Judgment :- ORDER: (R. BANUMATHI, J.) We have disposed of A.S.No.708 of 2008 (preferred by 1st respondent/Plaintiff), A.S.No.946 of 2009 (preferred by Petitioners/Defendants 1 and 2) and W.P.No.23405 of 2009 filed by 1st Respondent/Plaintiff by our common judgment dated 23.2.2010. 2. Stating that the order of the Division Bench suffers from error apparent on the face of record, that there is total lack of jurisdiction and the Court has acted in excess of jurisdiction, Review Petitioners/Defendants 1 and 2 have preferred these review petitions seeking review of the Judgment in A.S.No.708 of 2008 and W.P.No.23405 of 2009. Even though it was a common judgment, no review is sought for in respect of A.S.No.946 of 2009. 3. Grievance of the review petitioners is that the Court has exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 96 of Civil Procedure Code by going into the questions, which were not pleaded and which were not the subject matter of any issue by formulating questions of law, which did not arise in the first appeal and by interfering with the order of trial Court, which held that the Plaintiff is entitled to a "decree for specific performance" subject to mortgage of the Indian Bank without even an appeal against the said conditional decree. Further grievance of the review petitioners/Defendants 1 and 2 is that directions have been issued by the Court based on facts, which were not pleaded and by ignoring the statutory provisions in Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (in short, "RDB Act") and Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (in short, "SARFAESI Act") and they require to be reviewed. 4. The learned counsel for 1st Respondent/Plaintiff Mr.R.Thaigarajan submitted that there is no question of assumption of excessive jurisdiction or any error apparent on the face of the record warranting review of the judgment. Reiterating the findings in the common judgment, the learned counsel submitted that the power of review is available only when there is an error apparent on the face of the record and the judgment does not suffer any such error apparent on the face of the record. Reiterating the findings in the common judgment, the learned counsel submitted that the power of review is available only when there is an error apparent on the face of the record and the judgment does not suffer any such error apparent on the face of the record. The learned counsel submitted that as per the direction of the Supreme Court in S.L.P.(Civil) No.31358 of 2009, the Writ Petition was heard along with Appeals and exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, the Court has rightly issued direction to DRT and the same cannot be assailed as error apparent on the face of the record. The learned counsel further submitted that any error not being apparent on the face of the record cannot be sought to be reviewed by filing a review application. In support of his contention, the learned counsel inter alia placed reliance upon AIR 1960 SC 137 (SATYANARAYAN LAXMINARAYAN HEGDE AND OTHERS VS. MALLIKARJUN BHAVANAPPA TIRUMALE), (MEERA BHANJA (SMT) VS. NIRMALA KUMARI CHOUDHURY (SMT) (1995) 1 SCC 170 , PARSION DEVI AND OTHERS VS. SUMITRI DEVI AND OTHERS ( (1997) 8 SCC 715 ), INDERCHAND JAIN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS VS. MOTILAL (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. ( (2009) 14 SCC 663 , HARIDAS DAS VS. USHA RANI BANIK (SMT) AND OTHERS ( (2006) 4 SCC 78 ), B.DHANALAKSMI VS. M.SHAJAHAN (AIR 2004 MADRAS 512) and other decisions. 5. It was stated before us that based upon the Judgment, the Plaintiff has deposited Rs.7,84,13,020/- to the credit of O.S.No.336 of 2006 and Bank has also filed application for payment out before the trial Court (Principal District Court, Chengalpattu) and trial Court has also ordered payment out and issued Cheque in favour of Indian Bank on 25.3.2010. Placing reliance upon STATE OF NAGALAND AND ANOTHER VS. TOULVI KIBAMI AND ANOTHER ( (2003) 8 SCC 671 ), the learned counsel Mr.R.Thiagarajan submitted that the impugned judgment was already acted upon and the Review Application is not maintainable. The Plaintiff had only deposited the amount. The major part of the execution of decree is execution of the sale deed. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the Review Petition is not maintainable and we have proceeded to consider the merits of the contentious points raised in the review applications. 6. Before referring to the points urged, we may firstly deal with the contention raised regarding expression employed by us "decree for specific performance". In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the Review Petition is not maintainable and we have proceeded to consider the merits of the contentious points raised in the review applications. 