Judgment S.K.Gangele, J. ( 1. ) Petitioner has filed this petition challenging recovery of dues from the petitioner under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Shram Kalyan Nidhi Adhiniyam 1982. ( 2. ) The petitioner has been running a school named as Carmel Convent Senior Secondary School, Phalka Bazar, Lashkar, Gwalior. It is a minority educational institution and it has been imparting education to children up to 12th standard. The petitioner - institution is not getting any grant-in-aid from the State Government. The State Government enacted an Act named as Madhya Pradesh Shram Kalyan Nidhi Adhiniyam 1982 (Act No. 36 of 1983), hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1982. Under Chapter II of the aforesaid Act a fund has been constituted as Labour Welfare Fund and Section 9 of the Act of 1982 prescribes contribution payable under the afore said Act of 1982. Under the provisions of the aforesaid Act the Assistant Commissioner, M.P. Labour Welfare Mandal, Gwalior, vide letter dated 05.12.2005 sought details of the staff working in the institution of the petitioner and further intimated that an amount of Rs.30,000/- was due to the petitioner - institution as contribution under the provisions of the Act of 1982. The petitioner in its reply dated 02.01.2006 submitted that the institution is not liable to pay the contribution and further requested to drop the proceedings. Thereafter, vide another show cause noticie dated 06.03.2006 the Assistant Welfare Commissioner sought explanation from the petitioner that why amount of Rs.30,000/- as demanded was not paid. The petitioner in its reply dated 16th March 2006 further denied the fact that it is liable to pay an amount of Rs.30,000/- under the provisions of Act of 1982 as contribution. The petitioner stated in the reply that the institution has been running an educational institution and it is imparting education and the teachers are not governed by the definition of employee under the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, as per the judgment of Honble the Supreme Court, hence the provisions of Act of 1982 is not applicable to the petitioner - institution. Finally, vide impugned order dated 13.03.2008, Annexure P-I the petitioner has been directed by the Labour Welfre Commissioner to pay an amount of Rs. 11,640/-. ( 3. ) As per the return filed by respondents No. 2 and 3, the petitioner - institution is engaged in trade and business. Finally, vide impugned order dated 13.03.2008, Annexure P-I the petitioner has been directed by the Labour Welfre Commissioner to pay an amount of Rs. 11,640/-. ( 3. ) As per the return filed by respondents No. 2 and 3, the petitioner - institution is engaged in trade and business. It is imparting education to the students and it has been charging a fixed fee from the students. Thereafter, it has been paying salaries to its staff. Apart from teachers, there are other employees working in the institution - petitioner, such as, Peon, Chowkidar, Security Guards, Sweepers and other Class IV employees. At the time of inspection it was found that the petitioner employed near about 30 security guards on contract basis and there were total 97 employees who had been working in the institution other than teachers. The Inspection report has also been filed. The respondents further stated that the petitioner has not permitted the officers of the department to conduct inspection of the institution neither petitioner submitted service records of the employees for its perusal. It has further been pleaded that the Act of 1982 has been enacted by the State Government in order to provide certain benefits to the workers and it has been made applicable to all the establishments which carry on any business or trade or any work in connection to ancillary thereto. Hence, the petitioner - Institution has been covered under the provisions of the Act of 1982 and it is liable to pay contribution in accordance with Section 9 of the Act of 1982. Subsequently, the rate of contribution has been changed by the Government, hence a final demand of Rs. 11,640/- has been made against the petitioner as contribution. ( 4. ) The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner - institution has contended that the petitioner has not been engaged itself in any profession or trade, hence it is not governed by the provisions of the Act of 1982. Consequently, it is not liable to pay the contribution in accordance with Section 9 of the Act of 1982. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the petitioner - institution has been imparting education and its a minority institution, hence the object of the petitioner - institution is not to carry out any activity for the purpose of earning money. Consequently, it is not liable to pay the contribution in accordance with Section 9 of the Act of 1982. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the petitioner - institution has been imparting education and its a minority institution, hence the object of the petitioner - institution is not to carry out any activity for the purpose of earning money. In support of his contentions learned counsel relied on the following judgments :- (1) Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sai Publication Fund, AIR 2002 SC 1582 ; (2) The Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd., v. Their Workmen, AIR 1975 SC 1639 (3) Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and others, (1990) 3 SCC 682 . (4) P. Kasilingam and others v. PS. G. College of technology and others, (1995) (Suppl) 2 SCC 348; and (5) State of Gujrat v. Maheshkumar Dhirajlal Thakkar, (1980) 2 SCC 322 . ( 5. ) Contrary to this, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 2 and 3 has contended that the petitioner has been running educational institutions. It has been charging fees from students. Apart from tuition fees the institution has also been charging fees on other