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2010 DIGILAW 199 (ORI)

Jagannath Minerals v. State of Orissa

2010-03-23

I.M.QUDDUSI, SANJU PANDA

body2010
JUDGMENT SANJU PANDA, J. : In this writ application, the petition¬ers have challenged the revocation of Mining Lease transfer order dated 6.2.2007 passed by the Deputy Secretary to Government of Orissa, Department of Steel and Mines and cancellation of removal permission for iron ore (vide Annexure-14) and issuance of work¬ing permission in favour of a dead person, namely, Late Manoran¬jan Das (vide Annexure-16). 2. The facts leading to this case are as follows: A mining lease in respect of an area measuring Ac.11.533 hects in village Deojhar in the district of Keonjhar for a period of 20 years was to be granted in favour of one Manoranjan Das. Due to paucity of funds, on 18.3.1997 he entered into an agree¬ment with Deepak Kumar Rana, Managing partner of petitioner no.1 firm to transfer the said mining lease and also executed a General Power of Attorney in his favour. Accordingly, on the said lease being granted in favour of Manoranjan Das, on 6.7.1998 Deepak Kumar Rana as the Power of Attorney Holder of Manoranjan Das executed the mining lease deed with the Collector, Keonjhar to carry on the mining operation.In the said agreement, they further agreed that Deepak Kumar Rana will exercise all the lease-hold rights on his own and the Power of Attorney shall not be revoked till the lease was transferred. Thereafter, by virtue of a deed of partnership dated 16.4.1999, Manoranjan Das and Deepak Kumar Rana became partners and created a partnership firm under the name and style of M/s. Jagannath Minerals. It was agreed therein that Deepak Kumar Rana would be the managing partner of the said firm and if Manoranjan Das retired, neither he nor his heirs, successors and assigns could claim further continuance of partnership and the lease would continue in the name of the firm and Deepak Kumar Rana would be at liberty to take anybody as partner in the firm (Annexure-7). In pursuance of formation of the partnership firm between Manoranjan Das and Deepak Kumar Rana, a letter was issued to the authority for transfer of the mining lease in the district of Keonjhar in favour of M/s. Jagannath Minerals wherein it was clearly indicated that Deepak Kumar Rana was the Managing Part¬ner. A copy of the partnership deed was also enclosed for the purpose of transfer. A copy of the partnership deed was also enclosed for the purpose of transfer. The State Government on 9.5.2001 transferred the mining lease in favour of the partnership firm by granting permission under Rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules.There¬fore, the transfer deed was executed in Form ‘O’ on 4.8.2001 between the Collector, Keonjhar and Manoranjan Das as transferor and petitioner no.1 as transferee, but the said document was not registered. While the matter stood thus, Manoranjan Das decided to retire from the partnership and to that effect, he issued a letter on 21.3.2005 indicating therein that he cancelled the General Power of Attorney executed on 18.3.1997 in favour of Deepak Kumar Rana. Petitioner no.1 also filed Civil Suit No.16 of 2005 before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Champua with the following prayers: “(a) to restrain the defendant and any other person claiming under him from entering into the mines and from obstructing the petitioner from smooth operation of the said mines by virtue of the permanent injunction, (b) to restrain the defendant from revoking the power of attorney dated 18.3.1997 and if at all during the meantime the defendant no.1 revoked the said power of attorney, then the same may be declared as inoperative, void, ab initio by virtue of mandatory injunction and other consequential relief.” During pendency of the said suit, Manoranjan Das died on 6.5.2005. Therefore, the suit became infructuous. Removal permis¬sion granted in favour of the petitioners was stopped by the Government on 31.3.2005. 3. Challenging the order passed by opposite party no.4, the petitioners filed W.P.(C) No.8152 of 2005. On 2.9.2005 the said writ application was dismissed for non-prosecution. The petitioners were not aware of that order. When they came to Cuttack on 25.1.2007 and verified the record,they came to know about the same. 4. As Manoranjan Das retired and also died, Deepak Kumar Rana being a single person approached his father-in-law and brother-in-law to become partners in M/s. Jagannath Minerals to help him to run the mining business. They in their turn, informed that they were ready and willing to invest and help him without being partners of the firm and insisted petitioner no.2 who is the wife of Deepak Kumar Rana to become partner of the firm. Ac¬cordingly, partnership deed was drafted and executed at Cuttack and the firm asked permission from the Government for operation of the mining. Ac¬cordingly, partnership deed was drafted and executed at Cuttack and the firm asked permission from the Government for operation of the mining. At this juncture, the petitioners came to learn that mining lease which was granted in the name of M/s. Jagannath Minerals had already been revoked and was