ORDER This petitioner, who is the accused in case pending in C.C. No. 132 of 2006 on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu, seeks to quash the proceedings against him. A final report has been filed, which reads as follows: “The accused T. Sundarajan was working as the Managing Partner of Sr.Maruthi Finance and Investments at No. 11, Sannathi Street, Little Kancheepuram. During the period in between 1995 and 1996 the accused T. Sundarajan being the Managing Partner of the Sri Maruthi Finance and Investments with intention to cheat the public and other Co-partners had induced the public to deliver their money in the Finance for investments and committed criminal misappropriation of Finance funds to the tune of Rs. 9,14,540/- by directly took the sum of Rs. 4,00,000/- as a personal loan and use the same for his own purpose and not return this money to the members. He prepared 46 bogus loans and receipts to the name of 46 members and signed and forged the signatures of the said members and converted the amount for his own use and cheated the public and co-partners. Thereby the accused had committed the offences punishable under Section 420, 409, 468 and 471 IPC.” 2. Heard Mr. R. Shanmugasundaram, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. J.C. Durairaj, learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) appearing for the first respondent-State and also Mr. G.R. Swaminathan, learned counsel appearing for the defacto complainant/the second respondent. 3. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that though the charge sheet mentions that the petitioner prepared 46 bogus loans and receipts in the names of 46 members, signed and forged the signatures of the said members and thereby caused loss in a sum of Rs. 5,14,540/-, a perusal of the statements recorded during the course of investigation, shows that there is absolutely no material to substantiate the charge of usurping of funds through fabrication of documents. 4. The learned senior counsel submitted that even if it be admitted that the petitioner has misutilised the funds of the firm for his personal benefit, still no offence would be made out. The petitioner is a partner of a firm and as such, there was no occasion for misappropriation of funds. 4. The learned senior counsel submitted that even if it be admitted that the petitioner has misutilised the funds of the firm for his personal benefit, still no offence would be made out. The petitioner is a partner of a firm and as such, there was no occasion for misappropriation of funds. To attract an offence under Section 409 IPC, a person, in the capacity of a Public Servant, Merchant or Agent and entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property must have committed criminal breach of trust in respect thereof. In the instant case, the very complaint states that because of the petitioner’s act of usurping funds of the partnership, the depositors of the firm could not be repaid. 5. The learned senior counsel places strong reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 1965 SC 1433 : (1965) 1 MLJ (Crl) 519. The following discussion and findings in such Judgment usefully may be extracted at pp. 520, 521 and 522 of MLJ (Crl): “On behalf of the appellant it is contended that even if the prosecution had succeeded in showing that the four items referred to above were realised by the appellant and that he has not accounted for them properly he will not be liable for criminal breach of trust under Section 409 IPC but that his liability would be only of a civil nature. In support of this contention reliance is placed upon AIR 1951 Cal 69 (FB) : ILR (1952) 2 Cal 23. There the following question was referred for decision by the Full Bench: “Can a charge under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code be framed against a person, who, according to the complainant, is a partner with him and is accused of the offence in respect of property belonging to both of them as partners?” All the five Judges constituting the Full Bench answered the question in the negative. In the leading judgment which was delivered by HARRIS, C.J., he pointed out that before criminal breach of trust is established it must be shown that the person charged has been entrusted with property or with dominion over property and that a partner does not, in the ordinary course, hold property in a fiduciary capacity. In the leading judgment which was delivered by HARRIS, C.J., he pointed out that before criminal breach of trust is established it must be shown that the person charged has been entrusted with property or with dominion over property and that a partner does not, in the ordinary course, hold property in a fiduciary capacity. The learned Chief Justice further pointed out that there is really no distinct or defined share of a partner in any item belonging to the partnership. Upon the dissolution of the partnership and after an account is taken it may turn out that a partner who retains an asset is entitled to the whole of the asset and may be, much more. He referred to the English view that a partner does not hold money belonging to the partnership in a fiduciary capacity and said that this view appeared to him to be correct. Referring to the decision in Queen v. Okhoy Coomar Shaw, 13 Beng LR 307, in which a Full Bench had held that a partner who dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use any of the partnership property with which he is entrusted or over which he has dominion, is guilty of an offence under Section 405 IPC, HARRIS, C.J. observed: “The Full Bench never seems to have considered that there is really no partner’s share in the property until an account (sic) and it may well be that a partner, who retains an asset, is entitled not only to his share according to the partnership agreement in that asset, but, on taking an account, it may be found that he is entitled to the whole of the asset and considerably more. In such a case, how can it be said that he has been guilty of a breach of trust and has acted dishonestly towards his co-partners, if an account would show that he was entitled to everything which he had retained?” He has referred to a number of decisions of the Indian High Courts in some of which the view taken in Queen v. Okhoy Coomar Shaw (supra) was followed. One of those cases was AIR 1932 Bom 57, where it was held that a partner may be prosecuted under Section 406 IPC for failure to account for partnership monies and assets. One of those cases was AIR 1932 Bom 57, where it was held that a partner may be prosecuted under Section 406 IPC for failure to account for partnership monies and assets. In that case the partner who was the accused was given authority by the other partners to collect monies or property and according to the Bombay High Court in these circumstances he was “entrusted” with dominion over collections made by him. The learned Judges who decided that case had, however, pointed out that the Court should approach cases of this kind very carefully because it was impossible to say in many cases what the share of the accused might be, whether the accused was indebted to the firm or whether the firm was indebted to him. The High Court also pointed out that if the firm was indebted to him there might be no dishonest intention in his dealing with the partnership property. In the arguments before us, apart from these three decisions, our attention was called to a few more decisions of the High Courts in India. But whether they take one view or the other they do not seem to add to what has been said in these three decisions. We, therefore, do not feel called upon to make any reference to these decisions. It seems to us that the view taken in Buban Mohan Rana v. Surendra Mohan Das (supra), by the later Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court is the right one. Upon the plain reading of Section 405 IPC it is obvious that before a person can be said to have committed criminal breach of trust it must be established that he was either entrusted with or entrusted with dominion over property which he is said to have converted to his own use or disposed of in violation of any direction of law etc. Every partner has dominion over property by reason of the fact that he is a partner. This is a kind of dominion which every owner of property has over his property. But it is not dominion of this kind which satisfies the requirements of Section 405. In order to establish “entrustment of dominion” over property to an accused person the mere existence of that person’s dominion over property is not enough. It must be further shown that his dominion was the result of entrustment. But it is not dominion of this kind which satisfies the requirements of Section 405. In order to establish “entrustment of dominion” over property to an accused person the mere existence of that person’s dominion over property is not enough. It must be further shown that his dominion was the result of entrustment. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by HARRIS, C.J., the prosecution must establish that dominion over the assets or a particular asset of the partnership was, by a special agreement between the parties, entrusted to the accused person. If in the absence of such a special agreement a partner receives money belonging to the partnership he cannot be said to have received it in a fiduciary capacity or in other words cannot be held to have been “entrusted” with dominion over partnership properties.Mr. Chatterjee who appears for the respondent sought to show that here was special agreement in this case. According to him, by virtue of certain decisions taken at a meeting of the partners held on 7.1.1959, the appellant had been entrusted with the duty of making recoveries of monies from the debtors of the firm and, therefore, this was a case of specific entrustment. All that he could point out was Item No. 15 in the minutes of that meeting which runs thus: “Shri Veljibhai agrees to recover the monies due by Shri Kablasingh immediately and shall deposit the same with the Bankers of the firm.”He has, however, not been able to explain the next item in the minutes, the relevant portion of which runs thus: “(16) If in future any further moneys are required to be spent the same shall be spent out of the recoveries of the firm and no partner shall be bound or responsible to bring in any further money.” Reading the two together the meaning seems to be only this that as working partner the appellant should carry on the work of recovery of the dues of the partnership and that in respect of the dues from one Kablasingh it was decided that they should be deposited in the bank. It does not follow from this that any of the other partners was precluded from making the recoveries. Further, even if this is said to be a mandate to the appellant Item 16 authorises him to spend the money for the business of the partnership. It does not follow from this that any of the other partners was precluded from making the recoveries. Further, even if this is said to be a mandate to the appellant Item 16 authorises him to spend the money for the business of the partnership. That is to say, if the money was required for the business of the partnership it was not obligatory upon the appellant to deposit it in the bank. In our opinion, therefore, the appellant cannot be said to have been guilty of criminal breach of trust even with respect to the dues realised by him from Kablasingh and in not depositing them in the bank as alleged by the prosecution. Mr. Chatterjee finally contends that the act of the appellant will at least amount to dishonest misappropriation of property even though it may not amount to criminal breach of trust and, therefore, his conviction could be altered from one under Section 109 to that under Section 103, Section 103 runs thus: “Whoever dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use any movable property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” It is obvious that an owner of property in whichever way he uses his property and with whatever intention will not be liable for misappropriation and that would be so even if he is not the exclusive owner thereof. As already stated, a partner has, undefined ownership along with the other partner over all the assets of the partnership. If he chooses to use any of them for his own purposes he may be accountable civilly to the other partners. But he does not thereby commit any misappropriation. Mr. Chatterjee’s alternative contention must be rejected.” 6. On perusal of the papers, we find that the learned senior counsel is right in his contention of there being no material to substantiate the charge of usurping of funds through fabrication of documents. None of the witnesses examined in the course of investigation have spoken thereto. This takes us to, whether the petitioner could have committed an offence under Section 409 IPC. The petitioner has been entrusted or given dominion over property that belongs to the partnership firm. Undisputedly, the petitioner is a partner of the firm. None of the witnesses examined in the course of investigation have spoken thereto. This takes us to, whether the petitioner could have committed an offence under Section 409 IPC. The petitioner has been entrusted or given dominion over property that belongs to the partnership firm. Undisputedly, the petitioner is a partner of the firm. Whileso, he necessarily would be a part owner of the property entrusted to him or over which he has been given dominion. Whileso and particularly in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Velji Raghavji Patel v. State of Maharashtra (supra), he could not have committed any offence under Section 409 IPC in respect of such property. An offence under Section 420 IPC would stand committed only where the victim have been induced to deliver property by practice of deception. Here again, we find that there is nothing in the statement of witnesses that would reflect such position. In the result, none of the offences of which the petitioner stands charged are made out. 7. The proceedings in C.C. No. 132 of 2006 on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu shall stand quashed. The criminal original petition is ordered accordingly. Ordered accordingly.