JUDGEMENT , J. 1. The present appeal by the State of Bihar questions the propriety of judgment and order of acquittal dated 26.10.2009 passed by the learned Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Sitamarhi in S.T. No. 422 of 2008/20 of 2009. 2. The two accused persons, who are the respondents before us, were put on trial in the above case by framing charges under Sections 302/34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. 3. The short facts of the case are that the deceased Badri Mian was coming from Maniari Bazar by his motorcycle bearing Registration No. BR 308063 and when he had crossed the railways after Dheng railway station and had reached near a bridge, the two respondents came and fired at him from their respective revolvers, as a result of which, the deceased died. It was alleged that the respondents, thereafter, fled in a particular direction, who were duly identified by the informant. 4. The case was investigated into by drawing up the FIR of Majorganj P.S. Case No. 97 of 2007 dated 20th August, 2007 by P.W.6 Shiv Nandan Mishra, who prepared the inquest report and sent the dead body for postmortem examination. For quite some times, no one was coming forward to make a statement before the I.O. Ultimately,persons who were examined during trial, like, P.W.1 Jamaluddin, P.W.2 Md. Zahur Mansoori, P.W.3 Zamaruddin Ansari and P.W.4 Nasaruddin Ansari, came forward to make statement before the I.O. of the case who, after close of investigation, sent up the two respondents for trial. 5. In course of the trial, eight witnesses were examined, which included the above noted witnesses and besides them, Dr. Shakil Anjum, P.W.5 and a formal witnesses, like, P.W.8 Jitendra Jha. 6. The defence of the respondents was that the deceased was a veteran criminal as he was figuring in a huge number of cases, which have been detailed in paragraph 11 of the judgment and he had many enemies and any one of them could be settling his score against the deceased. 7. The learned trial judge, considering the evidence of each and every witness, like, P.Ws.1 to 4, the informant of the case and after assigning reasons, disbelieved their testimony. 7. The learned trial judge, considering the evidence of each and every witness, like, P.Ws.1 to 4, the informant of the case and after assigning reasons, disbelieved their testimony. As regards P.W.1, it was pointed out by the learned trial judge that in addition to being an interested person on account of being the nephew of the deceased, his evidence was suffering from such infirmities which could not be reconciled by the prosecution. Some of the most important statements, which were made by P.W.1, had never been made before the I.O. and further that he made belated statement before the police. In addition to that, as regards the manner of occurrence, the learned trial judge also did not believe the version put forth by the witnesses as the injuries which were recorded by the doctor were not in consonance with the statement of P.W.1 who was stating that shots were fired from very close range. So far P.W.2 was concerned, the learned trial judge pointed out that he was contradicting his earlier version as regards his presence at the site of the occurrence and he was deposing before the I.O. on the third day of the occurrence. Besides, his evidence at paragraph 9 of the deposition was completely overruling the possibilities of his presence at or around the place of occurrence. So far P.W.3 was concerned, he was identifying the respondent wrongly while deposing in court and on this score alone, the learned trial judge appears justified in rejecting his evidence. 8. As regards the evidence of the informant, we have found that the inquest report was prepared at 18.25 hours, i.e., 6.25 P.M. but, in spite of claiming himself being present at the place of occurrence, the informant does not appear coming forward to make any statement before the police. This is the reason that the Fardbeyan was recorded about twenty minutes after the preparation of the inquest report. This circumstance has been identified by the learned trial judge very correctly to point out that the whole prosecution story was shrouded in mystery. This is the reason that the Fardbeyan was recorded about twenty minutes after the preparation of the inquest report. This circumstance has been identified by the learned trial judge very correctly to point out that the whole prosecution story was shrouded in mystery. We also accept the reasons assigned by the learned trial judge simply for the reason that if the holding of inquest and preparation of the report in that behalf was preceding the fardbeyan, then one has to assume that the police officer after arriving at the scene of the occurrence, in spite of seeking some one to come forward to give statement, was not finding anyone who could make a narration as to in which manner the occurrence had taken place and who really had committed it and if someone comes very belatedly and after the inquest had been held, then one could very safely assume that either the man was not present or the story which he was propounding about the occurrence, could be an after thought. This could be the reason further to discard the claim of being present on or around the scene of occurrence of other witnesses also, because if they were the eye witnesses, there was no hurdle for them in coming forward and making statement before the police. That apart, what appears from the judgment, is that none of the witnesses were prompt in making statement before the police. Witnesses were not coming before the I.O. The learned trial judge has mentioned that the I.O. was searching for them. The witnesses, as we have just noted, were all interested. They were not prompt in making their statements. The fardbeyan was also belatedly recorded after preparation of the inquest report. These are some of the circumstances under which the order of acquittal was passed. 9. We find no perversity in the judgment of the trial court and we dismiss the appeal.