going to be transferred in favour of opposite party nos. 5 to 9 who are the legal heirs of Manoranjan Das. Though the petitioners under the RTI Act applied for a copy of the said revocation order, they did not get it. Therefore, they were constrained to file Civil Suit; No.41 of 2007 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge(Senior Division), First Court, Cuttack with the following prayers: “(i) Let it be declared that M/s. Jagannath Minerals is the lessee in respect of “Deojhar Ore Mines” situated in village Deojhar under Joda Police Station in the district of Keonjhar. (ii) Let it be declared that the revocation, if any, of the said lease deed is illegal and void and accordingly the same may be set aside. (iii) Let it be declared that plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 being partners of M/s. Jagannath Minerals are the lease holder of the said mines. (iv) Defendant nos. 1 to 4 be permanently injucted to trans¬fer the aforesaid lease in favour of defendant no.5 and other consequential relief.” On 7.2.2007, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division),First Court, Cuttack directed the parties to maintain status quo. 5. While the matter stood thus,on 20.6.2007 the State Government issued working permission to Manoranjan Das, who was dead. The said permission was granted for thirty days from the date of issuance of the letter. As the legal heirs of Manoranjan Das tried to carry on mining operation, the petitioners filed another interim application, i.e., I.A. No.268 of 2007, in Civil Suit No.41 of 2007. As the Court did not pass any order, the petitioners filed F.A.O. No.91 of 2007 before the learned Dis¬trict Judge, Cuttack. However, the first appeals was dismissed against which the petitioners filed W.P.(C) No.9698 of 2007 before this Court which has already been disposed of on 1.10.2007. 6. As the Court did not pass any order, the petitioners filed F.A.O. No.91 of 2007 before the learned Dis¬trict Judge, Cuttack. However, the first appeals was dismissed against which the petitioners filed W.P.(C) No.9698 of 2007 before this Court which has already been disposed of on 1.10.2007. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that in view of the above, finding no other alternative remedy, the peti¬tioners challenged the revocation order dated 6.2.2007 passed by the Government stating therein that as per the application for transfer of mining lease and execution of transfer deed in Form ‘O’,right, title and interest in the mining lease will be trans¬ferred to the transferee. The transfer deed being a non-testamentary instrument, which authorizes the assign/transferee right, title and interest in the immovable property, the same is not compulsorily registrable under Section 17(2)(vii) of the Registration Act. However, he further submitted that if the transfer/assignment dated 4.8.2001, is construed to be a grant, the same is exempted from registration under Section 90(1) of the Registration Act. Since the mining lease had already been trans¬ferred to M/s. Jagannath Minerals, it was not open to the Govern¬ment to revoke the said permission under Rule 37 of the mineral Concession Rules. The legal heirs of Manoranjan Das cannot be entitled to operate the mines on the basis of the working permis¬sion granted in favour of a dead person. Since the suit was not a speedy and efficacious remedy,during pendency of the writ appli¬cation the petitioners withdrew Civil Suit No.41 of 2007. Hence, this Court may interfere with the impugned order and quash the same in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. Opposite party nos. 6 to 10, who are the legal heirs of Manoranjan Das, appeared and filed their counter affidavit. They have taken a specific stand that the order impugned is revisable. Therefore, the writ application is not maintainable as alterna¬tive remedy is available and the claim of the petitioners that the transfer of mining lease from Manoranjan Das to the erstwhile M/s. Jagannath Minerals is a Government grant and does not re¬quire any registration is not correct. Rather the transfer is a private transaction basing on which the Government may, if satis¬fied, sanction a grant, but there is a clear instruction from the Government that such an instrument need be registered. Rather the transfer is a private transaction basing on which the Government may, if satis¬fied, sanction a grant, but there is a clear instruction from the Government that such an instrument need be registered. On the decision of Manoranjan Das regarding withdrawal of the transfer of lease so made in favour of M/s. Jagannath Minerals, the execu¬tion of Form ‘O’ has no existence in the eye of law. The present firm is not the same firm in whose favour the transfer lease was sought because after the death of Manoranjan Das, the firm did not exist as the same was constituted by two partners, i.e., Manoranjan Das and Deepak Kumar Rana only. Since Manoranjan Das decided not to transfer the lease to M/s. Jagannath Minerals before registration of the deed, the same document lost its force and could not have been utilized even otherwise. Further, on the death of Manoranjan Das, the lease automatically stood trans¬ferred to