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2010 DIGILAW 2009 (MAD)

Er. P. Veera Bhaarathi v. State of Tamil Nadu, represented by The Inspector of Police, Aruppukottai Town Police Station, Virudhunagar District

2010-04-28

M.CHOCKALINGAM, T.MATHIVANAN

body2010
ORDER M. CHOCKALINGAM, J. This criminal original petition is brought forth by one Mr. Veera Bhaarathi seeking a certificate in the nature of Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India that his case pursuant to the judgment rendered by this Court in Crl. A. (MD) No. 872 of 1999 on 10.8.2000, modifying the death sentence awarded by the Principal Sessions Division, Virudhunagar District at Srivilliputhur, in S.C. No. 30 of 1999, into life imprisonment, is a fit one for appeal to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 2. The affidavit in support of the petition is perused along with the grounds on which he seeks the relief. 3. The petitioner appeared in person, and he was heard. He put forth his submissions extensively. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor was also heard on those submissions. 4. Admittedly, the petitioner was charged with the offences under Sections 376 and 302 read with 34 of IPC before the Sessions Division, Srivilliputhur, along with two other accused in S.C. No. 30 of 1999. In the said case, a judgment came to be passed by the trial Court finding him guilty under Section 302 read with 34 of IPC and awarding the capital punishment of death sentence and two other accused also by a judgment dated 6.10.1999. An appeal preferred by him in Crl. A. (MD) No. 872 of 1999 and also the Referred Trial No. 2 of 1999 seeking affirmation of the sentence of death penalty, were taken up by a Division Bench of this Court whereby a judgment was rendered on 10.8.2000, modifying the death sentence into one of imprisonment for life. As against the same, he preferred SLP (Criminal) Nos. 4019-4020 of 2000. By an order dated 4.12.2000, the SLPs were dismissed. Thereafter, he preferred another petition before the Apex Court, and the same was not entertained. In such circumstances, this petition has been brought forth seeking the certificate. 5. As against the same, he preferred SLP (Criminal) Nos. 4019-4020 of 2000. By an order dated 4.12.2000, the SLPs were dismissed. Thereafter, he preferred another petition before the Apex Court, and the same was not entertained. In such circumstances, this petition has been brought forth seeking the certificate. 5. The petitioner advancing his arguments would submit that after the dismissal of the SLPs by the Supreme Court, he came to know about the existence of a new piece of evidence which is vital enough to prove his innocence in this case; that the communication dated 15.3.2006, received by him from the trial Court along with the xerox copy of Exhibit P24 would indicate the foul play displayed by the prosecution in implicating him as an accused; that in the appeal, this Court had more or less come to a decision that he might be an innocent person; that apart from that, he was not given reasonable opportunity to be clearly and properly questioned by the learned trial Judge under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.; that it is obvious that the delay of 5 1/2 years on the part of the learned trial Judge in implementing the orders of this Court is the cause of the delayed representation by him, and it is neither willful nor wanton but for the reasons beyond his control; that in the instant case, there were violations of mandatory provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure; that the investigation done in the present case would show that the investigation agency has made him as a scapegoat; that under the circumstances, he has got a good case to be advanced in the appeal before the Apex Court, and hence, the certificate has got to be issued. 6. After looking into the materials available and considering the submissions made by the petitioner and also the reply put forth by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, this Court is of the considered opinion that it is not a fit case where the Court can grant the certificate as asked for by the petitioner for more reasons than one. 7. Admittedly, the judgment was rendered by the Court of Sessions, Srivilliputhur, in S.C. No. 30 of 1999 on 6.10.1999 whereby he was awarded death penalty which was sought to be affirmed in R.T. No. 2 of 1999. He also preferred an appeal in Crl. A. (MD) No. 872 of 1999. 7. Admittedly, the judgment was rendered by the Court of Sessions, Srivilliputhur, in S.C. No. 30 of 1999 on 6.10.1999 whereby he was awarded death penalty which was sought to be affirmed in R.T. No. 2 of 1999. He also preferred an appeal in Crl. A. (MD) No. 872 of 1999. Both were taken up by the Division Bench of this Court, and the death penalty was reduced to life imprisonment by a judgment dated 10.8.2000. Thus, this OP has been brought forth for the certificate as one envisaged under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India after a lapse of nearly 9 1/2 years. The intervening circumstances were: (i) He preferred SLPs before the Apex Court and the same were dismissed; and (ii) Not satisfied, he also preferred another petition before the Apex Court, and it was not entertained. 8. Insofar as the delay of nearly 9 1/2 years, the petitioner would submit that though the judgment was rendered by the Sessions Division in the year 1999, there were return of property applications pending, and they were all disposed of in the year 2006 and thus there was a delay that was caused by the Court for which he was not responsible; that as far as the remaining period of delay of four years was concerned, his health condition became deteriorated; that he lost his mother, and his father’s health condition was also not all right since he was suffering from illness; that apart from that, his son was under treatment; that because of these factors, he was under mental agony; that he regained his regular work only thereafter, and thus the delay was caused. Relying on a decision of the Apex Court, the petitioner would further submit that whenever delay is caused by the Court, for the same, the party should not be allowed to suffer. 9. In the case on hand, the above contentions, in the considered opinion of the Court, cannot be countenanced at all. As far as the first part of the delay that was caused by the Court as contended by him, is concerned, it cannot be called as a delay at all. While the judgment was rendered by the Court of Sessions, the death penalty was awarded, and the same has actually been challenged by way of an appeal by the petitioner, and the proceedings were pending in this Court. While the judgment was rendered by the Court of Sessions, the death penalty was awarded, and the same has actually been challenged by way of an appeal by the petitioner, and the proceedings were pending in this Court. This Court also gave its verdict on 10.8.2000, and thus the return of property applications and the orders made thereon have nothing to do with the proceedings at all. 10. As far as the remaining part of the delay is concerned, this Court is of the considered opinion that the contentions put forth by the petitioner and recorded above, cannot be considered to be reasons at all. This Court is able to notice laches on the part of the petitioner. The petitioner would further submit that though there was a delay of 9 1/2 years, the certificate could be issued. This Court is of the firm view that here the delay is not only noticed, but also the intervening circumstances namely he has actually filed SLPs before the Apex Court and they were dismissed. At this juncture, the petitioner pointed out that those SLPs were dismissed in limine at the admission stage, and hence it would not be binding or considered to be a precedent. But, this contention cannot be countenanced in the given circumstances of the case since not only there was a dismissal of SLPs, but also he filed another petition before the Apex Court, and the same was also not entertained. 11. It remains to be seen under what conditions the certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India could be given. Now, at this juncture, it should not be forgotten that Article 134-A of the Constitution providing for application for certificate of leave to appeal to Apex Court, does not constitute an independent provision under which a certificate can be issued; but, it is ancillary to Article, 132(1), Article 133(1) and Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. No doubt, the Court can issue a certificate only when it is satisfied that the conditions in Article 132 or Article 133 or Article 134 of the Constitution, as the case may be, were satisfied. No doubt, the Court can issue a certificate only when it is satisfied that the conditions in Article 132 or Article 133 or Article 134 of the Constitution, as the case may be, were satisfied. It would be more apt and appropriate to reproduce Articles 132, 133 and 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India as follows: “132.Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in certain cases:-(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in the territory of India, whether in a civil, criminal or other proceeding. If the High Court certifies under article 134-A that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution.” “133.Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in regard to civil matters: (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies under article 134A- (a) that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance; and (b) that in the opinion of the High Court the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.” “134. Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in regard to criminal matters:- (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court- (a) ... (b) ... (c) certifies under article 134-A that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.” In the case on hand, this Court is unable to notice any such circumstances as found therein. 12. Now, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor brought to the notice of the Court that the introduction of Article 134-A of the Constitution of India was made in 1999. 12. Now, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor brought to the notice of the Court that the introduction of Article 134-A of the Constitution of India was made in 1999. Article 134-A of the Constitution of India reads as follows: “134-A.Certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court: Every High Court, passing or making a judgment, decree, final order, or sentence, referred to in clause (1) of article 132 or clause (1) of article 133, or clause (1) of article 134- (a) may, if it deems fit so to do, on its own motion; and (b) shall, if an oral application is made, by or on behalf of the party aggrieved immediately after the passing or making of such judgment, decree, final order or sentence, determine, as soon as may be after such passing or making, the question whether a certificate of the nature referred to in clause (1) of article 132, or clause (1) of article 133, as the case may be, sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of article 134, may be given in respect of that case.” 13. As could be seen, in the instant case, the instant OP has been brought forth seeking a certificate after a period of 9 1/2 years and after the dismissal of the SLPs and another petition by the Apex Court, with such laches. In such circumstances, this Court is unable to notice any circumstance or reasons as envisaged under Article 132 or 133 of the Constitution of India. Law also mandates that at the time of the passing of the judgment, it must be either suo motu by the Court or on oral application by the party. In the instant case, it is not available. Under the circumstances, it is not a fit case where certificate as asked for by the petitioner, can be issued. Accordingly, this criminal original petition fails, and the same is dismissed. Petition dismissed.