Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the records. 2. The instant civil revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (amended) arises out of the proceedings in suit for declaration wherein vide orders dated 25.5.2006 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No. 2, Sitapur, the defendants' application paper No.71Ga-2 was allowed, whereas the plaintiffs' application Nos. 74Ga-2 and 75 Ga-2 were rejected. 3. Brief facts, giving rise to the instant civil revision, are that plaintiffs/revisionists havefiled a suit for declaration and partition on 13.5.2003, which was numbered as Civil Suit No. 264 of 2003, along with an application for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Notice was issued and in response thereof, the defendant No.2/opposite party No.l-Usha Bhasin appeared through her Counsel on 13.5.2003 and filed her objections to an application for temporary injunction. The trial Court, vide order dated 23.5.2003, had granted ad interim injunction, restrain­ing the opposite party No.l-Usha Bhasin from raising any construction over the land in dis­pute till disposal of the suit. 4. Subsequently, as and when the case was fixed for filing written statement by the trial Court, the defendant No. 2/opposite party No.l-Usha Bhasin moved applications for adjournment on one pretext or the other, which was though vehemently opposed by the plaintiff but even then the trial Court on ev­ery occasion allowed the application for ad­journment and granted time to the defendant No. 2/opposite party No.l-Usha Bhasin for filing written statement. 5. However, being dissatisfied with the injunction order dated 23.5.2003, defendant No.2/opposite party No.l-Usha Bhasin has approached this Court by filing First Appeal From Order No. 500 of 2003. This Court, vide order dated 26.8.2003, admitted the appeal and as the respondent Nos. 4 to 16 in appeal were the proforma parties, whereas the re­spondent Nos. 1 to 3 in appeal appeared through his Counsel, namely, Sri R.K. Sharma and as such, no fresh notice was issued and with the consent of learned Counsel for the parties, this Court, vide order dated 17.11.2004, disposed of First Appeal From Order No. 500 of 2003 with the direction to the trial Court to decide the suit finally, ex-peditiously, say, within a period often months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order. 6. 6. It is relevant to point out that during the pendency of the said FAFO, on 2.11.2004 though the date was not fixed before the trial Court rather it was fixed for 3.12.2004, the defendant No. 2/opposite party No.l-Smt. Usha Bhasin moved an application, bearingPaper No. 71-C-2 for permission to file writ­ten statement after serving a copy to plain­tiffs/revisionists. The revisionists on the said application which was numbered as paper No.71-C-2, made an endorsement to the ef­fect that the said application is mala fide and is not maintainable as the time for filing writ­ten statement has elapsed long ago and as such, it cannot be allowed but the trial Court on 2.12.2004 allowed the application, bear­ing paper No. 71-C-2 and accepted the writ­ten statement. 7. As the plaintiffs/revisionists had no knowledge about the passing of order dated 2.12.2004 and as such, on 13.12.2004, the plaintiffs/revisionists moved an application, bearing Paper No. 74-C-2 for rejecting the written statement as the same was filed after expiry of the statutory period. The trial Court, on the date itself i.e. 13.12.2004, rejected the plaintiffs' application on the ground that the written statement was accepted on 2.11.2004 by the Court as there was sufficient ground and further this Court in FAFO No. 500 of 2003 on the basis of submissions provided time to file the written statement within two weeks and to decide the case within ten months. Thereafter, the plaintiffs' moved an application for recall of the order dated 13.12.2004, which too was rejected by the trial Court vide order dated 6.1.2005. 8. Against the orders dated 2.11.2004, 13.12.2004 and 6.1.2005, the plaintiffs/revi­sionists have approached this Court by filing civil revision No. 12 of 2005. This Court, vide order dated 18.1.2006, allowed the revision with costs, set-aside the orders dated 2.11.2004, 13.12.2004 and 6.1.2005 and the trial Court was directed to consider the defen­dants' application 71-C and objections 74-C,.75-C and 76-C in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India [ 2005 (6) SCC 344 : ( AIR 2005 SC 3353 )] and Smt. Rani Kusum v. Kanchan Devi [ 2005 (6) SCC 705 ]: ( AIR 2005 SC 3304 ). Pursuant to the Judgment and order dated 18.1.2006 of this Court, the trial Court reconsidered the aforesaid applications and by order dated 25.5.2006, allowed the defendant No.2/oppo-site party No.l's application, bearing No. 71- C-2 and rejected the plaintiffs/revisionists' ap­plication, bearing No. 74 Ga-2 and 75 Ga-2. 9. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs/revi­sionists preferred the instant civil revision inter alia on the grounds that Hon'ble Su­preme Court has held that the extension of time may be allowed under exceptional cir­cumstances by recording reasons, which must be beyond the control of the defendants. But in the instant case, the trial Court while al­lowing the defendant No.2's application did not record any such reasons/findings as to what were the exceptional circumstances, which were beyond the control of her. 10. While entertaining the instant civil re­vision, this Court, vide order dated 29.8.2006, provided that till the next date of listing, the trial Court shall not proceed with the case. 11. Sri R.K. Sharma, learned Counsel for the revisionists submits that the period for filing written statement under Order VIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is 30 days. However, the Court can extend the pe­riod up to 90 days after recording reasons for extending the time but in the instant case, the trial Court in spite of specific objection by the plaintiffs/revisionists did not pass any rea­soned order while extending the time for fil­ing written statement on several occasions and behind the back of the revisionists, the trial Court allowed the application, bearing No. 71-C-2, of the defendants No.2/opposite party No.l-Smt. Usha Bhasin, for permission to file written statement by the order dated 2.11.2004. He submits that the trial Court by misinterpreting the order dated 17.11.2004 passed in First Appeal From Order No. 500 of 2003, exempted/dispensed with the service of summons of defendants and illegally as­sumed that this Court has permitted the de­fendants to file written statement beyond the statutory period provided under Order VIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. 12. Sri R.K. Sharma, learned Counsel for the revisionists further submits that the state­ment of the Counsel for the defendant No.2-Smt. Usha Bhasin in the order dated 17.11.2004 that the defendants shall file writ­ten statement within two weeks, was incor­rect and unauthentic as the defendants had already filed an application for accepting thewritten statement to which the plaintiffs had registered their objections and as such, the statement of the Counsel for the defendant No.2 does not amount to an order of this Court permitting the defendants to file the written statement beyond the statutory period. 13. Lastly, Sri R.K. Sharma submits that this Court, vide order dated 18.1.2006, while allowing the Civil Revision No. 12 of 2005, has specifically directed the trial Court to consider the defendants No.2's application as well as plaintiffs' application in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India [ 2005 (6) SCC 344 ] : ( AIR 2005 SC 3353 ) and Rani Kusum (Smt.) v. Kanchan Devi [ 2005 (6) SCC 705 ] : ( AIR 2005 SC 3304 ) but without looking into the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judg­ments, the trial Court, by the impugned order dated 25.5.2006, rejected the plaintiffs' ob­jections and application and allowed the de­fendant No.2's application. 14. Learned Counsel for the revisionists has also submitted that though in Kailash v. Nankhu [( 2005 4 SCC 480 ] : (2005 All LJ 1736), the Apex Court held that the proviso to Order VIII, Rule 1 to be directory but in no uncertain terms stated that the defendants be permitted to file written statement after the expiry of 90 days only in exceptional situa­tions. Thus, the trial Court in admitting the written statement beyond 90 days without as­signing any reasons in the order had commit­ted manifest error. In support of the said sub­mission, he relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Mohammed Yusuf v. Faij Mohammad and others [2009 (3) Supreme Court Cases 513] : ((2009) 2 All LJ 185). 15. Thus, the trial Court in admitting the written statement beyond 90 days without as­signing any reasons in the order had commit­ted manifest error. In support of the said sub­mission, he relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Mohammed Yusuf v. Faij Mohammad and others [2009 (3) Supreme Court Cases 513] : ((2009) 2 All LJ 185). 15. On the other hand, Sri U.K. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the opposite parties sub­mits that in Salem Advocate Bar Association : ( AIR 2005 SC 3353 ) (supra) and Smt. Rani Kusum : ( AIR 2005 SC 3304 ) (supra), the Apex Court has held that the provisions of Order VIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Pro­cedure are directory in nature and not man­datory. He submits that there is no laxity on the part of the opposite party No.1 since the very first day of filing of the suit, the oppo­site party No.1 is contesting the case. He submits that every time, the opposite party No.1has moved an application before the trial Court seeking further time for filing written statement and the exceptional reasons and circumstances beyond control to the Counsel of opposite party No.1 were also mentioned therein and the Trial Court after going through, the application and after application of mind, ... allowed the application, which of course, are f the reasoned orders. He also submits that on . three occasions, the trial Court imposed costs on the opposite party No.l, so it cannot be said that the trial was held up only because of non-filing of written statement. 