J u d g m e n t:-The appellants are the accused charged with offences under Section 8(c) read with 21, 23, 28 and 29 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, (herein after referred as “NDPS Act”) for committing offences of conspiracy for illicit trafficking and possession of 21.100 kgs. heroin during the months of May and June 2001. 2.On the basis of an intelligence information gathered, on 26.6.01, the Senior Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligent Office, Tuticorin, after informing and obtaining prior permission from the higher officials, entered the residential premises at No.91 Munusamy Kovil Street, Tuticorin conducted searching. The appellant No.3 viz., Kamal Raj was present and was enquired and he produced a cement colour suitcase, which according to him was collected and carried by him from Chennai to Tuticorin on the instruction of the second appellant, viz., Mohammed Farook. The Senior Intelligence Officer, Tuticorin, on examination of the suitcase, found 8 plastic pockets containing brown colour powder, which answered positive for heroin under Narcotic Drug test kit and he seized 21.100 Kgs. Heroin, in the presence of independent witnesses. On information from the third appellant, the officers proceeded to the second appellant's resident at 8/162, Bala Thanduyutha Nagar, Rajapalayam, Tuticorin and similar search was conducted. On information from the second appellant, the first appellant was secured. The voluntary statements of the appellants were recorded by the Officers. The samples were subjected for chemical analysis and the appellants were arrested and a complaint Under Section 8(1)(c) read with 21,23,28 and 29 of the Act was filed before the Special District and Sessions NDPS Act, Madurai. The Senior Intelligence Officer investigated and laid the charge sheet for the offences as mentioned above. The Special District and Sessions Judge taking cognisance of the offence furnished copies of the documents and framed charges under Section 8(c) r/w 21,23, 28 and 29 of the Act and the appellants pleaded not guilty. To prove the charges, the prosecution examined six witnesses and produced 44 exhibits and 93 material objects. All the material objects are samples and pre-trial samples of the contraband, including photos and negatives. To prove the charges, the prosecution examined six witnesses and produced 44 exhibits and 93 material objects. All the material objects are samples and pre-trial samples of the contraband, including photos and negatives. 3.The case of the prosecution before the Special Judge was that during the month of May and June 2001, the appellants 1 to 3 along with one absconding accused Zahir Husasain and one Makin @ Babu Bai of Sri Lanka entered into a criminal conspiracy in Sri Lanka, Tuticorin, Chennai and at Rajasthan to do illicit trafficking of arranging, procuring, receiving, possessing, transporting and exporting heroin from India to Sri Lanka via Thoothukudi. In pursuant to such conspiracy, the first appellant who is the Sri Lankan national landed illegally at Tiruchendur in a fishing boat; he made a contact with one Zahir hussain of Tuticorin and stayed at a private hotel at Egmore, Chennai; on 18.06.2001, the said Zahir hussain met him at Chennai; on 24.06.2001, he received instruction from his Boss Makinan, to receive 20 kgs. of heroin transported in a truck from Rajasthan to Chennai, to be exported to Sri Lanka via Tuticorin; accordingly, he received a brown suitcase from the said truck and contacted Zahir hussain and handed over the same. As per his instruction, he went to Tuticorin and contacted the second appellant and stayed in a hotel. Meanwhile, on instruction from the second appellant, the third appellant went to Chennai and met Zahir hussain who handed over M.O.1, suitcase and he boarded a private bus and reached Tuticorin and was keeping the suitcase in his house. 4.On 26.06.2001, intelligence was gathered, the Senior Intelligence Officer intercepted, searched and seized the said heroin and arrested all the appellants and filed the charge-sheet. 5.To prove the prosecution theory, the Senior Intelligence Officer was examined as P.W.1. P.W.2 is the chemical examiner, who spoke about the examination of the sample, confirming it for heroin. P.W.3 is the owner of the private hotel at Egmore, who spoke about the first appellant's stay in his hotel. P.Ws.3, 4 and 5 are the Magazar witnesses, who turned hostile. P.W.6 is the Inspector, who received the sample for chemical analysis and deposited the same with the Forensic Department. 6.The learned Special Judge, NDPS, Madurai, relied on the sole evidence of the P.W.1, who is the Senior Intelligence Officer, who registered the case, investigated and laid the Complaint. P.Ws.3, 4 and 5 are the Magazar witnesses, who turned hostile. P.W.6 is the Inspector, who received the sample for chemical analysis and deposited the same with the Forensic Department. 