6. Before referring to the points urged, we may firstly deal with the contention raised regarding expression employed by us "decree for specific performance". The learned Senior Counsel has drawn our attention to Paragraph Nos.52, 59, 60, 63, 64, 69, 71, 72, 75, 76, 80, 81 and 85 of the Judgment and submitted that the Bench referred to "decree for specific performance" without referring to "decree for specific performance" being subject to the mortgage in favour of the 3rd Defendant Indian Bank. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the apparent error in referring to the "decree for specific performance" without referring to the "decree for specific performance being subject to mortgage" has misled the Court to believe that the decree is a simple decree for specific performance and the Court had not noticed that the "decree for specific performance" is subject to mortgage in favour of the 3rd Defendant Bank. 7. Of course "decree for specific performance" is subject to mortgage. But the learned Senior Counsel is not right in contending that the Court did not notice that the suit was "decree for specific performance", being subject to mortgage in favour of 3rd Defendant Bank. In several places, for instance, in paragraph Nos.16, 47, 55, 67 and 83, the Court has referred to the decree as "decree for specific performance subject to mortgage". Mere reference to the decree as "decree for specific performance" does not mean we have diluted that part of the decree - "Decree for specific performance", being subject to mortgage. On this score, in the language employed in the judgment, we do not find any error apparent on the face of the record. 8. Before we deal with the contentious points raised by the review petitioners, we may briefly refer to the principles of review. On this score, in the language employed in the judgment, we do not find any error apparent on the face of the record. 8. Before we deal with the contentious points raised by the review petitioners, we may briefly refer to the principles of review. The power of a civil court to review its judgment/decision is traceable in Section 114 C.P.C. The grounds on which review can be sought are enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. It may allow review on three specific grounds, namely, (1) discovery of new and important matter of evidence, which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicants knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order was made; (2) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (3) for any other sufficient reason." 9. The review proceeding is not by way of an appeal. Holding that the review must be confined to error apparent on the face of the record and re-appraisal of the entire evidence on record for finding the error would amount to exercise of Appellate Jurisdiction, which is not permissible, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170 , the Supreme Court held as under: "8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma (( 1979 (4) SCC 389 ), speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., has made the following pertinent observations: (SCC p. 390, para 3) “It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1963 SC 1909 ), there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” 9. Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed that they were entertaining the review petition only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale ( AIR 1960 SC 137 ), wherein, K.C. Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record: An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ. 10. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ. 10. Considering the scope of review jurisdiction and holding "mistake or error apparent on the face of the record must be self evident and does not require a process of reasoning, in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, ( (1997) 8 SCC 715 ), the Supreme Court has held as under: "7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.( AIR 1964 SC 1372 = (1964) 5 SCR 174 ) (SCR at p. 186) this Court opined: “What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an “error apparent on the face of the record”). The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an “error apparent on the face of the record”, for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by “error apparent”. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.” (emphasis ours) ...... 9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”. 11. Holding that the review is not an appeal in disguise and that the review Court cannot sit in appeal over its own order and rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law, in INDERCHAND JAIN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS VS. MOTILAL (DEAD) THROUGH LRS ( (2009) 14 SCC 663 ), the Supreme Court held as under: ".... 