Hon'ble SHARMA, J.—This writ petition has been filed against the order impugned dated 28.10.2010 passed by the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer in appeal No. 6341/08 with the following prayer:- By an appropriate writ of certiorari, order or direction in the nature thereof, thereby the impugned order dated 28.10.2010 passed by the learned Board of Revenue may kindly be quashed and set aside and the order dated 7.3.2008 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority may kindly be restored and upheld. 2. The facts in brief giving rise to this writ petition are that the agriculture land bearing Khasra No. 390/1 (old) Khasra No. 390/1/1, 390/1/2 and 390/1/3 measuring 232 bigha 3 biswa situated at Village Sambhar Lake, Tehsil Phulera District Jaipur was originally recorded in the name of Gyarsa son of Govind Ram. Thereafter, after the death of Gyarsa, Kishan Lal was succeeded, who, vide registered sale-deed dated 25.2.1961, sold the land measuring 20 bigha 3 biswa to Goma Ram, Nathuram and Mangla Ram. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondents No. 4 to 7 namely; Nathu, Mangla Ram, Gopal and Banwari are the owner of the land on the basis of the registered sale deed dated 25.2.1961 and they have got every right to alienate the said land. 4. The aforesaid respondents vide agreement to sale deed dated 19.6.2006 sold piece of land measuring 75 x 50 totaling 3750 sq. yds. of land to the petitioner and handed over possession to the petitioner. In lieu of the order passed by the Sub Registrar Sambhar Lake, the petitioner had deposited Rs. 89,000/-. 5. On the basis of the above registered sale deed, the petitioner filed a suit for partition and declaration of his khatedari rights in respect of purchased land in the Court of S.D.O. Sambhar Lake on 28.12.2006. 6. The Sub Divisional Officer after hearing the parties dismissed the suit of the plaintiff vide its judgment dated 31.12.2007. Against which, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur which was allowed vide judgment dated 7.3.2008 setting aside the judgment and decree dated 31.12.2007 passed by the S.D.O., Sambhar Lake and the petitioner was declared khatedar tenant in respect of the land measuring 3750 sq. meter out of Khasra No. 390/1/3. 7. Against which, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur which was allowed vide judgment dated 7.3.2008 setting aside the judgment and decree dated 31.12.2007 passed by the S.D.O., Sambhar Lake and the petitioner was declared khatedar tenant in respect of the land measuring 3750 sq. meter out of Khasra No. 390/1/3. 7. Against the aforesaid order dated 7.3.2008, respondent No. 3 Babu Lal Acharya preferred a second appeal before the Board of Revenue along with an application under Section 96 C.P.C. for granting permission to file appeal along with an another application under Section of the Limitation Act. 8. It was further submitted that the Board of Revenue after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that as the present respondent No. 3 (appellant) is not a person aggrieved therefore, refused to grant permission to file above appeal but at the same time, partly allowed the appeal vide judgment dated 28.10.2010 by exercising its power of superintendence and set aside the judgment dated 7.3.2008 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority and restored the judgment and decree dated 31.12.2007 passed by the S.D.O. Sambhar Lake. 9. Against the order dated 28th October, 2010, passed by the Board of Revenue, this writ petition is preferred by the petitioner. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Satya Narain Kumawat has contended that there were two appeals against the said appellate order and of which one has been decided and another is pending while both the appeals should have been decided by one common order. 11. He has further contended that the Board of Revenue has wrongly applied the provisions of Section 63(1) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. 12. He has further contended that in the present case, issue of khatedari rights and issue of succession of deceased Gyarsa son of Govind Ram are already subjudice in the aforesaid appeals pending adjudication before the Board of Revenue. Hence, the judgment of the Board of Revenue dated 28.10.2010 be set aside. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Satya Narain Kumawat. First of all, it will be appropriate to consider Section 63 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The said section is reproduced as under:- 63. Hence, the judgment of the Board of Revenue dated 28.10.2010 be set aside. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Satya Narain Kumawat. First of all, it will be appropriate to consider Section 63 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The said section is reproduced as under:- 63. Tenancy when extinguished- (1) the interest of tenant in his holding or a part thereof, as the case may be shall be extinguished- (i) when he dies leaving no heir entitled to merit in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 14. The said section is reproduced as under:- 63. Tenancy when extinguished- (1) the interest of tenant in his holding or a part thereof, as the case may be shall be extinguished- (i) when he dies leaving no heir entitled to merit in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 14. The learned S.D.O. has observed in his judgment as follows:- ^^okn esa tkfgj fd;s x;s mDr rF;ksa ,oa tokc nkos esa budh LohdkjksfDr ds e/;utj oknh ,oa izfroknh }kjk izLrqr lk{;ksa dk voyksdu djus ij ;g ik;k x;k fd izFker% rks izfr la- 5 ds firk fd'kuyky dk vius ijnknk X;kjlk dh [kkrsnkjh Hkwfe dk tks okfjl gksuk cryk;k gS og lk{;ksa ls izekf.kr ugha gksrk gSA tekcUnh Ex7 dh Hkwfe esa jktLo e.My ds U;k;ky; ls LVs gksuk tkfgj gksrk gSA bldk D;k gqvk ds rF;ksa dks Hkh okn o lk{;ksa esa Li"V ugha fd;k gSA nkok ftl iathc) bdjkjukesa ds vk/kkj ij yk;k x;k gS og dsoy bl vk/kkj ij cspku ugha ekuk tk ldrk gS fd ml ij LVkEi M;wVh cspku dh nj ij yh gSA eqnzkad vf/kfu;e ds izko/kkuksa ds rgr ,sls bdjkjukesa ftlds vk/kkj ij dCtk gLrkarfjr gks pqdk gks ij eqnzkad dj As on sale vnk djus ds mijkUr Hkh ;g bdjkjukek gh ekuk tkosxkA ,oa blds mijkUr cspku nLrkost gksus ij gh bls foØ; 'kqekj fd;k tkosxkA bls ek= dCts dk vk/kkj gh ekuk tk ldrk gSA bruk gh ugha cfYd ;g Hkh fd tc Hkwfe dh [kkrsnkjh X;kjlk ds uke gS rks izFker% rks mlds okfjlku dks tfj;s ukekUrj.k ;k ?kks"k.kkRed okn ds vk/kkj ij lk{; izLrqr dj [kkrsnkj ntZ o ?kksf"kr djokuk gksxk ,oa bldk claim ?kksf"kr gksus ij gh ml nkos esa [kjhnnkjksa ,oa bdjkjdrkZ [kjhnnkj dh gSfl;r r; gks ldsxhA D;ksafd bl okn esa X;kjlk ds HkkbZ dk ijiksrk fd'kuyky gh vdsyk dSls ntZ [kkrsnkj X;kjlk dk ,d ek= okfjl gqvk ;g lk{;ksa ls izekf.kr ugha gksrk gSA bl dkj.k mlds gLrkarfjr ;k i'pkrorhZ Øsrk dk gd Hkh ?kksf"kr ugha gks ldrk gSA ;fn e`rd fd'kuyky ntZ e`rd [kkrsnkj X;kjlk dk okfjl ?kksf"kr gksrk gS rHkh Ex1 ds iathc) cspku nLrkost ds vk/kkj ij iz-ok-la- 1 rk 4 [kkrsnkj Lohdkj fd;s tk ldrs gS ,oa bl Ø; 'kqnk Hkwfe esa ls bdjkjdrkZ oknh us tks Hkwfe Ø; djus dk bdjkj fd;k gS mlds dCts dk ekuk tk ldrk gSA ,oa cspku gksus ij [kkrsnkj ?kksf"kr fd;k tk ldrk gSA mijksDr vuqlkj oknh bLrdjkj gd izkIr djus o caVokjk djkus dh vf/kdkjh ugha gSA ftlls nkok [kkfjt ;ksX; gSaA** 15. The learned counsel has drawn attention of this Court upon Section 224 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act which reads as under:- 224. Appeals from appellate decrees-(1) An appeal shall lie to the revenue appellate authority from a decree passed in appeal by a Collector; (2) An appeal shall lie to the Board from a decree passed in appeal by a revenue appellate authority on any of the following grounds, namely; (i) the decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law; (ii) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law; (iii) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by or under this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, which may possibly have produced an error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits and; (iv) the decision being contrary to the weight of evidence on record where the lower appellate court varied or reversed any finding of the trial Court on a question of fact. 16. The Board of Revenue has rightly exercised its power and passed the order and the relevant Para 12 is reproduced as under:- ^^bl izdj.k esa vihykFkhZ dk u rks dksbZ fgr gS rFkk u gh dksbZ yksdl gS vr% og izHkkfor i{kdkj ugha gSA ;|fi flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 96 ds vUrxZr vihy nk;j djus ds fy, i`Fkd ls vuqefr dh vko';drk ugha gS c'krsZ fd lacaf/kr O;fDr fgrc) izHkkfor i{kdkj gksA ;|fi bl izdj.k esa vihykFkhZ dk ,slk yksdl ugha gS] ijUrq bl izdj.k esa jktLo vihy vf/kdkjh }kjk xaHkhj dkuwuh =qfV djuk ik;k tkrk gS rFkk jktLo vihy vf/kdkjh dk fu.kZ; iw.kZr% dkuwuh izko/kku ds izfrdwy o fof/k foijhr gSA vr% bl izdkj dh xaHkhj =qfV Li"Vr% n`f"Vxkspj gksus ij ;g U;k;ky; bl voS/kkfudrk dk ewd n'kZd ugha jg ldrk rFkk v/khuLFk U;k;ky; ds lUnHkZ esa vius i;Zos{k.k] v/kh{k.k o fu;a=.k ds vf/kdkj ds v/khu bl fof/k foijhr dk;Zokgh dks vikLr djus esa l{ke gSaA** 17. Learned S.D.O. has observed that as to how Kishan Lal alone entered as Khatedar and that from the record it does not appear that he was the sole successor of Gyarsa and therefore no right can be transferred by him. Learned S.D.O. has observed that as to how Kishan Lal alone entered as Khatedar and that from the record it does not appear that he was the sole successor of Gyarsa and therefore no right can be transferred by him. Had Kishan Lal been declared successor of deceased khatedar Gyarsa, then only the respondents No. 1 to 4 could be accepted as khatedar. Not being so, the appellant Madan Lal was the only purchaser of the disputed land having possession only through agreement from the respondents No. 1 to 4 and it could not be said that the sale was effected. He was only having the possession but as the sale was not effected the suit for partition and declaration was dismissed by the learned S.D.O. 18. The learned R.A.A. reversed the order of the learned S.D.O. observing that the appellant Madan Lal purchased the land through registered agreement and as the Department of Stamp and Duty imposed stamp duty, possession of khatedari rights were transferred to Madan Lal. The R.A.A. also observed that Gyarsa did not die leaving no heir but he left his successor Kishan Lal and also Gyarsa did not surrender or abandon the disputed land as observed in Section 63(1)(i) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. 