6.The learned Special Judge, NDPS, Madurai, relied on the sole evidence of the P.W.1, who is the Senior Intelligence Officer, who registered the case, investigated and laid the Complaint. The learned Special Judge, also relied on the statement of the appellants given under Section 67 of the NDPS Act,(herein after referred as Act)as a statement made before the investigating officer and found that the offences has been committed under 8(1)(c) read with 21,23,28 and 29 of the Act and imposed the statutory punishment of R.I. for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs.1 lakh with default clause for each offence by his judgment dated 17.06.2004. 7.Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the appellants have preferred the present Criminal Appeal on various grounds and more particularly, on the ground that except the evidence of P.W.1, there is no other evidence available to implicate the appellants for the offence committed under the Act. It is also contended that except the statement of A1 to A3 given in the custody of the respondent no other materials are against them to prove the case of the prosecution. The third appellant's case is that his possession was not conscious possession. 8.Mr.S.Shanmugavelayudam, learned counsel for the appellants 1 and 2 submitted that the contraband was not seized form the appellants 1 and 2 and except the statement of co-accused, there is no evidence to implicate these appellants. The learned counsel pointed out that the statement recorded under Section 67 of the Act was obtained while in custody and therefore, conviction solely on the strength of the statement is not sustainable. The learned counsel pointed out that there is nothing to implicate the appellants 1 and 2. 9.Mr.K.Jaganathan, learned counsel for the third appellant submitted that the third appellant is only a carrier and even according to the prosecution, he has no knowledge about the contraband and therefore the conscious possession was not established. The learned counsel pointed out that in the statement under Section 67 of the Act, the third appellant had specifically stated that he was not told about the content of M.O.1 and this statement was corroborated by the statement of the second appellant, under whose instruction, he received the suitcase. The learned counsel pointed out that in the statement under Section 67 of the Act, the third appellant had specifically stated that he was not told about the content of M.O.1 and this statement was corroborated by the statement of the second appellant, under whose instruction, he received the suitcase. According to the learned counsel, the second appellant had also stated that the third appellant had no knowledge and he was not told about the content of the suitcase. The learned counsel pointed out that in the absence of conscious possession, the appellant is entitled for acquittal. The learned counsel also pointed out that no independent witnesses were examined to prove the seizure. 10.The learned counsel relied on a decision reported in 2004 Crimes (3) 29 SC (Narcotics Control Bureau, Jodhpur Vs. Murlidhar Soni and others) wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows: “...The High Court in the course of its judgment has observed that the alleged statements of these accused persons purportedly made under Section 67 of the Act were obtained under duress. 9.We are in agreement with this finding of the High Court. It is to be noted that even though these accused persons were arrested on 24.09.1994, they were produced before the court only on 27.09.1994 on which date both the accused submitted before the Court that they had suffered injuries at the hands of the investigating agency and it is under such physical threat their statement were recorded under Section 67 of the Act. The said court had directed a medical examination of these accused on that day itself. The medical report and the evidence of Dws.1 and 2, the doctors who examined them, clearly shows that these accused had suffered injuries and Murlidhar Soni had actually suffered a fracture of the 10th left rib. The defence of the prosecution that these injuries might have been suffered by an accidental fall of the accused, cannot be accepted, thus, we are in agreement with the finding of the High Court that the statements of these accused persons have been obtained by the prosecuting agency under duress. The defence of the prosecution that these injuries might have been suffered by an accidental fall of the accused, cannot be accepted, thus, we are in agreement with the finding of the High Court that the statements of these accused persons have been obtained by the prosecuting agency under duress. ...” 11.Mr.S.Arul Vadivel @ Sekar, learned Special Public Prosecutor of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, would submit that the Trial Court has rightly considered the evidence of the Investigating Officer and the statement recorded under Section 67 of the Act is admissible in evidence as held by the Supreme Court as well as by the High Courts and therefore, the conviction based on the voluntary statement of the accused is sustainable in law. The learned counsel also pointed out that the third appellant was in possession of the contraband and therefore, he cannot now claim that he has no knowledge about the content in the suitcase and the conscious possession was proved by the prosecution. 12.The learned Special Public Prosecutor relied on a decision reported in AIR 2008 SC 1044 (Kanhaiyala V. Union of India) wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows: “...Since it has been held by this Court that an officer for the purposes of Section 67 of the NDPS Act read with Section 42 thereof, is not a police officer, the bar under Sections 24 and 27 of the Evidence Act cannot be attracted and the statement made by a person directed to appear before the officer concerned may be relied upon as a confessional statement against such person. Since a conviction can be maintained solely on the basis of a confession made under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, we see no reason to interfere with the conclusion of the High Court convicting the appellant.” 13.The learned counsel also relied on another decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 2003 SC 4311 (M.Prabhulal V. Assistant Director, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence) wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows: “...Under these circumstances, the confessional statements cannot be held to be involuntary. The statements were voluntarily made and can thus, be made the basis of appellants' conviction.” and also held as “...On the facts of the case recovery cannot be doubted for want of non examination of independent witnesses.” 14.The learned Special Public Prosecutor further relied AIR 2003 SC 3184 (Megh Singh V. State of Punjab) wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows: “...Coming to the plea of conscious possession it was held that the prosecution had produced ample evidence that accused was in physical possession and in terms of S.54 of the Act conscious possession was presumed unless proved to the contrary. Accused has failed to do so. Therefore, conscious possession was established. Accordingly the appeal filed by the accused was dismissed. ...” 15.Heard both sides and carefully considered the contentions and also perused the records. 16.The case of the prosecution is that on receipt of the intelligence report under Ex.A1, the Senior Intelligence officer, P.W.1, searched and seized 21.100 kgs of Heroin in M.O.1 suitcase from the third appellant at his house. The information gathered from the third appellant lead to the search of the second appellant's house. The second appellant's information lead to the arrest of the first appellant. Later all the three appellants were taken to the DRI office and their statements were recorded under the said Act. The entire prosecution case is relied on the evidence of P.W.1, who is the complainant and the investigating officer and also on the statement of the appellants under Section 67 of the Act. 17.Mr.K.Jaganathan, learned counsel for the third appellant would submit that there is no conscious possession on the part of the third appellant, who is alleged to be the carrier of the contraband from the Chennai to Tuticorin. 17.Mr.K.Jaganathan, learned counsel for the third appellant would submit that there is no conscious possession on the part of the third appellant, who is alleged to be the carrier of the contraband from the Chennai to Tuticorin. 54.Presumption from possession of illicit articles.-In trials under this Act, it may be presumed, unless and until the contrary is proved, that the accused has committed an offence under this Act in respect of - (a)any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance; (b)any opium poppy, cannabis plant or coca plant growing on any land which he has cultivated; (c)any apparatus specially designed or any group of utensils specially adopted for the manufacture of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance; or (d)any materials which have undergone any process towards the manufacture of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance, or any residue left of the materials from which any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance has been manufactured, for the possession of which he fails to account satisfactorily.” 18.Section 21 relates to an offence for possession of such contraband and it is well settled that in order to make possession illicit there must be a conscious possession. A mere possession without awareness of the nature of such possession offence under Section 21 is not attracted. The Supreme Court in AIR 2003 SC 3184 (Megh Singh Vs State Of Punjab)had dealt with possession and conscious possession. The Supreme Court has held in “13.Once possession is established the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it, because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of S.54 where also presumption is available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles. This position was highlighted in Madan Lal and Anr. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2003(6) SCALE 483).” 19.Therefore, whether there was a conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. 20.In the present case, the third appellant was directed by the second appellant to go to Chennai and meet one Zahir Husain and bring a parcel that he would be handed over at Chennai. He was paid a sum of Rs.1,500/-. 