JUDGMENT: Shyam Shankar Tiwari, J. 1. Heard Sri Abhishek Rai, the learned counsel for the applicant and the learned AGA and perused the record. 2. The accused applicant Virendra Chauhan has applied for bail in Case Crime No.970 of 2009 under sections 498A, 304B I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, P.S. Ghoshi, district Mau. 3. The prosecution story in brief is that the informant Kedar Chauhan married his daughter Lakshmina with accused applicant Virendra Chauhan in the year 2005. The applicant and other members of his family being not satisfied with the dowry given in marriage were demanding Rs.50,000/- from her parents and on non-fulfilment of the above dowry demand, they used to torture her frequently and ultimately on 9.6.2009 at about 1.00 p.m. they killed Lakshmina by poisoning her. The informant after getting information from someone went to the house of the accused-applicant and saw the dead body of his daughter lying there. He approached the police station and lodged the First Information Report against the applicant and three other members of his family, which was registered on Crime No.970 of 2009 under sections 498A, 304B I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, P.S. Ghoshi, district Mau. 4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that the accused applicant has falsely been implicated in this case. The deceased was a student and she wanted to continue her studies further. As she became pregnant, the applicant stopped her studies and her going to school. On the date and time of the alleged incident, the applicant was not present at his residence, as he was working in his garage (shop). The deceased took some drug. The applicant brought her to District hospital, where she was declared dead. The applicant had no knowledge as to how the deceased died. He has no criminal history. 5. The prayer for bail is opposed by the learned AGA submitting that the deceased has died an unnatural death within seven years of her marriage at the residence of the applicant. She was being tortured physically and mentally to bring the dowry and due to the cruel treatment meted out to her she lost her life. The factum of her being a student and taking her to District Hosptial has also been challenged. 6. She was being tortured physically and mentally to bring the dowry and due to the cruel treatment meted out to her she lost her life. The factum of her being a student and taking her to District Hosptial has also been challenged. 6. The relevant provision regarding dowry death is contained under section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (in short 'the Code') which reads as follows : "304B.Dowry death (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death." 7. In the case of Kansraj Vs. State of Punjab and others 2000 Cr.L.J. 2993 S.C. it has been held by the Apex Court that in order to seek conviction against a person for the offence of dowry death, the prosecution is obliged to prove that (a) the death of woman was caused by the burns or bodily injury or had occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances, (b) such death should have occurred within 7 years of her marriage, (c) Deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by any relative of her husband, (d) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry and (e) to such cruelty or harassment the deceased should have been subjected soon before her death. 8. In Baljit Singh and another Vs. State of Haryana AIR 2004 S.C. 1714 , the Apex Court has held, " For drawing presumption under section 113-B of the Evidence Act, firstly there should be death of woman otherwise than in normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and prosecution having shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of dowry by the present accused of having committed the offence. Unless and until these preliminary facts are established by the prosecution it is not open to the courts to draw a presumption against the accused invoking section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Unless and until these preliminary facts are established by the prosecution it is not open to the courts to draw a presumption against the accused invoking section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Merely because an allegation of death within seven years of the marriage was made presumption is not available against the accused without even the prosecution having proved the required preliminary facts." 9. If the above ingredients are present in any case a presumption is made under section 113-B of Indian Evidence Act, which reads as follows :- "When the question is whether a person has committed dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment or in connection with any demand for dowry the court shall presume that such person had caused dowry death." 10. In the case of Kansraj (supra) the Apex Court has elaborated the word "soon before" holding that 'soon before' is relative term which is required to be considered under the circumstances of each case and no straight jacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time limit. The expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term soon before is not synonymous with the term immediately before and is possessed of expression "soon after" as used and understood in section 114 illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. The Apex Court has further held in the above case that in relation to dowry death the circumstances showing existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance, but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand of dowry is shown to have preceded, it shall be deemed to be "soon before" the death. 11. In the case of Kailash Vs. State of M.P. A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 107, the Supreme Court has again interpreted the word "soon before" and has held that expression " soon before" is a relative term, which is required to be considered under the specific circumstances of each case and no straight jacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time limit. The expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. 12. The expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. 12. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that there is no apparent injury on the person of the deceased which shows that no cruelty was done soon before her death. A perusal of the provision mentioned above shows that mental and physical cruelty to the woman need not be just before her death. It is the impact of the above cruelty which matters in such cases. Similarly, what type of cruelty has been done is a matter of evidence which depends upon the facts and circumstances of the each case. The essential requirement is that such cruelty has been meted out to the deceased for demand of dowry and its non fulfillment. The word cruelty can not be defined in some particular words as it differs from case to case. The presence of apparent injuries on the person of the deceased is not a condition precedent to convict the accused u/s 304 B of the Code, if the other circumstances required under the section are present in the case. If the circumstances lead to the presumption that the husband made the life of the deceased so miserable on account of non fulfilment of dowry demand that she committed suicide., it is sufficient to presume that the cruelty was done to the deceased soon before her death. 13. In the case of Gajanand Agrawal Vs. State of Orissa 2007 (3) Supreme 434 the Apex Court has laid down certain principles for consideration of application for bail. In the above case it is observed that there is need to indicate in the order the reasons for prima facie concluding while the bail was being granted particularly where an accused was charged of having committed a serious offence. It is necessary for the courts dealing with the application for bail to consider among other circumstances the following factors also before granting bail, they are, (i) The nature of accusation and severity of punishment in case of conviction and nature of supporting evidence. (ii) Reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant. (iii) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. 14. (ii) Reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant. (iii) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. 14. It has further been observed that any order dehors of such reason suffers from non application of mind as was noted by this court in Ram Govind Upadhyay Vs. Sudarshan Singh 2002 3 SCC 598 , Pooran etc. Vs. Ram Vilas (2001) 6 SCC 338 and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav 2004 (3) JT (SC) 442. 15. In the above case the petitioner was involved in a case under section 304 B IPC. He was brother of husband of the deceased. His application for bail was granted by the High Court of Orissa which was cancelled by the Apex Court. The petitioner after some time again moved an application though on different grounds before the High Court, where he was granted bail, but the father of the deceased again approached the Supreme Court, where his bail was again cancelled considering the severity of the punishment and nature of evidence available on record. 16. Coming to the present case it is apparent from the record that the marriage of the deceased was solemnized in the year 2005. There was persistent dowry demand by the applicant and other members of his family. The deceased died an unnatural death at the residence of the applicant who is her husband on 9.6.2009. There is specific mention in the FIR as well as the statement of the informant recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. by the Investigating Officer that there was repeated dowry demand and frequent torture to the victim Lakshmina due to which she met with an unnatural death. 17. A perusal of the post mortem report of the deceased reveals that the deceased had a foetus of four months in her womb and her death was the result of ante mortem poisoning. The post mortem report further reveals that her nails were cynosed and her membranes, brain pleura, lungs, spleen and kidneys were found congested. Viscera was preserved by the doctor to ascertain the nature of the poison in the body of the deceased. The apparent cause of death was shock as a result of ante mortem poisoning. 18. The post mortem report further reveals that her nails were cynosed and her membranes, brain pleura, lungs, spleen and kidneys were found congested. Viscera was preserved by the doctor to ascertain the nature of the poison in the body of the deceased. The apparent cause of death was shock as a result of ante mortem poisoning. 18. It is immaterial whether the death is homicidal or suicidal because the evidence on record reveals that due to frequent torture by the applicant and other in laws on account of dowry demand the deceased embraced death. 19. It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that the deceased had taken some drugs due to which she died, is not acceptable at this stage in absence of any evidence to the effect that from before this incident the deceased was undergoing some treatment or was taking some medicine or any such drug was present in the house of the applicant in the knowledge of the deceased. Thus even if she has committed suicide by taking some drug the applicant can not escape from his liability. It is also submitted that the deceased was a school going student. As she had become pregnant, she was stopped from going to school, due to which she took some drugs to end her life. This contention is also not tenable, because there is no evidence at all from the side of the applicant to show that she was student of any class, of any school or college. It is also submitted that the applicant had taken her to the District Hospital for her treatment after knowing that she has taken some drug. This contention is also not believable as no documentary evidence has been filed on record to prove that she was taken to District Hospital. Had she been taken to the District Hospital where she died, some information must have been given to the police authorities by the Doctor attending her. There is nothing on record to prove that after unnatural death of his wife applicant had given any information to the police authorities or to her parents. 20. Had she been taken to the District Hospital where she died, some information must have been given to the police authorities by the Doctor attending her. There is nothing on record to prove that after unnatural death of his wife applicant had given any information to the police authorities or to her parents. 20. Thus it is apparent from the above facts and circumstances that the applicant is involved in the case under section 304 -B IPC and the nature of accusation and severity of punishment in case of conviction is serious as punishment of imprisonment for life can also be awarded to a person convicted for an offence under section 304 B IPC. With regard to the reasonable apprehension of tampering of the evidence since the case is still at the stage of investigation, the apprehension of tampering of the prosecution witnesses by the applicant can not be ruled out. From the perusal of the contents of the FIR and the statement of the witnesses recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. I find that there is prima facie evidence against the applicant. . 21. In view of the above facts and circumstances, considering the nature of allegations contained in the F.I.R. and the statement under section 161 Cr.P.C. the applicant does not deserve bail and accordingly, his prayer for bail is hereby rejected