19. Learned Board of Revenue has rightly observed that when Kishan Lal was not declared successor of Gyarsa, how can he be a khatedar and as such he was not entitled to sale the disputed land to the respondents No. 4 to 7 which was entered in the name of Gyarsa. The R.A.A. has accepted the registration of the land on the basis of stamp duty imposed. But the stamp duty and registration are two different factors. As such, the B.O.R. has rightly observed that the appellant Madan Lal has no right title or interest and locus standi and not an effected party. 20. The R.A.A. has accepted the registration of the land on the basis of stamp duty imposed. But the stamp duty and registration are two different factors. As such, the B.O.R. has rightly observed that the appellant Madan Lal has no right title or interest and locus standi and not an effected party. 20. It is true that Babu Lal Acharya, the appellant before the Board of Revenue and respondent No. 3, here, in this writ petition was not an effected party and was not having locus standi and therefore was not having right to file appeal before the B.O.R. but as the R.A.A. has committed gross legal error and the decision of R.A.A. was against the provisions of law in view of the ingredients of the sub section (2) of Section 224, the Board of Revenue was having every right to set aside the order of R.A.A. and rightly did so. 21. The above discussion find support from the judgments rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the following judgments: 22. In the case of Ramesh Chandra Sankla and Others vs. Vikram Cement and Others reported in (2008) 14 SCC 58 , Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed as under: 90. Now, it is well settled that jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 is discretionary and equitable. Before more than half a century, the High Court of Allahabad in the leading case of Jodhey vs. State 21 observed: (AIR p. 792, para 10) "10. ...There are no limits, fetters or restrictions placed on this power of superintendence in this clause and the purpose of this article seems to be to make the High Court the custodian of all justice within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction and to arm it with a weapon that could be wielded for the purpose of seeing that justice is meted out fairly and properly by the bodies mentioned therein." 91. The power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution conferred on every High Court over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction is very wide and discretionary in nature. It can be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to meet the ends of justice. It is equitable in nature. While exercising supervisory jurisdiction, a High Court not only acts as a court of law but also as a court of equity. It can be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to meet the ends of justice. It is equitable in nature. While exercising supervisory jurisdiction, a High Court not only acts as a court of law but also as a court of equity. It is, therefore, power and also the duty of the Court to ensure that power of superintendence must "advance the ends of justice and uproot injustice." 98. From the above cases, it clearly transpires that powers under Articles 226 and 227 are discretionary and equitable and are required to be exercised in the larger interest of justice. While granting relief in favour of the applicant, the court must take into account the balancing of interests and equities. It can mould relief considering the facts of the case. It can pass an appropriate order which justice may demand and equities may project. As observed by this Court in Shiv Shankar Dal Mills vs. State of Haryana 28 Courts of equity should go much further both to give and refuse relief in furtherance of public interest. Granting or withholding of relief may properly be dependent upon considerations of justice, equity and good conscience. 23. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Abdul Khuddus and Others reported in (2007) 15 Supreme Court Cases 261 as under:- 9. It is this order of the Special Court, which was challenged by the respondents by way of a writ petition. At this juncture, we may now consider as to when the High Court could interfere with a finding of fact arrived at by the Special Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well settled that the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, may interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the Special Court only if the findings are based on no evidence or based on conjectures or surmises and if no reasonable man would on given facts and circumstances come to the conclusion reached by the Special Court. Therefore, it is pellucid that it is only in these special circumstances that it would be open to the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the Special Court. 