20.In the present case, the third appellant was directed by the second appellant to go to Chennai and meet one Zahir Husain and bring a parcel that he would be handed over at Chennai. He was paid a sum of Rs.1,500/-. The third appellant, who is a casual labourer went to Chennai and contacted the said Zahir Husain, who directed him to wait at the private bus transport office and gave him MO.1 and a ticket for Tuticorin. The third appellant boarded the bus with suitcase and came to his house at Tuticorin. According to P.W.1 he enquired the third appellant whether he was keeping any contraband in his house for which he narrated his acquaintance with the second appellant; on his direction, making a visit to Chennai; meeting his brother; receiving a suitcase and keeping it in his house to be handed over to the second appellant. According to P.W.1, the third appellant produced M.O.1 and on opening of the suitcase he found the contraband. Ex.P.5 is a statement given by third appellant under Section 67 of the Act. The appellant had stated that “mr;rkaj;jpy; mjpfhhpfs; vd;Dila tPl;ow;F te;J nghij bghUs; vJt[k; cs;sjh vd;W tprhhpj;jhh;fs;. ehd; brd;idapy; ,Ue;J vLj;J te;j R{l;nfir mjpfhhpfsplk; xg;giljnjd;. Mdhy; mjpy; nghijg; bghUs; ,Ug;gJ vdf;Fj; bjhpahJ.”” 21.The deponent had denied the knowledge about the content of the suitcase. Ex.P.6 is the statement given by the second appellant under Section 67 of the Act. He had stated as follows: “Mdhy; nkw;go fkhy;uh$plk; R{l;nfrpy; bcwuapd; vd;w nghij bghUs; ,Ug;gij ehd; brhy;ytpy;iy.”” 22.Therefore, if the statement under Section 67 of the Act, given by second and third appellants is considered to be voluntary and reliable then the statement has to be accepted in whole and the benefit has to be given to the third appellant regarding the knowledge about the content of the M.O.1. It is a categorical statement of the second appellant that he did not tell the third appellant about the contents of M.O.1. Similarly, the third appellant would state that as directed he received the suitcase and brought the suitcase to Tuticorin for delivery to the second appellant. As stated earlier only a conscious possession will attract Section 21 of the Act and possession is accounted for under section 54 of the Ac. 23.I am of the considered view the third appellant is not coming under the category of a person having conscious possession. As stated earlier only a conscious possession will attract Section 21 of the Act and possession is accounted for under section 54 of the Ac. 23.I am of the considered view the third appellant is not coming under the category of a person having conscious possession. That being so, he has not committed any offence under Section 8(c)r/w 21,23,28 and 29 of NDPS Act. 24.Now coming to the case of the prosecution against the appellants, the trial court has relied on the sole evidence of P.W.1 and statements given by the appellants. The Mahazar witnesses for recovery had turned hostile. As observed earlier the possession was with the third appellant and there was no conscious possession. Therefore only the exculpatory statements of the appellants are available to prove the involvement of the appellants. P.W.1., the sole witness to the prosecution, has spoken about these statements. The statements are marked as Ex.A5, A6 and A9 through him. All these statements were recorded by one Sebastin who is an Intelligence Officer, DRI, Tuticorin. P.W.1 has signed in all the statements endorsing 'before me'. 25.In 2008(4) SCC 668 (kanhaiyalal v union of india)the Supreme Court has held that the statement made under Section 67 of NDPS Act before the officers under the Act is admissible in evidence and conviction based on such statement is sustainable. 26.The statement under Section 67 of the Act is different from a confession coming under Section 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the Indian Evidence Act while the former is admissible the later confessions are inadmissible. 27.The statement recorded under Section 67 of the Act is the only piece of evidence relied on by the trial court to prove the guilt of the accused. The person who recorded the statement of the appellants had made an endorsement as follows: “Statement recorded by me as deposed by the deponent read to him and accepted by the deponent that the statement is recorded as deposed by him. Sd/- Sebastin Intelligence Officer, DRI, Tuticorin.” P.W.1 has put his signature stating 'before me." 28.P.W.1 would state in his evidence that on 26.06.2001, all the appellants were brought to the office of DRI, Tuticorin and one Sebastin, Intelligence Officer, recorded the statements. P.W.1 would state that “gpd;dh; 3tJ vjphpia tprhuiz bra;J 26.06.2001k; njjp tprhuiz bra;J mth; mspj;j thf;F Kyj;ij vdf;F fPH; gzpg[hpa[k; jpU.b$g!;od; g[ydha;t[ mjpfhhp gjpt[ bra;jhh;. P.W.1 would state that “gpd;dh; 3tJ vjphpia tprhuiz bra;J 26.06.2001k; njjp tprhuiz bra;J mth; mspj;j thf;F Kyj;ij vdf;F fPH; gzpg[hpa[k; jpU.b$g!;od; g[ydha;t[ mjpfhhp gjpt[ bra;jhh;. 3tJ vjphp fky;uh$k; jd; ifg;gl thf;FKyk; ehd; brhy;y brhy;y mjpfhhpahy; vGj;g;gl;lJ vd mth; ifahy; vGjp mth; ifbaGj;J bra;jpUf;fpwhh;. thf;FKyj;ij gjpt[ bra;j mjpfhhpa[k; mjpy; ifbahg;gk; ,l;oUf;fpwhh;. me;j thf;FKyk; vd;dhy; gjpt[ bra;ag;gl;lJ vd;W vGjp vd;Dila ifbahg;gj;ij ,l;oUf;fpnwd;. me;j thf;FKyk; m.rh.M.5. gpd;dh; 26.6.2001k; njjpad;W 2tJ vjphp ghUf;if tprhuiz bra;njd;. mth; mspj;j thf;FKyj;ij vd; fPH; gzpbra;a[k; b$g!;Od;/ g[ydha;t[ mjpfhhp gjpt[ bra;jhh;. gjpt[ bra;jjw;fhf mtUk; jd;Dila ifbahg;gj;ij ,l;oUf;fpwhh;. thf;FKyj;ij goj;J fhz;gpj;J rhpahf ,Uf;fpwJ vd;W mth; xg;g[f;bfhz;lhh;. vd; Kd;dhy; gjpt[ bra;ag;gl;lJ vd ehd; vGjp ifbaGj;J bra;jpUf;fpnwd;. me;j thf;FKyk; m.rh.M.6. ....” 29.Recording of statement under Section 67 of the Act is not an empty formality. The evidentiary value of a statement under Section 67 of the Act stands above any other statement recorded by any police officer. The courts have held that such statement is admissible in evidence and a conviction solely based on such statement is sustainable. 30.Section 67 of the Act reads as follows: "67.Power to call for information, etc.,-Any officer referred to in Section 42 who is authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or a State Government may, during the course of any enquiry in connection with the contravention of any provision of this Act,- (a)call for information from any person for the purpose of satisfying himself whether there has been any contravention of the provisions of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder; (b)require any person to produce or deliver any document or things useful or relevant to the enquiry; (c)examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case." 31.Therefore, the officer referred under section 42 of the Act is empowered to call for information and examine any person. If that person makes a statement before that officer, and if it is reduced in to writing, it becomes a statement admissible in evidence. The officer, who gathered any information or examined any person who contravened the provisions of the Act or acquainted with the facts and circumstances the case, said to have gathered the primary evidence. The recorded statement becomes the corroborative evidence. The officer who has recorded the statement alone can speak about the statement and then only the statement is said to be proved. The recorded statement becomes the corroborative evidence. The officer who has recorded the statement alone can speak about the statement and then only the statement is said to be proved. If the officer, referred under section 42 has recorded the statement, and endorsed “Statement recorded by me as deposed by the deponent read to him and accepted by the deponent that the statement is recorded as deposed by him" it is required to be proved only through the officer who had recorded the same. 32.The non examination of the person who actually recorded, as deposed by the deponent, is not explained by the prosecution. In my considered view, he is the right person to prove the statement recorded under Section 67 of the Act. Though there is no impediment for P.W.1, who received the intelligence information, to exercise the power under sections 42; lodge a complaint; investigate; and depose as a sole witnesses for the prosecution, he can not stated to be the officer who recorded the statements which are marked as Ex.P.5,6 and Ex.P9. 33.No doubt, trafficking in narcotic substance is a heinous crime and deserves to be punished with severe sentence. But at the same time, the prosecution cannot casually mark a statement and try to prove the guilt of the accused on the sole evidence of P.W.1. Indisputably, the statement made under section 67 of the Act is admissible but, that piece of corroborative evidence has to be proved by the officer empowered under section 42 of the Act who recorded the same. Mere signing with a caption 'before me' by the investigating officer, who has not even stated that it was recorded on his direction, will not give any sanctity to the statement or is not enough to prove the statement. Such casual marking of the document by the investigating officer, a solo player, will only amount to mere marking of a document and nothing more. 34.In an unreported judgment in Crl.A. No.1397 of 2007, (Union of India Vs.Bal Mukund &others) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: "27.Exhibits 20 and 21 categorically show that they were interrogated. If they were interrogated while they were in custody, it cannot be said that they had made a voluntary statement which satisfies the conditions precedent laid down under Section 67 of the Act. If they were interrogated while they were in custody, it cannot be said that they had made a voluntary statement which satisfies the conditions precedent laid down under Section 67 of the Act. We, in the backdrop of the aforementioned events, find it difficult to accept that such statements had been made by them although they had not been put under arrest. As the authorities under the Act can always show that they had not formally been arrested before such statements were recorded, a holistic approach for the aforementioned purpose is necessary to be taken" 35.In 2008 9 SCALE 681 (Noor Aga Vs. State of Punjab and another) wherein it was held as "29.The court while weighing the evidentiary value of such a statement cannot lose sight of ground realities. Circumstances attendant to making of such statements should, in our considered opinion, be taken into consideration. 30.Concededly, the Act provides for a stringent punishment. We, for the purpose of this case, shall proceed on the assumption, as has been contended by Mr.Singh, that the prosecution need not examine any independent witness although requirements therefor cannot be minimized. (See Ritesh Chakeravarthy V. State of Madhya Pradesh JT 2006(12) SC 416 and Noor Agra (Supra)) 31.Where a statute confers such drastic powers and seeks to deprive a citizen of its liberty for not less than ten years, and making stringent provisions for grant of bail, scrupulous compliance of the statutory provisions must be insisted upon" 36.In 2006 13 SCC 210 (Francis Stanly Alias Stalin V. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, Thiruvananthapuram) the Supreme Court has held as follows: "15.We are of the opinion that while it is true that a confession made before an officer of the Department of Revenue Intelligence under the NDPS Act may not be hit by Section 25 in view of the aforesaid decisions, yet such a confession must be subject to closer scrutiny than a confession made to private citizens or officials who do not have investigating powers under the Act. Hence the alleged confession made by the same appellant must be subjected to closer scrutiny than would otherwise be required. Hence the alleged confession made by the same appellant must be subjected to closer scrutiny than would otherwise be required. 16.We have carefully perused the facts of the present case, and we are of the opinion that on the evidence of this particular case it would not be safe to maintain the conviction of the appellant, and he must be given the benefit of reasonable doubt." 37.In 2007 6 SCC 410 (Ravindran Alias John Vs. Superintendent of Customs wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows: "19.... The confessional statement of a co-accused could not be used as substantive evidence against the co-accused." In my considered view, the statement made under section 67 has to be recorded by the competent Authority. (i)As far as possible the statement should be written in the own hand-writing of the informant or the deponent and the Officer who examines must certify that the statement was written by the deponent himself in his presence. (ii)If the deponent is an ill-literate, the Officer, who examines the deponent may record the statement and after getting the signature from the deponent he shall certify as “Statement recorded by me as deposed by the deponent read to him and accepted by the deponent that the statement is recorded as deposed by him" (iii)The statement has to be proved only by the above said officers, who certified or recorded the statement. 38.Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case before me, I am of the considered view, that the purported confessions made by the appellants herein could not in the absence of other corroboration form the basis of conviction. 39.As stated earlier, when the conviction is based on the statement under Section 67 of the Act, it requires a strict proof of the same. The prosecution cannot casually mark a document and it has to be proved in the manner known to law. 40.In the earlier part of this judgment, this Court found that the third appellant has no conscious possession of the contraband and such finding was inferred on the statement of the second and third appellants. The third appellant would state that he had no knowledge about the content and the second appellant would state that he has not told the third appellant about the content of M.O.1. The third appellant would state that he had no knowledge about the content and the second appellant would state that he has not told the third appellant about the content of M.O.1. Under section 54 of the Act, if the accused fails to account for the possession, it is presumed that he had committed an offence under the Act. The term 'conscious possession' is the interpretation of the term 'possession' by judicial pronouncements. Incorporating such beneficial or technical terms in the alleged statement under Section 67 of the Act which would ultimately benefit the accused, creates a doubt. It is natural for the third appellant to state that he had no knowledge about the content of the M.O.1. But what prompted the second appellant to state that he had not told the third appellant about the content in M.O.1? When such statements creates a doubt, the statement requires to be proved by the person who recorded the same. 41.The non-examination of the officer who recorded the statement, as deposed by the deponent, is fatal to the prosecution and makes the statement inadmissible. The learned Special Judge, Madurai has based his conviction only on the evidence of P.W.1 and on the statement recorded under Section 67 of the Act. When the corroborative evidence looses it value, evidence of the sole witness can not be relied on. 42.In that event, the finding of the Special Judge, Madurai, based on the sole evidence of P.W.1 is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 46.In the result, the criminal appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence against the appellants are set aside. The appellants are acquitted from all the charges. Consequently, connected M.Ps. are closed.