The plaintiffs/appellants filed a suit for partition and for accountancy alleg­ing that the plaintiffs had a half share in the suit property. It is alleged that the plaintiff's husband and the defendants were co-owners and that in the suit property, a hotel under the name of Hill Way and a school under the name of North Point was running. Further there were various tenants in various portions of the prop­erty which were fetching rent. It is alleged that the defendants were not giving the share of the rent and income to the plaintiffs and consequently, the suit was instituted. 2. Along with the suit the plaintiffs also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C. P. C. for grant of a temporary injunc­tion. The plaintiffs also filed an application under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an appointment of a receiver. 3. Both the applications were resisted by the defendants admitting that the property was ancestral in nature and that the plaintiff's hus­band had made an oral gift, gifting the land and building to the defendants. This oral gift was subsequently reduced in writing on 1st March, 1991. The defendants further con­tended that the hotel was being run by the de­fendants, who had constructed the same from his own funds and that the school was being run by a registered society. Consequently, the plaintiffs are not entitled for any relief. 4. The trial Court, after considering the evidence on record, found that a prima facie case was made out by the plaintiffs. The trial Court found that the hotel was running since 1982 and the school was running since 1986, and at that point of time, the property was joint and at that stage no oral gift, if any had been executed in favour of the defendants. The trial Court, consequently allowed the injunc­tion application and restrained the defendants from alienating the property during the pen­dency of the suit. The trial Court, however, found that the plaintiffs were not entitled for an appointment of a receiver and consequently, rejected the said application. The plaintiffs, being aggrieved by the rejection of the appli­cation for an appointment of a receiver, has filed the present appeal under Order 43 Rule l(s) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. Heard Mr. Kanwaljit Singh, the learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. The plaintiffs, being aggrieved by the rejection of the appli­cation for an appointment of a receiver, has filed the present appeal under Order 43 Rule l(s) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. Heard Mr. Kanwaljit Singh, the learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. T. S. Bindra the learned counsel for the respondents. 6. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs/appel­lants submitted that the defendants had taken advantage of the absence of the plaintiffs and her husband, who were residing in Sweden and were, therefore, unable to look after the property and that the defendants have illegally manufactured an oral gift, which cannot be taken into consideration and in any case could not be relied upon since the said oral gift was not registered, and which was compulsorily required to be registered under the Registra­tion Act. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the deci­sion of the Supreme Court in the case of Radhakrishan Laxminarayan Toshniwal v. Shridhar Ramchandra Alshi and others reported in AIR 1960 SC 1368 and in the case of Kumar Gonsusab and others and Mohammed Miyan Urf Baban and others reported in 2008 (73) ALR 496 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1254). The learned counsel submitted that the Court be­low found that a prima facie case was made out and found that the property was an ances­tral property in which a hotel and a school was being run and that the property was let out to the various tenants. The learned coun­sel submitted that the trial Court in order to protect the property should have appointed a receiver. The learned counsel submitted that it was just and convenient that the trial Court should have appointed a receiver and had com­mitted an error in rejecting the application. Learned counsel submitted that the plaintiff is a widow and is in dire need of funds. It was further contended that the property being an­cestral, no part of income was being given by the defendants and consequently, it was just and convenient that a receiver should have been appointed, so that the property was not mismanage and the funds were not misappro­priated by the defendants. 7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the defendans submitted that the oral gift which was, subsequently, reduced in writing was not required to be registered. 7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the defendans submitted that the oral gift which was, subsequently, reduced in writing was not required to be registered. The said gift was acted upon by the plaintiffs husband and, based on the said gift, the defendants have become the absolute owner. Further there is no allegation that the defendants were mis­managing the property nor is there any allega­tion of misappropriation of the funds and, even assuming that the appellants are not the abso­lute owner but are only co-owners, nonethe­less, no case for appointment of the receiver is made out nor was it just and convenient for the Court to exercise the powers under Order 40 Rule 1 C. P. C. for an appointment of a receiver. 8. In order to appreciate the submission of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to peruse the provision of Order 40 Rule 1 of the C. P. C. as amended by the Allahabad High Court, which is applicable to the State of Uttarakhand. For facility, the said provision is extracted hereunder: 1. Appointment of receivers.- (1) Where it appears to the Court to be just and conve­nient, the Court may by order:- (a) Appoint a receiver of any property, whether before or after decree. (b) Remove any person from the posses­sion or custody of the property. © Commit the same to the possession, custody or management of the receiver; and (d) confer upon the receiver all such pow­ers as to bringing and defending suit and for the realisation, management, protection pres­ervation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and prof­its, and the execution of documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the Court thinks fit. 2. Nothing in this rule shall authorise the Court to remove from the possession or cus­tody of property, any person whom any party to the suit has not a present right so to re­move. High Court Amendment Allahabad - In sub-rule (2) after the words "any person" insert a 'comma' and add words "not being a party to the suit" (10-7-1943). 9. From the aforesaid provision, it is clear that the object of appointment of a receiver is to protect and preserve the property in suit. High Court Amendment Allahabad - In sub-rule (2) after the words "any person" insert a 'comma' and add words "not being a party to the suit" (10-7-1943). 9. From the aforesaid provision, it is clear that the object of appointment of a receiver is to protect and preserve the property in suit. In order to appoint a receiver, the plaintiff is not only required to show a prima facie case in his favour but must also show that there is a danger of loss of the property in suit. An or­der to appoint a receiver is passed only in ex­ceptional cases and cannot be passed in a rou­tine manner. The principles guiding the discretion of the Court for appointment of a receiver can be summarized as under: (a) It is dependent on the view taken by the Court with regard to the purpose of protect­ing the right of all parties and subject matter; (b) Unless the plaintiff is able to make out a prima facie case that he has an excellent chance of success in the suit Court should not ap­point a receiver. © The plaintiff shall not only show a case of adverse and conflicting claims to property but also he must show some emergency or danger or loss demanding immediate action and his own rights are reasonably clear and free from doubt; (d) Order having the effect of depriving a defendant of a de facto be in medio i.e. in the enjoyment of none; (e) Conduct of the party who must come with clean hands is also a relevant consider­ation." 10. In Mani Lal v. IIIrd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kanpur Dehat and others reported in ARC 1997 (1) (sic), the Court ex­plained the meaning of the expression "just and convenient" as under: The expression "just and convenient" used in Order XL, Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 have been borrowed from English Judicature Act which greatly enlarged the power formerly exercised by the Court of Chancery. This expression does not mean that the Court has to appoint receiver simply because the Court thinks it convenient. This expression does not mean that the Court has to appoint receiver simply because the Court thinks it convenient. It is to be done according to legal principles taking into account all the circumstances of the case for protection of the right of all the parties interested in the controversy and in the subject matter and for prevention of injury based on the fact that there is danger to the property and no other adequate means of sav­ing it is available and that there is reasonable apprehension of waste, malversation, misap­propriation or removal of property which may result in irreparable loss, vide Prabhat Misra v. Jai Shanker Tripathi, (sic) ALJ 672, Dibakar Naskar v. Rotary Village, 1977 (82) CWN 44. The primary consideration should be to see how the suit property is best preserved with­out being wasted, Jambagavalli v. Govindaraja, AIR 1980 Mad 103 . 11. In the light of the aforesaid, the Court finds that there is no averment that the defen­dants had been mismanaging the property in question. There is no allegation that the defen­dants were misappropriating the funds. Only a bald allegation has been made to the effect that the defendants may misappropriate the funds. In my opinion, such bald allegation is not sufficient to invoke the provision of Order 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure nor, on such allegation, it is just and convenient for the Court to appoint a receiver. 12. There is another aspect of the matter. The hotel is running since 1982 and the school is being managed by a registered society since 1986. There are tenants who are paying the rent to the defendants. The petitioner's hus­band died in 1992 and the plaintiffs kept quiet over the matter for 15 long years and thereaf­ter, filed the suit in 2006. No explanation has been given as to why the suit could not be filed earlier. In the absence of a plausible ex­planation being given and, in the absence of any allegations about misappropriation of fund and, in the light of the fact that the defendant is in possession of the property as a co-owner, if not as an absolute owner, the Court finds that it is not just and convenient to appoint a receiver. 13. In the light of the aforesaid, this Court does not find any error in the impugned order. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.