11. Therefore, it is pellucid that it is only in these special circumstances that it would be open to the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the Special Court. 11. We have already discussed the findings of the Special Court and we find from the same that the findings arrived at by the Special Court cannot by any stretch of imagination, be said to be based on no evidence or beset with surmises or conjectures and that the finding of the Special Court on the question of title of the respondents by way of adverse possession was based on consideration of the relevant evidence- both oral or documentary. That apart, we also find from the order of the Special Court that neither any relevant material was excluded from consideration by it nor was any irrelevant material relied upon by it in recording its findings. At the risk of repetition, we may say that the Special Court had gone into the evidence, considered the evidence adduced by both the parties including the documentary evidence on record and came to a finding that the schedule land did not belong to Gandhi Hill Society and that the respondents could not prove that they had perfected title in respect of the schedule land by way of adverse possession. That apart, we are of the view that since it has been found on facts that the respondents could neither prove that they had acquired the title by way of adverse possession in respect of the schedule land nor could it be proved that the schedule land belonged to Gandhi Hill Society, it cannot be ruled out that the land would only belong to the State which was grabbed by the respondents. 24. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed in the case of Sneh Gupta vs. Devi Sarup And Others reported in (2009) 6 SCC 194 as under:- 41. The High Court moreover was exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. While exercising the said jurisdiction, the High Court had a limited role to play. It is not the function of the High Court while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction to enter into the disputed question of fact. The High Court moreover was exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. While exercising the said jurisdiction, the High Court had a limited role to play. It is not the function of the High Court while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction to enter into the disputed question of fact. It has not been found by the High Court that the findings arrived at by the learned Additional District Judge were perverse and/or in arriving at the said findings, the learned Additional District Judge failed and/or neglected to take into consideration the relevant factors or based its decision on irrelevant factors not germane therefor. It could intervene, if there existed an error apparent on the face of the record or, if any other well-known principle of judicial review was found to be applicable. (See Yeshwant Sakhalkar vs. Hirabat Kamat Mhamai 11). 25. Thus, a writ court seldom interfered with the orders passed by such authorities exercising quasi judicial functions unless there is serious procedural illegality or irregularity or they have acted in excess of their jurisdiction. 26. It is true that in exercising writ jurisdiction, High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings of the courts below and therefore cannot be appreciate evidence. Findings of fact recorded by the fact finding authority should ordinarily be considered as final. Findings of the court below should not interfered with, in writ jurisdiction merely on the ground that material on which the court below acted was insufficient or not credible. It is also true that as long as the findings of fact are based on some materials which are relevant, findings may not be interfered with, merely because another view is also possible but where the court below records findings on no evidence or irrelevant evidence it is open to the High Court to interfere with the order of the court below. 27. Though power of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such power must be exercised within the limits of law. The power of supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as court of appeal or court of error. The power of supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as court of appeal or court of error. It can neither review nor re-appreciate nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of subordinate court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the limits of law. 28. For these reasons, I do not find a fit case for interference in this writ petition. 29. Consequently, the writ petition is fails and is hereby dismissed.