JUDGMENT By the Court.—The present Appeal has been filed under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 against the judgment and Order dated 30.3.2010 passed by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, Bulandshahr whereby compensation amounting to Rs. 3,01,304/- with simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum has been awarded to the claimant-respondent No. 1 on account of the death of Devendra Singh, son of the claimant-respondent No. 1 in an accident, which took place at 9 A.M. on 29.12.2005. 2. The claimant-respondent No. 1 filed Claim Case being W.C.A. No. 07 of 2006 before the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, Bulandshahr, inter alia, stating that her son Devendra Singh was employed on the post of Driver at Sohrab Gate Depot, Merrut of the respondent No. 2 for driving Bus bearing Registration No. U.P. 15-L/6738; and that on 29.12.2005, the said Devendra Singh was taking the said Bus from Meerut to Bareilly; and that at 9 a.m. on the said date, when the said Bus reached village-Megha Nangla, Police Station-Shahjadnagar on National Highway, Bareilly, a Tractor bearing Registration No. U.P. 22A 2567 coming from the opposite direction and being driven rashly and negligently collided with the said Bus as a result of which the said Devendra Singh was seriously injured, and he died in the Government Hospital, Rampur. 3. The Appellant-Insurance Company as well as the respondent No. 2 (U.P. State Road Transport Corporation) filed their respective Written Statements. 4. In the Written Statement filed on behalf of the respondent No. 2, it was, inter alia, stated that the deceased Devendra Singh was engaged as a contract driver, and there was no relationship of master and servant between the respondent No. 2 and the said Devendra Singh; and that the said Devendra Singh used to run Bus on payment of 50 paise per kilometer; and that the Bus was duly insured with the Appellant-Insurance Company. 5. In the Written Statement filed on behalf of the Appellant-Insurance Company, it was, inter alia, stated that there was collusion between the claimant-respondent No. 1 and the respondent No. 2 in order to make illegal gain. 6. The claimant-respondent No. 1 filed documentary evidence in support of her case. On behalf of the respondent No. 2, Insurance Policy was filed showing that the Bus was insured with the Appellant-Insurance Company for the period with effect from 13.12.2005 to 12.12.2006. 7. 6. The claimant-respondent No. 1 filed documentary evidence in support of her case. On behalf of the respondent No. 2, Insurance Policy was filed showing that the Bus was insured with the Appellant-Insurance Company for the period with effect from 13.12.2005 to 12.12.2006. 7. The claimant-respondent No. 1 (Smt. Rajkali) examined herself before the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, Bulandshahr. In her statement, the claimant-respondent No. 1 (Smt. Rajkali), inter alia, reiterated the averments made in her Claim Case. The claimant-respondent No. 1 also examined Harendra Singh who stated that he was travelling in the Bus. He proved the occurrence of accident, the Driver Devendra Singh sustaining injuries in the accident, and the death of Devendra Singh in Rampur Hospital. 8. On behalf of the respondent No. 2, Phool Singh was examined as a witness. The said Phool Singh, inter alia, stated that the deceased Devendra Singh was engaged as a contract driver, and he was paid at the rate of 50 paise per kilometer; and that there was no fixation of salary to be paid to the said Devendra Singh; and that the contract with the said Devendra Singh was made on 3rd July, 2003. 9. Santosh Kumar Sharma, who was the conductor of the aforesaid Bus, was also examined. The said Santosh Kumar Sharma, inter alia, stated that the accident took place in his presence; and that at the time of accident, the said Devendra Singh was driving the Bus; and that the said Devendra Singh was driving the Bus rashly. In his cross-examination, the said Santosh Kumar Sharma admitted that in the report lodged by him in regard to the accident, it was stated that the accident took place on account of fog, and there was no mention of the negligent driving by the said Devendra Singh in the said Report. 10. In his cross-examination, the said Santosh Kumar Sharma admitted that in the report lodged by him in regard to the accident, it was stated that the accident took place on account of fog, and there was no mention of the negligent driving by the said Devendra Singh in the said Report. 10. On a consideration of the evidence on record, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner held that the deceased Devendra Singh was engaged as contract driver by the respondent No. 2; and that the said Devendra Singh died on account of injuries sustained by him in the aforesaid accident, which took place on 29.12.2005; and that the case set-up by the respondent No. 2 that the accident took place on account of negligence of the said Devendra Singh, was liable to be rejected; and that as per the Post-Mortem Report and the Driving Licence, the age of the deceased was assessed as 35 years at the time of his death; and that the deceased Devendra Singh was paid Rs. 3058/- in the month of November, 2005, and the compensation to be awarded was to be computed on the said basis. 11. The Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner further held that whatever might be the category of the workman, compensation was to be awarded under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, in case, the death of such workman took place by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. 12. Accordingly, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner awarded compensation amounting to Rs. 3,01,304/-. Further, simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum was to be paid with effect from the date of filing of the Claim Case till the date of actual payment, in case, the payment was not made within the prescribed period. 13. Against the said Judgment and Order dated 30.3.2010 passed by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, Bulandshahr, the present Appeal has been filed by the Appellant-Insurance Company. 14. We have heard Shri S.K. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the Appellant-Insurance Company, and perused the record. 15. 13. Against the said Judgment and Order dated 30.3.2010 passed by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, Bulandshahr, the present Appeal has been filed by the Appellant-Insurance Company. 14. We have heard Shri S.K. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the Appellant-Insurance Company, and perused the record. 15. Shri S.K. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the Appellant-Insurance Company submits that in view of the findings recorded by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner that the deceased Devendra Singh was engaged as a contract employee for driving the Bus, he was not covered under the category of “workman”, and there was no relationship of master and servant between the respondent No. 2 and the said Devendra Singh. 