JUDGMENT This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 14-2-2000 in O.S. No. 1710 of 1987 on the file of the V Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, wherein, the said suit filed by the appellant herein for specific performance of contract of sale dated 25-11-1986, was dismissed. 2. Arguments of the learned counsel for the Appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent are heard. Perused the record 3. The appellant herein filed suit for specific performance with the averments, which in brief are as follows: The plaint schedule house property bearing D. No. 8-3-988/28, Srinagar Colony, Hyderabad, belonged to the first respondent. He offered to sell and the plaintiff agree to purchase the same. The sale consideration was fixed at Rs.3,85,000/-. As per the terms agreed upon, the plaintiff had to pay Rs.1,00,000/- as advance and he has to pay further sum of Rs.1,00,000/- where upon possession be delivered and the balance sale consideration has to be paid at the time of execution of registration of the sale deed. The first defendant passed a receipt to that effect on 25-11-1986 having received Rs. 1,00,000/-. The first defendant promised to get the property released from mortgage in favour of 3rd defendant. In the second week of December 1986 the first defendant sought further time on the ground the tenant did not vacate. The first defendant collected Rs. 97,000/- from the plaintiffs on 10-12-1986 by way of endorsement on the reverse of the receipt dated 25-11-1986. Having received more than half of the sale price by 10-12-1986, first defendant delivered symbolic possession to the plaintiff. The ground floor was in possession of M/s. Tresa German, tenant of first defendant. The tenant vacated the ground floor and the plaintiff took possession of the same in July 1987. The plaintiff permitted the first defendants son to live in the upstairs portion till he secures a suitable accommodation. In spite of several demands, the first defendant did not respond and did not obtain income tax clearance certificate and failed to discharge mortgage debt, but in stead, made attempts to sell the suit property to others. Hence, the plaintiff is constrained to file suit for specific performance. 4. The first defendant filed written statement contending in brief as follows: The first defendant never entered into an agreement of sale with the plaintiff in respect of the suit property. Hence, the plaintiff is constrained to file suit for specific performance. 4. The first defendant filed written statement contending in brief as follows: The first defendant never entered into an agreement of sale with the plaintiff in respect of the suit property. The amount of Rs.1,97,000/- was paid by plaintiff to first defendant by way of loan but not towards sale consideration. The first defendant is an employee of 2nd defendants bank and as such is a member of 3rd defendant-society In the year 1966, 3rd defendant after obtaining loan from 2nd defendant, purchased 2700 square yards of land in Ward No. 8 of Yellareddiguda under seven registered sale deeds for providing house sites to its members. The first defendant was allotted Plot No. 28 in the said land. The 3rd defendant constructed a house in 1973 with the financial help of 2nd defendant under housing loan scheme. As per the covenants in the agreement executed by 3rd defendant-society, the property allotted shall not be sold without prior permission of defendants 2 and 3. Due to financial crisis, the first defendant approached the plaintiff for hand loan of Rs.2,50,000/-. When the plaintiff asked the first defendant to execute registered agreement of sale or mortgage in respect of suit building by way of security, first defendant expressed his inability, since he has no title over the property. The plaintiff obtained signed blank papers from first defendant with an understanding that they would be returned on repayment of loan. The plaintiff paid Rs. 1,00,000/- and another sum of Rs.97,000/- through demand draft and account payee cheque under endorsements dated 25-11-1986 and 10-12-1986. The plaintiff used blank signed papers to fabricate receipts dated 25-11-1986 and 10-12-1986. The receipts were brought into existence by playing fraud and they are inadmissible in evidence for want of proper stamp duty. In August 1987 the plaintiff made attempts to take possession of the building forcibly. So first defendant filed suit O.S. No. 4193 of 1987 on the file of the 7th Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and obtained interim injunction. In spite of it, the plaintiff forcibly occupied the suit building in September 1987. The 7th Assistant Judge, Hyderabad ordered for restoration of the possession of the ground floor and also provided police aid. The alleged deli very of possession of ground floor in favour of the plaintiff is false. In spite of it, the plaintiff forcibly occupied the suit building in September 1987. The 7th Assistant Judge, Hyderabad ordered for restoration of the possession of the ground floor and also provided police aid. The alleged deli very of possession of ground floor in favour of the plaintiff is false. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff forcibly occupied the entire suit schedule property and is running a Convent School on commercial lines. The first defendant is entitled for rent of Rs.6,000/- per month for the illegal occupation by plaintiff. The plaintiff is guilty of tampering the alleged receipt by way of interpolation and making material alteration, besides fabricating the said document. 5. The 2nd defendant mortgagee filed written statement contenting in brief as follows: The 3rd defendant-society created mortgage over the suit property by deposit of title deeds. The 3rd defendant utilized the loan advanced by 2nd defendant for construction of the house for its members on mortgaged land, including the house of first defendant. Till the entire loan is discharged, suit property cannot be released from the mortgage. The first defendant has no right to sell the property, which is subject matter of the mortgage. Considerable amounts were outstanding in the loan account of 3rd defendant-society under the mortgage. As per the terms of the agreement executed by first defendant, he shall not part with property without prior permission. The first defendant has no title to the suit schedule property. 6. The 3rd defendant-society filed written statement contending that in the year 1966, 3rd defendant purchased 2700 square yards of land and availed loan of Rs.8,05,000/from 2nd defendant for purchase of the land and for construction of the house and created a mortgage by depositing the title deeds. The first defendant was allotted Plot No. 28 on his executing agreement dated 24-10-1973. The loan was repayable in monthly installments commencing from January, 1976. The first defendant stopped remitting installments from October, 1980 and an amount of Rs.27,478.92 is outstanding. The entire property is under mortgage and the suit property cannot be released from the mortgage till entire loan is discharged. The suit property is not yet conveyed in favour of first defendant by the society and the society is the owner thereof. Hence, the first defendant has no right to sell the property and any agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff is not valid. 7. The suit property is not yet conveyed in favour of first defendant by the society and the society is the owner thereof. Hence, the first defendant has no right to sell the property and any agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff is not valid. 7. On the strength of the above pleadings, the following issues were settled for trial. 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of the suit contract as prayed for? 2. Whether the payment of Rs.1,97,000/- made by the plaintiff to first defendant is not towards part of the sale consideration but as hand loan as alleged? 3. Whether the alleged receipt with endorsement dated 25-11-1986 and 10-12-1986 is fabricated as alleged? 4. To what relief? 8. During the trial, the plaintiff was examined as P.W. 1 and Exs. A-1 to A-61 were marked on his side. D. Ws. 1 to 4 were examined and Exs. B-1 to B-12 were marked on behalf of the defendants. 9. On a consideration of the evidence available on record, the trial Court held that the truth and genuineness of receipt Ex. A-1 and the endorsement Ex. A-6 on the reverse of Ex. A-1 are not established and the said document cannot be treated as an . agreement of sale and they are invalid and unenforceable and the payment of Rs.1,97,000/- by plaintiff to first defendant is only by way of hand loan and not towards part of sale consideration and the plaintiff is not entitled for the equitable relief of specific performance. Consequently, the suit was dismissed with costs. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff preferred the present appeal. 10. The plaintiff seeks specific performance of an agreement of sale in respect of plaint schedule house property based on Ex. A-1, which according to him is an agreement of sale executed by first defendant. The plaintiff contends that the first defendant offered to sell the suit property for a sale consideration of Rs.3,85,000/- and paid Rs.1,00,000/- as advance and executed Ex. A-1 in respect of the said transaction and balance sale price of Rs.1,00,000/- was to be paid subsequently and the remaining amount was payable at the time of execution of the registered sale deed. He would further contend that on 10-12-1986, the first defendant paid a further sum of Rs.97,000/- as agreed upon and made an endorsement Ex. A-6 on the back of Ex. A-1. He would further contend that on 10-12-1986, the first defendant paid a further sum of Rs.97,000/- as agreed upon and made an endorsement Ex. A-6 on the back of Ex. A-1. In the plaint, the plaintiff has prayed for the relief of specific performance of contract of sale dated 25-11-1986. It is also averred that the cause of action for the suit arose on 25-11-1986, the date on which agreement of sale was executed, and the part of sale consideration was paid. Thus, according to the plaintiff, Ex. A-1 