his legal representatives, as the mining lease deed executed between the State and Manoranjan Das was for a period of 20 years. Therefore, there is no illegality in the revocation order passed by the authority. The mining lease remained with Manoranjan Das and after his death as per the terms and condi¬tions of the lease read with the provisions contained in the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, the mines vested with the legal representatives of Manoranjan as by way of inheritance. The General Power of Attorney was granted in favour of Deepak Kumar Rana with all bona fide intention and since, he misutilised the power given to him, the said power was cancelled. Due to such misutilisation and abnormal behaviour of Deepak Kumar Rana, Manoranjan Das did not intend to part with the lease and keep the mines under the said partnership firm. They specifically denied the fact that due to ill-health of Manoranjan Das, the transfer deed in Form ‘O’ could not be registered before the Sub-Regis¬trar, Keonjhar. Rather, Manoranjan Das was aware of the clandes¬tine activities of Deepak Kumar Rana and compelled not to trans¬fer the lease and also to retire from the firm. He also cancelled the General Power of Attorney. Though he executed the deed for transfer of mining lease in Form ‘O’, since the transfer was a property transfer, mere execution of Form ‘O’ did not get the property transferred; it required registration. He also cancelled the General Power of Attorney. Though he executed the deed for transfer of mining lease in Form ‘O’, since the transfer was a property transfer, mere execution of Form ‘O’ did not get the property transferred; it required registration. Now after retire¬ment of Manoranjan Das, the partnership firm M/s. Jagannath Minerals has lost its existence. The present petitioners with an oblique motive to grab the property in question constituted the said firm and they have no locus standi to seek any permission to operate the mines. On 12.6.2006, their application for mining operation was rejected by the authority. Having not challenged the said order, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in this writ application, which is not maintainable.In view of the terms and conditions contained in the lease read with the proviso to Section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Development & Regula¬tion) Act, 1957 and Rule 25-A of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, the legal representatives of Manoranjan Das automatically stepped into the shoes of their predecessor and rightly operated the mines. Hence, the impugned order need not be interfered with by this Court. 8. The State also filed its counter-affidavit. It has taken a stand that the dispute between the two private individu¬als regarding the terms and conditions of the partnership deed executed between them being a disputed question of fact, adjudi¬cation thereof in this writ application is not warranted. The same is to be adjudicated by a civil Court. (C.S. No.41 of 2007) as well as W.P.(C) No.9896 of 2007 were withdrawn by October, 2007). The mining lease for iron ore was granted in favour of Manoranjan Das on 6.7.1998 in respect of an area measuring Ac.11.533 hects in village Deojhar in the district of Keonjhar for a period of 20 years. After the lease was granted, Manoranjan Das enter into an agreement with Deepak Kumar Rana on 16.4.1999 for constituting a partnership firm, namely, M/s. Jagannath Minerals. Later on Manoranjan Das submitted an application to the Government on 28.4.1999 for transfer of the lease in question in favour of the said firm. The said application was allowed on 9.5.2001. The Government issued a direction to Manoranjan Das for execution and registration of transfer lease deed. But before registration of the transfer lease deed,Manoranjan Das expired. As a result, the same could not be registered and the transaction was not completed. The said application was allowed on 9.5.2001. The Government issued a direction to Manoranjan Das for execution and registration of transfer lease deed. But before registration of the transfer lease deed,Manoranjan Das expired. As a result, the same could not be registered and the transaction was not completed. Before that,Manoranjan Das also intimated the Government not to transfer the lease in favour of M/s. Jagannath Minerals. In view of the said facts and circumstances, the Gov¬ernment vide its Proceeding No.1324 dated 6.2.2007 revoked the order dated 9.5.2001 by which the transfer of mining lease was allowed. As per Rule 37-A of the Mineral Concession Rules the transfer of lease allowed by the Government should be executed in Model Form ‘O’ within three months from the date of the order or within the time extended by the Government. Since the original lessee died prior to the date of transfer and registration of the transfer lease deed in prescribed format and the partnership was not in existence, the question of transfer could not be taken place. Therefore, the lessee has no right and the writ applica¬tion is liable to be dismissed. 