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2010 DIGILAW 204 (GAU)

Vidyasagar Sharma v. Jugal Kishore Sharma

2010-03-18

TINLIANTHANG VAIPHEI

body2010
JUDGMENT T. Vaiphel, J. 1. The legality of the judgment and order dated 21.4.2006 passed by the learned District Judge, Shillong in Test (P) Case No. 39 (H) of 2003 refusing to grant probate to the Appellant is called into question in this first appeal. 2. The material facts giving rise to this appeal may be noticed at the outset. The Appellant is the son of the late Hukumchand Sharma ("the deceased"), who died on 26.11.1996 at Shillong and had his fixed place of residence at Jhalupara, Shillong. The Appellant and the deceased belonged to Hindu community and are governed by Hindu Succession Act. The testator had left behind some property at Shillong. According to the Appellant, he and the testator used to be partners in M/s Rajhans Hotel, situate at G.S. Road, Police Bazar, Shillong, each of them having 50% share in the hotel business. It is the case of the Appellant that on 9.11.1983, the deceased made and published his last Will and testament appointing him as the sole executor of the Will and bequeathed his estate and assets, etc. as specified therein. As per the Will, on the death of the deceased, 50% of his share in the said Hotel would go to Smt. Anita Devi Sharma, wife of the Appellant, as she had been looking after and attending the testator when his health condition got deteriorated. The property mentioned in Clause 1 of the Will was disposed of during the lifetime of the deceased. According to the Appellant, the said hotel business was the self-acquired property of the deceased and was run in a rented premise, and he subsequently became a partner of the hotel by virtue of the Deed of Partnership executed on 1.4.1978. The value of the assets likely to come to the Appellant is not more than Rs. 44,123.29 p while a sum of Rs. 1,15,913.21 p as on the death of the deceased was likely to come to the beneficiary in the event of probate of the Will. At the time of the death of the deceased, he left behind him six other children, namely, (i) Shri Sitaram Sharma, aged 66 years, (2) Smt. Achi Devi Sharma, aged 60 years, (3) Shri Murarilal Sharma, aged 62 years, (4) Shri Jugal Kishore Sharma. At the time of the death of the deceased, he left behind him six other children, namely, (i) Shri Sitaram Sharma, aged 66 years, (2) Smt. Achi Devi Sharma, aged 60 years, (3) Shri Murarilal Sharma, aged 62 years, (4) Shri Jugal Kishore Sharma. aged 54 years (the Respondent herein), (5) Smt. Meena Devi Sharma, aged 50 years and (6) Smt. Awan Devi Sharma, aged 58 years. It is stated by the Appellant that one of the attesting witnesses to the Will, namely, Shri K.P. Sharma, has already expired. The properties which are the subject-matter of the Will are listed at Annexure "A" to the application. 3. The Respondent herein and one of the legal heirs of the deceased, namely, Shri Murarilal Sharma, filed their objections against the application for probate by filing separate written objections. The said Murarilal Sharma subsequently abandoned his defense. A perusal of their written objections will show that the stands taken by both of them are in pari materia. Therefore, suffice it to refer to the written objection of the Respondent herein. The said Murarilal Sharma, however, subsequently abandoned the case. According to the present Respondent, the document annexed to the application is not the Will of the deceased, which is a manufactured document and he was told by the deceased at his death bed that he left no such Will nor had he executed any codicil: in fact, he had wanted that his children should enjoy his estate equally for their betterment. Until his death, the deceased had acquired properties abutting Jail Road, Shillong and had also left sufficient cash balances in his Bank Account, which the Appellant in collusion with his wife had surreptitiously withdrawn and utilized for his gain. As the deceased ran the hotel in partnership with all his sons and had openly declared that the bulk of other properties were acquired by him through the income earned by him from the hotel business, the question of bequeathing the entire hotel business to the wife of the Appellant does not arise. In fact, the deceased on his death bed had clearly declared that the hotel business and the business of Lakshmi Flour Mill be shared equally by the four brothers for their betterment and old them to perform his last rites jointly. In fact, the deceased on his death bed had clearly declared that the hotel business and the business of Lakshmi Flour Mill be shared equally by the four brothers for their betterment and old them to perform his last rites jointly. It is alleged by the Respondent that the assets left behind by the deceased are ten times higher in value than as shown by the Appellant, which are conveniently concealed by him. Had the deceased executed a Will as alleged by the Appellant bequeathing all: lis properties in favour of the wife of the Appellant, the Appellant would have filed an application for probate immediately after the death o f the deceased. According to the Respondent the deceased at the time of his death left behind a sum of Rs. 6,15,689.53 p by way of savings/fixed deposits in commercial banks and mutual funds, which have been surreptitiously withdrawn by the Appellant without obtaining Succession Certificate and utilized by him for his own benefits. It is claimed by the Respondent that this probate application has been filed as an after-thought as he had already instituted a title suit against the Appellant for equal distribution of the estate of the deceased among his children, and the same is pending before the learned Munsiff, Shillong. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of the application. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the petition is maintainable in its pre sent form? 2. Whether the petition is barred by the limitation? 3. Whether the court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition? 4. Whether the Will in question is genuine one and admissible in the eye of law? 5. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to get the probate? 6. Whether the Objector has got any locus standi to file the objection? 7. Whether the probate court can determine the rights, interest and title of the parties? 8. Whether the parties are entitled to any other relief/reliefs in law? In the course of trial, four witnesses including two attesting witnesses were examined on behalf of the Appellant while three witnesses were examined on behalf of the Respondent. The trial court after hearing the parties dismissed the application on his findings that the Will is surrounded by several suspicious circumstances, which could not be dispelled by the Appellant. In the course of trial, four witnesses including two attesting witnesses were examined on behalf of the Appellant while three witnesses were examined on behalf of the Respondent. The trial court after hearing the parties dismissed the application on his findings that the Will is surrounded by several suspicious circumstances, which could not be dispelled by the Appellant. According to the trial court, the testator had no knowledge of English language upon which the Will was written, and there is no evidence adduced by the Appellant to show that the contents of the Will were read out and explained to the testator before signing the Will. The trial court further found from the deposition of PW 4, one of the attesting witnesses, that the contents of the Will was not read out to him. The trial court also observed that there was no explanation as to under what circumstances some properties, which are mentioned in the Will, had been disposed of by the testator during his lifetime and also how and in what manner the Appellant succeeded to transfer Bank Account No. 381 of Canara Bank in the name of his wife without first obtaining probate. Similarly, no explanation was forthcoming from the Appellant as to how the amount deposited under Account No. 9042 of United Commercial Bank, Jaipur got disappeared and what prevented him from presenting the Will immediately after the death of the testator for probate. The trial court also noticed that though the Will was executed on 9.11.1983, it was registered on 11.11.1983. According to the trial court, as the Appellant has failed to remove these suspicious circumstances, the Will was not a genuine Will, which could not be probated. The correctness of these findings is under challenge in this first appeal. 5. Mr. H.S. Thangkhiew, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, vehemently attacks those findings of the trial court and contends that the trial court committed gross error of law in not probating the Will when it has been satisfactorily proved by the Appellant that the Will was validly executed by the testator in a sound and disposing mind in the presence of three witnesses, two of whom deposed before the trial court. Stressing the fact that the Will is a registered Will, it is argued by the learned Counsel that there is thus presumption of genuineness of a registered Will, and the onus of proving that the Will was not validly executed by or presented before the Sub-Registrar heavily lies upon the Respondent who challenged the genuineness of the Will; the Respondent has miserably failed to discharge this onus. The learned Counsel also submits that the suspicious circumstances found by the trial court are not based on well-founded suspicions but are in the realm of mere suspicions, which ought to have been ignored by the trial court. The fact that the Will was written in English and that the testator had no knowledge of English, according to the learned Counsel, is no ground to raise suspicious circumstances on the genuineness of the Will when its execution and registration have been duly proved by oral and documentary evidence adduced by the Appellant in the course of trial. It is strongly urged by the learned Counsel that the trial court was unduly swayed by some suspicious circumstances of trivial nature such as the transfer of money in the account of the testator with Canara Bank and United Commercial Bank in the name of his wife without obtaining probate, the disposition of some properties by the testator during his lifetime and the delay in disclosing the existence of the Will and has in the process misdirected himself in law, which resulted in the impugned judgment. He, therefore, submits that the impugned judgment is not sustainable in law and is liable to be set aside. On the other hand, Mr. K.C. Gautam, the learned Counsel for the Respondent, supports the impugned judgment and submits that the trial court rightly held that the Appellant could not remove several suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will as found by the trial court. Contending that the appeal is devoid of merits, he strongly urges this Court to dismiss the appeal with costs. 6. The various contentions advanced by the counsel appearing for the rival parties have been duly taken note of. I have also perused the materials on record. Contending that the appeal is devoid of merits, he strongly urges this Court to dismiss the appeal with costs. 6. The various contentions advanced by the counsel appearing for the rival parties have been duly taken note of. I have also perused the materials on record. It is a well settled proposition of law that the mode of proving a Will does not differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a Will by Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. The onus to prove the Will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, proof of testamentary capacity and proof of the signature of the testator, as required by law, need be sufficient to discharge the onus. Where there are suspicious circumstances, the onus would again be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the Will can be accepted as genuine. Proof in either case cannot be mathematically precise and certain and should be one of satisfaction of a prudent mind in such matters. In case the person contesting the Will alleges undue influence, fraud for coercion, the onus will be on him to prove: the same. As to what are suspicious circumstances has to be judged in the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The position of law has been reiterated by the Ape): Court in Niranjan Umeshchandran Joshi v. Mrudula Jyoti Rao (2006) 13 SCC 442 which reads thus: 33. The burden of proof that the will has been validly executed and is a genuine document is on the propounder. The propounder is also required to prove that the testator has signed the will and the he had put his signature out of his own free will having a sound disposition of mind and understood the nature and effect thereof. If sufficient evidence in this behalf is brought on record, the onus of the propounder may be held to have been discharged. But, the onus would be on the Applicant to remove suspicion by leading sufficient evidence and cogent evidence if there exists any. In the case of proof of will a signature of a testator alone would not prove the execution thereof, if his mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated. But, the onus would be on the Applicant to remove suspicion by leading sufficient evidence and cogent evidence if there exists any. In the case of proof of will a signature of a testator alone would not prove the execution thereof, if his mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated. However, if a defense of fraud, coercion or undue influence is raised, the burden would be on the caveator. See Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage and Sridevi v. Jayaraja Shetty. Subject to above, proof of a will does net ordinarily differ from that of proving any o her document. 34. There are several circumstances which would have been held to be described by this Court as suspicious circumstances: (i) When a doubt is created in regard to the condition of mind of the testator despite his signature on tie will; (ii) when the disposition appears to be unnatural or wholly unfair in the light of the relevant circumstances; (iii) where propounder himself takes prominent part in the execution of will which confers on him substantial benefit. See H. Venkatala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Management Committee, T.K. Ghosh's Academy v. T.C. Palit. 35. We may not delve deep into the decisions cited at the Bar as the question has recently been considered by this Court in B. Venkatamuni v. C.J. Ayodhya Ram Singh, wherein this Court has held that the court must satisfy its conscience as regards due execution of the will by the testator and the court would not refuse to probe deeper into the matter only because the signature of the propounder on the will is otherwise proved. 36. The proof of a will is required not as a ground of reading the document but to afford the Judges reasonable assurance of it as being what it purports to be. 37. We may, however, hasten to add that there exists a distinction where suspicions are well founded and the cases where there are only suspicions alone. Existence of suspicious circumstances alone may not be sufficient. The court may not start with a suspicion and it should not close its mind to find the truth. A resolute and impenetrable incredulity is not demanded from the Judge even if there exists circumstances of grave suspicions. (See Venkatachala Iyengar.) 7. Existence of suspicious circumstances alone may not be sufficient. The court may not start with a suspicion and it should not close its mind to find the truth. A resolute and impenetrable incredulity is not demanded from the Judge even if there exists circumstances of grave suspicions. (See Venkatachala Iyengar.) 7. In the light of this settled position of the law, I now proceed to examine as to whether there are well-found suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will and if so, whether the propounder is able to remove these suspicious circumstances. In the case at hand, there is no dispute that the propounder did not take any part in the execution of the Will though substantial benefits have been conferred by it upon him and his wife. The first suspicious circumstance pointed out by the trial court is that the testator could not have understood the nature and effect of the Will written in English when he admittedly did not know this language. PW 2 is one of the attesting witnesses and deposed that he signed the Will as one of the attesting witnesses and the testator also signed in his presence and that he could testify the signature of the testator appearing in Ext. 1. He also deposed that the three attesting witnesses themselves signed the Will on the same day and the testator also signed the Will on the same day and that he read the Will and then signed it. According to him, he was working with the late O.P. Sharma (the scribe) and that at that relevant point of time, the testator came to their office and expressed his willingness to make his last Will and engaged the said O.P. Sharma to draft the Will. The Will was made on 9.11.1983. It reveals in his cross examination that he had no knowledge as to who read out or explained the contents of the Will to the testator before he signed it and that it was not mentioned anywhere in Ext. 1 the name of the person who had read out and explained the Will to the testator. He also testified that at the time of executing the Will, the testator was keeping good health and having a sound mind. 1 the name of the person who had read out and explained the Will to the testator. He also testified that at the time of executing the Will, the testator was keeping good health and having a sound mind. He, however, stated that he had no knowledge of who had read out or explained the contents of the Will to the testator before he signed it. No suggestion was made to this witness as to whether the testator understood the nature and effect of the Will. PW 4 is the other attesting witness to the Will and testified that though the Will was not prepared in his presence, the testator signed it in his presence. He further deposed that at the time of signing the Will, the health and mind of the testator was in normal condition. This witness was at the relevant time working as Manager of Rajhans Hotel under the testator. He corroborated the version of PW 2 that there were two more persons in addition to him who were present in the Office Chamber of the late Om Prakash Sharma and also admitted that the testator did not know English language whereas the Will was written in English. He also deposed that the testator was aged about 60 years at that time. According to PW 3, who is the elder brother of the Appellant, his father expired in the month of November. 1996 and was about 85 years old at the time of his death. He also admitted that the testator did not know English. 8. From the depositions of PWs 2 and 4, it is clear that the testator had signed the Will in their presence while in a sound disposing state of mind. In fact, the evidence of PW 2 would go to show that the testator himself had expressed his willingness to make his last Will and had asked the late Om Prakash Sharma to draft the Will. It is not the case of the Respondent that the testator was not of sound mind when he executed the Will. All that the Respondent alleged is that the signature of the testator is a forgery, and he could not have in his right mind signed the Will written in a language not admittedly understood by him. It is not the case of the Respondent that the testator was not of sound mind when he executed the Will. All that the Respondent alleged is that the signature of the testator is a forgery, and he could not have in his right mind signed the Will written in a language not admittedly understood by him. It is true that the burden always lies on the party propounding the Will to satisfy the conscience of the court that the testator at the time he executed the Will was of sound mind and disposing state of mind. But in the absence of any evidence as to the state of the testator's mind, proof that he had executed the Will rational in character in the presence of witnesses must lead to a presumption that he was of sound mind and understood what it was about. The reason which prompted the testator to execute the Will is found in the recital which prompted the testator to execute the Will is found in the recital which said that "My daughter-in-law Smti. Anita Devi Sharma wife of Shri Vidyasagar Sharma, aged about 20 years is at present leaving no stone unturned in looking after me and attending to all my requirements in my present state of health". That apart, the Appellant was all along running a partnership business with the testator whereas the Respondent in his evidence cleary stated that he had ceased to be a partner of Rajhans Hotel as early as 1978. There is no whisper of evidence adduced by the Respondent that he had looked after the testator during the lifetime of the latter. On the contrary, the evidence adduced by the Respondent reveals that he started living s separately from his father (the testator) after his marriage in 1978 and naturally was not in a position to look after the testator. Further more, it is in the evidence of PW 2, who was working with the scribe at the relevant time, that the testator used to come to the chamber of the scribe. The cross examination of the witnesses examined on behalf of the Appellant could not elicit anything which could persuade me to disbelieve their testimony. Further more, it is in the evidence of PW 2, who was working with the scribe at the relevant time, that the testator used to come to the chamber of the scribe. The cross examination of the witnesses examined on behalf of the Appellant could not elicit anything which could persuade me to disbelieve their testimony. The testator survived the Will by about 13 years and ran partnership business with the Appellant during this period, but he never took any steps whatsoever to disaffirm the provisions contained in the Will. Under such circumstances, the disposition in the Will whereby the testator devised his properties to his daughter-in-law cannot but be a natural disposition. The lacuna harped on by the Respondent that the testator having no knowledge of English upon which the Will was written cannot be conclusive of the matter. This lacuna may be due either to the fact that the Judge before whom the trial took place was not cautious enough or that the counsel who conducted the case on behalf of the Appellant did not take the necessary evidence recorded. In my judgment, the mere fact that the requisite evidence was not recorded does not establish that all the requirements of the Statute were no; complied with and does not render the Will ineffective. On the contrary, the evidence of PWs 2 and 4 must be taken to be sufficient compliance with the requirements of Section 63, Succession Act. Moreover, while it is true that there is a distinction between fraud and forgery, and forgery contains some elements that are not included in fraud, forgeries are a species of fraud See 37 Corpus Juris Secondum Forgery Section 2at 66 (1997). If that is so, the burden of proof that the signatures of the testator appearing in the Will are forgery, is upon the Respondent. No attempt was made by him to prove the alleged forgery by examining a handwriting expert. Thus, the preponderance of probabilities is that the execution of the Will in question by the testator has been duly proved and the Will is genuine and valid. There are, therefore, no well-founded suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will. 9. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order of the trial court is hereby set aside. There are, therefore, no well-founded suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will. 9. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order of the trial court is hereby set aside. Let a probate of the Will dated 9.11.1983 be granted in favour of the Appellant. The parties are, however, directed to bear their respective costs. Transmit the L.C. record forthwith. Appeal allowed