dated 25-11-1986 is the agreement of sale based on which suit is filed. In the body of the plaintiff, it is, however, pleaded that the document dated 25-11-1986 is only a receipt. The first defendant categorically denies that he executed any agreement of sale under Ex. A-1 or passed any receipt. He also denies to have offered to sell the suit house for a consideration of Rs.3,85,000/- or that he made any party payment by way of Advance of Rs.1,00,000/- on 25-11-1986 under Ex. A-l and Rs.97,000/- on 10-12-1986 under Ex. A-6. According to him, first defendant was in need of money in connection with the marriage and therefore, he approached the plaintiff for hand loan of Rs. 2,50,000/- and first defendant lent Rs.1,00,000/- on one occasion, Rs.97,000/on another occasion through demand draft and account payee cheque and the plaintiff taking advantage of the signed blank papers, which were taken by way of security, fabricated receipts under Exs. A-1 and A-6 and further manipulated the same by converting them into an agreement of sale by way of interpolation and material alteration. In view of the categorical denial of the transaction of sale and entering into any agreement of sale with the plaintiff and execution of any such document under Exs. A-1 and A-6 by defendant, the burden squarely lies on the plaintiff to establish the truth and validity of the transaction contained under Exs. A-l and A-6. 11. The factum of receipt of Rs.1,97,000/by first defendant from plaintiff is not disputed. But according to first defendant, it was received only by way of hand loan, whereas, the plaintiff contends that it was paid towards part of sale consideration. A perusal of Ex. A-l shows that it is styled as a receipt. A-l and A-6. 11. The factum of receipt of Rs.1,97,000/by first defendant from plaintiff is not disputed. But according to first defendant, it was received only by way of hand loan, whereas, the plaintiff contends that it was paid towards part of sale consideration. A perusal of Ex. A-l shows that it is styled as a receipt. The contents of EX.A-l has originally reflected that it was only a receipt acknowledging the receipt of Rs.1,00,000/by way of demand draft from the plaintiff. It is, however, stated in Ex. A-l that the said amount was received towards initial advance as against actual price of Rs.3,85,000/- towards sale of the suit house. However, it is further stated in Ex. A-l that actual sale agreement is to be executed in due course detailing terms and conditions after receiving further advance of Rs. 1,00,000/-. EX.A-l would, however, shows that certain words and sentences were added in different ink by way of interpolation under the caption receipt, it was added terms of sale - vacant possession after receipt of 50% of sale price. In the fourth line from the bottom, the words I above is noted as pre-fixed to the words terms and conditions. Towards end of the document, the words actual possession to be given as agreed to are added. All the above additions are made in different ink. In the cross-examination, P.W. 1 went to the extent of denying even the fact that they are in different ink, though, it is clear and apparent even to the naked eye that the above words and sentences are added in different ink. Even according to P. W. 1 he himself wrote the contents of Exs. A-l and A-6 and none was present to witness the transaction on those occasions. The plaint is silent as to when those additions were made and under what circumstances. A close scrutiny of the contents of Ex. A-l would disclose that there was an attempt on the part of the plaintiff to convert the document, which was originally written as a receipt in to the same sort of an agreement. No doubt, Ex. A-1 makes reference to payment of initial advance towards sale price, but it also stipulates that actual sale agreement is to be executed in due course detailing the terms and conditions after receiving further advance of Rs. 1,00,000/-Thus, even going by the contents of Ex. No doubt, Ex. A-1 makes reference to payment of initial advance towards sale price, but it also stipulates that actual sale agreement is to be executed in due course detailing the terms and conditions after receiving further advance of Rs. 1,00,000/-Thus, even going by the contents of Ex. A-1 as originally written, the said document was only a receipt for the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/paid towards advance with a stipulation that further advance of Rs. 1,00,000/- is to be paid on a future date in due course, where upon, the actual sale agreement is to be executed detailing the terms and conditions. Subsequently, as rightly held by the trial Court, the document was tampered with and some terms are sought to be introduced by adding words terms of sale - vacant possession after receipt of 50% sale price and that actual possession is to be given as agreed to. The document was made no appear that with the above terms and conditions actual sale agreement is to be executed. It is, therefore, clear from the document Ex. A-1 itself that a regular agreement of sale was proposed to be executed on a later date detailing the terms and conditions and after receiving further advance of Rs.1,00,000/-, in which event Ex. A-1 cannot be termed as an agreement of sale. The terms of sale, which are referred to in Ex. A-1 are vague and uncertain and do not in any way reflect meeting of minds of both parties in respect thereof. The fact that the additions were made subsequently can be discerned from the circumstances that the size of the letters in the last sentences got progressively reduced so as to squeeze them in the limited space available above and adjacent to the revenue stamps affixed. Similarly, in Ex. A-6 also it was originally drafted as a receipt for the payment of further advance of Rs. 97,000/- and it was reiterated that the agreement of sale would be executed in due course in consultation with the Advocate. The words owning to some tenant problem, the actual possession of her building could not be delivered, I have agreed to pay interest at 36% per annum till possession appearing at the top of Ex. A-6 and the words possession being arranged appearing at the end of Ex. A-6 are clearly additions made in different ink. The words owning to some tenant problem, the actual possession of her building could not be delivered, I have agreed to pay interest at 36% per annum till possession appearing at the top of Ex. A-6 and the words possession being arranged appearing at the end of Ex. A-6 are clearly additions made in different ink. The contents of those additions and the way they are written in an abridged manner would indicate that they were not contemporaneous with the original contents, but were interpolated subsequently and squeezed in the limited available space. Thought the first defendant has specifically pleaded in his written statement that Exs. A-1 and A-6 are fabricated documents and they are also materially altered so as to convert the receipt into an agreement, the plaintiff has not chosen to file any rejoinder. It is not a case where an agreement of sale was admittedly executed and the defendant questioned its validity on the ground of material alteration. The present one is a case where the first defendant totally denied the execution of any receipt or agreement and contends that the plaintiff originally fabricated the receipt on the signed blank papers and subsequently manipulated and sought to convert the same into an agreement of sale. Simply because, the first defendant has admitted receipt of Rs.1,97,000/- which according to him, is towards hand loan and does not dispute the signatures on Exs. A-1 and A-6, the burden does not shift on to the first defendant. The burden of proof still lies heavily on the plaintiff to establish the alleged transaction of sale and that the first defendant did in fact executed an agreement of sale in his favour and paid the amount of Rs.1,00,000/- and Rs.97,000/- towards sale consideration only. Except the ipsi dixit of P.W.1, there is absolutely no other evidence in support of his claim. In view of the suspicious circumstances surrounding to Exs. A-1 and A-6, which are apparent from the documents themselves and the material alterations, the version of P. W. l is wholly suspect. Even otherwise, Ex. A-1 is not an agreement of sale that was entered into but was only a receipt as per the pleading in the plaint and the document contemplates only sale agreement to be executed in due course. Based on such document as Ex. Even otherwise, Ex. A-1 is not an agreement of sale that was entered into but was only a receipt as per the pleading in the plaint and the document contemplates only sale agreement to be executed in due course. Based on such document as Ex. A-1, which is imperfect, incomplete, vague and uncertain no concluded contract that can be enforced by way of specific performance can be inferred. The plaintiff, has, therefore, failed to establish that there was any concluded contract of agreement of sale executed by first defendant in his favour, which can be specifically enforced. The finding of the trial Court that the plaintiff failed to establish the truth and genuineness of Exs. A-1 and A-6 does not, therefore, call for any interference. 12. In fact, first defendant has no title over the suit property to convey the same in favour of the plaintiff. Admittedly, the suit property forms part of larger extent of land, which was purchased by 3rd defendant-society by taking loan from the 2nd defendant bank for the purpose of construction of houses for its members and one such house i.e., suit property bearing Plot No. 28 was allotted to first defendant. It is also not disputed that entire property, including the suit property, was mortgaged by 3rd defendant in favour of 2nd defendant and the said loan is still outstanding. According to the 2nd defendant, first defendant committed default in payment of monthly installments from October 1980 and the part of loan is still outstanding. D.W.4 Secretary of the 3rd defendant society testified that the plot is standing in the name of 3rd defendant-society and the title is not conveyed in favour of first defendant. In fact P.W. 1 himself admitted in the cross-examination that still 3rd defendant is the owner of the property and first defendant has no right to convey. Though the defendants 2 and 3 are added as parties, no specific relief is claimed against them and plaint does not disclose as to why they are imp leaded. P.W.1 admitted in the crossexamination that he was personally aware of the mortgage of the suit property in favour of 2nd defendant and that it ws 3rd defendant society, who purchased the entire land including the suit site and created a mortgage over the same in favour of 2nd defendant. P.W.1 admitted in the crossexamination that he was personally aware of the mortgage of the suit property in favour of 2nd defendant and that it ws 3rd defendant society, who purchased the entire land including the suit site and created a mortgage over the same in favour of 2nd defendant. He further admitted that the suit property is not registered in the name of first defendant by 3rd defendant and he did not make any application before 2nd defendant or 3rd defendant, seeking no objection certificate and still huge amount is due by first defendant to 2nd defendant. From his own admissions in evidence, it is clear that the plaintiff is aware of the fact that the 3rd defendant continued to be the owner of the property including the suit property and the same is granted in favour of 2nd defendant and the loan due by first defendant in favour of 2nd defendant is still outstanding and therefore, title was not conveyed in favour of first defendant. Admittedly, the plaintiff has not chosen to clear the outstanding loan due by first defendant to 2nd defendant and got the property realized from mortgage before filing of the suit. He has never made any such effort before filing the suit and he has not averred in the plaint that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Admittedly, he has not issued any notice also to the first defendant or other defendants before filing of the suit, expressing his willingness to clear the loan on behalf of the first defendant. Thus, by the date of the alleged agreement of sale Ex. A-1, and even by the date of filing of the suit, and subsequently also, first defendant had no title over the suit property and 3rd defendant continued to be the true owner thereof subject to the mortgage in favour of 2nd defendant. Thus, when the first defendant himself had no title, the question of conveying any valid title to the plaintiff in respect of the suit property under Ex. A-1, even if, it is true, does not simply arise. 13. Regarding possession, Ex. A-1 as originally written, is silent as to when possession is to be delivered. Subsequent additions made in Ex. Thus, when the first defendant himself had no title, the question of conveying any valid title to the plaintiff in respect of the suit property under Ex. A-1, even if, it is true, does not simply arise. 13. Regarding possession, Ex. A-1 as originally written, is silent as to when possession is to be delivered. Subsequent additions made in Ex. A-1 in different ink are to the effect that the vacant possession is to be given after receipt of 50% of the sale price and that actual possession is to be given as agreed to. The above terms, which are subsequently interpolated and thereby amounting to material alterations have vitiated the document itself, apart from the fact that they are vague and uncertain and they do not disclose as to when and before what date 50% of sale price is to be paid. In Ex. A-6 it is made to appear that owing to some tenant problem, the actual possession could not be delivered and possession was being arranged. Thus, as per Ex. A-6 by 10-12-1986possession was not delivered. But the plaintiff claims that symbolic possession was delivered on 10-12-1986, for which there is no evidence. According to P.W.1 tenant D.W.3 delivered possession of ground floor in July 1987 and he permitted first defendants son to remain in the first floor and he delivered possession of the first floor in September 1987. 14. It is not disputed that first defendant filed O.s.No.4193 of 1987 against the plaintiff for injunction alleging that the plaintiff was trying to take forcible possession. The said suit was filed on 9-9-1987 and the temporary injunction was also granted in favour of first defendant in that suit. The first defendant alleges that in spite of temporary injunction, plaintiff has taken forcible possession. It is not disputed that the first defendant filed IA No. 917 of 1987 for restoration of possession and the same was allowed and warrant of delivery was also issued. Subsequently, the said suit was dismissed for default is a different matter. It is significant to note that the plaintiff has prayed not only for specific performance but also for recovery of possession. If really, the plaintiff has taken possession in July 1987 after the tenant vacated and locked the premises, question of praying for recovery of possession does not arise at all. It is significant to note that the plaintiff has prayed not only for specific performance but also for recovery of possession. If really, the plaintiff has taken possession in July 1987 after the tenant vacated and locked the premises, question of praying for recovery of possession does not arise at all. The evidence of D.W. 3 who was a tenant of the ground floor would support the case of first defendant that the plaintiff forcibly occupied the suit property after institution of suit O.S. No. 4193 of 1987. Exs. B-3 and B-4 Commissioners report and proceedings, also support the case of first defendant that he was in possession of suit house as on the date of the suit OS. No.4193 of 1987 On being satisfied with first defendants possession over the suit property, temporary injunction was granted by the Court in his favour in as. No. 4193 of 1987 and subsequently when the plaintiff has taken forcible possession, warrant for restoration of possession was also ordered to be issued. It is significant to note that the date on which the plaintiff obtained possession is nowhere mentioned in the plaint. The plaintiff seeks to rely on Exs. A-1 to A-5 and A-59 to A-61 property tax receipts in support of his claim of possession. According to first defendant, the plaintiff has taken away the said document after he forcibly occupied the suit house and by breaking open almirahs. Curiously, P.W. 1 in the cross-examination stated that he came into custody of those documents through the counsel for the defendant. His statement was rightly disbelieved by the trial Court. Even Ex. A-7 an incomplete inland letter addressed by 3rd defendant-tenant to first defendant also came into the hands of plaintiff, though it should be with D.W. 3 and this circumstance as pointed out by the trial Court also would lend support to the contention of first defendant that the plaintiff has forcibly occupied the suit premises. Tax receipts Exs. A-59 to 61 were ignored by the trial Court, as they were long subsequent to filing of the suit. The plaintiff has thus failed to establish as to when and how and in what manner he came into possession of the suit house. His claim that under Exs. Tax receipts Exs. A-59 to 61 were ignored by the trial Court, as they were long subsequent to filing of the suit. The plaintiff has thus failed to establish as to when and how and in what manner he came into possession of the suit house. His claim that under Exs. A-1 and A-6 symbolic possession was delivered and subsequently after tenant vacated, physical possession was delivered to him remains totally unsubstantiated and the evidence on record, on the other hand, would show that he has forcibly occupied the premises after filing of the suit O.S. No. 4193 of 1987 by first defendant and in spite of temporary injunction granted against him in that suit. 15. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the appellant is prepared to pay the balance amount due in favour of the 2nd respondent-bank on behalf of the first respondent and thus he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and to obtain sale deed. He would further contend that the first respondent being vendor is not entitled to put up a defence that he had no valid title. In support of his contention, he relied upon certain decisions referred to hereunder. 16. In Nathulal v. Phoolchand (1) AIR 1970 SC 546 the Apex Court held as follows: "Where by a statute property is not transferable without the permission of the authority, an agreement to transfer the property must be deemed subject to the implied condition that the transferor will obtain the sanction of the authority concerned". 17. The present case is not one where permission of an authority is required for entering into the transaction of sale by the first respondent with the appellant, but it is a case where the first respondent himself had no title to the suit property, the same not having been conveyed in his favour by the 3rd respondent-Society, as the property was not released from mortgage in favour of 2nd respondent-Bank. 18. In M.A.H. Khan v. A.M. Khadri (2) AIR 1972 A.P. 178 (DB) the Division Bench of this Court held as follows: "It is settled law that if a person executes an agreement to sell property, the vendor is not entitled to put forward, in a suit for specific performance by the purchaser the defence that the vendor had no title. In M.A.H. Khan v. A.M. Khadri (2) AIR 1972 A.P. 178 (DB) the Division Bench of this Court held as follows: "It is settled law that if a person executes an agreement to sell property, the vendor is not entitled to put forward, in a suit for specific performance by the purchaser the defence that the vendor had no title. It is open to the purchaser to set up a defence that the vendor had no title or has defective title in a suit for specific performance by the vendor. But the vendor cannot set up defective in his own title as a defence in a suit for specific performance by the purchaser" 19. The principle laid down in the above decision is not disputed, but the same is not applicable to the facts of the present case for the reason that there was no concluded contract between the appellant and first respondent and the document Ex. A-1 was only a receipt that was sought to be converted into an agreement by the appellant by manipulation and fabrication and thus materially altered and even otherwise, Ex. A-1 contemplated execution of regular agreement of sale on a future date, thereby indicating that it was not an agreement entered into with unity of minds regarding the terms and conditions. It is also not a case where the vendor also has set up a defence that he had no title, but the true owner 3rd respondent in whom the title vests as to now is also disputing the claim of the appellant that the first respondent is the owner of the property. 20. In Mrs. Chandnee Widya Vati Madden v. Dr. C.L. Katial and others the Apex Court held as follows: "The High Court was entirely correct in decreeing the suit for specific performance of the contract. The High Court should have further directed the defendant to the Chief Commissioner, which was implied in the contract between the parties." 21. In the above case, there was a concluded contract between the parties and only permission from the authority conveyed by Chief Commission was required and it was in fact, found implied in the contract between the parties. In the present case, Ex. In the above case, there was a concluded contract between the parties and only permission from the authority conveyed by Chief Commission was required and it was in fact, found implied in the contract between the parties. In the present case, Ex. A-1 does not reflect any concluded contract between the parties nor does it refer to the existence of outstanding loan in favour of 2nd respondent by 3rd respondent and does not contain any stipulation that the appellant shall discharge the said loan on behalf of the first respondent and get the property realized from the mortgage. The implied covenant on the part of the vendor to do all such things necessary to give effect to the agreement including obtaining of permission for transfer of the property cannot be drawn in the present case for the reason that Ex. A-1 is not a concluded contract between the parties and the first respondents vendor inherently lacked any title to the property that he could convey in favour of the appellant. 22. In M/s. Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt. Ltd., v. Vinod Kumar Alag (3) AIR 1991 Del315 it was held as follows: "Where the parties contemplate a writing to complete the contract or where the contract is required by law or otherwise to be in writing, it will be necessary that the contract is reduced to writing. Further, where all the specific terms have been agreed upon and reduced into writing, the mere fact that it is stated that a formal contract will be executed does not render the writing, in the first instance, to be of no avail" It was further held as follows: "Mere heading or title of a document cannot deprive the document of its real nature. Law is well settled in such matters that it is the substance which has to be seen and not the form." 23. In the above case, though the agreement was in the form of a receipt, still it was found that all specific terms which are agreed upon have been reduced into writing and therefore, it was held that mere heading or title of a document cannot deprive the document of its real nature and the recitals that formal contract will be executed in future does not also alter the situation. In the present case, apart from the fact that Ex. In the present case, apart from the fact that Ex. A-1 is only a receipt not merely because it is described so but also it was pleaded as such. That apart, the contents of Ex. A-1 coupled with the recitals subsequently added by way of interpolation would show that a document which was originally designed to be receipt was subsequently sought to be converted into an agreement. It is therefore, not a case where all the terms agreed upon have been reduced to writing and the document was however described as a receipt. 24. In Kalianna Gounder v. Palani Gounder (4) AIR 1970 SC 1942 the Apex Court held as. follows: "Insertion of words clear the debts and execute the sale deed free from encumbrance after its execution does not amount to material alteration so as to cancel it." It was further held as follows: "Ordinarily when property is agreed to be sold for a price, it would be the duty of the vendor to clear it of all the encumbrances before executing the sale deed. The alteration, if any, cannot therefore be regarded as material". 25. In the above case, the document was memorandum of agreement for sale and the addition of the words to the effect that the vendor shall clear the debts and execute the sale deed free from encumbrances only reflect the duty of the vendor and therefore alterations if any cannot be considered as material. In the present case, the document EX.A-l first of all is not an agreement of sale, but it was basically a receipt, which the appellant unilaterally sought to convert into an agreement of sale. There is any amount of difference between the two situations where an agreement of sale is entered into and subsequently either of the parties makes an alteration in terms by way of interpolation and a situation where the document executed is not an agreement of sale but something else and the same is sought to be converted by either of the parties into an agreement of sale. In the present case the very nature and complexion of the document Ex. A-1 is sought to be changed and not the terms alone. 