JUDGMENT : K.M. THAKER, J. 1. The above mentioned group of Appeals is directed against the common award dated 1st April, 2006 passed by the M.A.C. Tribunal (Main), Kheda at Nadiad in M.A.C.P. Nos. 1823 of 1992 to 1831 of 1992 whereby the learned Tribunal has, while passing award in favour of the claimants and awarding compensation at the rates mentioned in the award, exonerated the insurance company from the liability to pay the compensation and passed the award against the opponent Nos.1 and 2. 1.1 So far as the above mentioned group of writ petitions is concerned, the said writ petitions also arise from the above mentioned common award dated 1st April, 2006. The petitions have been preferred against the award in connection with M.A.C.P. Nos. 1834 of 1992 to 1847 of 1992 because the claim amounts awarded by the learned Tribunal in the said cases i.e. M.A.C.P. Nos. 1834 of 1992 to 1847 of 1992, as stated by the petitioners are less than Rs. 10,000/-. The writ petitions have been preferred with the same grievance and for same relief. 2. In view of the aforesaid position, the appellants and the writ petitioners are, for the sake of convenience, referred to as "the claimants" which would also include the original claimant and their heirs/legal representatives as well as the victim of the accident. 3. From the challenge raised in the appeals and the petitions and contentions in support of the challenge, it emerges that the claimants are aggrieved by the impugned award, only to the limited extent by which the learned Tribunal has exonerated the insurance company. There is no grievance and/or challenge made out from the side of the claimants so far as the quantification of the compensation is concerned. 4. Even during hearing of the appeals and the writ petitions, learned advocate Mr. Devnani representing the claimants, has not made any submission and/or raised any contention with reference to the quantification of the compensation. 5. Earlier, the writ petitions were placed for hearing in January, 2009 when the Court was pleased to pass below mentioned order on 15th January, 2009. "Learned advocate Shri Dharmesh Devnani for the petitioners states that against some of the awards arising out of the common judgment, the claimants have filed First Appeals which are pending before this Court at the stage of delay condonation. "Learned advocate Shri Dharmesh Devnani for the petitioners states that against some of the awards arising out of the common judgment, the claimants have filed First Appeals which are pending before this Court at the stage of delay condonation. These petitions be placed along with the connected matters being C.A. No.6335 of 2008 in First Appeal (St.) No.4552 of 2007 and allied matters." 6. Subsequently, the appeals and the writ petitions were heard on 7th April, 2010 and after hearing the learned advocate for the claimants, following order was passed on 7th April, 2010. "Heard Mr. Devnani, learned advocate for the appellants/petitioners. He has submitted that as per the orders passed in another Civil Application, additional parties at Nos. 2/1 and 2/2 have been brought on record. He has further submitted that subsequently, it in- formed by the opponent that No.2/2 was not one of the partners hence, his name has been deleted in view of the order dated 1st October, 2009. Therefore, now only No.2/1, besides opponent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, survives as the additional party to the proceedings who has been impleaded by virtue of the order passed in Civil Application Nos.215 to 223 of 2009. Issue Notice returnable on 19th April, 2010. Direct service is permitted today. The appellants shall effect the direct service to the insurance company on or before 13th April, 2010. The direct service to be handed over to the appellants today itself. The appellants/petitioners will take all necessary steps to ensure that the notice is served to the insurance company as specified above." 7. After the said order dated 7th April, 2010, the writ petitions and the appeals were heard at length on 19th April, 2010 i.e. today. Mr. Devnani, learned advocate, has appeared for the claimants in all appeals/writ petitions and Mr. Parikh, learned advocate, has appeared for the respondent Nos. 2, 2.1. As per the order dated 7th April, 2010, the respondent No. 2, 2.2 has been deleted. 8. Heard the learned counsel for the respective parties. 9. Mr. Devnani, learned advocate for the claimants, has submitted that about 22 claim petitions were filed by the claimants. The claimants had prayed for compensation in view of the injuries sustained or on account of death of their respective sons, daughters or spouse due to the vehicular accident which occurred on 17th February, 1992. 9. Mr. Devnani, learned advocate for the claimants, has submitted that about 22 claim petitions were filed by the claimants. The claimants had prayed for compensation in view of the injuries sustained or on account of death of their respective sons, daughters or spouse due to the vehicular accident which occurred on 17th February, 1992. He submitted that though the learned Tribunal has accepted and allowed the claims petitions, the insurance company has been exonerated. It is the said decision which is challenged in these appeals and petitions. Whether the decision of the learned tribunal to exonerate the insurance company is just and correct is the issue on hand. Mr. Devanani submitted that the learned tribunal has committed error in exonerating the insurance company. He also assailed the finding that the victims were traveling in goods vehicles. He submitted that the victims were owners of the goods and had paid fare. Besides other contentions opposing the claim petitions, the insurance company mainly contested the claim petitions on the ground that the vehicle in question was a goods carriage and the claimants or the victims were traveling in the offending vehicle as passengers in goods carriage and that therefore, the insurance company had no liability to pay the compensation. 10. It comes out from the record that the claimants had fixed the fare for going in Eisher tempo bearing registration No. GJ.7.T.8123. The claimants alleged that the driver of the tempo was driving the tempo with excessive speed and in rash and negligent manner. The driver lost the control and the tempo dashed on the road side and turned turtle in a drainage. In this accident, some of the passengers died and some suffered serious injuries. The heirs/legal representatives of the deceased passengers traveling in the tempo who died on account of the said accident and the passengers who had suffered injuries, preferred the claim petitions. The claimants advanced the claims under diverse heads including loss of future income, loss of estate, medicines, medical treatment, special diet, attendance charges, pain, shock and suffering. etc. The opponents appeared and resisted the claim petitions. 11. The opponent insurance company not only denied the claim and disputed such obligation to pay the compensation, but also denied the factual details averred in the claim petitions. etc. The opponents appeared and resisted the claim petitions. 11. The opponent insurance company not only denied the claim and disputed such obligation to pay the compensation, but also denied the factual details averred in the claim petitions. The insurance company also denied the allegations that the driver of the tempo was driving the tempo in rash and negligent manner and the accident occurred due to negligence of the driver of the tempo. The insurance company denied its liability on the ground that it had no liability to pay compensation in respect of the persons traveling in goods vehicle as passengers. 12. The learned tribunal, after recording the evidence and upon conclusion of the sub- missions of the contesting parties, came to the conclusion that the death and/or the injuries occurred on account of the vehicular accident in which the vehicle - tempo bearing registration No. GJ.7.T.8123 was involved and that they were entitled for compensation. On the basis of the evidence on record and after analysis of the documentary and oral evidence, the learned tribunal quantified the compensation in respect of each of the claims/petitions. The conclusion that the death and injuries occurred due to the accident by the vehicle tempo No. GJ.7.T.8123 in which the concerned persons were travelling and that the claimants are entitled for the compensation and the decision regarding quantification has culminated into the impugned award dated 1st April, 2006. The conclusions regarding factum of accident, the conclusion that death/accident occurred due to accident, the entitlement and/or quantification are not under challenge. 13. It is pertinent that the learned advocate for the appellants-petitioners has empathetically stipulated that neither the owner of the vehicle nor the insurance company has challenged the award and/or any of the conclusions and directions-either regarding entitlement or quantification and even regarding factum and/or cause of accident and involvement of the vehicle. In view of the fact that the insurance company has been, as aforesaid, exonerated, there is no question of any challenge against the award by the insurance company even as regards the quantification. 14. In view of the fact that the insurance company has been, as aforesaid, exonerated, there is no question of any challenge against the award by the insurance company even as regards the quantification. 14. The fact that the award is, (as asserted by the learned advocate of the claimants) not challenged even by the owner of the vehicle, translates into the fact-situation that the rate of compensation determined by the learned tribunal the fact regarding age and/or the income of the victim and such other relevant details of the concerned persons, as accepted by the learned tribunal, are not in dispute. 15. Mr. Parikh, learned advocate, who has entered appearance on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2, 2.1, has not disputed the claimants assertion that the award has not been challenged by the owner of the vehicle. 16. Before proceeding further, it needs to be noted that the learned tribunal has recorded finding of fact, on the basis of the evidence obtaining on record, that the concerned persons were traveling to attend pre-marriage ritual ceremony called "Mamera". The learned tribunal has recorded that the claimants asserted that the concerned persons were traveling with their goods as owner or the representatives of the owners of the goods. However, in view of the details recorded in the Panchnama, the learned tribunal has not accepted the said version of the claimants and has proceeded on the premise that the persons were traveling to attend marriage ceremony and/or that they were traveling with personal or household goods. In this regard, following observations by the learned tribunal is required to be noted. "99. No doubt the applicants in their oral evidence have stated that they had boarded with their goods either mango or Bajari. However, in this regard Mr. Malek has drawn my attention to copy of panchnama at Exh. 154 wherein the description of the place of incident after occurrence has been mentioned and factum of attending Mamera is supported by the averments referred in panchnama at Exh.154 because therein it has been mentioned that new clothes, saries and utensils were lying here and there at the place of incident and nowhere it has been found any bundle of Bajari or mango fruits as stated by the applicants. Therefore, Mr. Therefore, Mr. Malek has contended before me that the case of applicants have that they had boarded in the offending vehicle along with their respective goods as stated by them in examination-in-chief is not correct and supported by the contents of panchnama of place of incident and on the contrary the contents of F.I.R. at Exh.153 all the applicants had boarded in the offending vehicle to attend Mamera noticed fully corroborated from the contents of panchnama at Exh. 154 because there is a reference about articles of Mamera specially new cloth, saries, household utensils like basket and sanitary articles of household goods." 17. It appears from the record that some of the witnesses have come on record stating that some of the concerned persons were traveling with vegetables, some with basket of bajra and some with basket of mangoes. The learned counsel for the appellants writ petitioners has not been able to point out any evidence from the record which would assist him in successfully assailing the conclusions recorded by the learned tribunal in para- 99. He could only refer to the statements of some of the witnesses, who claimed that the person concerned/in respect of whom the witness was giving evidence, was traveling with basket of vegetable or bajra or mango. 18. On analysis of the evidence of witnesses and examination of the material on record, it does not appear that the learned tribunal has committed any error in holding that the passengers in the offending vehicle were traveling with household or personal articles and/or were traveling to attend the Mamera. At this stage, reference to the observations and conclusions recorded by the learned tribunal in para 98 of the judgment under the heading "liability", are relevant. The learned tribunal has observed that : "98. Now so far as liability is concerned, Learned advocate Mr. Malek for the insurance company has vehemently argued that it is an admitted fact that the offending vehicle was a goods tempo and goods carrier, as it reveals from Panchnama Exh.154 and copy of insurance policy Exh.157 wherein the of fending vehicle in question referred as public carrier. Not only that according to Mr. Malek as per contents of F.I.R. Exh.153, the tempo in question is referred as goods carries and all the applicants have stated that they have boarded in the tempo in question along with their goods. Therefore, according to Mr. Not only that according to Mr. Malek as per contents of F.I.R. Exh.153, the tempo in question is referred as goods carries and all the applicants have stated that they have boarded in the tempo in question along with their goods. Therefore, according to Mr. Malek it is undisputed fact that the offending vehicle was public carrier meant for carrying goods. He has then drawn my attention, contents of F.I.R. Exh.153 wherein it has been categorically mentioned that all the applicants had boarded in the offending vehicle for attending Mamera of their relatives and this F.I.R. is produced by the applicants themselves. Therefore the applicants are bound to contents thereof. Thus in view of these position, Mr. Malek has contended that the applicants had boarded in the offending vehicle as passengers for attending Mamera at village Agarva, therefore the vehicle in question has been used in contravention of the terms and conditions of the policy permit. Therefore, under these circumstances, the insurance company will not be responsible for any amount of damages." (Emphasis supplied) 19. At this stage, reference also needs to be made to the findings recorded, on the basis of material (in particular the FIR and the Panchnama) on record, by the learned tribunal in para 100 which read thus:- "100............ With due regard, I do not find any submission of Mr. Gohel for the simple reasons that as it reveals from the F.I.R., it was produced by applicants themselves all the applicants had boarded in the offending vehicle for attending Mamera and that fact finds corroboration from the thing noticed after incident at the place of the accident in panchnama at Exh.154 where from it transpires that the household utensils and new cloth meant for Mamera were found and no signal bundle or grain of mango pleaded as stated by applicants is noticed in the panchnama. Therefore, in my opinion the submission of Mr. Malek is well founded and supported by Apex Court (supra), the insurance company cannot be held responsible for applicants. In the result, I constrained in exonerate the insurance company opponent No.3 and only opponent Nos. 1 and 2 are held responsible for the amount of compensation awarded to the applicants. Accordingly, I decide issue Nos.1 and 2." (Emphasis supplied) 20. Thus, the F.I.R. and the panchnama also do not aid the claimant's contentions. In the result, I constrained in exonerate the insurance company opponent No.3 and only opponent Nos. 1 and 2 are held responsible for the amount of compensation awarded to the applicants. Accordingly, I decide issue Nos.1 and 2." (Emphasis supplied) 20. Thus, the F.I.R. and the panchnama also do not aid the claimant's contentions. As noted by the tribunal, at the scene of the accident any baggage/basket of bajra or grain or mangoes or vegetables was not found. In the F.I.R., it was specifically mentioned that the concerned persons had boarded as passengers to go to village Agarva to attend "Mamera". They were also carrying material for "Mamera". 20.1 In this context, it is appropriate at this stage to take into account the definition of the term "goods" under Section 2(13) which reads thus: "2(13) "goods" includes livestock, and anything (other than equipment ordinarily used with the vehicle) carried by a vehicle except living persons, but does not include luggage or personal effects carried in a motor car or in a trailer attached to a motor car or the personal luggage of passengers travelling in the vehicle;" As per the said definition, the personal luggage of passengers travelling in the vehicle is not included in the definition of goods. Thus, when the deceased or injured persons were travelling as "passengers" and they were indisputably travelling in goods carriage and when the "goods" are found to be "luggage of passengers" then the conclusion by the learned Tribunal and the impugned award cannot be faulted. 21. Having regard to the contents of F.I.R., the material found or rather not found at the scene of evidence, the panchnama, etc. and the provision under Section 2(13), it is not possible to hold that the learned tribunal committed any error in concluding that the persons travelled in a goods carriage and they travelling as "passengers", (in goods carriage) with luggage or personal effects, hence the terms of policy were breached and that therefore, the insurance company cannot be made liable to pay compensation. The learned advocate for the claimants has filed to show any evidence from record which would lead the court to and persuade the court to hold that the finding and conclusion of the learned tribunal are contrary to evidence on record. He has failed to successfully assail the award and to show any material to substantiate any submission. The learned advocate for the claimants has filed to show any evidence from record which would lead the court to and persuade the court to hold that the finding and conclusion of the learned tribunal are contrary to evidence on record. He has failed to successfully assail the award and to show any material to substantiate any submission. It is not possible to find fault in the findings or conclusions. Once it is found that there was breach of terms of policy and the breach was regarding and of the fundamental conditions, the decision to exonerate the insurance company cannot be faulted. The petitions and appeals wherein the scope and purview of the challenge is limited, fails. The conclusions and directions do not warrant any interference. Hence, the appeals and petitions deserve to be rejected and are hereby rejected. Appeals dismissed.