Heard Sri R.K. Singh learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Stand­ing Counsel for the opposite parties. 2. The petitioner has been dismissed from service by Superintendent of Police, Hardoi on 1.4.2008 as contained in Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition. The said order has been passed under Rule 8(2) of U.P. Police Offic­ers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 read with Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India. 3. The facts of the case are that the peti­tioner was appointed as Constable in Police Department and he completed about 33 years of his satisfactory service. The charge lev­elled against the petitioner on 6.12.2007 at the time of duty is that in the morning he was found in intoxicated state after drinking wine and on 1.4.2008 he was produced before the Additional Superintendent of Police (West­ern) and he was found in intoxicated condi­tion and on the said act of the petitioner by the order of Additional Superintendent of Police, he was awarded 14 day's punishment of P.D. and the petitioner had been directed for the medical condition. In the medical ex­amination he was found to be in intoxicated state. It was stated in the impugned order of dismissal that petitioner was found guilty of dereliction and laxity towards duty. It is also mentioned in the impugned order that the petitioner was earlier awarded two adverse entries. The petitioner was earlier punished on account of dereliction of duties and he was earlier provided major punishment of mini­mum of pay scale for a period of two years. 4. The crucial question involved in this case is as to whether the order of dismissal dated 1.1.1998 fulfills the condition prece­dent before passing the order as provided under the aforesaid Rules. Rule 8 of the Rules reads as under: "8. Dismissal and removal- (1) No Po­lice officer shall be dismissed or removed from service by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority. Rule 8 of the Rules reads as under: "8. Dismissal and removal- (1) No Po­lice officer shall be dismissed or removed from service by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority. (2) No Police officer shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after proper inquiry and disciplinary proceedings as contemplated by these rules : Provided that this rule shall not apply- (a) Where a person is dismissed or re­moved or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) Where the authority empowered to dis­miss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reasons to be recorded by that authority in writing it is not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry; or (c) Where the Government is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such enquiry." 5. The aforesaid Rule-8 is pan materia with Article 311(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India which confers certain constitutional protection upon a person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or a State. The normal rule is that no punitive action entail­ing consequence of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank would be taken without hold­ing a disciplinary enquiry against a member of a civil service i.e. unless and until he has been informed of the charges and given a rea­sonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. However, an exception has been given in respect of certain cases where holding of departmental enquiry would not be possible, may be either due to not reasonably practicable or in the interest of security of the State, the enquiry should not be held. 6. In order to deprive a member of civil service the aforesaid Constitutional protec­tion and in order to bring the same within the ambit of exception provided in the Constitu­tion, heavy burden lies upon the State to show that the order has been passed strictly within the four corners of the Statute and all the rel­evant ingredients have been taken into ac­count. 7. 7. A perusal of the dismissal order dated 1.4.2008 shows that the disciplinary author­ity has nowhere mentioned that holding of disciplinary enquiry is not reasonably practi­cable, although it has exercised the power under Rule 8(2)(b) of Rules, 1991 which is pari materia with Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Even he has not recorded his satisfaction in respect of the aforesaid re­quirements. The counter-affidavit filed by the respondent in the writ petition also nowhere mention the aforesaid requirements of Rules and the only thing mentioned therein that it has passed the order on the basis of the en­quiry conducted by the Circle Officer, Saifai, Etawah. The moot question would be, does it constitutes sufficient material. We are of the view that this contention of the appellant is apparently incorrect and cannot be sustained. It does not constitute the sufficient material and does not satisfy the requirement of stat­ute. 8. Considering the scope of Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution of India in the case of Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 , the Apex Court pointed out that two conditions must be satisfied to sustain any action taken thereunder. These are (i) there must exist a situation which renders holding of any enquiry nor reasonably prac­ticable, (ii) The Disciplinary Authority must record in writing its reasons in support of its satisfaction. The Apex Court also held that although clause (3) of that Article makes the decision of the disciplinary authority in this behalf final, such finality can certainly be tested in a court of law and interfered with if the action is found to be arbitrary or mala fide or motivated by extraneous considerations or merely a ruse to dispense with the inquiry. 9. 9. In the case of Union of India v. Balbir Singh, AIR 1998 SC 2043 , referring to its ear­lier decision, the Apex Court with reference to Clause (c) of Second Proviso of Article 311(2) held as under: "(1) That the order would be open to chal­lenge on the ground of mala fides or being based wholly on extraneous and/or irrelevant grounds, (2) even if some of the material on which the action is taken is found to be irrel­evant the court would still not interfere so long as there is some relevant material sustaining the action; (3) the truth or correctness of the material cannot be questioned by the court nor will it go into the adequacy of the mate­rial and it will also not substitute its opinion for that of the President; (4) the ground of mala fides takes in, inter alia, situations where the proclamation is found to be a clear case of abuse of power or what is sometimes called fraud on power; (5) the court will not lightly presume abuse or misuse of power and will make allowance for the fact that the Presi­dent and the Council of Ministers are the best judge of the situation and that they are also in possession of the information and mate­rial and Constitution has trusted their judg­ment in the matter; (6) this does not mean that the President and the Council of Minis­ters are the final arbiters in the matter or that their opinion is conclusive." 10. Considering the case in hand in the light of the legal principle laid down in the above cases we find that the order of dismissal nowhere shows that the authority has re­corded its satisfaction that holding of a disci­plinary enquiry is not reasonably practicable. No record has been produced by the appel­lant to show that such findings were recorded by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, the impugned order is in violation of the provi­sions of the aforesaid Rules. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant attempted to justify the order that it satisfies the requirements of Rules. We are of the view that even this contention is apparently mis­conceived. Therefore, the impugned order is in violation of the provi­sions of the aforesaid Rules. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant attempted to justify the order that it satisfies the requirements of Rules. We are of the view that even this contention is apparently mis­conceived. The Apex Court at page -1479 in Tulsi Ram Patel ( AIR 1985 SC 1416 ) (su­pra) held as follows: "A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary enquiry lightly or arbitrary or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's case against the Government servant is weak and must fail." 12. The words "some reasons to be re­corded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold enquiry" means that there must be some material for satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that it is not reasonably practicable. The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. The Apex Court in the case of Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1991 SC 385 in para 5 at page 390 has observed as under: "It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the Court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent No. 3 in the impugned order. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practi­cable to hold a departmental enquiry." "...When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the officer concerned." 13. In almost similar circumstances the matter came up before the Apex Court in the case of Chief Security Officer v. Singasan Rabi Das, AIR 1991 SC 1043 and the ApexCourt found that the dismissal order before enquiry in the said case on similar ground as in the case in hand did not satisfy the require­ments of the Rules as is apparent from the following : "In the present case the only reason given for dispensing with that enquiry was that it was considered not feasible or desirable to procure witnesses of the security/other Rail­way employees since this will expose these witnesses and make them ineffective in the future. It was stated further that if these wit­nesses were asked to appear at a confronted enquiry they were likely to suffer personal humiliation and insults and even their family members might become targets of acts of vio­lence. In our view these reasons are totally insufficient in law. We fail to understand how if these witnesses appeared at a confronted enquiry, they are likely to suffer personal humiliation and insults. These are normal witnesses and they could not be said to be placed in any delicate or special position in which asking them to appear at a confronted enquiry would render them subject to any danger to which witnesses are not normally subjected and hence these grounds constitute no justification for dispensing with the en­quiry. In this view it is not necessary for us to consider whether any fresh opportunity was required to be given before imposing an or­der of punishment. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs." 14. The impugned order of punishment of dismissal has been passed by the respondent No. 5 without issuing any show-cause notice and without issuing any charge-sheet and without conducting any disciplinary inquiry. 15. The main argument of the petitioner is that the charge levelled against the petitioner are not such which can not be normally in­quired into or the provisions of Rule 8(2)(b) could be attracted in the matter. Number of decisions have been laid down in this regard. The order dated 1.4.2008 passed by Superin­tendent of Police, Hardoi is not sustainable in the eye of law. The impugned order of dis­missal is hereby quashed. 16. The writ petition is allowed. 17. No orders as to costs. 18. Number of decisions have been laid down in this regard. The order dated 1.4.2008 passed by Superin­tendent of Police, Hardoi is not sustainable in the eye of law. The impugned order of dis­missal is hereby quashed. 16. The writ petition is allowed. 17. No orders as to costs. 18. It is further observed that if the respon­dents so desire they may proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law afresh. Petition allowed.