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2010 DIGILAW 2022 (MAD)

S. Sarath Kakkamanu v. Anandraj

2010-04-29

M.JAICHANDREN

body2010
Judgment :- 1. This civil revision petition has been filed against the order, dated 30.4.2009, in I.A.No.525 of 2009, in O.S.No.297 of 2009, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Alandur. 2. The petitioner in the present civil revision petition is the defendant in the suit, in O.S.No.297 of 2009. The respondent had filed the suit praying for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the petitioner and others from, in any manner, interfering with the plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit properties, described in schedules `A and `B of the plaint and for costs. 3. It has been stated that, originally, the petitioner had purchased the property bearing Door Nos.1/37, 1/53 and 1/53A, Officers line, Pallavaram Cantonment, Pallvaram, Chennai, situated in R.S.Nos.179 and 180, by way of two separate sale deeds, dated 12.3.1996 and 8.4.1996, from the Madras Christian Children Home, which is a society, represented by V.A.George. From the date of its purchase, the petitioner has been in possession and enjoyment of the said property. 4. It has been further stated that in the month of October, 2001, when the respondent had attempted to trespass into the petitioners property he had filed a civil suit. Later, the said suit had been transferred to the file of the District Munsif Court, Tambaram, and numbered as O.S.No.201 of 2003. The petitioner had sought for a decree of permanent injunction against the respondent, restraining him from entering the suit property. 5. In the meantime, the respondent had filed two suits against the petitioner challenging the sale deeds, dated 12.3.1996 and 8.4.1996, through which the petitioner had purchased the property in question. The said suit had been transferred to the file of the District Munsif Court, Tambaram, and it was numbered as O.S.Nos.202 and 203 of 2003. 6. All the three suits were taken up for joint trial and evidence was recorded. The suits had been dismissed by the learned District Munsif, Tambaram, on 27.11.2008. While so, the respondent had filed another suit, in O.S.No.297 of 2009, before the District Munsif Court, Alandur, by suppressing the fact that the earlier suits filed by him, in O.S.Nos.202 and 203 of 2003, had already been dismissed. 7. The suits had been dismissed by the learned District Munsif, Tambaram, on 27.11.2008. While so, the respondent had filed another suit, in O.S.No.297 of 2009, before the District Munsif Court, Alandur, by suppressing the fact that the earlier suits filed by him, in O.S.Nos.202 and 203 of 2003, had already been dismissed. 7. After obtaining an ex parte order of ad interim injunction, on 30.4.2009, in I.A.No.525 of 2009, in O.S.No.297 of 2009, clandestinely, the respondent and his men had entered the suit property and took possession of the same. They had damaged the materials belonging to the petitioner’s lessee, worth several lakhs of rupees. In such circumstances, the petitioner has filed the present civil revision petition, to set aside the ex parte order of the learned District Munsif, Alandur, dated 30.4.2009, made in I.A.No.525 of 2009 in O.S.No.297 of 2009. 8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted that the order of ad interim injunction granted by the learned District Munsif, Alandur, dated 30.4.2009, in I.A.No.525 of 2009, is arbitrary and illegal. The ex parte order obtained by the respondent through fraud, suppression of material facts and by abuse of the process of the Court, cannot be sustained in the eye of law. The respondent had obtained the ex parte order, without disclosing the fact that the previous suits filed by him, in O.S.Nos.202 and 203 of 2003, before the District Munsif Court, Tambaram. 9. The interim order obtained by the respondent, by fraudulent means, cannot be allowed to continue, as it is causing irreparable loss and harm to the petitioner and his lessee. It has also been stated that, after obtaining the ex parte interim order, the respondent and his men had trespassed on the property, which was under the occupation and possession of the petitioner, and they had damaged goods and materials, worth more than Rs.1.25 crores, which were under hypothecation with the Union Bank of India, Nungambakam Branch. The respondent and his men were also causing serious and irreparable damage to the property in question. In such circumstances, the ex parte interim order granted by the learned District Munsif Alandur, on 30.4.2009, in I.A.No.525 of 2009, is to be set aside, in the interest of justice. 10. The respondent and his men were also causing serious and irreparable damage to the property in question. In such circumstances, the ex parte interim order granted by the learned District Munsif Alandur, on 30.4.2009, in I.A.No.525 of 2009, is to be set aside, in the interest of justice. 10. It has been further stated that the respondent, by misusing the judicial machinery and by abusing the process of the Court, had entered into the possession of the property in question, after having obtained an ex parte order of injunction, fraudulently. Further, it has also been stated that, admittedly, the property in question belongs to the Pallavaram Cantonment Board. 11. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted that this Court may be pleased to direct the parties to the present civil revision petition to maintain status quo ante, in order to restore the possession, as it existed prior to the passing of the impugned order, dated 30.4.2009, by the learned District Munsif, Alandur, in I.A.No.525 of 2009. Thereafter, the learned District Munsif, Alandur, may be directed to dispose of the suit, in O.S.No.297 of 2009, expeditiously. 12. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions: 12.1. In Surya Dev Rai V. Ram Chander Rai ( 2003(6) SCC 675 ), the Supreme Court had held as follows: “24.The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram and others v. Smt. Radhikabai and another, (1986) Supp SCC 401. Proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 25. Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labelling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject, we venture to state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the inferior court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, may be by way of guiding the inferior court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well. 26. In order to safeguard against a mere appellate or revisional jurisdiction being exercised in the garb of exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, the courts have devised self-imposed rules of discipline on their power. Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision is available to the person aggrieved. The High Court may have regard to legislative policy formulated or experience and expressed by enactments where the legislature in exercise of its wisdom has deliberately chosen certain orders and proceedings to be kept away from exercise of appellate and revisional jurisdiction in the hope of accelerating the conclusion of the proceedings and avoiding delay and procrastination which is occasioned by subjecting every order at every stage of proceedings to judicial review by way of appeal or revision. So long as an error is capable of being corrected by a superior court in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction though available to be exercised only at the conclusion of the proceedings, it would be sound exercise of discretion on the part of the High Court to refuse to exercise power of superintendence during the pendency of the proceedings. However, there may be cases where but for invoking the supervisory jurisdiction, the jurisdictional error committed by the inferior court or tribunal would be incapable of being remedied once the proceedings have concluded. 27. In Chandrasekhar Singh and others v. Siva Ram Singh and others (1979) 3 SCC 118 , the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution came up for the consideration of this Court in the context of Sections 435 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code which prohibits a second revision to the High Court against decision in first revision rendered by the Sessions Judge. On a review of earlier decisions, the three-Judges Bench summed up the position of law as under :- (i) that the powers conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot, in any way, be curtailed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure; (ii) the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is restricted. The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors; (iii) that the power of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution; (iv) that the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior Court can do in exercise of its statutory power as the Court of Appeal; the High Court cannot, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, convert itself into a Court of Appeal.” 12.2. In Subramanya Swamy Temple V. Kanna Gounder (2009(3) 3 SCC 306), the Supreme Court had held as follows: “In India, nobody can take possession of an immovable property except in accordance with law. The respondent was a licensee under the appellant. He was evicted from the shop which was allotted in his favour. If he had encroached upon a portion of the poramboke land, he could have been evicted by the Temple on the basis of its possessory title. If, thus, the Temple was in prior possession of the land which would be evidenct from the classification made by the State Government and recognition of its right thereover, it also had right to initiate proceedings in a civil Court for eviction of a rank trespasser. In a case of this nature, the Court is required to consider as to who was in prior possession. Only in the event the respondent was in a position to show that he had a better title, could he continue with the possession. The only defence taken by the respondent was that the land was occupied by him. Such a contention has been negatived by the trial Court as also by the first appellate Court. A finding of fact had been arrived at. The only defence taken by the respondent was that the land was occupied by him. Such a contention has been negatived by the trial Court as also by the first appellate Court. A finding of fact had been arrived at. Having regard to the concurrent finding of fact as regards the possession of the parties vis-à-vis their respective title in and over the suit land, the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was required to formulate a substantial question of law which might have arisen for its consideration. No question of law was framed far less any substantial question of law relating to identification of the property. The High Court, therefore, completely misdirected itself in passing the impugned judgment.” 13. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent had submitted that the averments and allegations made on behalf of the petitioner, in the present civil revision petition, are incorrect and false. The respondent had filed the suit, in O.S.No.297 of 2009, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Alandur, praying for the relief of permanent injunction, to restrain the petitioner herein from interfering with the respondents peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. 14. The learned District Munsif, Alandur, by his order, dated 30.4.2009, made in I.A.No.525 of 2009, had granted an ex parte order of injunction, in favour of the respondent, after considering the pleadings and the documents filed along with the plaint. There is no error apparent on the face of the record, as alleged by the petitioner. The present civil revision petition, filed by the petitioner, is not maintainable, either in law or on the facts of the case and therefore, it is liable to be dismissed. Further, since efficacious alternative remedies are available to the petitioner, the civil revision petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. 15. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent had also submitted that it is open to the petitioner to take steps to vacate the ex parte order of injunction granted in favour of the respondent, by moving the District Munsif Court, Alandur. It is also open to the petitioner to file an appeal against the interim order, granted by the learned District Munsif, Alandur, dated 30.4.2009, under Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. It is also open to the petitioner to file an appeal against the interim order, granted by the learned District Munsif, Alandur, dated 30.4.2009, under Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. While so, the petitioner has preferred to come before this Court by filing a civil revision petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 16. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent had also submitted that the suit filed by the petitioner, in O.S.No.201 of 2003, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Tambaram, had been dismissed. The suit which had been filed by the petitioner had been originally numbered as O.S.No.524 of 2001, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Alandur. Thereafter, it had been transferred and renumbered as O.S.No.201 of 2003, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Tambaram. The interim order of injunction, dated 18.12.2001, granted by the learned District Munsif-cum-Judical Magistrate, Alandur, in favour of the petitioner, in I.A.No.2280 of 2001, in O.S.No.524 of 2001, had been set aside by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Chengalpet, by his order, dated 2.5.2002, in C.M.A.No.53 of 2001, as it was found that the petitioner was not in possession of the property in question. Thereafter, the petitioner had filed a civil revision petition before this Court, in C.R.P.(PD) No.943 of 2002. By an order, dated 27.1.2003, this Court had dismissed the civil revision petition filed by the petitioner challenging the order, dated 2.5.2002, made in C.M.A.No.53 of 2001. The petitioner had preferred a special leave petition before the Supreme Court and the same had been dismissed. In such circumstances, the present civil revision petition, filed by the petitioner, is devoid of merits and therefore, it is liable to be dismissed. It has also been stated that the interim order of injunction granted by the learned District Munsif, Alandur, by his order, dated 30.4.2009, in I.A.No.525 of 2009, had not been extended, in view of the order of status quo granted by this Court, on 20.5.2009, in M.P.Nos.1 and 3 of 2009, in C.R.P. (PD).No.1408 of 2009. 17. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions. 17.1. In A.Venkatasubbiah Naidu V. S.Challappan (2000(IV) CTC 358), the Supreme Court had held as follows: “19. 17. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions. 17.1. In A.Venkatasubbiah Naidu V. S.Challappan (2000(IV) CTC 358), the Supreme Court had held as follows: “19. It is the acknowledged position of law that no party can be forced to suffer for the inaction of the Court or its omissions to act according to the procedure established by law. Under the normal circumstances the aggrieved party can prefer an appeal only against an order passed under Rules 1, 2, 2A, 4 or 10 of Order 39 of the Code in terms of Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code. He cannot approach the appellate or revisional Court during the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of temporary injunction. In such circumstances the party who does not get justice due to the inaction of the Court in following the mandate of law must have a remedy. So we are of the view that in a case where the mandate of Order 39, Rule 3-A of the Code is flouted, the aggrieved party, shall be entitled to the right of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of a temporary injunction, against the order remaining in force. In such appeal, if preferred, the appellate Court shall be obliged to entertain the appeal and further to take note of the omission of the subordinate Court in complying with the provisions of Rule 3-A. In appropriate cases the appellate Court, apart from granting or vacating or modifying the order of such injunction, may suggest suitable action against the erring judicial officer, including recommendation to take steps for making adverse entry in his ACRs. Failure to decide the application or vacate the ex parte temporary injunction shall, for the purposes of the appeal, be deemed to be the final order passed on the application for temporary injunction, on the date of expiry of thirty days mentioned in the Rule.” 17.2. In Surya Dev Rai V. Ram Chander Rai ( 2003(6) SCC 675 ), the Supreme Court had held as follows: “In the initial years the Supreme Court was not inclined to depart from the traditional role of certiorari jurisdiction and consistent with the historical background felt itself bound by such procedural technicalities as were well known to the English Judges. In Surya Dev Rai V. Ram Chander Rai ( 2003(6) SCC 675 ), the Supreme Court had held as follows: “In the initial years the Supreme Court was not inclined to depart from the traditional role of certiorari jurisdiction and consistent with the historical background felt itself bound by such procedural technicalities as were well known to the English Judges. In later years the Supreme Court has relaxed the procedural and technical rigours, yet the broad and fundamental principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction have not been given a goby. It is well settled that the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 is administrative as well as judicial, and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is paving the path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. The power under Article 227 is wider than the one conferred on the High Court by Article 226 in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labelling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncements. The differences in jurisdiction between Article 226 and 227 are: Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the inferior court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the inferior court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, may be by way of guiding the inferior court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well. In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate Court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.” Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e., when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. On the other hand, Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (iii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision is available to the person aggrieved. Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision is available to the person aggrieved. The High Court may have regard to legislative policy formulated or experience and expressed by enactments where the legislature in exercise of its wisdom has deliberately chosen certain orders and proceedings to be kept away from exercise of appellate and revisional jurisdiction in the hope of accelerating the conclusion of the proceedings and avoiding delay and procrastination which is occasioned by subjecting every order at every stage of proceedings to judicial review by way of appeal or revision. The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. In the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction the High Court proceeds on an assumption that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has the jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly. In the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction the High Court proceeds on an assumption that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has the jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly. The High Court would not, therefore, for the purpose of certiorari assign to itself the role of an appellate Court and step into reappreciating or evaluating the evidence and substitute its own findings in place of those arrived at by the inferior Court. Despite laying down the broad principles and working rules, the fact remains that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Article-226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a straitjacket formula or rigid rules. Not less than often the High Court would be faced with dilemma. If it intervenes in pending proceedings there is bound to be delay in termination of proceedings. If it does not intervene, the error of the moment may earn immunity from correction. The facts and circumstances of a given case may make it more appropriate for the High Court to exercise self-restraint and not to intervene because the error of jurisdiction though committed is yet capable of being taken care of and corrected at a later stage and the wrong done, if any, would be set right and rights and equities adjusted in appeal or revision preferred at the conclusion of the proceedings. But there may be cases where a stitch in time would save nine. The power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the Judge.” 18. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties concerned and on a perusal of the records available and in view of the decisions cited above, this Court is of the considered view that the civil revision petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable. It is seen that the order of the learned District Munsif, Alandur, dated 30.4.2009, made in I.A.No.525 of 2009, in O.S.No.297 of 2009, is only an ex parte interim order and therefore, it is open to the petitioner to vacate the said order by initiating appropriate proceedings before the District Munsif Court, Alandur. 19. It is seen that the order of the learned District Munsif, Alandur, dated 30.4.2009, made in I.A.No.525 of 2009, in O.S.No.297 of 2009, is only an ex parte interim order and therefore, it is open to the petitioner to vacate the said order by initiating appropriate proceedings before the District Munsif Court, Alandur. 19. Even otherwise, it may be open to the petitioner to invoke the appellate remedy provided, under Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, as per the decision of the Supreme Court reported in VENKATASUBBIAH NAIDU Vs. CHELLAPPA (2001) 1 M.L.J.75(SC.). Even though the petitioner had prayed that this Court may be pleased to exercise its jurisdiction, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, alleging that the respondent had obtained the interim order, dated 30.4.2009, fraudulently, by suppressing certain material facts, the petitioner could raise all the grounds available to him, either before the trial Court or before the Appellate Court, as per the relevant provisions of law. 20. There is no doubt that this Court has wide powers, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Such powers are exercised only in appropriate cases, if the facts and circumstances of the case warrants such interference. In normal circumstances, it is for the petitioner to invoke the alternative remedies available to him for the redressal of his grievances. In the present case, the petitioner has not been in a position to show that it is imperative for this Court to interfere with the impugned order of the learned District Munsif, Alandur, dated 30.4.2009, made in I.A.No.525 of 2009, at this stage. As such, the civil revision petition is devoid of merits and therefore, it is liable to be dismissed. Hence, it is dismissed No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. 16.1. In VENKATASUBBIAH NAIDU Vs. CHELLAPPA (2001) 1 M.L.J.75(SC.), the Supreme Court had held that any order passed in exercise of the powers under Order 39, Rule 1, of the Civil Procedure Code, would be appealable as indicated in Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code. The choice is for the party affected by the order either to move the appellate Court or to approach the same court which passed the ex parte order for any relief.