Judgment :- 1. The civil miscellaneous petitioner herein is the tenant in R.C.O.P.No.23 of 1996 on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Ambur and the appellant in R.C.A.No.1 of 2000, on the file of the Sub-ordinate Court, Thiruppattur. The petitioner has filed the above C.M.P.No.6275 of 2006 in CRP (NPD) SR.No.133378 of 2003 praying to condone the delay of 140 days in filing the civil revision petition under Section 25(2) of Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. 2. In the said condone delay petition, the petitioner has stated that the respondent/landlord had filed R.C.O.P.No.23 of 1996, before the Rent Controller/District Munsif of Ambur for fixation of fair rent for the building occupied by the department of posts, as tenant, at a monthly rent of Rs.2,500/- and has sought for enhancement of the rent to Rs.12,175/- per month. The learned Rent controller was pleased to allow the R.C.O.P.No.34 of 1991 by an Order dated 29.06.1998 fixing the fair rent for the building at Rs.12,000/- per month. Aggrieved by the said decree and decreetal order of the Rent Controller, the Postal Department had preferred an appeal in R.C.A.No.1 of 2000 before the appellate authority/Subordinate Judge of Tiruppattur, who was pleased to dismiss the appeal in R.C.A.No.1 of 2000 by an order dated 15.07.2003. Aggrieved by the said dismissal of the appeal, the Postal Department has now preferred the present revision in CRP (NPD) SR.No.133378 of 2003. 3. The tenant/civil revision petitioner has stated that he has made an application for certified copies on 18.07.2003. The copies were ready on 30.10.203 and delivered on 31.10.2003. The time of 30 days for preferring the revision expired on 26.11.2003. The tenant further submitted that they could not file the civil revision petition within the period of limitation, since on obtaining the copies, the same had to be sent to the Ministry of Law and Justice for seeking opinion and advise and for nomination of the counsel. Thereafter, the file had to be referred to the Additional Central Government Standing Counsel for preparation of draft, which had again to be verified by the Law Ministry. The correspondence had taken some time. Consequently, there has occurred a delay. The extended time of 30 days, which comes within the condonable delay period, expired on 26.12.2003, which happened to be a holiday for this Honble Court. The correspondence had taken some time. Consequently, there has occurred a delay. The extended time of 30 days, which comes within the condonable delay period, expired on 26.12.2003, which happened to be a holiday for this Honble Court. The following two days being Saturday and Sunday, the revision petition could be filed only on 29.12.2003, when this Honble Court re-opened. The delay of 30 days has occurred due to unavoidable reasons stated above. There is no negligence or indifference on the part of the department. Therefore, the Postal Department has prayed to condone the delay of 30 days in preferring the revision. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has filed typed set of papers for supporting his civil revision petition and cited the following Judgments: (1962) 2 SCR 324 : AIR 1961 SC 1704 , Nav Rattanmal v. State of Rajasthan, as held as follows: "This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer, and is directed against the judgment of that court dated 16-12-1954 by which the decree in favour of the respondent – Union of India – was affirmed. 2. Seth Lal Chand Kothari – the original first appellant in the appeal before us (he died pending this appeal and his heirs have been brought on record as his legal representatives – Appellants 1 to 6) was appointed by the Commissioner, Ajmer-Merwara as Government Treasurer, Ajmer-Merwara, by an order dated 20-2-1940, the treasuries to be under his charge being two – that at Ajmer and a sub-treasury at Beawar. Before accepting office he had, under the rules, to deposit Government promissory notes to the extent of Rs.60,000 and also execute a security bond for a like amount with two sureties to cover any loss to the Government in these treasuries. He accordingly made the deposit, and a security bond was executed by him on 27-2-1940 with Seth Phool Chand – who is now the 7th appellant in the appeal and one Seth Kanwarlal Ranka who died even before the suit and was not impleaded in it. Thereupon Lal Chand Kothari was directed to take charge of the office as Treasurer and he did so on 6-3-1940. 3. We are not concerned with the treasury at Ajmer, but only with that a Beawar. Thereupon Lal Chand Kothari was directed to take charge of the office as Treasurer and he did so on 6-3-1940. 