Judgment : 1. These RevisionPetitions arose out of the order, dated 4. 2003 in R.C.A.No.2 of 2002 passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Principal Subordinate Judge) at Nagapattinam confirming the judgment and decree dated 4. 2002 in R.C.O.P.No.30 of 2000 passed by the Rent Controller (District Munsif) at Nagapattinam. 2. Thebrief facts, which are necessary for disposal of these Revisions, can be stated briefly as below: 3. The revision petitioner is the tenant under the respondent herein in respect of the demised premises. The petitioner is a Weavers Society, being represented by its Managing Director, having its office at Thattanchavadi, Pondicherry State. The petitioner took the property on lease on 12. 1978 on monthly rent of Rs.100/- and a sum of Rs.500/- was paid towards advance. The rent amount was revised periodically from time to time and as on the date of filing the Rent Control proceedings, the rent was at Rs.400/- and advance amount was Rs.2000/-. According to the petitioner, the rent amount was paid regularly without any default up to 30.6.1998 and thereafter, when the payment of rent was offered, the respondent refused to receive and demanded additional amount of Rs.50/-. The petitioner also agreed the same and ready to pay the rent, but the respondent refused to receive and hence, the petitioner sent the rent through money order, which was also refused by the respondent. Thereafter, the petitioner sent a legal notice requesting the respondent to give her Bank account to deposit the rent regularly, for which also there is no reply. In such circumstances, finding no other alternative, the petitioner filed a Petition in R.C.O.P.No.30 of 2000 under Section 8(5) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to ‘the Act’) before the Rent Controller, Nagapattinam praying to permit the petitioner to deposit the rent amount of Rs.9,000/- towards rent for 20 months payable from July 1998 till October 2000. 4. During pendency of the above said Petition, the respondent/landlady filed a Petition in R.C.O.P.No.2 of 2001 under Section 10(2)(i) and 10(3)(iii) of the Act for eviction of the petitioner on the ground of willful default and owner’s occupation. According to the respondent/landlady, the tenant occupied the premises initially on monthly rent of Rs.100/- with advance of Rs.500/-, which subsequently increased and on the date of filing the Petition, the rent was at Rs.400/- and advance of Rs.2000/-. On 7. According to the respondent/landlady, the tenant occupied the premises initially on monthly rent of Rs.100/- with advance of Rs.500/-, which subsequently increased and on the date of filing the Petition, the rent was at Rs.400/- and advance of Rs.2000/-. On 7. 1983, the tenant executed an unregistered Lease Deed for a period of one year and later on 28. 1994, he executed a Lease Deed for a period of three years. It is agreed that the monthly rent should be paid on or before 10th of every succeeding month of English calendar. The tenant used to pay the rent by way of demand draft enclosing a letter. On 6. 1998, the tenant sent Rs.400/- towards rent by way of Demand Draft, that that time, the landlady specifically informed the tenant that she requires the demised premises for her foster son, namely Sekar to carryon jewellery business. The rental agreement expired on 28. 1997 and the landlady demanded the tenant to hand over vacant possession of the premises. However, the tenant neither vacated the premises nor paid the rent from June 1998. In such circumstances, the landlady has come forward with the Eviction Petition. 5. By a common order, dated 4. 2002, the Rent Controller while dismissing the Petition filed by the tenant, allowed the Eviction Petition filed by the landlady, directing the tenant to vacate and hand over the possession of the premises to the landlady within three months from the date of the order. Aggrieved by the said common order, the tenant has preferred Appeals in R.C.A.Nos.1 and 2 of 2002 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Nagapattinam. 6. By common judgment, dated 4. 2003, the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority, Nagapattinam, having considered all the facts and circumstances of the case, dismissed the Appeals preferred by the tenant while confirming the findings of the Rent Controller in respect of eviction on the ground of owner’s occupation only and rejected the eviction on the ground of willful default. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings of the Courts below, the revision petitioner/tenant has filed the present Revision Petitions. 7. Assailing the findings of the Courts below, Mrs. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings of the Courts below, the revision petitioner/tenant has filed the present Revision Petitions. 7. Assailing the findings of the Courts below, Mrs. R.T. Shyamala, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner/tenant submits that admittedly, the tenant has paid the rents regularly without any default till 30.6.1998 and thereafter, the landlady started to refuse to receive the rent despite the tenant offered the rent even by way of money order and that no particulars regarding bank account were furnished by the landlady enabling the tenant to deposit the rent and hence the tenant has come forward with a Petition before the Rent Controller to deposit the rent amount which shows the bona fide of the tenant and therefore, there is no evidence to show that the tenant has committed willful default in payment of rent. She also submits that though the Rent Controller negatived this aspect, however, the Rent Control Appellate Authority has rightly analyzed and held that there is no willful default on the part of the tenant. The learned counsel further submits that both the Courts below have not dealt with the matter regarding bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlady while ordering eviction against the tenant despite the fact that the landlady has failed to establish her case for eviction on the ground of owner’s occupation. It is also submitted that there is no evidence regarding the steps taken by the landlady including monetary capacity to start the jewellery business for her foster son. She pointed out that the landlady sought for eviction on the ground of owner’s occupation since the premises are required to start jewellery business by her foster son, who is her brother’s son, however, it is settled that ‘foster son’ cannot be treated as a son in the eye of law and further in Section 2(6-A) of the Act, ‘foster son’ is not included as ‘family member’ for whose behalf eviction can be sought for. The learned counsel also submits that even otherwise, the landlady failed to prove that her so-called foster son is not occupying any nonresidential premises for business purpose in order to claim eviction against the tenant. 8. With the above submissions, the learned counsel appearing for the tenant sought for setting aside the eviction order inflicted against the tenant by the Courts below by impugned orders. 8. With the above submissions, the learned counsel appearing for the tenant sought for setting aside the eviction order inflicted against the tenant by the Courts below by impugned orders. In support of her submissions, the learned counsel relied upon the following decisions, viz., - (a) In K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal, 1997 (2) SCC 53 : AIR 1997 SC 628 , wherein, requisites for being treated the ‘foster son’ as member of the landlord’s family where enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 27 and 31 as under: “27. If a child comes to a person or is found by that person as forlorn child or the parents of that child, may be, on account of their poverty or their family circumstances, bring that child to the other person and request him to bring up that child which is accepted by that person and such child is brought up from the infancy as the own son by that person who loves that child as his own, nourishes and brings him up, looks after his education in the school, college or university and bears all the expenses, such child has to be treated as the son of that person particularly if that person holds the child out as his own. Care, therefore, in rearing up the child need not always be parental. It can be even that of a “foster father”. In such a situation, the son so brought up would be the “foster son” of that person and since the devotion with which he was brought up, the love and care which he received from that person were like those which that person would have given to his real son, the “foster son” would certainly be a member of the family”. “31. From the above, it would appear that it is not in every case that a son who is not the real son of a person would be treated to be a member of family of that person but would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case”. (b) In M.P. Ramanujammal v. C. Parankujam, 1990 TLNJ 220, for the proposition that the expression ‘any son’ in Section 2(8) of the Act will not be taken in “a foster son”. It has been held so by this Court in para 10 as follows: “10. (b) In M.P. Ramanujammal v. C. Parankujam, 1990 TLNJ 220, for the proposition that the expression ‘any son’ in Section 2(8) of the Act will not be taken in “a foster son”. It has been held so by this Court in para 10 as follows: “10. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that Srinivasa Mudaliar was brought up by Loganayaki Ammal and her husband Ranganatha Mudaliar as their foster son and the expression “any son” in Section 2(8) will include a ‘foster son’ also. I am unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. The expression “any son” in Section 2(8) of the Act cannot include ‘a foster son’ because the word ‘any’ in Section 2(8) when read along with Sections 2(8)(i) and 2(8) .(ii) only refers to, in the case of a residential building, to that particular son who is living with the tenant in the building as a member of the family upto the date of death of the tenant or in the case of non-residential building that particular son who had been in continuous association with the tenant for the purpose of carrying on the business of the tenant upto the death of the tenant and continue to carry on such business thereafter. The expression ‘any son’ in Section 2(8) of the Act will not be taken in “a foster son”. .(c) In R. Sudhandhira Devi and others v. K. Navanithakrishna, 2005 (4) MLJ 127 , wherein, it has been held by this Court as under in para 20: “20. …. It is incumbent upon the landlord to plead the minimum requirements, to satisfy the ingredients available under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act says, “the landlord or the member of the family, if the building is required for the member, must be carrying on business on the date of filing of the Application, that he or the member of the family should not own any non-residential building for the purpose of carrying on the said business and that the requirement must be bona fide not aiming at evicting the tenant.” Therefore, the landlord must say, whether the member of the family, since in this case the building is sought for the members of the family, is owning any property, of his own, as non-residential building, for the purpose of carrying on business, which is absent here. What is the name of the business, who is the owner of the business, also not specifically pleaded. In the absence of any proof, by producing some documents at a later stage, the landlords want to make out a case, as if the members of the family are carrying on the business. ….” 9. On the other hand, Ms. Nalinishree, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/landlady submits that the Courts below, having considered the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the evidence let in by the parties, have dealt with the matter in a proper perspective and rightly ordered eviction against the tenant which requires no interference of this Court. She also submits that the lease agreement which was renewed during the year 1994 was only for three years and after expiry of such lease, the landlady requested the tenant to hand over the vacant possession of the premises for her own occupation and for that she has established by letting in evidence that the requirement of the premises is bona fide. It is submitted that after lapse of two years, the tenant has filed a Petition before the Rent Controller for deposit of rent amount and therefore, the tenant has committed willful default. She further submits that the landlady is admittedly running a pawn broker shop and having sufficient means to set up a jewellery shop for her foster son and that it is established in evidence that her foster son is not owning any other premises. The learned counsel further submits that the landlady can seek for eviction of the premises for her foster son for the purpose of setting up a jewellery shop and the tenant has not raised the issue regarding ‘foster son’ before the Courts below and there is no issue in respect of foster son was framed and no finding was given and therefore, the tenant cannot now raise a different plea for the first time in the Revision Petitions. She further submits that it is settled law that even the ‘foster son’ also can be treated as a member of the family under Section 2(6-A) of the Act and therefore, the landlady has proved her bona fide requirement of the premises for her foster son. 10. With these submissions, the learned counsel sought for dismissal of the Revision Petitions while confirming the findings of the Courts below. 10. With these submissions, the learned counsel sought for dismissal of the Revision Petitions while confirming the findings of the Courts below. In support of her submissions, the learned counsel for the tenant relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal, 1997 (2) SCC 53 : AIR 1997 SC 628 , wherein, it has been held in para 32 and 33 as under: “32. Analyzing the facts of this case in the light of the principles enunciated above, it will be seen that Arunachala Bakthar is the brother’s son of the respondent’s husband who, therefore, was related to the respondent’s husband by blood and was his heir not only under the old Mitakshara Law (as brother’s son) but also under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as a Class II heir. Arunachala Bakthar was brought up by the respondent and her husband and was living all along with them. He apparently acted as a devoted son to the respondent’s husband and helped him in all possible ways including the business which he carried on. Respondent’s husband acted also as a devoted father to Arunachala Bakthar in whose favour he also executed a will and after reciting therein that Arunachala Bakthar was brought up by him, he bequeathed his business jointly to him and the respondent specifying further that after the death of the respondent, the business shall be carried on by Arunachala Bakthar. Respondent’s husband also, significantly, did not bequeath the residential house absolutely in favour of the respondent but created only a life estate therein for her. The remainder was bequeathed to the children of Arunachala Bakthar. 33. In view of the above facts and circumstances, Arunachala Bakthar was clearly a member of the family of the respondent’s husband within the meaning of Section 2(6-A) of the Act and consequently, the respondent could well file an Application for eviction of the appellant from the premises in question not only for her need but also for the need of her “FOSTER SON”, Arunachala Bakthar”. 11. Heard the learned counsel appearing for either side and gone through the entire materials placed before this Court. 12. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is the tenant of the demised premises under the respondent/landlady. It is also not in dispute that the rental agreement executed on 28. 11. Heard the learned counsel appearing for either side and gone through the entire materials placed before this Court. 12. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is the tenant of the demised premises under the respondent/landlady. It is also not in dispute that the rental agreement executed on 28. 1994 came to be expired in the year 1997. After expiry of the lease agreement, the landlady requested the tenant to hand over the vacant possession on the ground of owner’s occupation as she requires the premises in order to set up a jewellery shop for her foster son, namely Sekar. It is admitted fact that the rents were paid upto 30.6.1998 and thereafter, according to the tenant, the landlady refused to receive the rent despite sending even by money order and also not furnished the Bank details to deposit the rent. It is to be noted that tenant has sent notice, dated 20.11.1998 to the landlady seeking for furnishing the Bank account for depositing the rent amount and thereafter, the tenant kept silent for two years without paying the rents and later, during the year 2000 only, the tenant has come forward with a Petition under Section 8(5) of the Act before the Rent Controller for depositing the rent into the Court. Therefore, from this, it is clear that the tenant has committed default in payment of rent from June 1998 onwards. Therefore, on the ground of willful default, the eviction inflicted against the petitioner/tenant is sustainable. 13. As regards the bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlady, on a perusal of the entire evidence, it is evident that after expiry of the rental agreement, the landlady has requested the tenant to hand over the vacant possession of the premises for the purpose of setting up a jewellery shop for her foster son, who acquired rich experience by working in a jewellery shop. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/tenant canvassed before this Court that the landlady cannot seek eviction of the premises for her foster son inasmuch as ‘foster son’ cannot be treated even as an adopted son in the eye of law and further in Section 2(6-A) of the Act, ‘foster son’ is not included as ‘family member’ for whose behalf eviction can be sought for. It is very significant to note that this aspect has not been canvassed before the Courts below and neither an issue was framed nor a finding was rendered by the Courts below. For the first time, the petitioner has raised this issue. Even other wise also, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, the landlady can seek eviction for the purpose of setting up a jewellery show for her foster son and her requirement is bona fide. 14. A contention was raised by the revision petitioner/tenant that the ‘foster son’ being none other than brother’s son of the respondent/lady is not included under Section 2(6) of the Act and the respondent/landlady has stated that her brother’s son is her ‘foster son’ whereas as per Adoption Act, brother’s son could not be adopted and he could not be considered as ‘foster son’. 15. Analyzing the facts of this case, whether the claim of the revision petitioner/tenant, as the foster son could not be an adopted son and that too in a case of brother’s son there cannot be any adoption, can be examined in the light of the pleadings and evidences. 16. Inthe case, the claim of the respondent/landlady all along on the basis that Mr. Sekar as her ‘foster son’ for whom she requires the premises to set up a jewellery shop. If we examine this position, as defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, ‘adopt’ means, “legally take (another’s child) and bring it up as one’s own”. The meaning of ‘foster son’ as defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, is, “one brought up as a son though not a son by birth”. The word “foster”, in the same dictionary, is indicated to mean, to supply with food; to nourish, feed, support; to bring up with parental care; to nurse, tend with care, to grow. In such a situation, the son so brought up would be the “foster son” of that person and since the devotion with which he was brought up, the love and care which he received from that person were like those which that person would have given to his real son, the “foster son” would certainly be a member of the family as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above decision. Therefore, the foster son is different from an adopted son or son by an adoption. Therefore, the foster son is different from an adopted son or son by an adoption. In the instant case, the claim of the respondent/landlady is only a foster son and therefore, in the absence of any claim as adopted son, this Court cannot give a different meaning invalidating the claim of the respondent/landlady as he is a person come well within the purview of family and be a member of the family. 17. The revision petitioner/tenant has not raised any ground regarding Section 2(6-A) but raised only under Section 2(6) of the Act and when that being so, the real interpretation to be given in a literal meaning with a clear definition from the Dictionary meaning, it could be construed that the claim of the landlady that her brother’s son, namely, Sekar could be a foster son and therefore, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, foster son could be a member of the family and accordingly this Court is of the view that the claim of the respondent/landlady for requirement of the premises for his foster son is bona fide and rightly held by the Rent Controller as well as Rent Control Appellate Authority. 18. Therefore, it is well settled that a ‘foster son’ also can be treated as a member of the family under Section 2(6-A) of the Act and therefore, it can be held that the landlady has proved her bona fide requirement of the premises for her foster son. In this juncture, it is worthwhile to refer a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal, 1997 (2) SCC 53 : AIR 1997 SC 628 , wherein, while dealing with similarly situated in respect of term ‘foster son’, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that – “… Care, therefore, in rearing up the child need not always be parental. It can be even that of a “foster father”. In such a situation, the son so brought up would be “foster son” of that person and since the devotion with which he was brought up, the love and care which he received from that person were like those which that person would have given to his real son, the “foster son” would certainly be a member of the family”. 19. 19. Therefore, on a plain reading of the above, it is clear that a “foster son” can be treated as a member of the family. When such being the situation, in the present case, the landlady has sought for eviction of the premises for her foster son in order to set up a jewellery shop. Therefore, with this bona fide intention, the landlady has rightly requested the tenant for handing over the vacant possession of the premises and when the tenant failed to do so, she made a Petition before the Rent Controller under Sections 10(2)(i) and 10(3)(iii) of the Act on the grounds of willful default and owner’s occupation. The landlady has established her case on both these grounds for eviction of the tenant and both the Courts below have rightly ordered the eviction of the tenant. 20. For all the foregoing reasons, it can be held that the foster son of the landlady is clearly a member of the family of the landlady within the meaning of Section 2(6-A) of the Act and consequently, the landlady could well file an Application for eviction of the tenant from the demised premises. Therefore, I do not find any infirmity or irregularity in the orders passed by the Courts below while inflicting eviction order against the tenant. Accordingly, the Revision Petitions fail and they are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected C.M.P. is closed. The revision petitioner is directed to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the premises within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.