heads. It has been paying regular salary to its employees, which include teaching staff as well as other non-teaching staff. Hence, the petitioner is in the business and it is governed by the provisions of the Act of 1982. Consequently, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 6. ) From the facts of the case, it is clear that the petitioner - institution has been providing education to various children and for the aforesaid purpose it has been charging fees from the students as tuition fees as well as fees on other heads. The respondents collected information with regard to petitioner - institution and they found that the petitioner - institution employed Peon, Chowkidar, Security Guards, Sweepers and other Class IV employees and also employed teachers for imparting education. The respondents collected information with regard to petitioner - institution and they found that the petitioner - institution employed Peon, Chowkidar, Security Guards, Sweepers and other Class IV employees and also employed teachers for imparting education. The State Government in exercise of powers conferred to it by Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act of 1982 appointed 1st day of June 1995 as the date on which all the provisions of the said act shall come in to force in respect of such establishments in the State of Madhya Pradesh, which carry on any business or trade or any work in connection with or ancillary thereto, and which employ or have employed on any working day during the preceding twelve months more than 9 persons. The notification dated 04.05.95 is as under :- "F-l 4-3/94/16-B, In exercise of the powers coanferred by subsection (3) of section 1 of the Madhya Pradesh Shram Kalyan Nidhi Adhiniyam, 1982 (No.36 of 1983) read with clause (11) of sub-section (5) of Section 2 thereof, and in continuation of Labour Deptts previous notification No. 14-01-84-XVI-B Dt. 11.11.87 the State Government hereby appoints 1st day of June 1995 as the date on which all the provisions of the said act shall come in to force in respect of such establishments in the State of Madhya Pradesh, which carry on any business or trade or any work in connection with or ancillary thereto, and which employ or have employed on any working day during the preceding twelve months more than 9 persons." ( 7. ) It is not in dispute that the petitioner has employed more than nine persons. Now it has to be decided that whether the petitioner carry on any business or trade or any work in connection with or ancillary thereto. ( 8. ) In the case of Model Town Welfare Council Ludhiana v. Bhupinder Pal Singh, AIR 1973 Punjab and Haryana 76, has quoted the Corpus Juris Secundum, Valume 12, at page 762 the word business which is as under :- "11. ( 8. ) In the case of Model Town Welfare Council Ludhiana v. Bhupinder Pal Singh, AIR 1973 Punjab and Haryana 76, has quoted the Corpus Juris Secundum, Valume 12, at page 762 the word business which is as under :- "11. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Valume 12, at page 762 the word business in its broad sense is defined as follows :- "In its broad, its broader, or in its broadest, since, in its more general or common use, in its primary meaning, or when used colloquially, the word business carries with it a very borad meaning : and it has been said that it denotes not only all gainful occupations, but all occupations or duties in which men engaged............; has common and general application to all sorts of enterprises which engage peoples attention and energies; and includes nearly all the affairs in which either an individual or a corporation can be actors; and is a word in common use to describe every occupation in which men engaged, ......, the word is commonly employed in connection with an occupation for livelihood or profit but it is not limited to such pursuits, for it has been said that the definition of business by the lexicographers is sufficiently broad and comprehensive to embrace every employment or occupation........" The very fact, that the word trade has been used separately from business It was urged, clearly shows that the word business is used in a much wider sense than the word trade. For the respondent the contention, however, was that the word business as used in the Rent Restriction act cannot be taken to mean the activities normally within the sphere of the working of a welfare society and must mean an undertaking of a commercial type involving some pursuit with an eye to profit." ( 9. ) The Honble Supreme Court in Messrs. Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills v. The Commr. Of Excess Profits Tax, AIR 1955 SC 176 , has held as under with regard to Busines as defined in section 2 (5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act, after quoting a judgment of Privy Council :- "(14) Business as defined in section 2 (5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act includes amongst others, any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventure in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture. The first part of this definition of a business in the Excess Profits Tax Act is the same as the definition of a business in section 2 (4) of the Indian Income-tax Act. Whether a particular activity amounts in any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventure in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture; is always a difficult question to answer. On the one hand it has been pointed out by the Judicial Committee in the - Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Shaw Wallace and Co., AIR 1932 OC 138 (A), that the words used in that definition are no doubt wide but unerlying each of them is the fundamental idea of the continuous exercise of an activity. The word business connotes some real, substantial and systematic or organised course of activity or conduct with a set purpose. On the other hand, a single and isolated transaction has been held to be conceivably capable of falling within the definition of business as being an adventure in the nature of trade provided the transaction bears clear indicia of trade. The question, therefore, whether a particular source of income is business or not must be decided according to our ordinary notions as to what a business is." ( 10. ) Honble the Supreme Court further in the case of Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax and Excess Profits Tax, AIR 1958 SC 861 , has held, as under, with regard to business :- "(14) We are unable to agree with this contention. The word "business" is, as has often been said, one of wide import and in fiscal statutes, it must be construed in a broad rather than a restricted sense. Discussing the connotation of the word "trade", scott, L. J., observed in Smith Barry v. Cordy, 1946-28 Tax Cas. 250 at p. 259(A) : "The history of judicial decisions has been similar, showing a strong tendency not to restrict the scope of Schedule D; a tendency which was, we think, in sympathy with the general social and economic out-look of the country. 250 at p. 259(A) : "The history of judicial decisions has been similar, showing a strong tendency not to restrict the scope of Schedule D; a tendency which was, we think, in sympathy with the general social and economic out-look of the country. There is hardly any activity for gaining a livelihood and not covered by the other Schedules, which does not seem to us to be swept into the fiscal net by the Schedule D." "The word business connotes, it was observed by this Court in Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax 1955-1 SCR 952 at p. 96: [(S) AIR 1955 SC 176 at p. 181) (B);" some real, substantial and systematic or organised course of activity or conduct with a set purpose." Now,"it may be conceded that when a person purchases his requirements from a particular dealer, he cannot without more be said to carry on business with him. But, here there is much more. The non-resident ;Companies send their ships for repair to the appellant, not as they might to any other repairer but under a special agreement that repairs should be done at cost. And further unlike customers who purchase goods for their own consumption or use, the non-resident Companies get their shops repaired for use in what is admittedly their business. These are clearly trading activities, organised and continuous in their character and it will be difficult to escape the conclusion that they constitute business. We are not even concerned in this appeal with the larger question whether the activities of the nonresident Companies in connection with the repair of the shops amount to carrying on of business. What we have to decide is whether having regard to the course of dealings between the nonresident Companies and the appellant it can be said of the former that they carry on business with the latter within the meaning of S. 42 (2). Now, it should be observed that S. 42 speaks not of the non-residents carrying on business in the abstract but of their carrying on business with the resident, and in the context, it must include all activities between them having relationship to their business. That is the view taken by the learned Judges in the Court below, and we are in agreement with it." ( 11. That is the view taken by the learned Judges in the Court below, and we are in agreement with it." ( 11. ) Honble the Supreme Court further in Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager, U.P. Financial Corporation and others, AIR 1993 SC 935 , has held, as under, with regard to business :- "Corporation deal with public money for public benefit. The approach has to be public oriented, helpful to the loanee, without loss to the corporation. S. 24 of the Act itself required the Board "to discharge its function on business principles, due regard being had to the interest of industry, commerce and general public". Business is a word of wide import. It has no definite meaning. Its perceptions differ from private to public sector or from institutional financing to commercial banking. The Financial Corporations under the Act were visualised not as a profit earning concerns but an extended arm of a welfare State to harness business potential of the country to benefit the common man." ( 12. ) From the aforesaid principle of law laid down by Honble the Supreme Court, it is clear that the word business has no definite meaning. It is a word of wide meaning and its perceptions differ from private to public sector. Even non- profitable activities could be included in the word business. In the present case, the petitioner - institution has employed teaching staff and other non-teaching staff, namely, Peon, Chowkidar, Security Guards, Sweepers and other Class IV employees and it has been imparting education to the children. It is charging monthly tuition fees from the children and it has also been paying salary to its staff members. The petitioner has not produced any Profit and Loss account to establish that it is a non-profitable institution. It is paying regular salary to its staff members and staff members are dependent over the salary for their livelihood. In such circumstances, in my opinion, the petitioner - institution has been carrying a business. Hence, it is governed under the provisions of the Act of 1982 as per the notification dated 04.05.1995, copy of which has been filed as Annexure R-1. ( 13. ) Consequently, the petitioner - institution is liable to pay contribution as per the provisions of the Act of 1982. Hence, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. It is hereby dismissed. ( 13. ) Consequently, the petitioner - institution is liable to pay contribution as per the provisions of the Act of 1982. Hence, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. It is hereby dismissed. Looking to the facts of the case, no order as to cost. Petition dismissed.