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2010 DIGILAW 20 (GAU)

Arambam Biren Singh v. State of Manipur

2010-01-12

KETULHOU MERUNO, T.NANDAKUMAR SINGH

body2010
JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. The challenge in this writ petition is to.(i) the order of the learned District Magistrate, Imphal West, being Crl/NSA/No. 40 of 2009, dated 2nd June, 2009, wherein and whereunder the learned District Magistrate, after his satisfaction that the activities of the detenue Shri Arambam Thoithoi Singh (28 years), S/o Late A. Biren Singh of Khurai Nandeibam Leikai, P.S. Porompat, District-Imphal East, Manipur (writ petitioner) are pre-judicial to the maintenance of public order, directed that the detenue be detained under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 until further order; (ii) the order of the State Government being No. 17(1)/1488/2009-H, dated 10th June, 2009 for approving the order of detention dated 2.6.2009 and (iii) also the Government older being No. 17(1). 1488/2009-H, dated 15th July, 2009 for confirming the detention order dated 2.6.2009 in pursuance with the opinion expressed by the Advisory Board in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 12(1) of the National Security Act, and further fixing the period of detention for 12 months from the date of detention of the detenue for the activities of the detenue pre-judicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order under Section 13 of the National Security Act, 1980. 2. Heard Mr. Dolen Ph., learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as well as Mr. Amarjit Naorem, learned C.G.S.C. appearing for the respondent No. 3. 3. FACTUAL BACKG. ROUND: The petitioner is the father of the detenue Shri Arambam Thoithoi Singh. In the year 2001-02, while the detenue was in the College, i.e., Biramangol College, Sawombung, he was elected as Magazine Secretary of the Student Union of the said college and sometime in 2003, he started to work for the DESAM (Democratic Students Alliance of Manipur) and was elected as President, Imphal East in the year 2005. Since 2008, the detenue was working as Secretary, Education and Academic Affairs of DESAM for the interest of the students at large in the State of Manipur. As a part of his duties being the Secretary, Education and Academic Affairs of DESAM, the detenue often visited Schools and Colleges of the State of Manipur and Manipur University, Canchipur in order to check the academic atmosphere in the Institutions. As a part of his duties being the Secretary, Education and Academic Affairs of DESAM, the detenue often visited Schools and Colleges of the State of Manipur and Manipur University, Canchipur in order to check the academic atmosphere in the Institutions. DESAM is not a frontal organization of the banned organization KYKL (Kanglei Yaol Kanna Lup). 4. On 26.05.2009, while the detenue was at his residential home, some police personnel came and apprehended him accusing him that DESAM is involved in killing of one Prof. Md. Islamuddin of Economics Department and former Dean of Students' Welfare, Manipur University on 25.5.2009 near the Library Building of the Manipur University and the detenue was taken to Singjamei Police Station and, thereafter, he was arrested in connection with the FIR Case No. 109(5)/09 SJM P.S., under Sections 302/120B/123, IPC, 16/18/20 UA(P)A Act and 25(1C)A Act. On 27.5.2009, the detenue along with other arrested students were produced before the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Imphal in connection with the said FIR case and the said case was transferred to the court of the Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Imphal by an order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Imphal. The learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Imphal remanded the detenue in the police custody till 2.6.2009 on the prayer of the Investigating Officer. On 2.6.2009, when the detenue was produced before the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Imphal, the impugned detention order dated 2.6.2009 passed by the District Magistrate, Imphal West was furnished to the detenue in the court premises itself, informing that he has been detained under the National Security Act, 1980 ('NSA') with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the maintenance of public order. 5. On 5.6.2009 at about 4.30 p.m., the detenue was served with several documents purported to be the grounds of order of detention dated 5.6.2009. 5. On 5.6.2009 at about 4.30 p.m., the detenue was served with several documents purported to be the grounds of order of detention dated 5.6.2009. It is submitted by the petitioner that the facts given in the grounds of detention was substantially a verbatim reproduction of the interrogation statement purported to have been stated by the detenue before the Investigating Officer of the said police case while he was in the police custody and that the detenue has been preventively detained wholly on the basis of the purported interrogation statement of the detenue and that in view of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 such statements are non est in law and as such the impugned detention order dated 2.6.2009 is invalid and liable to be set aside. 6. The letter of the learned District Magistrate, Imphal West District, Manipur being Crl/NSA/No. 40 of 2009, dated 5th June, 2009 to the detenue, furnishing the grounds of detention under Section 8of the NSA, reads as follows: No. Crl/NSA/No. 40 of 2009 Imphal, the 5th June, 2009 To Shri Arambam Thoithoi Singh (28yrs) S/o A. Biren Singh of Khurai Nandeibam Leiaki, P.S.-Porompat, District-Imphal East, Manipur. Subject: Grounds of detention under Section 8 of the National Security Act, 1980. In pursuance of Section 8 of the National Security Act, 1980 you are hereby informed that the grounds of detention are as follows: 1. That, you were elected as Magazine Secretary of the Students Union, Biramangol College, Sawombung for the term of 2001-02. In the same year you were working as President of Khurai Unit, AMSU. Since 2003 you started to work for the Democratic Students' Alliance of Manipur ('DESAM'). In year 2005 you were elected as President of DESAM, Imphal East. Again, you were working as Dy. Secy. Education and Academic Affairs, DESAM for the term 2006-07. You have been working as Secy. Education and Academic Affairs since 2008 till date. The Democratic Students Alliance of Manipur(DESAM) is the frontal organization of the banned organization, namely, Kanglei Yaol Kanna Lup ('KYKL'). (A portion of the statement of R.K. Premjit Singh @ Tomba @ Chinglen (39 yrs) S/o R.K. Sanatomba Singh of Nambol Thiyam recorded in connection with FIR No. 5(4)05 WKG is enclosed for reference). The Democratic Students Alliance of Manipur(DESAM) is the frontal organization of the banned organization, namely, Kanglei Yaol Kanna Lup ('KYKL'). (A portion of the statement of R.K. Premjit Singh @ Tomba @ Chinglen (39 yrs) S/o R.K. Sanatomba Singh of Nambol Thiyam recorded in connection with FIR No. 5(4)05 WKG is enclosed for reference). During those period you came to know a number of KYKL members such as (i) Puyam Nando(33yrs) of Langathel (ii) Chingkhei (30yrs) of Heinoubok and (iii) Lakpa Singh. Top leaders of KYKL including the above noted members used to visit your house frequently. You, being the Secy. Education and Academic Affairs of DESAM frequently visited the Hostel rooms of the Manipur University to contact the members of DESAM and discussed in length about the education system of Manipur. In the month of January/February 2009, you contacted O. Amarjit @ Loyumba (29 yrs.) of Kakching Khunou Cheksapat, S/s Lt. of KYKL along with (i) Puyam Nando (33 yrs.) of Langathel (ii) Chincikhei (30 yrs.) of Heinoubok and (iii) Lakpa Singh and discussed about the academic atmosphere in the University including Student's Union and contract works taken up by them. In the 1st week of April, 2009 the above KYKL activists came to you and directed you to work for DESAM sponsored candidate Miss K. Ranjita Devi. Moreover, you along with L.C. Santosh (President), P.C. Neuton (Advisor) visited at the MU campus and discussed strategies to get Ranjita elected during elections by any means. You and some students' of MU including Th. Shyam Singh, Ksh. Kiran Singh and Shri Th. Lankeshwor Singh carried out election campaign vociferously for DESAM sponsored candidate Miss K. Ranjita Devi as per guide line given by MPLF. 2. That, as the candidature of Miss K. Ranjita Devi was rejected by MUSU election committee as she could not produce her original certificate of Class-XII, there was violent protest on the day of security on 20.4.2009. You along with Miss K. Ranjita Devi, Th. Shyam Singh, Ksh. Kiran Singh, Th. Lankeshwor Singh and other students working for DESAM decided to lodge a complaint report with the Joint Task Force (Human Right) ('JTF/HR') of KYKL and UNLF to declare the elections null and void and also to punish election committee and others including the Dean of Students Welfare. Shyam Singh, Ksh. Kiran Singh, Th. Lankeshwor Singh and other students working for DESAM decided to lodge a complaint report with the Joint Task Force (Human Right) ('JTF/HR') of KYKL and UNLF to declare the elections null and void and also to punish election committee and others including the Dean of Students Welfare. Accordingly on 21.4.2009, the JTF (HR) of KYKL and UNLF, published through local dailies "Sangai Express" of 21st April, 2009 edition that the election had been conducted in an unfair manner and the same should be declared null and void. The JTF(HR) warned all those involved (including Prof. Md. Islamuddin, Dean of Student's Welfare) in the alleged unfair election with dire consequences if the election was not declared null and void. (A copy of the "Sangai Express" dated 21.4.2009 is enclosed herewith for reference). However, the election committee including Prof. Md. Islamuddin did not pay any heed. Instead, the election committee announced the result declaring new President and councillors of MUSU for the session 2009-10. In that situation, the leaders of so-called DESAM and AMSU contacted Top leaders of underground organization namely in favour of MSF sponsored candidates uncontested. Having Kanglei Yaol Kanna Lup ('KYKL') to take stern action against the election committee including Prof. Md. Islamuddin. As a consequence of the conspiracy, on 25.5.2009 at about 12:15 p.m. Prof. Md. Islamuddin was shot dead by some armed cadres of the banned organization (UNLF and KYKL) at the University campus. It refer to FIR No. 109(5)09 SJM-PS under Section302/120B/123, IPC, 16/18/20 UA(P)A. Act and 25(1-C)A Act. KYKL claims that the incident was carried out by their cadres through local Manipuri daily "The Sangai Express" dated 27.5.2009 as "KYKL na Cheirak Pikhibani. Such act of nexus with the underground organization and your involvement in the killing of eminent Prof. Md. Islamuddin gave rise to chaos and havoc in the academic and study environment of Manipur University and a terror wave to the general public more particularly to the Government employee which is pre-judicial to the maintenance of public order. 3. That, on 26.5.2009 at about 2.00 p.m. you were arrested in connection with FIR No. 109(5)09 SJM-P.S. under Section 302/120B/123, IPC, 16 Shri Phijam Dinesh/18/20 UA(P)A Act and 25(1-C) A Act and remanded into Police custody till 2.6.2009. 4. 3. That, on 26.5.2009 at about 2.00 p.m. you were arrested in connection with FIR No. 109(5)09 SJM-P.S. under Section 302/120B/123, IPC, 16 Shri Phijam Dinesh/18/20 UA(P)A Act and 25(1-C) A Act and remanded into Police custody till 2.6.2009. 4. That, in view of your tendencies and inclinations reflected in your acts of support and nexus with underground organization, viz., KYKL, in the proximate past and involvement in the assassination of an eminent professor of Manipur University within the university campus, I am satisfied that after having availed of bail facilities and becoming a free person, you being a dangerous person would continue to indulge in similar activities which are. pre-judicial to the maintenance of the public order. Hence, the application of normal criminal law against you will not at all be effective to prevent you from the commission of further pre-judicial activities. An alternative preventive measure is, therefore, immediately called for. From the above grounds, I am satisfied that with a view to prevent you from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the maintenance of public order, I have made this order directing that you be detained under NSA, 1980. 