ORDER Heard learned counsel for the appellants and perused the office notes regarding the maintainability of this Second Appeal. 2. Office has pointed out that since the appeal after hearing the parties and considering the entire submissions made on their behalf has been dismissed holding that the suit itself was found hopelessly barred under the provisions of Limitation Act, the remedy against the impugned judgment by filing Second Appeal would not be available in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Ratansingh Vs. Vijaysingh and others {A.I.R. 2001 Supreme Court 279}. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the suit was filed by the plaintiffs-appellants for declaration of title and confirmation of the possession over the scheduled property. One of the issues framed by the trial court was as to whether the suit was time barred. The trial court while recording findings on the other issues has dismissed the suit and one of the grounds was that the same is barred by law of limitation. The decree of the trial court was challenged by filing Title Appeal No.49 of 2004. The appellate court also after hearing the parties has come to the conclusion that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was time barred and, thus, has dismissed the appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that while deciding the suit the rights of the parties after framing the issues have been decided and such judgment would amount to a decree. It is submitted that if the title appeal was maintainable against the decree, why not Second Appeal would be maintainable against the confirmation of such decree by the appellate court. I find force in the submissions raised on behalf of the appellants. 5. The Apex Court in Ratansingh (supra) has held that if a petition for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal is dismissed and as a consequence of which the appeal is dismissed as having been time barred that would not amount to a decree. However, in the present case, the question as to whether the suit is liable to be dismissed on the point of it is being time barred was an issue before the trial court as well as the appellate court, that has been decided after considering the materials on record and hearing the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties. However, in the present case, the question as to whether the suit is liable to be dismissed on the point of it is being time barred was an issue before the trial court as well as the appellate court, that has been decided after considering the materials on record and hearing the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties. Thus, in terms of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court also, it would amount to be an adjudication in the suit and appeal determining the rights of the parties with regard to such an issue which was in controversy therein. Neither any application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal has been dismissed nor the appeal has been dismissed as time barred rather, the courts below after framing such issues and appreciating the materials on records have held that the suit itself was time barred. 6. However, subsequently, a three Judges' Division Bench of the Supreme Court in Shyam Sunder Sarma Vs. Pannalal Jaiswal and others {A.I.R. 2005 Supreme Court 226} has observed that the earlier decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Messrs. Mela Ram and Sons Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab { 1956 SCR 166 } could not be brought to the notice of the Apex Court, while taking a decision in Ratansingh (supra) holding that dismissal of appeal on ground of limitation after refusing to condone the delay would not amount to a decree. Thus, upon placing reliance upon decision in Mela Ram (supra), their Lordships have held that even if a petition for condoning the delay in filing that appeal is dismissed on the refusal to condone the delay consequently dismissing the appeal, that would nevertheless be a decision in the appeal. 7. That being the situation, the objection raised by the office does not seem to be correct and the same is overruled and I hold that the remedy by filing .this second appeal would be available against the impugned judgment and decree.