16. Sri U.K. Srivastava further submits that this Court, vide order dated 17.11.2004 passed in F.A.F.O. No. 500 of 2003, directed the trial Court to decide the suit within ten months and further the appellant/defendant No.2/op- . posite party No.1 was directed to file its writ­ten statement within two weeks. He submits that the order dated 17.11.2004 was passed by this Court with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties and as such, there is, no occasion for the plaintiffs/revisionists to oppose the same before the trial Court and the trial Court also has no other option ex­cept to comply with the orders passed by this . Court. He submits that the order dated 17.11.2004 was passed by this Court with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties and as such, there is, no occasion for the plaintiffs/revisionists to oppose the same before the trial Court and the trial Court also has no other option ex­cept to comply with the orders passed by this . Court. Thus, the trial Court has committed no illegality by accepting the written state­ment as the order dated 25.5.2006 passed by the trial Court is a reasoned, just, proper anda legal order, which requires no interference. 17. In support of his submission, he has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the cases of Salem Advo­cate Bar Association : ( AIR 2005 SC 3353 ) (supra) and Rani Kusum (Smt.) : ( AIR 2005 SC 3304 ) (supra). 18. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the records. 19. The Code of Civil Procedure enacted in 1908 consolidated and amended the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature. It has undergone several amend­ments by several Acts of the Central and State Legislatures. Under Section 122, CPC the High Courts have power to amend by rules, the procedure laid down in the orders. In ex­ercise of these powers various amendments have been made in the orders by various HighCourts. Amendments have also been made keeping in view the recommendations of the Law Commission. Anxiety of Parliament as evident from the amendments is to secure an early and expeditious disposal of civil suits and proceedings without sacrificing the fair­ness of trial and the principles of natural jus­tice inbuilt in any sustainable procedure. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for enact­ing the Code of Civil Procedure (Amend­ment) Act, 1976 (104 of 1976) [hereinafter referred to as "1976 Amendment Act"] high­lights the following basic considerations in enacting the amendments: 5. (i) that a litigant should get a fair trial in accordance with the accepted principles of natural justice; (ii) that every effort should be made to expedite the disposal of civil suits and pro­ceedings, so that justice may not be delayed; (iii) that the procedure should not be com­plicated and should, to the utmost extent pos­sible, ensure fair deal to the poorer sections of the community who do not have the means to engage a pleader to defend their cases. 20. 20. By the 1999 Amendment Act the text of Order 8, Rule 1 was sought to be substi­tuted in a manner that the power of the court to extend the time for filing the written state­ment was so circumscribed as would not per­mit the time being extended beyond 30 days from the date of service of summons on the defendant. Due to resistance from the mem­bers of the Bar against enforcing such and similar other provisions sought to be intro­duced by way of amendment, the Amendment Act could not be promptly notified for en­forcement. The text of the provision in the present form has been introduced by the Amendment Act with effect from 1-7-2002. The purpose of such-like amendments is stated in the Statement of Objects and Rea­sons as "to reduce delay in the disposal of civil cases". 21. The Order 8, Rule 1, as it stands now, reads as under: 1. Written statement. -The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of ser­vice of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence: Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said pe­riod of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be speci­fied by the court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons. 22. Order 8 Rule 1 after the amendment casts an obligation on the defendant to file the written statement within 30 days from the date of service of summons on him and within the extended time falling within 90 days. The provision does not deal with the power of the court and also does not specifically take away the power of the court to take the written state­ment on record, though filed beyond the time, as provided for. Further, the nature of the pro­vision contained in Order 8, Rule 1 is proce­dural. It is not a part of the substantive law. Substituted Order 8, Rule 1 intends to curb the mischief of unscrupulous defendants adopting dilatory tactics, delaying the dis­posal of cases, causing inconvenience to the plaintiffs and the applicants approaching the court for quick relief and also the serious in­convenience of the court faced with frequent prayers for adjournments. The object is to expedite the hearing and not to scuttle the same. The object is to expedite the hearing and not to scuttle the same. While justice delayed may amount to justice denied, justice hurried may in some cases amount to justice buried. 23. All the rules of procedure are the handmaids of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of procedural law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to ad­vance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the pro­cess of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the stat­ute, the provisions of CPC or any other pro­cedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court help­less to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. 24. The procedural law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in Judges to act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly in­equitable. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence, processual, as much as substantive. No per­son has a vested right in any course of proce­dure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner for the time being by or for the court in which the case is pending, and if, by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. A procedural law should not ordinarily be con­strued as mandatory, the procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be followed. 25. It is also to be noted that though the power of the court under the proviso ap­pended to Rule 1 of Order 8 is circumscribed by the words "shall not be later than ninety days" but the consequences flowing from non-extension of time are not specifically pro­vided for though they may be read by neces­sary implication. Merely, because a provision of law is couched in a negative language im­plying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions. Merely, because a provision of law is couched in a negative language im­plying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions. The courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though worded in the negative form. 26. Challenge to the constitutional valid­ity of the Amendment Act and the 1999 Amendment Act was rejected by the Apex Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 189 . However, to work out modalities in respect of certain provisions a committee was constituted. Af­ter receipt of the committee's report the mat­ter was considered by Hon'ble three-Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Salem Advocate Bar Assocnn. v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353 . As regards Order 8 Rule 1 the committee's report is as follows: (SCC pp. 362-63, paras 15-18). "15. The question is whether the court has any power or jurisdiction to extend the pe­riod beyond 90 days. The maximum period of 90 days to file written statement has beenprovided but the consequences on failure to file written statement within the said period have not been provided for in Order 8, Rule 1. The point for consideration is whether the provision providing for maximum period of ninety days is mandatory and, therefore, the court is altogether powerless to extend the time even in an exceptionally hard case. 16. It has been common practice for the parties to take long adjournments for filing written statements. The legislature with a view to curb this practice and to avoid un­necessary delay and adjournments, has pro­vided for the maximum period within which the written statement is required to be filed. The mandatory or directory nature of Order 8, Rule 1 shall have to be determined by hav­ing regard to the object sought to be achieved by the amendment. It is, thus, necessary to find out the intention of the legislature. The consequences which may follow and whether the same were intended by the legislature have also to be kept in view. 17. In Raza Buland Sugar Co. It is, thus, necessary to find out the intention of the legislature. The consequences which may follow and whether the same were intended by the legislature have also to be kept in view. 17. In Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Mu­nicipal Board, Rampur [1965] 1 SCR 970 : ( AIR 1965 SC 895 ) a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the question whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory cannot be resolved by laying down any gen­eral rule and it would depend upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making out the provision is the determining factor. The purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case including the lan­guage of the provision, have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory. In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah [1955] 2 SCR 1 : ( AIR 1955 SC 425 ) considering the provisions of the Code deal­ing with the trial of suits, it was opined that: (SCR pp. 8-9)Now a Code of Criminal procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sec­tions that leaves no room for reasonable elas­ticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means de­signed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be con­demned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably pos­sible, in the light of that principle. [See: SK. Salim Haji Abdul Khyumsab v. Kumar, AIR 2006 SC 396 and R.N. Jadi & Bros. v. Subhashchandra, AIR 2007 SC 2571 ]." 27. In view of the reasons and circum­stances as well as the orders, which were passed by the trial court, after appreciating the evidence on record, whereby the defen­dant No.2's application was allowed and that of plaintiffs application was rejected, the case of Mohammed Yusuf ((2009) 2 All LJ 185) (supra), relied by the counsel for the revision­ist, has no application insofar as the Apex Court in the said case has held that the High Court should not have permitted filing of written statement in exercise of its writ juris­diction, whereas in the instant case, the trial Court had assigned sufficient and cogent rea­sons in support of its order. Moreover, in view of the aforesaid legal proposition, I find no infirmity in the impugned order. 28. The civil revision is dismissed. Revision dismissed.