9. In view of the above rival submissions of the parties, this Court has to determine in this writ application- (i) Whether any alternative remedy is available to the petitioners? (ii) Whether the partnership firm-M/s. Jagannath Minerals did exist and continue on the retirement/after death of the other partner Manoranjan Das? (iii) Whether the mining lease is a lease or grant and such transfer needs registration? and (iv) Since the lease was in favour of Manoranjan Das and was not transferred to any partnership firm, whether the petitioners have no locus standi to claim any relief to continue the mining operation as they have not obtained the lease and the transfer deed was not registered? 10. The learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted that the writ application is not maintainable as an alternative remedy by way of revision under Section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 is available to the petitioners. In support of his contention, he cited the decision reported in AIR 2005 SC 3425 (Central Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand and others) wherein it has been held that relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not available when an alternative remedy is available. In support of his contention, he cited the decision reported in AIR 2005 SC 3425 (Central Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand and others) wherein it has been held that relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not available when an alternative remedy is available. However, though any order passed by the authority is revisa¬ble as per Section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 and the lease was not transferred and the petitioners have filed this writ application to continue the min¬ing operation, since there is a dispute regarding continuation of mining operation between the petitioner and the legal representa¬tives of the original leaseholder, this Court entertains the writ application to consider the questions of law formulated above. 11. Now, it has to be determined in this writ application whether the partnership firm-M/s. Jagannath Minerals did exist and continue on the retirement/after death of the other partner Manoranjan Das and whether the mining lease is a lease or grant and such transfer needs registration. In the case of Abbashbhai K. Golwala v. R.G. Shah and others reported in AIR 1988 Bombay 187, it was held that when there was an express provision under the Clause of partnership deed which enabled a remaining partner to continue the business is partner¬ship with other parties also, i.e., by taking new partners into the partnership, then on retirement of all the other partner but one that remaining partner would be entitled to continue the business of the firm on his making payments to the retiring part¬ners as provided in the clauses of partnership deed. The said decision was rendered by the Bombay High Court on the Clauses in the partnership deed. In that case, the partnership was between five partners who had 20% share each in the business. The rele¬vant clauses of the partnership deed were as follows: “2. The said decision was rendered by the Bombay High Court on the Clauses in the partnership deed. In that case, the partnership was between five partners who had 20% share each in the business. The rele¬vant clauses of the partnership deed were as follows: “2. The partnership with the change in the constitution of the firm, has commenced the partnership business on and from the 1st day of January, 1971 and shall continue unless dissolved or determined by and with the mutual consent of all the partners provided that any of the parties hereto may retire from the partnership after giving to the others a previous notice in writ¬ing of not less than three calender months of his intention to retire from the partnership and he shall be deemed to have re¬tired from the partnership of the expiration of the period of the said notice and remaining partners shall be entitled to continue to carry on the said business in partnership among themselves or with any other person or persons. xxx xxx xxx 18. In the case of retirement of any partners, as provided for herein he shall be paid the amount standing to his credit in the books of account of the partnership and his proportionate share in the goodwill and profits of the firm up to the date of his retirement within six months from the date of his retirement. If in case there is a loss for the said period the same shall also be likewise deducted from the amount standing to the credit of the retiring partner. 19. Death, retirement or insolvency of any partner shall not be continued between the remaining partners. In such a case, the amount standing to the credit of the deceased, retiring or insol¬vent partner together with the share of the goodwill and the profit up to the date of his death, retirement or insolvency shall be paid to him or to his legal heirs and if there is any loss then proportionate share of loss up to the date of death, retirement or insolvency shall be deducted from the amount stand¬ing to his credit.” In view of the clause for taking partners into partnership, the person who remains, therefore, can continue the business in partnership by taking other persons as partners. The business of the firm may be continued even when all the partners but one retires. The business of the firm may be continued even when all the partners but one retires. It was held by the Court that on retirement of the other partners the remaining partner is entitled to continue the said business. In the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur and Bhandara, Nagpur (in both the Appeals) v. Seth Govin¬dram Sugar Mills (in both the Appeals) reported in AIR 1966 SC 24 it was held as follows: “A combined reading of Sections 42 and 31 of the Partnership Act, according to the learned counsel, would lead to the only conclusion that two partners of a firm could by agreement induct a third person into the partnership after the death of one of them. 7. There is a fallacy in this argument. Partnership, under Section 4 of the Partnership Act, is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. Section 5 of the said Act says that the relation of partnership arises from contract and not from status. The fundamental principle of partnership, therefore, is that the relation of partnership arises out of contract and out of status. To accept the argument of the learned counsel is to negative the basic principle of law of partnership. Section 42 can be interpreted without doing violence either to the language used or to the said basic principle. Section 42(c) of the Part¬nership Act can appropriately be applied to a partnership where there are more than two partners. If one of them dies, the firm is dissolved; but if there is a contract to the contrary, the surviving partners will continue the firm.On the other hand, if one of the two partners of a firm dies, the firm automatically comes to an end and, thereafter, there is no partnership for a third party to be introduced therein and, therefore, there is no scope for applying clause (c) of Section 42 to such a situation. It may be that pursuant to the wishes or the directions of the deceased partner the surviving partner may enter into a new partnership with the heir of the deceased partner, but that would constitute a new partnership. In this light Section 31 of the Partnership Act falls in line with Section 42 thereof. It may be that pursuant to the wishes or the directions of the deceased partner the surviving partner may enter into a new partnership with the heir of the deceased partner, but that would constitute a new partnership. In this light Section 31 of the Partnership Act falls in line with Section 42 thereof. That section only recognizes the validity of a contract between the partners to introduce a third party without the consent of all the existing partners: it presupposes the subsistence of a part¬nership: it does not apply to a partnership of two partners which is dissolved by the death of one of them, for in that event there is no partnership at all for any new partner to be inducted into it without the consent of others.” In the case of Erach F.D. Meheta v. Minoo F.D. Meheta re¬ported in AIR 1971 SC 1653 , the apex Court has held that when the partnership consisted of only two partners and one partner agreed to retire, there can be no doubt that as per the terms of agree¬ment one of the partners will retire amounts to dissolution of the partnership. In the said case, the relevant terms of the deed of partnership were as follows: “3. The duration of the partnership shall be at will. xxx xx xxx 15. In the said case, the relevant terms of the deed of partnership were as follows: “3. The duration of the partnership shall be at will. xxx xx xxx 15. All disputes and questions whatsoever which shall either during the partnership or afterwards arise between the partners or between one of them and the personal representatives of the other or between their respective personal representative touch¬ing these presents or the interpretation of this deed or the construction of the application thereof or any clause of thing herein contained or any account valuation or division of assets debts or liabilities to be made hereunder or as to any act deed or commission of either partner or as to any act which ought to be done by the partners in dispute or as to any other matter in any way relating to the partnership business or the affairs and transactions thereof or the rights, duties or liabilities of either partner under these presents shall be referred to two Arbitrators one to be appointed by each party to the difference in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, or any statutory modification thereof for the time being in force.” In the present case, the following clauses of the partner¬ship agreement are relevant for the purpose of this writ applica¬tion: “4. That in view of reasons explained earlier, the 2nd party shall function as managing Partner of firm, look after the day-to-day mining operation, all applications necessary to be made to the statutory authorities, seeking permission either for extraction or for transportation shall be under the signature of the 2nd party............ xxx xxx xxx 9........That since the Mining lease now stands in the personal name of 1st party, necessary applications to the competent authorities shall be made by the 1st party on the same day on the date of execution of this Deed and the process of transfer of mining lease in the name of the aforestated firm shall be made completed as quickly as possible. ..... 10. That in the event the 1st party desirous to retire he will have to express such of his desire in writing and communica¬te the same to the 2nd party by a Regd. Letter 30 days prior to the date of his proposed retirement. So, that within the inter¬regnum period of 30 days all accounts can be settled. ..... 10. That in the event the 1st party desirous to retire he will have to express such of his desire in writing and communica¬te the same to the 2nd party by a Regd. Letter 30 days prior to the date of his proposed retirement. So, that within the inter¬regnum period of 30 days all accounts can be settled. In the event the 1st party retires he shall have, neither he nor any of his heirs/successors/assigns can claim further continuance in partnership. And the mining lease which on transfers on the name of firm shall continue in the name of firm. Neither the 1st party nor his heirs/successors/assigns shall have any claim over the same. The 2nd party shall be at liberty to take anybody as a partner to the firm. 11. That all disputes arising of partnership deed and be¬tween the partners enforce only shall be resolved by way of Arbi¬tration pursuant to the arbitration law, for the time being in force. xxx xxx xxx.” 12. Considering the above clauses of the partnership agreement on the touch-stone of the decisions as discussed in the above paragraph, in plain and simple language, a partnership means a contract of two or more competent persons to place their money, effects, labour and skill, or some or all of them, in lawful commerce or business and to divide the profit and bear the loss in certain proportions. Therefore, from the said meaning, it appears that partnership is a relation between persons who have agreed to share the profit of business to be carried on by all or any of them acting for all. The said relation subsists between the persons who have agreed to combine their profit, labour, skill and to share the profit thereof between them. Therefore, from the above discussion, it cannot be said that a partnership would continue by only one person if the partnership was formed between two persons and out of them one declared his intention to retire or withdraw himself from the said partnership. In the case of V.H. Patel & Company and others v. Hirubhai Himabhai Patel and others) reported in (2000) 4 SCC 368 , the apex Court while considering the provision under Section 39 of the Partnership Act, 1932 held that breach of agreement and conduct destructive of mutual confidence, give rise to a ground for dissolution of a partnership. In the case of V.H. Patel & Company and others v. Hirubhai Himabhai Patel and others) reported in (2000) 4 SCC 368 , the apex Court while considering the provision under Section 39 of the Partnership Act, 1932 held that breach of agreement and conduct destructive of mutual confidence, give rise to a ground for dissolution of a partnership. The factual background of the said case is that the dispute between the parties originated on the basis whether one or other partner had not retired from partner¬ship or as to the rights arising in relation to trademarks or otherwise still when there was no mutual trust between the par¬ties and the relationship became so strained that it is impossi¬ble to carry on the business as partners, it was certainly open to them to claim dissolution and such a question could be adjudi¬cated. In the said case, the apex Court held as follows: “If there has been breach of agreement and conduct is destructive of mutual confidence certainly such conduct can give rise to a ground for dissolution of the partnership. While mere disagreement or quarrel arising from impropriety of partners is not sufficient ground for dissolution, interference should not be refused where it is shown to the satisfaction of the adjudicating authority that the conduct of a partner has been such that it is not reasonably practicable for other partners to carry on the business in partnership. For instance, dissolution should be ordered if it is shown that the conduct of a partner has resulted in destruction of mutual trust or confidence which is the very basis for proper conduct of partnership. .......Dissolution will arise where it appears that the state of feelings and conduct of the partners have been such that business cannot be continued with advantage to either party.” In the case of M. Vedachala Mudaliar and another v. S. Rangaraju Naidu reported in AIR 1960 Madras 457, it was held that when there are more than two partners in a firm and one of the partners severs his connection with the business and the other partners continue the business as a firm, the transaction of severance can be appropriately described as one of retirement. But where there are only two partners, the appropriate terms to describe severance by one partner of his connection with the business of the partnership is dissolution and not retirement. But where there are only two partners, the appropriate terms to describe severance by one partner of his connection with the business of the partnership is dissolution and not retirement. In a recent decision of the apex Court reported in (2010) 2 SCC 407 (Mohammad Laiquiddin and another v. Kamala Devi Mishra (Dead) By LRs and others) it was held that dissolution of part¬nership firm on account of death of one of the partners is sub¬ject to the contract entered into by the parties. However, where there are only two partners constituting partnership firm, on account of death of one of them, the firm is deemed to be dis¬solved despite existence of a clause which says otherwise. In view of the apex Court’s decision reported in the cases of Commissioner of Income-tax, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur and Bhanda¬ra, Nagpur v. Seth Govindram Sugar Mills (supra) and Mohammad Laiquiddin and another v. Kamala Devi Mishra (Dead) By LRs and others (supra), the partnership automatically comes to an end and there is no partnership for a third party to be introduced there¬in where the partnership is between two persons after the death of one partner. 13. The Mines and Mineral (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 and the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, have been made to regulate mining leases. Prior to this Act there were specially made statutory provisions to regulate these leases. Mining leases are not grants of the ordinary types as covered under the Grants Act. The object of the Grants Act as declared in its preamble is to remove certain doubts “as to the extent and operation of the T.P. Act, 1882, and as to the power of the crown to impose limi¬tations and restrictions upon grants and other transfers of land made by it or under its authority”. Section 2 enacts that the provisions of the T.P. Act do not apply to crown grants. Section-3 declares that “all provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over” shall take effect according to their tenor. In view of the above position, in the present case, the dispute being with regard to mining lease, it cannot be a grant. 14. In the case of Sri Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur Jiu v. Dar Dass Dey & Co. Section-3 declares that “all provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over” shall take effect according to their tenor. In view of the above position, in the present case, the dispute being with regard to mining lease, it cannot be a grant. 14. In the case of Sri Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur Jiu v. Dar Dass Dey & Co. and others reported in (1979) 3 SCC 106 , the apex Court held that the definition of ‘immovable property’ given in Section 3, para 1 of the Transfer of Property Act being in nega¬tive terms and not exhaustive, the definition given in Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act will apply to the expression used in the Transfer of Property Act except as modified by the definition in the first clause of Section 3. The expression ‘immovable property’ comprehends all that would be real property according to English Law, and possibly more. Thus, every interest in immovable property or a benefit arising out of land, will be ‘immovable property’ for the purpose of Section 105. Therefore, a right to carry on mining operations in land to extract a speci¬fied mineral and to remove and appropriate that ‘mineral’ is a ‘right to enjoy immovable property’ within the meaning of Sec¬tion-105 more so, when-as in the instant case-it is coupled with a right to be in its exclusive khas possession for a specified period. The ‘right to enjoy immovable property’ spoken of in Section 105, means the right to enjoy the property in the manner in which that property can be enjoyed. If the subject-matter of the lease is mineral land or a sand-mine, as in the present case, it can only be enjoyed and occupied by the lessee by working it, as indicated in Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, which regulates the rights and liabilities of lessors and lessees of immovable property. Minerals may be made a part of the sub¬ject-matter of a lease, and in such a case the lease would permit the idea of the partial consumption of the subject-matter of the lease. In view of the above discussion, since the transfer of mining lease is a property transfer, it requires registration. 15. Minerals may be made a part of the sub¬ject-matter of a lease, and in such a case the lease would permit the idea of the partial consumption of the subject-matter of the lease. In view of the above discussion, since the transfer of mining lease is a property transfer, it requires registration. 15. The last point to be determined in this writ application is that since the lease was in favour of Manoranjan Das and was not transferred to any partnership firm, whether the petitioners have no locus standi to claim any relief to continue the mining operation as they have not obtained the lease and the transfer deed was not registered. In the present case, since the transfer deed has not been executed, the right over the mines cannot be transferred to the transferee. Hence the petitioners have no locus standi to claim any relief to continue the mining operation. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the writ applica¬tion is dismissed. No costs. I.M. QUDDUSI, ACJ. I agree. Application dismissed.