3. We are not concerned with the treasury at Ajmer, but only with that a Beawar. Lal Chand, at the time of his taking charge, executed a receipt headed charge report and in it is recited that he had taken over from the previous incumbent (M.L.Patni) the amount of such which tallied with what had to be in the treasury according to the books. Nothing happened between 1940 and 1948 and the business at the treasury appeared to be proceeding regularly and according to the rules. It may be mentioned that there were the usual periodical checks and audits by government officials but no impropriety was discovered during these checks or audits. On 31-3-1948, the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Ajmer, made a check of the treasury at Beawar. The treasury staff who ought to have been there were however absent in spite of their having had prior intimation of his arrival and thereupon he directed the treasury to be sealded. There were two cash chests at this sub-treasury – one secured with a single lock, the key of which was with the staff of the Treasurer and the other with double locks, the keys of which were held, one by the employee of the Treasurer and the other by the Government Treasury Officer – the Tahsildar. A verification of the balance in the two chests disclosed that a sum of 7 annas, 9 pies was missing from the single lock chest and Rs.84,215 from the chest with the double lock. The Government thereupon took proceedings to realise the missing amount from the security of Rs.60,000 which had been under deposit. The Government securities were sold and they realised about rupees 58 thousands and odd leaving a sum of Rs.25,786-13-9 still due. The Union of India thereupon filed a suit – Civil Suit 125 of 1951 before the Sub-Judge First Class Beawar on the security bond dated 27-201940 against Lal Chand Kothari and Seth Phool Chand for recovery of this sum. Several defences were raised by the defendants but they were all rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge who granted the respondents a decree in terms prayed for in the suit. Several defences were raised by the defendants but they were all rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge who granted the respondents a decree in terms prayed for in the suit. The defendants filed an appeal to the Judicial Commissioner who dismissed it, but having regard to the fact that some of the defences turned on the interpretation of the security bond dated 27-2-1940, granted a certificate under Article 133(1) of the Constitution and that is how the appeal is now before us. 4. Neither the factum of the loss by embezzlement nor its amount is in question, and the only points raised for consideration are: (1) whether on the terms of the bond the decree in favour of the appellants could be sustained; (2) whether the claim in the suit was not barred by limitation. The argument on this second point was that if Article 83 of the Indian Limitation Act governed the claim it would be barred, and that the provision contained in Article 149 prescribing a 60-year period of limitation for suits by the Government was unconstitutional as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is this lost plea that has led to the appeal being heard by this larger Bench." 2001 (4) CTC 422 , High Court of Madras, Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd., Vs. Mrs.Stella CoilPillai Nazeresh and 3 others, the relevant headnotes of which are as follows: "Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 – Revision petition filed within time without producing certified copy of order of Appellate Authority – Registry returning papers for production of certified copy of such order – Since revision was filed in time and papers were returned for curing defects only, no delay has been occasioned – No petition under section 5 was required." 5. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted written submissions, which reads as follows: 1. CMP No.6275 of 2006 if filed praying for condonation of a purported delay of 30 days in filing CRP SR.133378 of 2003, which is a Revision against Order dated 15-07-2003 made in RCA No.1/2000 on the file of Sub Court, Tiruppatur, (Appellate Authority) confirming the Fair Rent Order of the District Munsiff, Ambur (Rent Controller). 2. The petitioner in CMP No.6275 of 2006 is the Senior Superintendent of Post Officers, Tiruppattur under whom the Post Office at Ambur is functioning from within the Tenancy Building owned by the Respondent. 3. 2. The petitioner in CMP No.6275 of 2006 is the Senior Superintendent of Post Officers, Tiruppattur under whom the Post Office at Ambur is functioning from within the Tenancy Building owned by the Respondent. 3. As admitted in Para 3 of Petitioners Affidavit, the application for Certified Copies of the Order sought to be revised was made on 18-07-2003, that Copies were ready on 30-10-2003 and that they were delivered on 31-10-2003. Chronological List of Dates & Events 15-07-2003: The Appellate Authority made the Order sought to be revised in the proposed CRP SR No.133378/2003. 18-07-2003: As admitted in Para 3 of Petitioners Affidavit in CMP No.6275 of 2006, Application for Certified Copy was made on this date before the Appellate Authority. 30-10-2003: As admitted in Para 3 of Petitioners Affidavit in CMP No.6275 of 2006, Certified Copy f the Order sought to be revised was ready on this date. 31-10-2003: As admitted in Para 3 of Petitioners Affidavit in CMP No.6275 of 2006, Certified Copy of the Order sought to be revised was delivered to the Petitioners Counsel before the Lower Court on this date. The limitation for filing a CRP against aforesaid order dated 15-07-2003 expired on this date, when the High Court was closed for Christmas Vacation. 29-12-2003: After Christmas Vacation High Court re-opened on this date and the Petition had filed on this re-opening date the proposed C.R.P.Sr.No.133378 of 2003 against aforesaid order dated 15-07-2003 even without filing a certified copy of the Appellate court Order and Decree. 09-01-2004: The High Court Registry had returned C.R.P.Sr.No.133378 of 2003 for want of proper presentation, giving 10 days time for compliance and re-presenting the paper from 13-01-2004. 16-04-2004: The returned papers in CRP Sr.No.133378/2003 were re-presented on this date together with the Certified Copies of the Fair Order and Decreetal order dated 15-07-2003 made in RCA No.1 of 2000, for the first time, that too without the necessary the court fee stamps that are required to be affixed on the Certified Copies. NOTE: This fact may be seen from the High Court Round Date Seal affixed on the docket of the said Certified Copies presented for the first time only on this date (16 Apr 2004). Hence, if at all, the CRP.Sr.No.133378/2003 can be said to have been properly presented only on 16-04-2004. NOTE: This fact may be seen from the High Court Round Date Seal affixed on the docket of the said Certified Copies presented for the first time only on this date (16 Apr 2004). Hence, if at all, the CRP.Sr.No.133378/2003 can be said to have been properly presented only on 16-04-2004. The Registry too has treated that CRP Sr.No.133378/2003 was properly presented only on this date, as may be seen from the number of days taken by the Petitioner to file the proposed CRP, calculated in writing by the concerned passing officer in the High Court Registry. 24-05-2004: The papers were once again returned by the High Court Registry with Item.1 in the printed return sheet marked for compliance within 10 days there from. Item.1 reads as follows: 1. "It may be stated how the civil revision petition is maintainable as the same is statutorily barred by limitation." 17-06-2004: The papers were once again represented with the ACGSCc observation on the Return Sheet that "The CRP is not barred by limitation and the same is filed within the prescribed period envisaged under law............" NOTE: As per the calculation of delay made by the Registry overleaf the Certified Copy of the Decreetal Order, the actual number of days of delay in due and proper presentation of C.R.P.Sr.No.133378 of 2003 is not 30 days in any event and exceeds 170 days. 02-03-2005: The papers were returned for the reason "previous returned to be complied with" giving 10 days time for compliance. 28-03-2005: The papers so returned on 02-03-2005 were represented on this date, observing that "The time of 30 days for preferring expired on 26-11-2003. But the revision was filed only on 29-12-2003. The Honble Court was closed for Christmas Holidays from 25-12-2003 to 28-12-2003; it was filed on 29-12-2003 with an application to condone the delay. Hence, the application to condone the delay may be numbered. 22-07-2005: The petitioner has filed the Certified Copy of the fair order and Decreetal order dated 15-07-2003 in RCA No.1 of 2000, duly stamped only on this date. NOTE: This fact may be seen by the High Courts round date seal found affixed over the Stamps pasted on the face of the Fair Order & Decreetal Order in RCA No.1 of 2000. NOTE: This fact may be seen by the High Courts round date seal found affixed over the Stamps pasted on the face of the Fair Order & Decreetal Order in RCA No.1 of 2000. Hence, if at all, the CRP Sr.No.133378/2003 can be said to have been properly presented only on either of the two dates, viz., 16-04-2004 or 22-07-2005. The Registry has treated the earlier of the 2 dates as the date of proper presentation and has accordingly calculated the number of days taken by the Petitioner to properly present the proposed CRP. 02-09-2005: All the papers so for filed, returned, re-presented were placed in the list of default cases. 01-10-2005: CRP Sr.No.133378 of 2003 together with other papers were listed before court were, I understand listed before court and I further understand this Honble court had directed that "the defects pointed out by the Registry shall be complied with on or before 31-10-2005 failing which, the respective proceedings in which the effects pointed out shall be struck out without any further reference to this court". 08-11-2005: The Registry had observed that "defects not rectified – may be sent to ER". Accordingly the proposed CRP was dismissed for Default. Thereafter, the petitioner filed necessary Petitioners and got the dismissed CRP restored and had got the present CMP No.6275 of 2006 numbered on some date in the year 2006 taken orders for issue of notice in the same year. Again the Petitioner had failed and neglected to take steps for issue of notice until January month in this year 2010. 4. It may be stated at the cost of repetition that admittedly the Petitioner had received the Certified Copy of the Appellate Authoritys Fair Order & Decreetal Order on 31-10-2003, which was a date much before the improper presentation of CRP Sr.No.133378 on 29-12-2003. So the first and foremost submission is that the proposed CRP Sr.No.133378/2003 was not properly presented on 29-12-2003 and that it may be said that it could at all be said to have been properly presented only on 16-04-2004 when the returned CRP papers were re-presented together with the Certified Copy of the Appellate Authoritys Fair Order & Decreetal order after a delay of more than 140 days and therefore this Honble Court does not have the power or jurisdiction to condone delay in proper presentation of CRP Sr.No.133378/2003 beyond one month period. 5. 5. Therefore the filing of CRP Sr.No.133378/2003 is hopelessly time-barred. Excluding the statutory one month period of limitation as prescribed in Sec.25(2) of the Tamilnadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960 the number of days of delay is at least 140 days. In this regard, the Respondent relies also upon the calculation made by the concerned Passing Officer in the High Court Registry contained overleaf the last page of the Certified Copy of the Decreetal Order produced by the Petitioner for the first time on 16-04-2004 from the expiry of the period of limitation contained in Sec.25(2) of the Rent Control Act. 6. The next submission is that under the Proviso to Section 25(2) of the Act, this Honble Court may condone delay of up to one month only and that delay cannot be condoned by the High Court under Sec.25(2) of the Act if such delay is beyond one month from the expiry of the period of limitation contained in Sec.25(2) of the Rent Control Act. 7. The next submission is that Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not at all applicable to condone delay in filing a Revision under section 25 of the Rent Control Act: Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act itself is a direct answer to this proposition. 8. The following case law are relied upon for the respective propositions contained hereunder: 1998(I) MLJ 711 (per) R.Balasubramaniam.J. K.Alagappan Padayachi vs V.Alagappa Padayachi decided on 27th July 1997 Referring to and/or relying upon various judgments AIR 1982 Mad 189 referred to: (1990) 2 MLJ 537 extracted: The appellate Side Rules framed under the CPC specifically provides that the Memorandum of CRP shall among other things be accompanied by a Certified Copy of the Judgment, if any, on which the Decree is based and so, the inherent power under Sec.151 CPC cannot be exercised inconsistent without coming into conflict with the above said rules. AIR 1961 SC 832 relied on: If at the time when the appeal is preferred a Decree has already been drawn up by the Trial Court and the appellant has not applied for it in time, it would be a clear case where the appeal would be incompetent and a penalty of dismissal would be justified on the ground that the appeal is not accompanied with a certified copy of the Decree .. .. .. .. .. On the other hand it a Decree has been drawn up and an application for its certified copy has been made by the appellant after the Decree was drawn up, the Office of the appellate Court should return the appeal to the appellant as defective, and when the Decree is filed by him, the question of limitation may be examined on the merits. AIR 1967 SC 1470 relied on: The requirement of Order 41 Rule 1 is mandatory and in the absence of a copy of the Decree, the filing of the appeal would be incomplete, defective and incompetent. AIR 1969 SC 575 relied on: a memorandum of appeal is not validly presented, unless it is accompanied by certified copies of the Decree and Judgment AIR 1954 Madras 883 relied upon: The presentation of a memorandum of appeal, without a copy of the decree appealed against is not a valid presentation and the appeal is not maintainable...... Held as follows: The settled position of law as could be called out from the above referred to judgments, is that the filing of the Decree Copy can never be dispensed with. 7. As already noticed the Revision Petitioner had the certified copy of the 3 Orders which he filed before this Court even on the day when he filed the CRP. Even at the earliest point of time after presentation, viz., on 05.07.1996 itself, the Registry had found out this defect and pointed out the same to be counsel who had entered appearance for the revision petitioner. However the certified copy of the proceedings challenged in the revision came to be filed only on 24.06.1997. When that being so and in view of the several judgments referred to above, I am of the firm opinion that on the day, viz., 18-06-1996 when the CRP came to be filed before this Court, it was not validly presented and it was liable to be rejected on that sole ground alone. In other words the revision before this Court on 18-06-1996 was totally an incompetent one..........Certified copies of the proceedings came to be filed on 24-06-1997. Under these circumstances, the date i.e., 24.06.1997 is the day on which it could be said that the CRP came to be properly instituted before this Court..........This appears to be the view of the Honble Supreme Court of India in its judgment reported in........ Under these circumstances, the date i.e., 24.06.1997 is the day on which it could be said that the CRP came to be properly instituted before this Court..........This appears to be the view of the Honble Supreme Court of India in its judgment reported in........ AIR 1969 SC 575 8. Since the CRP in this case has been filed without the certified copies of the Order and the Decreetal Order, it has to be necessarily held that there was no valid presentation of the CRP on 18-06-1996 as provided for under Order IV Rule 21 of the Appellate Side Rules. Submission: In the above decision, the Honble Judge referring to and relying upon the several decisions, has conclusively held that mere filing of the CRP without certified copies of the Fair Order & Decreetal Order, does not amount to valid, that is to say, proper presentation. The proposed CRP Sr.No.133378/2003 too was filed on 29-12-2003 without certified copy of the Fair Order & Decreetal Order dated 15-07-2003 made in RCA No.1 of 2000 that too on he 30th day from the expiry of one month period of Limitation prescribed in Sec.25(2) of the Rent Control Act. Hence the filing was not valid or proper. It was only on 16-04-2004 the certified copy of the Fair order & Decreetal Order of the Appellate Authority was filed before this Honble Court for the first time while representing the returned papers in CRP.Sr.No.133378/2003. The filing of the CRP Sr.No.133378/2003 can hence be said to be properly made only on 16-04-2004. In the following case law, it is held that this Honble Court has no power, that is to say, no jurisdiction to condone any more than 1 month (30 days) from the expiry of the limitation prescribed in Sec.25(2) of the Act. 1981 (I) MLJ 275 Para 3 @ Pg.277 (per V.Balasubramanyan, J) Venkaimarbon vs Dakshinamoorthy decided on 30-01-1980. The question is, whether it (Rent Control Act) expressly rules out, either wholly or to a lesser extent, the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act. This is always the approach which Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act demands as respects any Special or Local Law. This is illustrated by another limitation provision in this very Rent Control Act, namely, section 25(2). This is always the approach which Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act demands as respects any Special or Local Law. This is illustrated by another limitation provision in this very Rent Control Act, namely, section 25(2). This section prescribes a period of one month as the time limit for a revision to the High Court from an Order passed by an appellate authority. Under the proviso to section 25(2), however, the High Court is empowered to admit a revision beyond the time-limit. But this power of extension is itself subject to the restriction that the High Court cannot extend the time, in any case, beyond one month of the expiry of the period of limitation. This means that whatever might be the cause and however sufficient it might be, the High Court will be powerless to condone the delay beyond one month............Section 25 rules out section 5 precisely for the reason that it expressly legislates on the very subject which is dealt with by section 5. 1981 (I) MLJ 394 Para 27 @ Pg.401 (per T.Sathiadev, J) T.N.Krishnamoorthy vs M/s.Jagat Textiles decided on 31-10-1980. High Court will have to decide the revision under section 25 of the Rent Control Act by following the Civil Procedure Code. Submission: If for deciding a Revision this Honble Court follows CPC, equally this Honble Court should also follow Rules of the Appellate side of Madras High Court (AS Rules for short) made under Sec.122 of CPC. 1981 TLNJ 288 @ Pg.290 (Per Ramanujam & Fakkir Mohammed, JJ.) Therefore S 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to a revision petition filed in the High Court u/s 25 of the Act 18/1960 because the said application of S.5 is impliedly excluded by prescribing a special period of extension of time for limitation. 1988 (II) MLJ 355 Paras 2 & 4 @ Pg.356 (per) Srinivasaj, J. Kasoar Udayar vs M.V.R Oorani Private Trust. The petitioner presented the CRP on 12.-09-1988 in this Court along with a petition to condone the delay of 33 days. The maximum period which the Court could grant under the proviso to S.25(2) is thirty days. This Court has repeatedly held that the Court has no power to condone delay beyond the period of thirty days. The petitioner presented the CRP on 12.-09-1988 in this Court along with a petition to condone the delay of 33 days. The maximum period which the Court could grant under the proviso to S.25(2) is thirty days. This Court has repeatedly held that the Court has no power to condone delay beyond the period of thirty days. Recently I had occasion to reiterate the position after tracing the entire case law on the subject in C.R.P.Sr.Nos.56119 and 56121 of 1986 and C.R.P.Sr.Nos.56123 of 1986, 85587 and 85590 of 1987 by order dated 1.8.1988. 1984(I) MLJ 85 Para 16 @ Pg.89 (per T.Sathiadev J.) M/s.M.M.Handalappa, A.G.Balasubramaniam Mudaliar & Co. Vs M/s.H.G.Krishna Reddy & Co. But when Sec.25(2) not only prescribes a special period of limitation for preferring revision petitions to the High Court but also contains an inbuilt provision of an extended period within which petitions beyond the period of limitation could be instituted by conferring a discretion in the High Court to condone delay within the prescribed period on sufficient cause shown it being unlike what has been provided under Sec.23 of the act and in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in.............it has to be held that section 25(2) itself contemplates an express exclusion of section 5 of the Limitation Act. 1992-2 LW (Vol.102) 563 @ Pg.564 (per Nainar Sundaram ACJ & Somasundaram J) Lakshmikantham Ammal & 4 ors vs Jayarama Odayar. the question of condoning the delay in preferring a revision beyond the time prescribed under sec.25 of the TN (Rent Control) Act stands already answered in the negative by pronouncements of learned Single Judges of the Court vide 1975-2 MLJ SN 19 per Sethuraman J. 1982 (Vol.95) L.W.7429 per K.B.N.Singh the above pronouncements though of learned Single Judges of this Court, are well laid down and are portent on the subject. We fully endorse the ratio countenanced in them and there is no warrant to depart or differ from the said pronouncements of this Court. Applying the ratio expressed in the said pronouncements of this Court to this revision arising under the Act, the papers in this revision are rejected. 9. As against all the above considered Authorities fully binding on this Honble Court, the learned ACGSC, appearing for the petitioner produced a decision of the Honble Mr.Justice S.S.Subramani reported in 2001 (4) CTC 422 . 9. As against all the above considered Authorities fully binding on this Honble Court, the learned ACGSC, appearing for the petitioner produced a decision of the Honble Mr.Justice S.S.Subramani reported in 2001 (4) CTC 422 . The submission on this case law by the respondents counsel is as follows: " From a thorough reading of the decision SSS J, it is evident on its face that it was decided # without reference to the crucial words contained in order 4 Rule 21 of A.S.Rules. # delivered without arguments. # without reference to any citation of authority. # Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which precisely does not apply to the case on hand. # When the provision of law contained in order 4 rule 21 of A.S. Rules does not appear to have been present in the Learned Judges mind or perceived by the Learned Judge. " Therefore it is submitted that the said decision should be treated as one given per incuriam and as one which passes sub-silentio. The respondents counsel relies upon the following case law, both decided by the Supreme Court of India and reported in the following citations: AIR 1988 S.C. 1531 : A.R.Antulay – Vs- R.S.Nayak and others. AIR 1989 S.C.38 : Municipal Corpn., of Delhi – Vs-Gurnam Kaur. The respondent therefore prays that this Honble Court may dismiss C.M.P.No.6275 of 2006 and consequently reject the CRP Sr.No.133378 of 2003 as incompetent and time barred and thus render justice. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that the department occupied the petition premises bearing Door No.50, Nethaji road, Ambur as a tenant, for running the post office for the general public, for a monthly rent of Rs.2,500/- including amenities. The tenancy had come into effect in the year 1985. The landlord has filed the petition under Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act to fix the fair rent of the petition premises at Rs.12,175/- per month. After contest, the learned Rent Controller has fixed the fair rent as Rs.12,000/- per month. Aggrieved by the said order the tenant/revision petitioner has filed an appeal in R.C.A.No.1 of 2000 before the learned Rent Controller Appellate Authority/Sub-ordinate Judge, Tiruppattur. The learned Judge dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the Rent Controller. 7. After contest, the learned Rent Controller has fixed the fair rent as Rs.12,000/- per month. Aggrieved by the said order the tenant/revision petitioner has filed an appeal in R.C.A.No.1 of 2000 before the learned Rent Controller Appellate Authority/Sub-ordinate Judge, Tiruppattur. The learned Judge dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the Rent Controller. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that the rent fixed by the below Courts are erroneous and hence the same had been pointed out in the revision petition. For filing the revision petition, a delay of 30 days was caused. The delay was not caused wantonly or deliberately but had been caused only due to administration process. The learned counsel further argued that the revision petitioner occupied the petition premises as tenant for running the post office, for the public at large including the landlord. Hence, he has prayed to condone the delay of 30 days for filing the civil revision petition. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent/landlord vehemently argued that the delay period was not properly calculated. Further, as per Sec.25(2) of the Rent Control Act, only a delay of 30 days is condonable, but in the instant case, a delay of 140 days has been caused. The learned counsel for the respondent further argued that the learned Rent Controller as well as the Rent Control Appellate Authority had passed orders only after consideration of oral and documentary evidence furnished by both the parties and the rent was fixed at Rs.12,000/- per month. The findings arrived at by both the Courts have been done after well considering all the relevant facts and issues. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent further argued that the reason stated in the condone delay petition was not correct and that the reasons for the day to day delay had not been explained properly. Hence, the learned counsel had pointed out that the condone delay petition is not maintainable under Sec.25(2) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 10. Hence, the learned counsel had pointed out that the condone delay petition is not maintainable under Sec.25(2) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and perusal of the orders of the Courts below, arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing on either side and after going through the written submission submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent, this Court is of the view that the delay had not been properly calculated and that the day to day delay had not been properly explained. Further, in the instant case, the landlord had filed the petition only for fixation of fair rent and not for delivery of property. As such, the interest of General Public will not be compromised. Hence, the Court dismisses the condone delay petition in C.M.P.No.6275 of 2006 in C.R.P.NPD.Sr.No.133378 of 2003, on the file of this Honble Court. 11. In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Petition is dismissed. Consequently, the CRP.NPD.SR.No.133378 of 2003, on the file of this Honble Court is rejected. Connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. There shall be no order as to costs.