JUDGEMENT Shiva Kirti Singh and Hemant Kumar Srivastava JJ. 1. Both the writ petitions raise a common question of law with a view to challenge the correctness and legality of impugned orders passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna. In the case of Bidya Nand Choudhary, the impugned order is dated 3.6.2005 (Annexure-4) passed in O.A. No.697 of 2004. In the other case also the impugned order is dated 3.6.2005 but passed in O.A. No. 764/2002 filed by the two petitioners of the other case, Yadunandan Roy and Balkishan Roy. 2. In both the cases the learned Tribunal noticed that the charge-sheet relied only upon statement made by the concerned employees before the Justice G.N.Ray Commission which was admittedly constituted under Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 in relation to a railway accident on 1.2.1999 involving collision between Awadh Assam Express and Brahmputra Mail at Gaisal within Katihar Division. The Tribunal found that use of statements made by the concerned employees/delinquent was not permissible in view of provisions in Section 117 of the Indian Railways Act which reads as follows: "117. Statement made before Commissioner. No statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence in an inquiry before the Commissioner shall subject him to, or be used against him in, any civil or criminal proceeding, except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement: Provided that the statement is (a) made in reply to a question which is required by the Commissioner to answer; or (b) relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry." 3. The learned Tribunal placed reliance upon a judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh V/s. Gendalall, AIR 1966 SC 1445 for interpreting the words any civil proceeding so as to include all proceedings affecting civil rights, which are not criminal in nature. Learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the said judgment for pointing out that the wide meaning given to the words any civil proceeding was in context of Article 133 of the Constitution of India and in relation to jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and hence, the same should not be held applicable while interpreting Section 117 of the Railways Act, 1989 . 4. 4. Before considering the aforesaid submission, it is relevant to point out that Section 117 is applicable only in case of evidence in an inquiry before the Commissioner as defined under the Railways Act, 1989 and not before the Commissioner appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. However, this fact would not have any material effect on the outcome of these writ petitions because Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 is same as Section 117 of the Railways Act, 1989 . 5. Having clarified the position relating to applicability of the different Acts, the issue remains the samewhat should be the interpretation of the term any civil proceeding? On a careful consideration of the wordings used in Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act which are same as the wordings in Section 117 of the Railways Act, we are of the considered view that use of the word "any" followed by an exception after the word proceeding leaves no manner of doubt that the term any civil proceeding has to be given a wider meaning as was done by the Apex Court while interpreting Article 133 of the Constitution. The exception is only a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement. In view of only one exception being provided by the Legislature it is further confirmed that all other proceedings are covered by the term any civil or criminal proceeding. There is no difficulty in visualizing that any proceeding, by going to the root of the proceeding, can be classified as civil or criminal proceeding. The disciplinary proceeding will obviously fall into such wider meaning of "any civil proceeding" because ultimately a disciplinary proceeding has civil consequences. 6. In view of aforesaid discussion, we are in agreement with the views expressed by the learned Tribunal that the departmental proceeding decided against the petitioners in these two cases suffered from vital defect because besides the statement of the concerned employees no other material was brought on record alongwith the charge-sheet as evidence against the concerned employees. As noticed above, those statements could not have been used in view of bar under Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. Hence, we have no difficulty in concurring with the opinion of the learned Tribunal that the proceedings were decided on the basis of no evidence. As noticed above, those statements could not have been used in view of bar under Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. Hence, we have no difficulty in concurring with the opinion of the learned Tribunal that the proceedings were decided on the basis of no evidence. The learned Tribunal has given liberty to the petitioners which appears to be in consonance with law and justice. 7. In the facts of the case, we find no good reason to interfere with the views of the learned Tribunal. Both the writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed. It is again made clear that the petitioners will have the liberty as given by the learned Tribunal to proceed against the delinquent employees if they so like. No order as to costs.