Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 2150 (ALL)

KULDEEP KUMAR JOHARI v. STATE BANK OF INDIA

2010-07-22

DEVI PRASAD SINGH, F.I.REBELLO

body2010
JUDGMENT Hon’ble F.I. Rebello, C.J.—This special appeal has been preferred by an award employee, (Workman), who was employed as a Cashier in the State Bank of India in a substantive capacity. Pursuant to disciplinary proceedings taken against him, he was dismissed from service by order dated 03.09.1986. Against the said order, he preferred a statutory appeal. The Appellate Authority noted that the appellant had put in over eight years of service in the Bank till his suspension and was 30 years of age and considering that, condoned his misconduct and discharged him from service in terms of Para 521 (10) (c) of the Shastry Award, as retained by the Desai Award, with effect from the date of his dismissal. A direction was also issued to pay him retrenchment compensation and a month’s pay in lieu of notice in terms of Section 25 - F of the Industrial Disputes Act, and accordingly modified the order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 3rd September, 1986. The appeal was disposed of on 9th February, 1987. 2. The appellant, aggrieved by that order, preferred a petition before this Court. The relief sought for by the appellant, amongst others, were to quash the orders of dismissal and/or discharge, and to allow him to continue on the post which he was holding at that time, with all consequential benefits, back wages arising therefrom etc., and also to issue any other writ, which the Court deemed fit and proper. The learned Single Judge by order dated April 6, 2010 was pleased to dismiss the petition by recording a finding that he found no illegality in the order passed by the Appellate Authority. It is this order, which is the subject matter of the present appeal. 3. At the hearing of this appeal, on behalf of the appellant, the learned counsel has limited himself to the issue that, though the termination is by way of discharge, the terminal dues to which the appellant is entitled to, have not been paid. Learned counsel has relied on the Shastry Award for that purpose. 4. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent - Bank, learned counsel submits that this was neither the relief prayed for by the appellant in the petition nor considered by the learned Judge, and consequently the appeal should be dismissed. Learned counsel has relied on the Shastry Award for that purpose. 4. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent - Bank, learned counsel submits that this was neither the relief prayed for by the appellant in the petition nor considered by the learned Judge, and consequently the appeal should be dismissed. Secondly, it is submitted that the order of discharge is by way of punishment, and all that the appellant is entitled to, is a month’s pay, which has been given to him and, therefore, the question of payment of terminal benefits would not arise. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India v. The Workmen of State Bank of India and another, AIR 1990 SC 2034 . 5. With the above background, we may now proceed to decide this appeal. Insofar as the first contention is concerned, the objection is procedural. By now, it is well settled that the procedure is not meant to trip justice, on the contrary to advance it. The appellant had come to the Court contending that his discharge was illegal and, therefore, was entitled to reinstatement. Had the relief been granted, the appellant would have been in service. The order of discharge, however, has been upheld by the learned Single Judge. The appellant has confined himself to direct the respondents to pay him the terminal dues, which he would be entitled to having rendered service in the Bank considering the Shastry Award. We are, therefore, not impressed by that objection raised on behalf of the respondents. It is open to this Court, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, considering the docket explosion and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, to grant the reliefs prayed for in the petition if the same are capable of being granted and/or to mould the relief if the same can be moulded. The first objection, therefore, is rejected. 6. We, then, come to the second question, namely, whether the act of discharge amounts to retrenchment, consequently termination simplicitor. In our opinion, this issue is no longer res integra having been answered in the case of State Bank of India (supra) cited by the respondents themselves. The first objection, therefore, is rejected. 6. We, then, come to the second question, namely, whether the act of discharge amounts to retrenchment, consequently termination simplicitor. In our opinion, this issue is no longer res integra having been answered in the case of State Bank of India (supra) cited by the respondents themselves. In the said case, the Supreme Court was ceased of the very issue, namely, whether a discharge in terms of sub-paras (9) and (10) of Para 521 of the Shastry Award amounts to a discharge simplicitor or a discharge by way of punishment. For that purpose, we may gainfully reproduce paragraph 10 of the said judgment, which reads as follows : “10. If our reading of the provisions is correct, then it needs no elaborate explanation as to why the punishment of discharge both in sub-paras 5(e) and 10 (c) has been worded as it is and why further it became necessary to add the last sentence to sub-para 10 (c). Since in the context, such a discharge is by way of punishment, the relevant provisions give a discretionary power to the authority to convert, what would otherwise be a dismissal into a mere discharge. This is for the benefit of the employee. It protects him from the baneful consequences of dismissal. At the same, it relieves the management of the burden of retaining him in service when it has become inexpedient to do so. Thus the provision of such discharge works to the advantage of both. At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that the said discharge is as a result of the disciplinary proceeding. Although in form it may not, and for the reasons stated above in the peculiar circumstances, it is intended that it should not look like a disciplinary action, it cannot be denied that it flows from and is a result of the disciplinary proceedings. To make clear, however, that the action, though spawned by the disciplinary proceedings should not prejudice the employee, the last sentence in question has been added by way of an abundant precaution.” 7. From the judgment, it follows that discharge in terms of 521 (10) (c) of the Shastry Award is a discharge by way of punishment and not discharge or termination simplicitor. Secondly, such a discharge, though a punishment, protects an employee from baneful consequences of dismissal. From the judgment, it follows that discharge in terms of 521 (10) (c) of the Shastry Award is a discharge by way of punishment and not discharge or termination simplicitor. Secondly, such a discharge, though a punishment, protects an employee from baneful consequences of dismissal. In other words, if there be provisions of denying terminal benefits on dismissal, a discharge by its very nature if otherwise not provided, will entitle the workman to those terminal benefits. 8. The question, therefore, that we have been called upon to answer is whether, on account of discharge under Para 521, the appellant would be entitled to any terminal benefits? For that purpose, we shall have to examine the Shastry Award. 9. Para 364 of the Shastry Award provides for provident fund. Para 367 (17) reads as under : “(17) There shall be no forfeiture of any amount due to a workman under this scheme excepting in the case where he is dismissed for misconduct causing financial loss to the employer, and in such cases, limited only to extent of such financial loss.” 10. Para 388 of the Shastry Award notes that the retiring benefits are generally of three kinds - (1) Provident Fund, (2) Gratuity and (3) Pension. Para 392 prescribes the gratuity that is payable, depending on the classification of the Banks. Para 398 extends the gratuity benefits to employees, who have retired or resigned or their services might have come to an end in any one of the ways recognized at any time after 5th January, 1952. There is no provision by which the gratuity can be denied to a person or forfeited where a workman has been discharged from service, even may be by way of punishment. If a benefit is available and if there be no provision for forfeiture, then, in our opinion, it cannot be forfeited. In Para 390 of the Shastry Award, it is specifically set out as under : “... We hold accordingly that there should be no forfeiture of gratuity even for dismissal on account of misconduct except in cases where such misconduct causes financial loss to the company and in that case to that extent only.” 11. The appellant, therefore, is also entitled to gratuity and the respondents are bound to pay him the same to the extent that he is entitled to. 12. The appellant, therefore, is also entitled to gratuity and the respondents are bound to pay him the same to the extent that he is entitled to. 12. The next question is whether the appellant is entitled to any pension?Insofar as the pension is concerned, at least in the Award, there is nothing to indicate that there was a pension scheme insofar as the State Bank of India is concerned. If, however, there be any pension scheme and the appellant completes the requisite number of years, then he would be entitled to the same. If he does not satisfy the criteria, then he would not be entitled to. At the time of his suspension, the workman had put in over eight years of service. Between the date of suspension and the date of termination, which was 03.09.1986, some further time has expired. Considering that the termination is of 03.09.1986, the issue, whether the period of suspension can be considered, is something that cannot be gone into by us. That question is left open for consideration if there be any pension scheme and if the appellant complies and fulfills the requisite norms and if any order has been passed by the respondents in regard to the period of suspension. 13. For the reasons aforestated, we partly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order dated 6th April, 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge. —————