as Shiksha Mitra which appointment was made in the year 2005 while giving no relief to the applicant before the Tribunal. Learned counsel for the petitioner challenges the order primarily on three grounds. Firstly, the appeal was too belated to be entertained. Secondly, the appeal could not be decided or heard in absence of the petitioner and thirdly, the Tribunal, being creature of Statute, could decide only the question of grant of relief to the appellant before it but could not travel beyond the same. Heard the parties and considered the matter. 2. In my view, the writ petition must succeed on all three grounds. It is not in dispute that petitioner was appointed Shiksha Mitra in the year, 2005. The appointment was twice renewed and then petitioner was absorbed as a Primary Panchayat Teacher in the year, 2006 and consequently, the post of Shiksha Mitra stood abolished. The applicant before the Tribunal filed the appeal for the first time on 22.06.2009 that is four years after petitioners appointment and that too an appointment in relation to Shiksha Mitra which post itself had been long back abolished. Thus, the Tribunal could not have or should not have entertained the appeal as has been held by this Court in the case of Alok Kumar and Others V/s. State of Bihar and Others, 2009 (2) PLJR 929 . Thus, the order of the Tribunal is not sustainable. 3. Secondly, it is well established that no order adverse can be passed against a person without hearing. In the present case, it is apparent that the order of the Tribunal has been passed setting aside the appointment of petitioner without even petitioner being made a party much less hearing the petitioner. The order, thus, is void ab initio being passed in gross violation of principles of natural justice. On this count also, the order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained. 4. In respect of the third ground, again the petition must succeed. From the order of the Tribunal, it is clear that the applicant before the Tribunal had come that he had been wrongly refused to be selected. On this count also, the order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained. 4. In respect of the third ground, again the petition must succeed. From the order of the Tribunal, it is clear that the applicant before the Tribunal had come that he had been wrongly refused to be selected. The Tribunal was shown that the applicants application itself had been rejected on the ground that the applicant had 35% marks as against minimum requirement of 45% in Intermediate. Thus, the Tribunal found that the applicant before it could not be granted any relief. 5. In my view, the Tribunal should have stopped there because if the appellant could not be granted any relief then there was no cause for the Tribunal to proceed further because the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is to resolve a lis inter party and not a lis in public interest. The Tribunal has no inherent jurisdiction to decide any issue on its own. Once it was found that the appellant could not be granted any relief, that was end of the matter. The Tribunal, thus, erred in proceeding further to examine the validity of the petitioners appointment because that was clearly beyond the scope of its jurisdiction which jurisdiction is based upon the appeal filed by a person seeking relief. 6. Thus, the Tribunals order cannot be sustained and is set aside. Consequently, the consequential order terminating the service of the petitioner is also set aside. The petitioner is directed to be immediately reinstated in service and as the petitioner had been terminated without due process of law and his termination having been held to be bad, it would be deemed that the petitioner was in service all along continuously for all purposes and intents. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed.