Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. The Union Territory, Chandigarh, has challenged order dated 16.10.2001, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh (for brevity, the Tribunal) in O.A. No. 810/CH/96, quashing orders dated 15.6.1994, 28.11.1994 and 21.6.1996 (A-1, A-2 and A-3 respectively). It is appropriate to CWP No. 13996-CAT of 2002 mention that vide order dated 15.6.1994, the Senior Superintendent of Police, U.T. Chandigarh, has inflicted upon Constable Raghbir Singh respondent No. 2 major punishment of forfeiture of one year service with permanent effect by keeping in view the nature of the misconduct. The other order dated 28.11.1994 has been passed by the Inspector General of Police, U.T. Chandigarh, by invoking Rule 16.28 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (as applicable to the U.T. Chandigarh) [for brevity, the Rules], enhancing the punishment to forfeiture of three years service for a period of three years entailing reduction of his pay from Rs. 1,200/- to Rs. 1,125/- with cumulative effect. The last order dated 13.6.1996, set aside by the Tribunal, has been passed by the Home Secretary, U.T. Chandigarh, rejecting the appeal filed by Constable Raghbir Singh-respondent No. 2. 2. Brief facts of the case which has led to the filing of the instant petition by the U.T. Chandigarh are that Constable Raghbir Singh-respondent No. 2 was one of the Security Guard posted at the residence of Honble Mr. Justice G.C. Garg at House No. 502, Sector 16, Chandigarh. On 27.1.1993 at about 9.00 p.m., Deputy Superintendent of Police (Security), namely, Shri B.D. Bector along with Inspector Shri Sandal Singh visited the site for checking and found that Constable Raghbir Singh-respondent No. 2 was taking liquor along with Constable Mohan Singh (No. 2871/CP) and one private person Santokh Singh, resident of village Attawa, Chandigarh, in the Security Guards tent. The arms and ammunition for the security guards were also found to be in unsafe condition. 2 CWP No. 13996-CAT of 2002 Head Constable Babu Ram (No. 152/CP) was found absent. It is appropriate to mention that some marriage party was going on in the house opposite to the house of Honble Judge and many dignitaries along with the Chief Minister, Punjab, were present in the said party. On seeing the checking party, Constable Raghbir Singh-respondent No. 2 ran away from the spot. As such a DDR was made by the DSP (Security). On seeing the checking party, Constable Raghbir Singh-respondent No. 2 ran away from the spot. As such a DDR was made by the DSP (Security). Constable Mohan Singh and his associate Santokh Singh were taken to General Hospital for their medical examination. It was reported that they had consumed liquor. Constable Raghbir Singh respondent No. 2 came back to the Security Guards tent late in the night and took the plea that he was not present in the tent at the time of checking and that he had gone for meals after taking permission from Head Constable Babu Ram, who was also found absent. A departmental inquiry was initiated against all the aforesaid persons. The misconduct on the part of Constable Raghbir Singh-respondent No. 2 was also proved. Keeping in view the gravity of the charges and the misconduct on the part of Constable Raghbir Singh respondent No. 2, the punishment of forfeiture of one year service with permanent effect was inflicted on him by the Disciplinary/Punishing Authority i.e. Senior Superintendent of Police, U.T. Chandigarh, vide order dated 15.6.1994 (A-1). 3. The Inspector General of Police, U.T. Chandigarh, while exercising power of review found that Constable Raghbir Singh respondent No. 2 deserves to be visited with more heavier punishment. Accordingly, a show cause notice was issued under Rule 16.28(1) of the Rules by taking suo motu notice. The Inspector General of Police noticed that the basic concept of guard duty is that other guard members on standby may go to the rescue of the sentry on duty or take other necessary action should any contingency arise. It also provides for giving rest to individual guards by rotation during which they may leave the guard premises. However, they cannot sit and consume liquor in their place of duty under any circumstances. The Inspector General of Police took serious notice of the brazen manner in which the guards were consuming liquor while deputed on guard duty at the residence of a protected person, who was a sitting Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The sensitivity of the situation was further increased because many VIPs including the Chief Minister, Punjab, was attending the marriage party at a house located opposite to the house where the guard was stationed. The sensitivity of the situation was further increased because many VIPs including the Chief Minister, Punjab, was attending the marriage party at a house located opposite to the house where the guard was stationed. Such an occasion did not lead to any restraint or self control on the part of Constable Raghbir Singh- respondent No. 2 and others. Accordingly, the Inspector General of Police inflicted the punishment of forfeiture of three years service for a period of three years entailing a reduction of his pay from Rs. 1,200/- to Rs. 1,125/- with cumulative effect. In the appeal filed by Constable Raghbir Singh- respondent No. 2, the punishment was upheld by the Home Secretary. All the aforesaid orders were challenged by Constable Raghbir Singh-respondent No. 2 before the Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 810/CH/1996, which was allowed on 16.10.2001. 4. The Tribunal seems to be persuaded by an argument that issuance of show cause notice after disciplinary authority had reached the conclusion for infliction of punishment would not satisfy the requirement of grant of an opportunity to a delinquent employee before acceptance of the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The view of the Tribunal is discernible from paras 5, 6 and 7 of its order, which reads thus :- "5. The learned counsel for the applicant has cited the judgment of Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 141/CH/89 dated 10.2.95 in re. Baldev Singh v. Union of India & others, wherein it has been held following the judgment of Ram Pat v. Union of India & others (1984 (3) SLR 757) that the judgment of Delhi High Court was squarely covered the case and the case was remanded through the disciplinary authority for passing appropriate orders. The judgment of the Chandigarh Bench was appealed before the Honble Supreme Curt in Civil appeal No. 105 of 1997 and it was held by the Apex Court that "sub-clause (2) of rule 16.5 cannot be said to have traveled beyond Section 7 and that the punishment awarded is in terms of the Rules. The Tribunal was not right in setting it as on the record it did. The appeal is accordingly allowed." 6. The learned counsel for the applicant has also relied-upon the decision of Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 127/CH/95 in re. The Tribunal was not right in setting it as on the record it did. The appeal is accordingly allowed." 6. The learned counsel for the applicant has also relied-upon the decision of Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 127/CH/95 in re. Varinder Singh v. Union of India & Others dated 24.7.98 and the judgment given in O.A. No. 220/CH/98 in re. Sub Inspector Naib Singh v. Union of India dated 26.9.2000 and has contended that issuance of a show-cause notice after the disciplinary authority had reached the conclusion regarding punishment to be imposed does not satisfy the requirement of grant of an opportunity to the delinquent employee before acceptance of the findings of the Enquiry Officer as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan (J.T. 1990 (4) SC 456). 7. In view of the above, we quash the impugned orders dated 15.6.94, 28.11.94/1.12.94 and 21.6.96 contained as Annexure nos. A-1, A-2 & A-3 respectively, and remand the case to the disciplinary authority for proceeding with the matter from the stage of supply of copy of the inquiry report, and take a final decision after affording an opportunity to the applicant to represent and to consider the reply, if any, filed by him." 5. Mr. K.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the U.T. Administration, Chandigarh, has argued that the Tribunal has committed a grave error in law by quashing orders dated 15.6.1994, 28.11.1994 and 21.6.1996 (A-1, A-2 & A-3). According to the learned counsel the rationale adopted by the Tribunal to reach the aforesaid conclusion is that the punishing/disciplinary authority had issued show cause notice after it had reached the conclusion of imposition of penalty on the delinquent employee, which is against the principle of grant of opportunity to him before accepting the findings of the Enquiry Officer. According to the learned counsel, the show cause notice, which has now been placed on record, does not in terms decide the quantum of punishment. He has referred to the show cause notice dated 8.3.1994 (P-4) and submitted that Constable Raghbir Singh-respondent No. 2 was called upon to show cause within 15 days as to why the punishment of forfeiture of one year service with permanent effect be not imposed upon him. He has further argued that in the case of Union of India v. Mohd. He has further argued that in the case of Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, 1991(1) S.C.T. 111 : (1991) 1 SCC 588, the stage of reasonable opportunity, as envisaged by relevant provisions in the said case, would fully justify the issuance of show cause notice in the manner it has been done. According to Mr. K.K. Gupta, no lapse on that account could be found. He has also defended the show cause notice dated 8.3.1994 by submitting that recording the agreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer by the disciplinary/ punishing authority would also not attract any procedural lapse and no exception could be taken by Constable Raghbir Singh- respondent No. 2 in that regard. He has further submitted that on merit there is no challenge to the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and, therefore, the learned counsel has urged that in the absence of any serious prejudice to the case of Constable Raghbir Singh-respondent No. 2, no exception could be taken to the orders passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police, U.T. Chandigarh, the Inspector General of Police, U.T., Chandigarh and the Home Secretary, U.T. Chandigarh. 6. Mr. R.K. Sharma, learned counsel for Constable Raghbir Singh-respondent No. 2 has submitted that issuance of show cause notice in the manner it has been done would prima facie establish the pre-determined mind of the disciplinary/punishing authority. According to the learned counsel, before seeking response of the delinquent employee to the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, the punishing/disciplinary authority should not have recorded its agreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. According to the learned counsel, once the mind of the punishing/disciplinary authority is made up then there would be no room for consideration of the submissions made by the delinquent employee as response to the findings of the Enquiry Officer. He has also submitted that once prejudice is patent then there is no obligation to establish by adducing evidence. Therefore, such a prejudice must be presumed. Mr. Sharma has also pointed out that in the so called DDR dated 27.1.1993, no entry with regard to the presence of Constable Raghbir Singh- respondent No. 2 has been made. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, we are of the considered view that the Tribunal has not acted in accordance with law. Mr. Sharma has also pointed out that in the so called DDR dated 27.1.1993, no entry with regard to the presence of Constable Raghbir Singh- respondent No. 2 has been made. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, we are of the considered view that the Tribunal has not acted in accordance with law. It is admitted position that Rule 16.24 of the Rules is applicable. According to Rule 16.24 of the Rules, a detailed procedure for holding departmental inquiries has been provided. According to clause (iii) of Rule 16.24 of the Rules, the officer conducting the inquiry is required to record evidence oral or documentary in proof of the accusation to support the charge in case the delinquent police officer has not admitted the misconduct. The Enquiry Officer has been given wide powers and a detailed procedure has been provided by clauses (iv), (v) and (vi) of Rule 16.24 (1) of the Rules. After the conclusion of inquiry, if the Enquiry Officer is not empowered to pass order of punishment then he is required to forward the case with his findings and recommendation to an officer having necessary power. Further, detail procedure has been provided in clauses (vii), (viii) and (ix) of Rule 16.24(1) of the Rules, which being relevant to the controversy in hand, are reproduced as under :- "16.24. Procedure in departmental enquiries. - (1) The following procedure shall be followed in departmental enquires :- (i) to (vi) xxx xxx xxx (vii) The enquiring officer shall be proceed to pass orders of acquittal or punishment, if empowered to do so, or to forward the case with his finding and recommendations to an officer having the necessary powers. Whenever the officer passing the orders of punishment proposes to take into consideration the adverse entries on the previous record of the accused police officer, he shall provide reasonable opportunity to the defaulter to defend himself; and a copy or at least a gist of those entries shall be conveyed to the defaulter and he shall be asked to give such explanation as he may deem fit. The explanation furnished by the defaulter shall be taken into account by the officer before passing orders in the case. The explanation furnished by the defaulter shall be taken into account by the officer before passing orders in the case. (viii) Nothing in the foregoing rule shall debar a Superintendent of Police from making or causing to be made a preliminary investigation into the conduct of a suspected officer. Such an enquiry is not infrequently necessary to ascertain the nature and degree of misconduct which is to be formally enquired into. The suspected police officer may or may not be present at such preliminary enquiry, as ordered by the Superintendent of Police or other gazetted officer initiating the investigation, but shall not cross-examine witnesses. The file of such a preliminary investigation shall form no part of the formal departmental record, but statements therefrom may be brought to the formal record when the witnesses are no longer available in the circumstances detailed in clause (iii) above. All statements recorded during a preliminary investigation should be signed by the person making them and attested by the officer recording them. (ix) No order of dismissal or reduction in rank shall be passed by an officer empowered to dismiss a police officer or reduce him in rank until that officer has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, provided that this shall not apply - (a) where a police officer is dismissed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) where the officer empowered to dismiss him or reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that officer in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to give to that police officer an opportunity of showing cause. Before an order of dismissal or reduction in rank is passed, the officer to be punished shall be produced before the officer empowered to punish him, and shall be informed of the charges proved against him, and called upon to show- cause why an order of dismissal or reduction in rank should not be passed. Before an order of dismissal or reduction in rank is passed, the officer to be punished shall be produced before the officer empowered to punish him, and shall be informed of the charges proved against him, and called upon to show- cause why an order of dismissal or reduction in rank should not be passed. Any representation that he may make shall be recorded, shall form part of the record of the case, and shall be taken into consideration by the officer empowered to punish him before the final order is passed : Provided that if, owing to the complicated nature of the case or other sufficient reason to be recorded, the officer empowered to impose the punishment considers this procedure inappropriate, he may inform the officer to be punished in writing of the charges proved against him, and call upon him to show cause in writing why an order of dismissal or reduction in rank should not be passed. Any written representation received shall be placed on the record of the case and taken into consideration before the final order is passed." 8. A perusal of the aforesaid Rule shows that after the Enquiry Officer has submitted his report to the punishing authority then the delinquent officer is required to be given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The constitutional mandate has also been followed in the Rules that the order of dismissal or reduction in rank shall not be passed until the delinquent officer has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. According to proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, if after a regular departmental inquiry the punishing authority proposed to impose upon a delinquent employee any such penalty on the basis of evidence adduced during such inquiry then the same can be imposed and it is not necessary to give such an employee an opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed. 9. In the present case, it has not been disputed that the detail procedure has been followed and a regular departmental inquiry was entrusted to Inspector Moti Ram, vide order dated 17.11.1993. There Constable Raghbir Singh- respondent No. 2 has been given full opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. 9. In the present case, it has not been disputed that the detail procedure has been followed and a regular departmental inquiry was entrusted to Inspector Moti Ram, vide order dated 17.11.1993. There Constable Raghbir Singh- respondent No. 2 has been given full opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The Enquiry Officer submitted his findings on 31.12.1993 in which Constable Raghbir Singh-respondent No. 2 alongwith another was found guilty of the charge. Accordingly, a show cause notice presumably with a copy of the inquiry report was issued on 11.3.1994 for forfeiture of one years service with permanent effect (P-4). After considering the reply, the Disciplinary Authority finally passed order dated 15.6.1994 (A-1), inflicting the proposed punishment. The Inspector General of Police reviewed the order and issued a show cause notice to him proposing the punishment of dismissal. After considering his reply, order dated 1.12.1994 (A-2), inflicting the punishment of forfeiture of three years service for a period of three years entailing a reduction of his pay from Rs. 1,200/- to Rs. 1,125/- with cumulative effect was passed. On appeal by the delinquent officer, the Home Secretary, U.T. Chandigarh, upheld the said order, vide his order dated 21.6.1996 (A-3). 10. The rationale adopted by the Tribunal does not have any judicial backing. It is appropriate to notice that the Tribunal in its order appears to have concluded that issuance of show cause notice after the disciplinary authority had reached the conclusion regarding punishment to be imposed would not satisfy the requirement of grant of opportunity to the delinquent employee before acceptance of the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The Tribunal has placed reliance on the observations made by Honble the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Ramzan Kans case (supra). The principles of natural justice are not required to be followed mechanically. A 5-Judge Constitution Bench of Honble the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, 1994(1) S.C.T. 319 : (1993) 4 SCC 727, has laid down that even in cases where a copy of the inquiry report has not been furnished to the delinquent employee, it has to be ascertained whether any prejudice has been caused on account of non-furnishing of inquiry report. In para 30(v), the aforesaid aspect has been put beyond any shadow of doubt, which reads as under :- "30(v). In para 30(v), the aforesaid aspect has been put beyond any shadow of doubt, which reads as under :- "30(v). The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the Inquiry Officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to a "unnatural expansion of natural justice" which in itself is antithetical to justice." 11. It would, thus, be evident that the delinquent employee is to be granted an opportunity of hearing after the receipt of the inquiry report. However, if the report is not furnished the findings recorded in the inquiry would not be vitiated unless some prejudice to the right of the delinquent employee is shown. The Punishing Authority ordinarily has to apply its mind to the gravity of the charges. However, if the report is not furnished the findings recorded in the inquiry would not be vitiated unless some prejudice to the right of the delinquent employee is shown. The Punishing Authority ordinarily has to apply its mind to the gravity of the charges. It has to either agree or disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer then it would record its agreement and issue a show cause notice to the delinquent employee by furnishing him a copy of the inquiry report. In case the punishing/disciplinary authority agrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. In the present case, a perusal of the show cause notice issued on 11.3.1994 (P-4), would show that the punishing authority has expressed its agreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and has sought the reply of the delinquent employee with regard to punishment as well. 12. After 42nd Amendment no show cause notice with regard to the quantum of punishment to be inflicted on an employee was required to be issued. However, the petitioner went ahead with the issuance of a show cause notice to Constable Raghbir Singh respondent No. 2 calling upon him to show cause as to why the punishment of forfeiture of one year service with permanent effect may not be imposed upon him. In fact, the punishing/disciplinary authority was soliciting the comment of the delinquent officer to the proposed punishment as well and was yet to conclude its opinion about the quantum of punishment. It had never reached the conclusion regarding the punishment to be imposed. Accordingly, the view expressed by the Tribunal was not correct as no final opinion was expressed with regard to quantum of punishment. If the punishment remains at the proposal stage and the delinquent employee was granted opportunity of hearing, the procedure followed by the department completely satisfy the requirement of clause (ix) of Rule 16.24(1) of the Rules. 13. The question whether a delinquent employee is entitled to an opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed after 42nd Amendment of the Constitution has also been considered in B. Karunakars case (supra). Answering the aforesaid question, the 5-Judge Constitution Bench has observed as under :- "....The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. Answering the aforesaid question, the 5-Judge Constitution Bench has observed as under :- "....The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the Forty-second Amendment. The second stage consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. But before the Forty second Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage viz. the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the Forty second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officers report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence in respect of the charges." (emphasis added) 14 The aforesaid view has also been applied and followed in the case of State of Uttaranchal v. Bharak Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 236. 15. When the facts of the present case are examined in the light of the principles laid down by Honble the Supreme Court, no doubt is left that the principles of natural justice have been complied with in holding of inquiry, granting of opportunity to Constable Raghbir Singh-respondent No. 2. It is not even the case set up by Raghbir Singh-respondent No. 2 that inquiry report has not been furnished or that the opportunity of hearing has not been granted. In cases where lack of opportunity of hearing is occasioned on account of non- furnishing of copy of the inquiry report, there the delinquent employee has to show some prejudice caused to him. There is no such prejudice even alleged or pleaded at any stage. In cases where lack of opportunity of hearing is occasioned on account of non- furnishing of copy of the inquiry report, there the delinquent employee has to show some prejudice caused to him. There is no such prejudice even alleged or pleaded at any stage. Accordingly, we are of the view that the order dated 16.10.2001, passed by the Tribunal is not sustainable in the eyes of law and the order passed by the departmental authorities on 15.6.1994, 28.11.1994 and 21.6.1996 (A-1, A-2 and A-3 respectively) could not have been quashed by the Tribunal. 16. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion this petition succeeds. Order dated 16.10.2001, passed by the Tribunal is set aside and those of the departmental authorities dated 15.6.1994, 28.11.1994 and 21.6.1996 (A-1, A-2 and A-3 respectively) are hereby restored.