5. That the copies of the following documents which form the basis grounds of your detention are enclosed herewith for your reference: (a) Your statement given before the I.O. on 27.5.2009. (b) Statement of Inspt. N. Mangi Singh OC/SJM PS. recorded under Section 161, Cr.PC in connection with FIR No. 109(5)09 SJM P.S. under Section 302/120B/123, IPC, 16/18/20 UA(P) A Act and 25(1-C)A Act. (c) Copy of a portion of statement of R.K. Premjit Singh @ Tomba @ Chinglen (39 yrs.) S/o R.K. Sanatomba Singh of Nambol Thiyam recorded in connection with FIR No. 5(4)/05 WKG-P.S. (d) Copy of arrest memo dated 26.5.2009. (e) Copies of Sangai Express dated 21.4.2009 and 27.5.2009. (f) Copy of the leaflet dated 11.7.1999 signed by Sanayaima P.B. MPLF. (g) Copy of FIR No. 109(5)09 SJM-PS under Section 302/120B/123, IPC, 16/18/20 UA(P)A Act and 25(1-C)A Act. (h) Copy of Government of Manipur, Home Departments' Order No. 17(1)/49/80-H(Pt-I) dated 12.5.2009. 6. That, you are hereby informed that you have the right to make representation to the Government of Manipur as well as to the Central Government against the order of detention passed against you and you are hereby afforded the earliest opportunity for making such representation if you wish to do so. 6. That, you are hereby informed that you have the right to make representation to the Government of Manipur as well as to the Central Government against the order of detention passed against you and you are hereby afforded the earliest opportunity for making such representation if you wish to do so. The representation is to be sent through Addl. Superintendent of Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa to the Chief Secretary, Government of Manipur in respect of representation to the Government of Manipur and to "The Secretary to the Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs, (Department of Internal Security) North Block, New Delhi-110001" in respect of representation to the Central Government and should be submitted within 3(three) weeks from the date of detention. Further, you are informed that you have right to make representation to the detaining authority within 12(twelve) days from the date of detention or till the order is approved by the State Government whichever is earlier. The representation is to be sent to the District Magistrate, Imphal West. Representation if any, would be placed before the Advisory Board within 3(three) weeks time from the date of your detention and such other documents/papers in connection with your detention, as the Government is bound under the law to produce before the Board for its consideration. 7. That, you are hereby informed that the Advisory Board may call for such information as it may deem necessary from you and if you desire to be heard, hear you in person. You may intimate about it and arrangement may be made to produce you before the Board on the date fixed by it for the purpose. (A. Ibocha Singb) District Magistrate, Imphal West District, Manipur. 7. You may intimate about it and arrangement may be made to produce you before the Board on the date fixed by it for the purpose. (A. Ibocha Singb) District Magistrate, Imphal West District, Manipur. 7. The material facts for coming to the subjective satisfaction of the learned District Magistrate that the activities of the detenue give rise to chaes and havoc in the academic and study environment of the Manipur University and a terror-wave to the general public, more particularly to the Government employee, which is pre-judicial to the maintenance of public order for which the detenue is detained under the impugned detention order dated 2.6.2009 under Section 3(2) of the NSA in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-section(3) of Section 3 of the NSA, read with Home Department's Order No. 17(1)/49/80-H(pt-I) dated 12.5.2009 are mentioned in the said letter dated 5.6.2009, which has been quoted above, for furnishing the grounds of detention of the detenue. On perusal of the said letter dated 5.6.2009, it appears that the material facts, which culminate to subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Imphal West, that the activities of the detenue will have serious affect not only to the certain section of individuals but also to the public at large, more particularly to the students and the Government employees were furnished to the detenue. 8. The Governor of Manipur, after carefully consideration of the grounds for detention furnished by the District Magistrate, Imphal West, was of the opinion that there are sufficient material for detention of the detenue under Section 3(2) of the NSA and, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 3(4) of the NSA was pleased to approve the detention order dated 2.6.2009 passed by the District Magistrate, Imphal West vide the Government order being No. 17(1)/1488/2009-H, dated 10th June, 2009. 9. Mr. R.S. Reisnng, learned Government Advocate, as ordered by this Court, also makes the report of the Advisory Board dated 8.7.2009, constituted under Section 9 of the NSA, available before this Court for perusal. 9. Mr. R.S. Reisnng, learned Government Advocate, as ordered by this Court, also makes the report of the Advisory Board dated 8.7.2009, constituted under Section 9 of the NSA, available before this Court for perusal. On perusal of the report of the Advisory Board dated 8.7.2009, it appears that the Advisory Board after due consideration of the materials in support of the grounds of detention and also the statement, of the detenue recorded by the Investigating Officer in connection with the said police case and also the explanatory statement of the detenue before the Advisory Board, had came to a finding that "....In view of the materials before us and interactions with the persons concerned, we conclude that the detenue is a member of the Democratic Students' Alliance of Nanipur ('the DESAM') which is a frontal organization of the banned organization, namely, Kanglei Yaol Kanna Lup (KYKL') and he indulged in illegal activities till the date of his arrest which are pre-judicial to the maintenance of public order. As such, in the opinion of the Board, there are sufficient cause for continued detention of the detenue under the National Security Act, 1980. Application of normal Criminal Law to the detenue will not be effective in curbing his unlawful activities...." 10. As such, in the opinion of the Board, there are sufficient cause for continued detention of the detenue under the National Security Act, 1980. Application of normal Criminal Law to the detenue will not be effective in curbing his unlawful activities...." 10. The grounds, which hove been pressed at the time of hearing of the present writ petition for assailing the impugned detention order dated 2.6.2009 and approval order dated 10.6.2009 are that, there was no cogent material or document before the District Magistrate, Imphal West on the basis of which he could be satisfied that the activities of the detenue are pre-judicial to the maintenance of public order and as such the satisfaction of the District Magistrate is mechanical and also even assuming the allegations made in the grounds of detention against the detenue is correct, by no stretch of imagination the offence/illegality allegedly committed by the detenue can be called or can be treated prejudicial to the maintenance of public order under Sub-section (2) of Section 3of the NSA and the activities alleged to have been committed by the detenue and his friends affect only specific individuals and, therefore, affect only the law and order and not the public order and also the grounds of detention is only a verbatim reproduction of the interrogation statement purported to have been stated by the detenue before the Investigating Officer of the said police case while he was in the police custody and that in view of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 such statements are non est in law and as a result the impugned detention order dated 2.6.2009 is invalid and liable to set aside. 11. After the respondents filed their affidavit-in-oppositions in the present writ petition, the petitioner also filed the supplementary affidavit doted 25.12.2009, wherein it is stated that the order of the Governor of Manipur being No. 17(1) 1488/2009-H, dated 15th July, 2009 for confirmation of the detention order and also fixing the period of detention for 12 months from the date of detention on two grounds that the activities of the detenue are (i) pre-judicial to the security of the State and (ii) maintenance of the public order, is illegal as there was no cogent reason or material in support of one of the grounds, i.e., pre-judicial to the security of the State. 12. 12. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the NSA provides that the State Government, or the Central Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the maintenance of public order or from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. Therefore, a person can be detained with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the maintenance of public order. This being the provision of Section 3(2) of the NSA, a person can be detained under the NSA either for preventing him from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the maintenance of public order. 13. Section 5A of the NSA provides that where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under Section 3 which has been mode on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly, such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are vague, non-existent, not relevant, not connected or not proximately connected with such person and also that an officer of the Government making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under Section 3 of the NSA after being satisfied as provided in that section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. For easy reference, Section 3(2), 3(3) and Section 5A of the NSA are reproduced below: 3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons. - (1)... For easy reference, Section 3(2), 3(3) and Section 5A of the NSA are reproduced below: 3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons. - (1)... (2) The Central Government or the State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the maintenance of public order or from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ (3) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct, that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in Sub-section (2), exercise the powers conferred by the said Sub-section: Provided that the period specified in an order made by the State Government under this Sub-section shall not, in the first instance, exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time. ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ 5A. ______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ 5A. Grounds of detention severable.- Where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention [whether made before or after the commencement of the National Security (Second Amendment) Act, 1984] under Section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly - (a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are - (i) vague, (ii) non-existent, (iii) not relevant, (iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or (v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not, therefore, possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in Section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention; (b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said section after being satisfied as provided in that section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds.] 14. Deprivation of personal freedom must be founded on the most serious considerations relevant to the welfare objective of the society, specified in the Constitution. The object of law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence. It is resorted when the Executive is convinced that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the persons detained from acting in a manner pre-judicial to certain objects which are specified by the law. The framers of the Constitution, being aware that preventive detention involves a serious encroachment on the right to personal liberty, took care to incorporate, in Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22, certain minimum safeguards for the protection of persons sought to be preventively detained. These safeguards are required to be "zealously watched and enforced by the court". The Apex Court in Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab (1981) 4 SCC 481 observed that - ...May be that the detenue is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralysed the Indian economy. These safeguards are required to be "zealously watched and enforced by the court". The Apex Court in Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab (1981) 4 SCC 481 observed that - ...May be that the detenue is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralysed the Indian economy. But the loss of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set-up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenues...." [Ref.: Para-4 of the SCC Rattan Singh's case (supra)]. 15. No doubt, the doctrine of preventive power of the Administrative/Executive authority, constitutionally validate preventive process for the maintenance of public order, security of the State, national security, defence of India and relations of India with the foreign power. The Apex Court in Amir Shad Khan v. L. Hmingliana and Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 39 held that - The law of preventive detention is harsh to the person detained and, therefore, there can be no doubt that it must be strictly construed. Article22(3)(b) denies to a person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention the protection of Clauses (1) and (2) of the said article. Clause (4) thereof enjoins that the preventive detention law must conform to the limitations set out thereunder. Clause (5) of Article 22 reads as under: 22. (5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order." [Ref.: Para 3 of the SCC in Amir Shad Khan's case (supra)]. 16. The Apex Court had considered the meaning and import of the expressions - 'law and order' and 'public order' in a catena of cases. The Apex Court in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 740 through Justice Hidayatullah (as he then was), observed that one has to imagine three concentric circles, in order to understand the meaning and import of the expression 'law and order', 'public interest' and 'security of State'. The Apex Court in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 740 through Justice Hidayatullah (as he then was), observed that one has to imagine three concentric circles, in order to understand the meaning and import of the expression 'law and order', 'public interest' and 'security of State'. 'Law and order' represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing 'public order' and the smallest circle represents 'security of State'. 17. The Apex Court in State of U.P. and Anr. v. Sanjai Pratap Gupta @ Pappu and Ors. 2004 (7) SC 24, held that the crucial issue is whether the activities of the detenue were pre-judicial to public order. While the expression 'law and order' is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order. 'Public order' has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only 'such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' is one of the degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it pre-judicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting 'public order' from that concerning 'law and order'. The question to ask is: "Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affects merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed"? This question has to be faced in every case on its facts. 18. The question to ask is: "Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affects merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed"? This question has to be faced in every case on its facts. 18. The material facts mentioned in the grounds of detention indicate that the alleged illegal activities of the detenue affect the large magnitude of creating chaos and havoc to the general public and study environment of the Manipur University and its effect is not confined to a few individual. The distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has been pointed out succinctly in Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal 1970 (3) SCR 288 , Babul Mitra @ Anil Mitra v. State of West Bengal and Ors. 1973 (1) SCC 393 and Milan Banik v. State of West Bengal 1974 (4) SCC 504 . According to the decision of the Apex Court in the above cited cases, the true distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' is "one of degree and extent of reach of the act in question upon society". 19. This Court (incidentally one of us is the party), W.P.(CrL) No. 19 of 2008 [Smt. Keithelakpam (O) Shyama Devi v. The District Magistrate and Ors.], had discussed the issue as to whether there is bar in taking into consideration of the statement of the detenue recorded by the police officers in connection with the criminal case's in issue in coming to the subjective satisfaction by the authority for detaining him, i.e., the detenue under the NSA. Relevant portion of para Nos. 13, 14 and 15 of the aforesaid judgment read as follows: 13....It is also well settled that sufficiency of the materials, probative value of evidences available to the detaining authority and the propriety of the grounds, on which the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is based, cannot be tested or examined by the court. From the above settled principles of law, there cannot be any dispute that the sufficiency and propriety of the documents or materials on the basis of which the detaining authority formed his subjective satisfaction for passing the order of detention cannot be questioned by the court. From the above settled principles of law, there cannot be any dispute that the sufficiency and propriety of the documents or materials on the basis of which the detaining authority formed his subjective satisfaction for passing the order of detention cannot be questioned by the court. In other words, the court can examine on the point of non-application of mind in reference to the materials placed before him. But court cannot examine as regards to the admissibility of the materials, which are before the detaining authority. 14. Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 put an embargo to the use and proof of any confession of any person made to police officer while in custody as against such person of any offence, unless the said confession was made in presence of a Magistrate. Proof of any confessional statement as against the person, who confessed, is a different aspect. A fact can be said to have been proved by a court, if such statement appears to be true, correct and reliable. In the case of preventive detention, it appears that there is no bar in taking into consideration the statement of the detenue recorded in connection with a criminal case as one of the grounds for the purpose of satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order. In criminal trial, the statement of the accused recorded under Section 161 of Cr.PC cannot be proved as against the accused for the purpose of conviction. However, such a statement can be and always taken into consideration for the purpose of framing of charges and also at the time of consideration of the bail prayer of the accused even in criminal proceeding. 15. It is also well settled that such a statement, if it is relevant, can be used in other proceedings like Civil Suit, etc. Besides, the order of detention passed under NSA detaining a person is a purely preventive measure and not a punitive action in order to prevent the detenue from indulging further in such activities which are pre-judicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order. Thus, we are of the firm view that there is no bar in taking into consideration of such a statement as one of the grounds in passing the detention order under the Act. Thus, we are of the firm view that there is no bar in taking into consideration of such a statement as one of the grounds in passing the detention order under the Act. That being the situation, we are unable to share our view with the earlier view expressed by another Bench of this Court in the above case. 20. This Court (one of us is the party) in Lourembam Sana Singh v. State of Manipur and Ors. 2008 (2) GLT 813, held that - 13. It is well settled law that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at for detaining the detenue as a preventive measure under the preventive law is invalid if such satisfaction is based on nonexistent or irrelevant ground only. Reference in Dwarika Prasad Sahu v. State of Bihar and Ors. AIR 1975 SC 134 . The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at while considering the materials and records was the cumulative result of all the grounds of detention and the involvement of the detenue in different activities. Reference may be made in A.P. Saravanan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2001) 10 SCC 212. There is no set standards laid down by the NSA for arriving at subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority on the basis of all the materials placed before it by the police. In the present case as stated above, the detaining authority had arrived at, on subjective satisfaction, for detaining the detenue under the NSA on the basis of the materials and the information placed by the Superintendent of Police, Imphal West. Therefore, the detention order cannot be said to be illegal on the ground of non-application of mind. Reference in Gurdev Singh v. Union of India (2002) 1 SCC 545 . The Apex Court in Union of India v. Paul Manickam (2003) 8 SCC 342 held that: Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence while the criminal proceedings are to punish a person for an offence committed by him. They are not parallel proceedings. The object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. It is resorted to when the executive is convinced on the materials available and placed before it that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the person detained from acting in a manner pre-judicial to certain objects which are specified by the law. The object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. It is resorted to when the executive is convinced on the materials available and placed before it that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the person detained from acting in a manner pre-judicial to certain objects which are specified by the law. The action of the executive in detaining a person being only pre-cautionary, the matter has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the executive authorities. It is not practicable to lay down objective rules of conduct, the failure to confirm to which alone should lead to detention. 21. This Court in Thongam (Ongbi) Sanatombi Devi v. District Magistrate, Imphal West and Ors. 2007 (4) GLT 931 also held that - 13. It is a settled position of law that the nature of satisfaction of the detaining authority in issuing the detention order under National Security Act for preventing a detenue from indulging in such activities which are pre-judicial to the maintenance of the public order and the security of the State is only a subjective satisfaction but subjective satisfaction should not be on no material. 14. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at while considering the materials and records was the cumulative result of all the grounds of detention in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in A.P. Saravanan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2001) 10 SCC 212. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents no set standards have been laid down by the Act for arriving at subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The subjective satisfaction in the present case had been arrived at by the detaining authority on the basis of all the materials placed before him. Therefore, the detention order cannot be said to be illegal on the grounds of non-application of mind in view of the principles laid down in Gurdev Singh v. Union of India (2002) 1 SCC 545 . 19. As we have discussed above, satisfaction of the (sic) authority for issuing the detention order is only a subjective satisfaction. Therefore, the detention order cannot be said to be illegal on the grounds of non-application of mind in view of the principles laid down in Gurdev Singh v. Union of India (2002) 1 SCC 545 . 19. As we have discussed above, satisfaction of the (sic) authority for issuing the detention order is only a subjective satisfaction. We, within the four corners of law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases discussed above, perused the materials available on record to see as to whether the relevant materials were placed before the detaining authority at the time of passing the detention order or not be effective to prevent him from the commission of further pre-judicial activities. 22. For the reasons discussed above, we are not in agreement with the contentions and assertions of the writ petitioner in the writ petition, which have been urged forcefully by Mr. Dolen Ph., learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that there is no cogent and material reason for coming to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority for detaining the detenue under the impugned detention order dated 2.6.2009 for preventing him from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the maintenance of the public order. Regarding the last point, forcefully urged for interfering with the confirmation order of the State Government dated 15.7.2009 on the sole ground that one of the reasons/grounds for confirmation of the detention order under the NSA, i.e., security of the State is not based on materials and cogent reason and, therefore, the confirmation order dated 15.7.2009 is liable to be set aside, we may refer to Section 5A of the NSA in the given case. We have already come to the conclusion that one of the grounds for detaining the detenue, i.e., for preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public order is valid and not called for any interference. Section 5A of the NSA in a clear and unequivocal term provides that the detention order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are vague, non-existent, not relevant and not connected or not proximately connected with such person and also that the order of detention shall deem to have been made under Section 3 of the NSA with reference to the remaining grounds which are valid. Regarding this point, we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court (9-Judges) in Attorney General for India and Ors. v. Amratlal Prajivandas and Ors. (1994) 5 SCC 54 . The Apex Court in para Nos. 46, 47, 49 and 50 of the SCC in Attorney General for India's case (supra) held that - 46. Section 5A of COFEPOSA may be reproduced here for ready reference. It roads: 5A. Grounds of detention severable. - Where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly- (a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are - (i) vague, (ii) non-existent, (iii) not relevant, (iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or (v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not, therefore, possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention; (b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said Sub-section (1) after being satisfied as provided in that Sub-section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. 47. The section is in two parts. The first part says that where an order of detention is made on two or more grounds, "such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds", while the second part says that such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely for the reason that one or some of the grounds are either vague, non-existent, irrelevant or unconnected. That the second part is merely a continuation of and consequential to the first part is evident from the connecting words "and accordingly". The second part goes further and says that the order of detention must be deemed to have been made on being satisfied with the remaining good ground or grounds, as the case may be. Both the parts are joined by the word "and". 49. The second part goes further and says that the order of detention must be deemed to have been made on being satisfied with the remaining good ground or grounds, as the case may be. Both the parts are joined by the word "and". 49. Now, take a case, where three orders of detention are made against the same person under COFEPOSA. Each of the orders is based upon only one ground which is supplied to the detenue. It is found that the ground of detention in support of two of such orders is either vague or irrelevant. But the ground in support of the third order is relevant, definite and proximate. In such a case, while the first two orders would be quashed, the third order would stand. This is precisely what the first part (the main part) of Section5A seeks to do. Where the order of detention is based on more than one ground, the section creates a legal fiction, viz., it must be deemed that there are as many orders of detention as there are grounds which means that each of such orders is an independent order. The result is the same as the one in the illustration given by us hereinabove. The second part of it is merely clarificatory and explanatory, which is evident from the fact that it begins with the word "accordingly"-apart from the fact that it is joined to the first part by the word "and", in such a situation, we are unable to see how can the section be characterised as inconsistent with Article 22(5). Had there been no first part, and had the section consisted only of the second part, one can understand the contention that the section is in the teeth of Article 22(5) as interpreted by this Court-this was indeed the situation in K. Yadigiri Reddy v. Commissioner of Police ILR 1972 AP 1025as we shall presently indicate. It is difficult to conceive any inconsistency or conflict between Article 22(5) and the first-the main-part of Section 5A. Parliament is competent to create a legal fiction and it did so in this case. Article 22(5) does not in terms or otherwise prohibit making of more than one order simultaneously against the same person, on different grounds. No decision saying so has been brought to our notice. Parliament is competent to create a legal fiction and it did so in this case. Article 22(5) does not in terms or otherwise prohibit making of more than one order simultaneously against the same person, on different grounds. No decision saying so has been brought to our notice. Be that as it may, we do not see why Parliament is not competent to say, by creating a legal fiction, that where an order of detention is made on more than one ground, it must be deemed that there are as many orders of detention as there are grounds. If this creation of a legal fiction is competent, then no question of any inconsistency between the section and Article 22(5) can arise. 50. It is true that validity of Section 5A or for that matter, of Section 5A of National Security Act, 1980, which is in identical terms-does not appear to have been questioned in this Court so far, though it has been applied in several decisions. Three of the reported decisions are brought to our notice, viz., State of Gujarat v. Chaman Lal Manjibhai Soni (1981) 2 SCC 24 , Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Kerala 1985 Supp SCC 144 and N. Meera Rani v. Government of T.N. (1989) 4 SCC 418 . Actually, in the last-mentioned decision, there are observations affirming its validity, though no final opinion has been expressed on the question because it was not canvassed in that case. It is also brought to our notice that a Bench of Gujarat High Court has affirmed and applied the said provision in a case arising under COFEPOSA. 23. Keeping in view of the decision of the Apex Court (9-Judges) in Attorney General for India's case (supra) and Section 5A of the NSA, we have given our anxious consideration to the last point urged by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and are of the considered view that the detention order dated 2.6.2009 passed by the learned District Magistrate, Imphal West is not required to be interfered with only on the ground that one of the grounds for confirmation of the detention order mentioned in the Confirmation order dated 15.7.2009 is not sustainable and not based on cogent reason. Further, we are also of the considered view that the decision of the Apex Court in G.M. Shah's case (supra) will not come to the rescue of the petitioner, inasmuch as, the Apex Court set aside the detention order in that case which is diametrically different from the case in hand. The District Magistrate in G.M. Shah's case (supra) issued the detention order with a view to preventing the detenue from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the maintenance of the public order but, the grounds furnished to the detenue stated that the detenue's remaining at large is pre-judicial to the maintenance of public order and also to the security of the State. In the present case, the ground for detaining the detenue under the impugned detention order dated 2.6.2009 is for preventing him from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the maintenance of the public order and the ground for detention furnished to the detenue for detaining him under the NSA is also only for preventing him from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the maintenance of the public order. Therefore, there is no variance or contradictions between the impugned detention order and the ground of detention furnished to the detenue. The relevant portion of the Apex Court in G.M. Shah's case (supra) are quoted hereunder: 6. As already mentioned, while the order of detention states that it was being made with a view to preventing the detenue from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the maintenance of public order, in the grounds disclosed to him, it had been stated that the detenue's remaining at large was pro-judicial to the maintenance of public order and also to the security of the State. We shall now briefly refer to the nature of the grounds furnished to the detenue. First we shall deal with paragraphs (1), (3) and (5) to (7) of the grounds. In paragraph (1) of the grounds, it is stated that the detenue along with his erstwhile associates was responsible for creating subversion and danger to the maintenance of public order by organizing anti-national demonstrations and protests. 7. It is, thus, clear that none of the grounds supplied to the detenue falls within the scope of Clause (a) of Section 8(3) of the Act which defines the expression "acting in any manner pre-judicial to the security of the State". 7. It is, thus, clear that none of the grounds supplied to the detenue falls within the scope of Clause (a) of Section 8(3) of the Act which defines the expression "acting in any manner pre-judicial to the security of the State". It is further seen that even though it is stated in the grounds that the District Magistrate was of the view that the detenue remaining at large was pre-judicial to the security of the State also, he did not make the order with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner pre-judicial to the security of the State. A combined reading of the order of detention and the grounds furnished to the detenue shows that at the time when the order was made, the District Magistrate either had no material relevant to the security of the State On which he could act or even if he had information of those grounds, he did not propose to act on it. He, however, tried to support the order of detention by stating in the course of the grounds that by the detenue remaining at large, the security of the State was likely to be pre-judiced. 24. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is devoid of merit and accordingly, dismissed. Petition dismissed