8. An application for review will lie inter alia when the order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record and permitting the same to continue would lead to failure of justice. In Rajendra Kumar v. Rambai (2007) 15 SCC 513 ), this Court held: (SCC p.514, para 6) "6. The limitations on exercise of the power of review are well settled. The first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and permitting the order to stand will lead to failure of justice. In the absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed." 9. The power of review can also be exercised by the court in the event discovery of new and important matter or evidence takes place which despite exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. An application for review would also lie if the order has been passed on account of some mistake. Furthermore, an application for review shall also lie for any other sufficient reason. 10. It is beyond any doubt or dispute that the review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is permissible in law. Furthermore, an application for review shall also lie for any other sufficient reason. 10. It is beyond any doubt or dispute that the review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is permissible in law. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. It is also trite that exercise of inherent jurisdiction is not invoked for reviewing any order. 11. Review is not appeal in disguise. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224 , this Court held (SCC p. 251, para 56): "56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise."... 12. As held by the Supreme Court in AIR 1960 SC 137 , (SATYANARAYAN LAXMINARAYAN HEGDEVS. MALLIKARJUN BHAVANAPPA TIRUMALE), the error must be apparent on the face of the record i.e., error must be self-evident and not which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning or which has to be searched. In other words, it must be an error and it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. Under the guise of review, parties are not entitled to rehearing of the same issue. An error can be said to be apparent on the face of the record only if such error is patent and can be located without any elaborate argument and without any scope for controversy with regard to such error, which stares at the face even by a mere glance of the judgment. 13. In the light of the well settled principles, we have to consider the contentions raised. The points falling for our consideration are - Whether our common judgment suffers from any error apparent on the face of the record and whether there is patent/manifest error warranting review of our common judgment.? 14. It was contended that except the suit property, other properties were not subject matter in O.S.No.336 of 2006. The points falling for our consideration are - Whether our common judgment suffers from any error apparent on the face of the record and whether there is patent/manifest error warranting review of our common judgment.? 14. It was contended that except the suit property, other properties were not subject matter in O.S.No.336 of 2006. On behalf of the Review Petitioners, learned Senior Counsel Ms.Nalini Chidambaram submitted that the Ex.A2 “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 15.8.2005, Ex.A3” agreement of sale dated 3.2.2006, the legal notices issued by the 1st Respondent/Plaintiff, the plaint, written statement filed in O.S.No.336 of 2006 and evidence adduced by the parties only refer to suit schedule property, having been given as security and the need to sell the suit property to clear the liability to the Indian Bank and no reference was made to any other property given as security by Defendants 1 and 2 - Review Petitioners for the loan availed by M/s.Anand Agency to Indian bank. The contention of the Review Petitioners is that the details of other properties are not on record and therefore the 1st Appellate Court has no jurisdiction to traverse beyond the pleadings and the evidence in trial Court proceedings. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that from Ex.A1 - MOU dated 15.8.2005 and Ex.A2 - agreement of sale dated 3.2.2006, the intention of parties is that the sale consideration of suit property alone would be utilised for liquidating the liability of Indian Bank and the parties believed that a one time settlement would be arrived at and the sale consideration would be more than sufficient to satisfy the debt to the Bank, leaving a surplus to the business of Defendants 1 and 2 and so in the absence of any reference to any other property mortgaged with Indian Bank by M/s.Anand Agency, the 1st Appellate Court cannot give any direction for sale of any other property. The main contention of Review Petitioners is that Senthamangalam and Pappankuzhi properties other than the suit properties are not part of the first Appellate Court Proceedings and not a subject matter of MOU and agreement of sale and while so the direction in Paragraph No.75 of the Judgment that "Indian Bank should satisfy the mortgage debt from out of other properties and only if it is not sufficient, Indian Bank can proceed against the suit properties" ignores the fact that the other properties are not the subject matter of the suit. 15. In S.L.P. (Civil) No.31358 of 2009, the Supreme Court ordered to dispose of the Appeals (A.S.No.708 of 2008 (preferred by the Plaintiff) and A.S.No.946 of 2009 (preferred by Defendants 1 and 2) and the connected Writ Petition (W.P.No.23405 of 2009) expeditiously, if possible, not later than six months. Pursuant to the order of Supreme Court, both the Appeals and the Writ Petition were taken up together. We may also note that for hearing the Appeals along with Writ Petition, all the parties to the proceedings agreed including the Review Petitioners. 16. In W.P.No.23405 of 2009, the Writ Petitioner/Plaintiff sought for the following relief: "writ of mandamus forbearing the respondents from bringing the schedule property more fully described in the schedule to the petition and forming the subject matter of the decree in favour of the petitioner in O.S.No.336 of 2006 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Chengalpet to auction on 25.11.2009 at 3.00 P.M or any other subsequent date or dates for realisation of the debt due by the 4th and 5th respondents to the 2nd respondent in respect of D.R.C.No.102 of 2009 and direct the 2nd respondent to accept the payment of Rs.4,80,48,000 being the remaining sale consideration as per the decree made in O.S.No.336 of 2005 dated 30.04.2008 and for the remainder assign the debt due and payable by the 4th and 5th respondents in favour of the 2nd respondent and entrust all the documents of title and also execute a deed of assignment in favour of the petitioner assigning the rights created in favour of the 2nd respondent by the 4th and 5th respondents in respect of the debts covered by the DRC.No.102 of 2009 on the file of the Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Chennai pursuant to the order in O.A.No.491 of 2009 dated 05.05.2009 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Chennai. 17. 17. In the writ petition, the common order dated 15.5.2009 in O.A.No.491 of 1999 and Counter Claim No.1 of 2009 was produced. Counsel for the Bank also brought to our notice about Applications/Memo filed by the Defendants 1 and 2 before the Recovery Officer. The learned counsel for the Indian Bank has produced the order in O.A.No.491 of 1999 bringing it to our notice that apart from the schedule property, other items of properties were also mortgaged to the Indian Bank. The Indian Bank and Defendants 1 and 2 have filed joint proposal to bring 49 items of distinct lands for sale. By its order dated 8.2.2010 and taking note of the valuation given by the 3rd Defendant Bank, DRT observed that the entire lands could be divided into two lots i.e., 19.99 acres having access from Bangalore - Chennai High Way and 10.19 acres having access from Podavur Tar road. DRT has ordered sale for 19.19 acres, which has approach way on the Bangalore - Chennai Highways. In the Writ Petition, the said order of DRT in O.A.No.491 of 1999 was also produced before us. 18. While hearing the Appeals along with the Writ Petition and referring to the memo/counter filed by the 3rd Defendant Bank, we have referred to the other properties mortgaged to 3rd Defendant Bank. In the context of order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (in short, "DRT") in O.A.No.491 of 1999 and also report filed by the Bank, while hearing the Appeals along with the Writ Petition, this Court has taken note of the fact that the other properties were also mortgaged to the 3rd Defendant Indian Bank. As such, we do not find any error apparent on the face of the record nor can it be said that this Court has acted on extraneous materials other than the evidence and materials on record. 19. In paragraph No.16 of the judgment, we have framed the following points for consideration: (i) Whether the trial Court is right in passing the decree for specific performance subject to mortgage in favour of 3rd Defendant Bank? (ii) Whether the contract is a contingent contract and whether it cannot be implemented? (iii) Whether Plaintiff is right in insisting upon grant of mandatory injunction to direct Defendants No.1 and 2 to discharge the liability proportionately? (ii) Whether the contract is a contingent contract and whether it cannot be implemented? (iii) Whether Plaintiff is right in insisting upon grant of mandatory injunction to direct Defendants No.1 and 2 to discharge the liability proportionately? (iv) Whether the right of marshalling is available to a decree holder in a suit for specific performance? (v) Whether the trial Court was justified in deviating from the normal rule "costs shall follow the event"? (vi) To what relief the plaintiff is entitled to? 20. Drawing our attention to the points for determination framed, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that Point No.1 was not at all an issue and that Defendants 1 and 2 have accepted the decree for specific performance being subject to mortgage and even then the Court had taken up the issue "whether the trial Court was right in passing the decree for specific performance". The learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the question of "readiness and willingness" was not an issue arising for consideration in the appeal and while so, from Paragraph Nos.17 to 35, the Court had considered the question of readiness and willingness. It was further argued that in Paragraph Nos.43 to 50, the Court had again considered the question as to "whether Plaintiff is entitled to discretionary relief" and "the tender of money/deposit of balance sale consideration", which were not at all made issues and while so the Court has proceeded to consider the matter on which no issue was raised at all, which has led to erroneous judgment. 21. While hearing the Appeals, during oral arguments, even though it was stated that 1st Defendant is accepting the decree for specific performance subject to mortgage, in the Memorandum of appeal in A.S.No.946 of 2009, the review petitioners/Defendants 1 and 2 have raised the question of Plaintiffs "readiness and willingness" and also that the Respondent/Plaintiff was not ready with the balance consideration. We may usefully refer to the grounds raised in the memorandum of Appeal in A.S.No.946 of 2009, which reads as under: "...16. We may usefully refer to the grounds raised in the memorandum of Appeal in A.S.No.946 of 2009, which reads as under: "...16. The Lower Court failed to appreciate that the two cardinal principles namely "WILLINGNESS AND READINESS" which are mandatory in a relief for Specific performance and which is required to be fulfilled by the 1st Respondent (Plaintiff) is conspicuous by its absence and the 1st Respondent (Plaintiff) has miserably failed to prove that he had fulfilled the conditions for the grant of relief of specific performance. 17. The Lower Court failed to appreciate that the 1st Respondent had failed to fulfil his obligations under the MOU dated 15-08-2005 and the sale agreement dated 03-02-2006 by not remitting the balance sale considerations to the Appellants and thereby led to the breach of contract. The aforesaid conduct of the 1st Respondent was compounded by the illegal conduct of the 1st Respondent in surreptitiously withdrawing the sum of Rs.10,01,000/- deposited in the "no-lien account" of the 2nd Respondent which led to the collapse of the settlement talks between the Appellants and 2nd Respondent. 18. The Lower Court erred in holding that the 1st Respondent possessed the necessary funds to pay the sale consideration for purchase of the subject property by relying on Ex-A-12 and Ex-A-13 which are bank deposit receipts issued by Indian Overseas Bank in the name of the Respondent. ...." 22. By a reading of the above, it is clear that the question of readiness and willingness by the Plaintiff and that he did not pay the sale consideration to the Defendants 1 and 2 and thereby failed to fulfil his obligation under the sale agreement were emphatically raised in the memorandum of Appeal. In the absence of endorsement in the Memorandum of Appeal in A.S.No.946 of 2009 not pressing those points, necessarily, the Court has to meet and answer the points raised in the grounds of Appeal in A.S.No.946 of 2009. It is not as if we have dealt with the issues as to "readiness and willingness" and "failure of Plaintiff to fulfil obligation", which was not raised at all. 23. Contending that the Judgment suffers from error apparent on the face of record, the learned Senior Counsel mainly submitted that the 1st Appellate Court, being Civil Court, has exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the proceedings of DRT. 23. Contending that the Judgment suffers from error apparent on the face of record, the learned Senior Counsel mainly submitted that the 1st Appellate Court, being Civil Court, has exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the proceedings of DRT. The learned Senior Counsel inter alia raised the following contentions: 1. The market value of the suit property is more than sufficient to satisfy the decree passed by the DRT in O.A.No.491 of 1999 and there is no necessity to bring any other property to sale. In view of Section 34 of SARFAESI Act and Section 18 of RDB Act, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of which the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any Court in respect of any action taken in pursuance of power conferred under SARFAESI Act and RDB Act. The provisions of RDB Act read with Schedule II of Income-tax Act empowers the Recovery Officer to bring the suit property to sale and Civil Court cannot interfere with the power of the Recovery Officer. By Order dated 15.5.2009, DRT-I passed a decree in favour of Indian Bank in O.A.No.491 of 1999. In ALLAHABAD BANK VS. CANARA BANK (2000) 4 SCC 406 at Paragraph 23 it has been clearly stated that only the Recovery Officer has to execute the decree of DRT. 24. Learned Senior Counsel contended that when the competent forum DRT has passed the decree in favour of Indian bank to satisfy the decree by bringing the properties for sale, the direction in paragraph No.75 of the Judgment that "...... Indian Bank should satisfy the mortgage debt from out of other properties and only if it is insufficient, Indian Bank can proceed against the suit property...." ignores the fact that the decree for specific performance is subject to mortgage in favour of Indian Bank and the same has become final. 25. Indian Bank should satisfy the mortgage debt from out of other properties and only if it is insufficient, Indian Bank can proceed against the suit property...." ignores the fact that the decree for specific performance is subject to mortgage in favour of Indian Bank and the same has become final. 25. Learned Senior Counsel mainly submitted that as against the decree for specific performance, which is subject to mortgage in favour of Indian Bank, the Plaintiff has not preferred any Appeal and while so, there is error apparent on the face of the record when the Court has issued direction that the Indian Bank should satisfy the mortgage debt from out of other properties and only if it is insufficient Indian Bank can proceed against the suit property. 26. In O.S.No.336 of 2006, the trial Court has passed decree for specific performance subject to mortgage in favour of Indian Bank. Of course, the Plaintiff has not challenged the rider that the suit for specific performance is subject to mortgage. In the suit, however the Plaintiff has sought for the prayer for mandatory injunction and the said prayer reads as under: "(ii) for a mandatory injunction directing the first and second Defendants to discharge the loan payable to the third Defendant Bank in respect of proceedings pending on the file of Honble Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chennai, as per the terms of the contract dated 3.2.2006 thereby retrieve the documents and deliver the same to the Plaintiff at the time of execution and registration of Sale Deed or Sale Deeds in favour of the Plaintiff or his nominee or nominees either in one lot or in pieces as the case may be;.." Since the trial Court negatived the above said prayer for mandatory injunction, being aggrieved by the declining of the relief of mandatory injunction, Plaintiff has filed appeal in A.S.No.708 of 2008. In A.S.No.946 of 2009, Defendants 1 and 2 have challenged the decree for specific performance against the Appellants. 27. We have heard both the Appeals along with Writ Petition. During the course of arguments, it was brought to our notice that apart from schedule properties, other properties were also mortgaged in favour of the Indian Bank. Based on the order of DRT in O.A.No.491 of 1999 and the subsequent proceedings before the Recovery Officer, we have recorded our findings in Paragraph Nos.56 to 60. During the course of arguments, it was brought to our notice that apart from schedule properties, other properties were also mortgaged in favour of the Indian Bank. Based on the order of DRT in O.A.No.491 of 1999 and the subsequent proceedings before the Recovery Officer, we have recorded our findings in Paragraph Nos.56 to 60. The order passed by the DRT in I.A.No.1 of 2010 in DRC.No.102 of 2009 in O.A.No.491 of 1999 filed by the 2nd Defendant as the sole proprietor of M/s.Anand Agency dated 8.2.2010 was produced before us. The proposal to bring the entire Schedule D property for sale was a mutual proposal of the 2nd Defendant and the Indian Bank. Rejecting the mutual proposal made by the 2nd Defendant and Indian Bank for bringing the entire Schedule D property for sale, the Recovery Officer directed that the entire Schedule D property be demarcated into two, with one portion of lands of an extent of 19.99 aces and other portion of 10.19 acres and directed sale of only 19.99 acres, vide Order of Recovery Officer dated 8.2.2010. 28. In paragraph No.58 of our judgment, we have recorded our findings that the said 19.99 acres notified for sale includes Survey Nos.23/7A2, 23/7C1, 23/7C2 and 23/7D, which are Items 35 to 38 of the suit property. Recording our findings regarding hardship that would be caused to the Plaintiff if the said extent of 19.99 acres are sold, we have issued directions to DRT. There is no force in the contention that being the first Appellate Court, this Court was not right in issuing directions to the DRT. In the facts and circumstances of the case, balancing the rights of parties, we have issued directions to DRT. In our considered view, an error apparent on the face of the record must be such a patent error, which in one glance, can be detected without advancing long drawn argument on either side. Where there are two possible views regarding interpretation or application of law vis-a-vis the particular facts of a case, taking one view, even if it is erroneous, cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Merely because we have taken a view in the facts and circumstances of the case and issued directions to DRT, it cannot be contended that it is an error apparent on the face of the record. 29. Merely because we have taken a view in the facts and circumstances of the case and issued directions to DRT, it cannot be contended that it is an error apparent on the face of the record. 29. As mentioned earlier, the Appeals and the Writ Petition were taken up together and a common judgment was passed. Since the parties are same and issues are inter-linked, a detailed order was passed in A.S.No.708 of 2008 and findings made therein are made common and applicable to A.S.No.946 of 2009 and W.P.No.23405 of 2009. Therefore, all the contentions raised in all the three cases have been dealt with in the 1st case namely in A.S.No.708 of 2008, which cannot be faulted with. The petitioners also cannot be said to be aggrieved by the said process adopted by this Court by way of convenience, more so, when there is no apparent prejudice caused. It is for granting relief all the cases have been shown separately. 30. Learned Senior Counsel mainly contended that the right of marshalling was not pleaded before the trial Court and it is a mixed question of law and facts. It was further contended that right of marshalling is higher than the right of the Plaintiff to direct the Defendants to liquidate the dues to the Indian Bank as per the terms of the contract and RDB Act is a special law vis-a-vis the Transfer of Property Act and hence the provisions of RDB Act will prevail over the Transfer of Property Act. RDB Act gives entire discretion to the Recovery Officer. It was further argued that when the RDB Act gives entire discretion to the Recovery Officer to bring the properties for sale, the direction in Paragraph No.75 that "..... Indian Bank should satisfy the mortgage debt from out of other properties and only if it is insufficient the Indian Bank can proceed against the suit property...." ignores that the decree for specific performance is subject to mortgage in favour of Indian Bank and that it has become final. 31. As pointed out earlier, the Plaintiff has sought for mandatory injunction directing Defendants 1 and 2 to discharge the loan payable to the 3rd Defendant Bank in respect of D.R.T. Proceedings pending on the file of Debt Recovery Tribunal, thereby retrieve the documents and deliver the same to the Plaintiff. 31. As pointed out earlier, the Plaintiff has sought for mandatory injunction directing Defendants 1 and 2 to discharge the loan payable to the 3rd Defendant Bank in respect of D.R.T. Proceedings pending on the file of Debt Recovery Tribunal, thereby retrieve the documents and deliver the same to the Plaintiff. When Plaintiff has asked for a larger relief of mandatory injunction to direct the defendants to discharge the entire debt and release the documents we have granted the lesser relief to the Plaintiff the right of marshalling that the Bank should satisfy the mortgage debt from out of other properties and only if it is not sufficient the Indian Bank can proceed against the suit property in issuing direction for marshalling. If there was any improper appreciation of evidence and facts by the Bench, that point could be raised only in the Appeal. In a review application, this Court cannot sit as an appellate Court and re-appreciate the entire evidence to go into the merits of the contentions now raised by the learned Senior Counsel as the same would amount to re-appreciating the entire evidence on record for finding out the error, which, in our considered view, would amount to exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which is not permissible. 32. Assailing our findings in paragraph No.76 of the Judgment, where we have dealt with the point "Costs shall follow the event" and set aside the order of the trial Court directing both parties to bear the respective costs and further directing defendants 1 and 2 to pay the suit costs to the Plaintiff, learned Senior Counsel submitted that paragraph Nos.76 to 79 of the Judgment proceed on erroneous assumption that the Plaintiff succeeded in the suit and the Court failed to note that the Decree for specific performance is subject to the mortgage in favour of the Bank and that portion of the decree has become final. It was further argued that when the Plaintiff got a decree for specific performance only subject to the mortgage and the said prayer for mandatory injection "(ii)" was also refused by the trial Court, the Bench was not right in saying that the Plaintiff was successful in the suit and directing Defendants 1 and 2 to pay the suit costs. It was further argued that when the Plaintiff got a decree for specific performance only subject to the mortgage and the said prayer for mandatory injection "(ii)" was also refused by the trial Court, the Bench was not right in saying that the Plaintiff was successful in the suit and directing Defendants 1 and 2 to pay the suit costs. Here again, the points urged by the learned Senior Counsel is only the argument advanced on the view taken by us, which cannot be examined in the review application filed under Order 47 Rule 1 of C.P.C. 33. Insofar as the value of the property, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the suit properties are now valued at more than Rs.30 Crores, whereas the Plaintiff has been litigating by paying only Rs.75 lakhs, which is only 1/6th of total sale consideration of Rs.5,55,48,000/-. It was further argued that when the Plaintiff has paid only Rs.75 lakhs for the property worth more than Rs.30 Crores, the Court did not keep in view the hardship that is caused to the Defendants 1 and 2 in directing " ...... the Indian Bank to satisfy its debt from other properties and only if it is insufficient to proceed against the suit property....." The learned Senior Counsel submitted that while the Court has considered the hardship caused to the Plaintiff, the Court did not keep in view the hardship caused to the Defendants 1 and 2. 34. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that there are many inconsistencies in the judgment and the Court has not at all kept in view the breach caused to the Defendants 1 and 2. In our considered view, the arguments advanced on the points regarding "consideration" and "inconsistencies" cannot be advanced in the review applications nor would they render the judgment error apparent on the face of the record. We also note that it is not the case of the Petitioners either in their pleadings or in their arguments that the consideration in the agreement is inadequate or there is escalation of price. Even then this Court on its own granted an equitable decree by increasing the amount payable by the Plaintiff. 35. The Supreme Court in the case of KERALA SEB Vs.HITECH ELECTROTHERMICS & HYDROPOWER LIMITED, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 651 , held at paragraph No.10 as follows: ".... Even then this Court on its own granted an equitable decree by increasing the amount payable by the Plaintiff. 35. The Supreme Court in the case of KERALA SEB Vs.HITECH ELECTROTHERMICS & HYDROPOWER LIMITED, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 651 , held at paragraph No.10 as follows: ".... In a review petition it is not open to this Court to re-appreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible...... If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. The same is the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of DELHI ADMINISTRATION Vs. GURDIP SINGH URBAN, reported in 2001(1)MLJ 45 (S.C.). 36.The Apex Court in Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik - (2006) 4 SCC 78 , after elaborate discussion of Sections 114, 11, Or.47 Rule 1 and Or.2 Ru.2 CPC has held that seeking a review on the ground that the review petitioner had not highlighted all aspects of the case or could have argued more forcefully or cited binding precedents to get a favourable judgment cannot be reason to invoke the above said provisions and where the remedy of appeal is available, the power of review should be exercised by the court with the greatest circumspection. 37. The uniform principle that runs through catena of decisions is that "a mistake apparent on record" must be obvious and apparent mistake and not something, which can be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points on which there may be conceivably two opinions. The various points raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioners, in our considered view, are upon the merits of the matter and the Review Court, sitting as Appellate Court and exercising Appellate jurisdiction, cannot go into the merits of our own findings. 38. In the Review Application filed in A.S.No.708 of 2008, in paragraph "X", the review petitioners have raised the point that the finding of the Court that the sale agreement is not a contingent contract suffers from error apparent on the face of the record. 38. In the Review Application filed in A.S.No.708 of 2008, in paragraph "X", the review petitioners have raised the point that the finding of the Court that the sale agreement is not a contingent contract suffers from error apparent on the face of the record. During the course of argument, learned Senior Counsel Ms.Nalini Chidambaram submitted that the review petitioners are not challenging our finding that the sale agreement is not a contingent contract. Challenging the decree for specific performance and the consequential injunction not to alienate the suit property, Defendants 1 and 2 filed A.S.No.946 of 2009. Incidentally, it may be noted that as against our findings in A.S.No.946 of 2009 i.e., the Appeal preferred by Defendants 1 and 2, Defendants 1 and 2 have not filed any review application, even though A.S.No.946 of 2009 was also disposed of by the common judgment. 39. Upon careful consideration of the points urged by the review petitioners/Defendants 1 and 2, in our considered view, the Judgment does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record warranting review of our judgment dated 23.2.2010 and the review Applications are liable to be dismissed and accordingly the same are dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs.