Datta Ram Ramesh Kumar v. D. I. G. , B. S. F. Rajasthan, Jodhpur
2010-12-23
A.M.SAPRE, C.M.TOTLA
body2010
DigiLaw.ai
Hon'ble SAPRE, J.—This is an intra court Special Appeal filed by the plaintiff under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance (for short hereinafter called "the ordinance" for brevity) against the judgment and decree dated 1.11.2001 passed by Single Judge in Civil First Appeal No. 112 of 85 which in turn arise out of judgment and decree dated 17.8.85 passed in Misc. Case No. 39 of 73 by District Judge, Bikaner. 2. In order to appreciate the issue involved in the appeal, it is necessary to state the relevant facts in brief. 3. The appellant is the plaintiff whereas the respondents are the defendants. The appellant filed a civil suit in the Court of District Judge, Bikaner out of which this appeal arises against the respondents for recovery of Rs. 11,000/-. The District Judge dismissed this suit by judgment/decree dated 17.8.85. The appellant feeling aggrieved by the dismissal, filed. First Appeal under Section 96 of Civil Procedure Code to this Court, being First Appeal No. 112 of 85. The Single Judge dismissed the appeal. It is against this appellate judgment/decree, the plaintiff feeling aggrieved filed this intra court appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance. This appeal was filed on 18.12.2001. It was admitted for final hearing on 28.1.2003. 4. Learned Counsel for the respondents at the outset raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the appeal. According to him, the appeal is not maintainable by virtue of bar contained in Section 100-A of C.P.Code. He urged that since Section 100-A bars filing of intra court appeal against the appellate decree/order passed by the Single Judge in the same court, the present appeal being in the nature of intra court appeal is not main tenable. Learned counsel next contended that the appeal is also hit by Section 102 of the Code read with Section 16(2)(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act 2002 (for short called Amending Act) and hence not maintainable. According to him, since the original value of the suit out of which this appeal arise is Rs. 11,000/-, hence the bar contained in Section 102 is attracted which bars filing of second appeal in the cases where original value of the suit does not exceed Rs. 25000/-.
According to him, since the original value of the suit out of which this appeal arise is Rs. 11,000/-, hence the bar contained in Section 102 is attracted which bars filing of second appeal in the cases where original value of the suit does not exceed Rs. 25000/-. Learned counsel pointed out that since the appeal was not admitted for final hearing prior to 1.7.2002 but was admitted on 28.1.2003 i.e. after the amendment made in Civil Procedure Code on 1.7.2002 and hence, by virtued another bar contained in Section 16(2)(a) ibid, this appeal is not saved for its disposal on merits. The appeal according to learned counsel is thus liable to be dismissed as not main tenable on this ground as well. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant in reply to this objection contended that since the learned Single Judge heard and decided the first appeal out of which this intra Court appeal arises prior to the date on which amendment in C.P.C. came in to force i.e. on 1.7.2002 coupled with the fact that this intra court appeal was filed prior to the date of amendment, this Court has the jurisdiction to decide the appeal on merits notwithstanding the bar contained in Section 100-A ibid. Learned counsel further contended that so far as bar contained in Section 102 is concerned, it too has no application to this appeal. Learned counsel pointed out that bar applies only to second appeals filed under Section 100 ibid and since the appeal in question is not filed under Sec. 100 ibid but filed under Section 18 of the Ordinance and hence this appeal remains unaffested so far as bar contained in Section 102 is concerned. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to overrule the objections raised by the respondent and in consequence hold that appeal is maintainable for its decision on merits in accordance with law. 7. Coming to the second objection of the respondent first, in our opinion, it has no merit. It is for the reason, that bar contained in Section 102 applies only to Second Appeals filed under Section 100 of C.P. Code and that too to those second appeals that arise out of suits filed for recovery of money not exceeding Rs. 25,000. 8.
It is for the reason, that bar contained in Section 102 applies only to Second Appeals filed under Section 100 of C.P. Code and that too to those second appeals that arise out of suits filed for recovery of money not exceeding Rs. 25,000. 8. So far as present appeal is concerned, it is admittedly an appeal in the nature of intra Court appeal filed under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. It is for this reason; the bar contained in section 102 would not apply to this appeal. In other words, bar contained in section 102 is not absolute but has its application only to second appeals filed under Section 100 of C.P. Code and that too when such appeals arise out of suits filed for recovery of money whose original valuation is less than Rs. 25,000. Since this appeal is not filed under Section100 of the Code but in filed under Section 18 of the Ordinance, and hence bar contained in section 102 would not be applicable to this appeal. 9. In our opinion, there lies a distinction between the Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of Code and the Appeal filed under Section 18 of the Ordinance. In the case of former, the Court is required to frame substantial question of law as provided in Section 100 for admitting the appeal whereas in the case of later, it is not so necessary. That apart both the appeals are filed under different Acts having different source of their enactment so also their object and scope. We cannot therefore that both the appeals. i.e. the one filed under Section100 of Code and other filed under Section 18 of the Ordinance at par for applying the provisions of Section 102 ibid. 10. In our opinion, in order to determine the nature of appeal, it is necessary to see as to under which provision of law it is filed. The use of expression "Second Appeal" in section 102 is significant. It makes the section applicable only to Appeals filed Section 100 of Code and to no other appeals.
10. In our opinion, in order to determine the nature of appeal, it is necessary to see as to under which provision of law it is filed. The use of expression "Second Appeal" in section 102 is significant. It makes the section applicable only to Appeals filed Section 100 of Code and to no other appeals. If the intention of the legislature were to make Section 102 applicable to all appeals, irrespective of the Section and the Acts in which it was filed then it would not have used the expression "second appeal" in Section 102 but in its place would have used the expression "all appeals" or "further appeal". Such is not the case here. 11. In the light of foregoing discussion, this objection is found to be devoid of any merit. It is accordingly overruled. 12. Coming now to the first objection of the respondent, in our opinion, it too has no merit. It is not in dispute that the Single Judge decided the first appeal out of which this intra court appeal arise on 1.11.2001 whereas the present appeal was filed on 18.12.2001. It is therefore, clear that on the date when the impugned decision was rendered and the date when this intra court appeal was filed, the amended Section 100-A had not come in to force. Since the, cause of action to file this appeal had accrued to the appellant on 18.12.2001 when they suffered the adverse impugned order of the first appellate Court, they were within their legal right to file an intra Court appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance. This right in our opinion was not impaired in any manner by any provision of law. Indeed, the use of expression "heard and decided by a Single Judge of High Court" in Section100-A suggest that only those appeals which were heard and decided by the Single Judge on and after 1.7.2002, would be hit by the bar contained in Section 100-A. 13. In the light of foregoing discussion, we also overrule the first objection of the respondent. 14. In view of foregoing discussion, we hold that the appeal is maintainable and not hit by the bar contained in section 100-A or/and section 102 ibid. 15. Let the appeal be now listed for final hearing on merits in the month of January 2011.