26. In the present case the very nature and complexion of the document Ex. A-1 is sought to be changed and not the terms alone. 26. In Kollipara Sriramulu v. T. Aswatha Narayana (5) AIR 1968 SC 1028 , the Apex Court held as follows: "A mere reference to a future formal contract in an oral agreement will not prevent a binding bargain between the parties. The fact that the parties refer to the preparation of an agreement by which the terms agreed upon are to be put in a more formal shape does not prevent the existence of a binding contract." 27. The principle laid down in the above case is not disputed. But in the present case, there is no oral agreement pleaded by either side. It is not the case of the appellant that there was an oral agreement between him and the first respondent and in pursuance thereof it was proposed to reduce the terms into writing on a future date. 28. In Nirmal Anand v. Advent Corporation (P) Ltd. (6) AIR 2002 SC 3396 = 2002 (4) ALT 14.4 (DN SC) the Apex Court held as follows: "It is true that grant of decree of specific performance lies in the discretion of the Court and it is also well settled that it is not always necessary to grant specific performance simply for the reason that it is legal to do so. It is further well settled that the Court in its discretion can impose any reasonable condition including payment of an additional amount by one party to the other while granting or refusing decree or specific performance. Ordinarily, the plaintiff is not to be denied the relief of specific performance only on account of the phenomenal increase of price during the pendency of litigation. That may be in a given case, one of the considerations besides many others to be taken into consideration for refusing the decree of specific performance. As a general rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily the plaintiff cannot be allowed to have, for her alone, the entire benefit of phenomenal increase of the value of the property during the pendency of the litigation". 29. The principle laid down in the above case also is not disputed. As a general rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily the plaintiff cannot be allowed to have, for her alone, the entire benefit of phenomenal increase of the value of the property during the pendency of the litigation". 29. The principle laid down in the above case also is not disputed. However, the facts and circumstances of the present case, the conduct of the appellant, particularly his not coming to the Court with clean hands does not justify the grant of discretionary relief of specific performance in this favour even by imposing any conditions, especially, because the first respondent had not title to the suit property that could be conveyed in favour of the appellant either on the date of the alleged transaction or subsequently. 30. The above decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant are therefore not applicable to the facts of the present case. 31. In Bal Krishna v. Bhagwan Vas (7) AIR 2008 SC 1786 the Apex Court held as follows: "The relief for specific performance lies in the discretion of the Court and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. The exercise of the discretion to order specific performance would require the Court to satisfy itself that the circumstances are such that it is equitable to grant decree for specific performance of the contract. While exercising the discretion, the Court would take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the conduct of parties, and their respective interests under the contract. No specific performance of a contract, though it is not vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation, can be granted if it would given an unfair advantage to the plaintiff and where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant, which he did not foresee. In other words, the Courts discretion to grant specific performance is not exercised if the contract is not equal and fair, although the contract is not void." 32. In view of the decision of the Apex Court referred to above, it is held that relief specific performance is a discretionary relief and the Court is not bound to grant the same even if it is legally to do so, and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the cases, the plaintiff is not entitled for the same. 33. 33. For the reasons stated above, the finding recorded by the trial Court that the plaintiff is not entitled for the relief of specific performance in respect of the suit property does not therefore call for any interference by this Court and the appeal is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, it is dismissed. 34. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.