16. Having considered the submissions made by Shri S.K. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the Appellant-Insurance Company, we find ourselves unable to accept the same. 17. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (in short “the W.C. Act”), inter alia, provides that if personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of the said Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (in short “the W.C. Act”), inter alia, provides that if personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of the said Act. The word “employer” has been defined in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the W.C. Act as under: “(e) “employer” includes any body of persons whether incorporated or not and any managing agent of an employer and the legal representative of a deceased employer, and, when the services of a workman are temporarily lent or let on hire to another person by the person with whom the workman has entered into a contract of service or apprenticeship, means such other person while the workman is working for him;” The word “workman” has been defined in clause (n) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the W.C. Act as under: “(n) “workman” means any person [***] who is- (i) a railway servant as defined in [clause (34) of section 2 of the Railway Act, 1989 (24 of 1989)], not permanently employed in any administrative, district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, or [(ia) (a) a master, seaman or other member of the crew of a ship, (b) a captain or other member of the crew of an aircraft, (c) a person recruited as driver, helper, mechanic, cleaner or in any other capacity in connection with a motor vehicle, (d) a person recruited for work abroad by a company, and who is employed outside India in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II and the ship, aircraft or motor vehicle, or company, as the case may be, is registered in India, or] (ii) employed [***] [***] in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union [***]; and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference to his dependants or any of them.” 18. Reading the definition of “employer”, as contained in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the W.C. Act, with the definition of “workman”, as contained in clause (n) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the said Act, it is evident that in case a person is employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II to the said Act, the person would be covered under the definition of “workman” whether the contract of employment is expressed or implied, oral or in writing. 19. Hence, it follows that for a person to be covered under the definition of the word “workman” under the W.C. Act, he must be employed under a contract of employment in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II to the said Act. Such contract of employment may be expressed or implied, oral or in writing. However, there is no mention in the W.C. Act regarding nature of employment which results from such contract of employment, namely, as to whether the nature of employment should be permanent, temporary, casual or contractual etc. In absence of any such restriction in the W.C. Act, we are of the opinion that irrespective of the nature of employment, the person may be covered under the category of “workman” provided various requirements as contained in clause (n) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the W.C. Act read with Schedule II to the said Act are fulfilled. 20. It is pertinent to note that prior to the amendment made by Act No. 46 of 2000 in clause (n) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the W.C. Act, the words “any person” occurring in clause (n) were followed by the following brackets and words: “(other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer’s trade or business)”. 21. The said words were omitted by Act No. 46 of 2000 with effect from 8.12.2000. This amendment further shows that the definition of the word “workman”, as contained in clause (n) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the W.C. Act, does not contemplate any particular kind of employment, namely, permanent, temporary, casual or contractual etc. 21. The said words were omitted by Act No. 46 of 2000 with effect from 8.12.2000. This amendment further shows that the definition of the word “workman”, as contained in clause (n) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the W.C. Act, does not contemplate any particular kind of employment, namely, permanent, temporary, casual or contractual etc. Whatever may be the nature of employment, the person may be covered under the definition of “workman” provided the requirements laid down in clause (n) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the W.C. Act read with Schedule II to the said Act are fulfilled. 22. In the present case, it is established on record that the deceased Devendra Singh was engaged as a driver by the respondent No. 2 on contractual basis. The factum of employment of the deceased Devendra Singh with the respondent No. 2 was thus established. 23. In view of the above discussion, the fact that the deceased Devendra Singh was engaged as a driver on contractual basis was not relevant. 24. The said Devendra Singh was thus employed under a contract of employment in the capacity of driver. 25. Therefore, the said Devendra Singh was covered within the definition of “workman” as defined in clause (n) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the W.C. Act, read with Item (xxv) of Schedule II to the said Act. 26. It has been established on record that the said Devendra Singh sustained injuries while driving the aforesaid Bus, and he died on account of the said injuries. Therefore, the death of the said Devendra Singh took place on account of the injuries sustained by him by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the respondent No. 2. 27. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner was justified in awarding compensation to the claimant-respondent No. 1 on account of the death of the said Devendra Singh in the aforesaid accident. 28. As regards the findings recorded by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, the same have been recorded on a consideration of the evidence on record. No illegality or perversity has been shown in the said findings. 29. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that no substantial question of law is involved in the present Appeal. 28. As regards the findings recorded by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, the same have been recorded on a consideration of the evidence on record. No illegality or perversity has been shown in the said findings. 29. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that no substantial question of law is involved in the present Appeal. The Appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed, and the same is accordingly dismissed. 30. However, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. —————