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2010 DIGILAW 2272 (PAT)

Janardan Singh v. State Of Bihar

2010-09-30

DHARNIDHAR JHA, MRIDULA MISHRA

body2010
JUDGEMENT Mridula Mishra and Dharnidhar Jha JJ. 1. Appellant Janardan Singh has preferred the above noted interlocutory application for suspending the order of conviction which was recorded by the Presiding Officer of Fast Track Court I, Gaya, in Sessions Trial No. 118 of 2007/190 of 1999 against him, which is being challenged in the present appeal. 2. Appellant Janardan Singh was tried along with others for charges under various sections including Sections 307, 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. After being found guilty of committing offence under Sections 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, the appellant was directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. No separate sentence was passed either under Sections 307/149 of the Penal Code or Section 27 of the Arms Act by the learned Trial Judge. 3. Advancing his submissions on the interlocutory application, Shri Yogesh Chandra Verma, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that appellant Janardan Singh was granted bail by this Court by order dated 27.3.2008 in the light of discussions of evidence in the judgment. It was contended that there was no direct evidence of participation in killing of the deceased and the conviction of the appellant was by virtue of Section 149 of the Penal Code. It was contended that the appellant was to contest the coming elections to the Bihar Legislative Assembly and because the conviction was still operative, so he was disqualified under Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 to do so. It was contended by Shri Verma that the appellant has a statutory right of setting himself up as a candidate in the elections. But, if the subsisting order of conviction, was not stayed, it could entail a situation for the appellant which could be causing irreversible situation for him as regards his right aforesaid. In support of the contention Shri Verma has placed before us a decision of the Supreme Court in Ravikant S. Patil V/s. Sarabhouma S. Bagali, reported in (2007) 1 SCC 673 . 4. The case in which the appellant stood convicted and sentenced, as indicated at the very out set of the present order, related to an incident dated 4.7.1996 in which a mob of persons including the present appellant variously armed with country made rifles, guns, garansa, lathis, etc. 4. The case in which the appellant stood convicted and sentenced, as indicated at the very out set of the present order, related to an incident dated 4.7.1996 in which a mob of persons including the present appellant variously armed with country made rifles, guns, garansa, lathis, etc. came to the house of the informant and started firing shots. The informant raised a hulla upon which his brother Surendra Singh and his father Bodh Narayan Singh came there so as to rescuing his family members and the informant as well: The accused persons surrounded the informant and others, like his brother and father. The informant and his family members also attempted to repel the attack and in that attempt some of the accused persons also received some injuries. The attempt by the informant and his family members to repel the attack was imperative as the accused persons appeared bent upon killing him and his brother and son. The informant and his family members were attacked by the appellant and others as a result of which Awadhesh Singh and Bodh Narayan Singh fell down at the place of occurrence after receiving gun shot injuries. His brother Awadhesh Singh had received severe and grievous injuries and while he was being shifted to the Primary Health Centre, Wazirganj, for treatment he died in the way. Other injured persons were referred by the Doctor to Bodh Gaya and Bodh Narayan Singh, another injured also died. The informant stated that he also received injuries on account of the shot fired by the present appellant. 5. The learned trial Judge, after considering the evidence and the impact thereof on the proof of the charges, came to the conclusion that the informant was also injured by the shot fired by the present appellant and two others were killed on account of being attacked by the mob which was variously and seriously armed and which had come to attack the family members of the informant and thus, found the charges proved and held the appellant and other accused persons guilty and thereafter went on to pass the sentence as indicated at the outset of the present order. 6. Section 389(1), Cr PC empowers appellate Court to order that execution of sentence or order appealed against be suspended and also, if any convicted person is in confinement that he be released on bail or his own bond. 6. Section 389(1), Cr PC empowers appellate Court to order that execution of sentence or order appealed against be suspended and also, if any convicted person is in confinement that he be released on bail or his own bond. Sub-section(2) of that section entitles the High Court also to exercise that power in case of an appeal by a person convicted by a sub-Ordinate Court. It is too well known to be pointed out that if there could not be any conviction, there could not be any question of passing any sentence and, as such, the order of sentence is consequential to the order of conviction. As such, the word order. Which appears after the words execution of sentence, being con-juncted by or refers to an order of conviction. As soon as an accused is granted bail and he is released from custody, the order of sentence could be said to be suspended automatically as the person is released and he could no longer be said to be serving out the sentence which was directed to be served by him on being inflicted upon him. But, the effect of his conviction remains, till it is suspended. A subsisting order of conviction may entail many disqualifications upon a convicted person. If the conviction is suspended, the effect of such an order is not only that the sentence is automatically stayed as in that situation the convicted person has necessarily to be released from custody but also that the disqualification arising out of the order of conviction may temporarily be erased entitling the convict to contest an election. He is also precluded from serving out the sentence and, thereby, his sentence also stands suspended. It may, as such, be noted that suspending the order of conviction is a very serious judicial business and the order in that behalf may not as ordinarily be granted as the Court is approached. The exceptional nature of an order suspending the conviction of a convict, may be gathered from this fact that the provision mandates the Appellate Court to record reasons in writing for suspending the order of conviction. The exceptional nature of an order suspending the conviction of a convict, may be gathered from this fact that the provision mandates the Appellate Court to record reasons in writing for suspending the order of conviction. What, therefore, implies is that if the Appellate Court is not inclined to suspend the conviction of a person under Section 389(1), Cr PC then also it may be all the more necessary for the Appellate Court to record reasons of refusing the prayer because it might ultimately be continuing the disqualification which the convicted person might have incurred on account of being visited with an order of conviction. The above aspect on the scope and ambit of Section 389 (1), Cr PC was considered by this Court while considering a similar prayer in Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav V/s. State of Bihar through CBI, reported in 2009(2) PLJR 650 . 7. On perusal of the above decision of this Court, it may be found that while considering the prayer of the present nature the Court is not required to rove deeply into the evidence of the case as if it were called upon to pass a judgment as it has to after finally hearing the appeal; it has only to apply its mind to the evidence on record of the case on a cursory basis so as to finding the prima facie evidence of involvement of the appellant as regards his conviction. 8. The evidence of the case has been discussed by the learned Trial Judge at page 14 of the judgment where he has discussed the evidence of P.W. 7, the informant of the case. The evidence of the informant Lalan Singh was that the appellant fired a shot at him as a result of which he received injuries in his lips and teeth. The evidence of participation of the appellant appears at page 15 of the judgment and it is indicated by the evidence of P.W. 7, the informant that the appellant fired from his rifle upon the informant as a result of which his teeth were broken. He was sent to the Doctor for treatment by the police and from there he was shifted to Anugrah Narain Medical College Hospital, Gaya. He was sent to the Doctor for treatment by the police and from there he was shifted to Anugrah Narain Medical College Hospital, Gaya. Besides the above, the evidence on direct participation of the appellant in commission of the offence in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly was amply available on the record, as appears discussed by the learned Trial Judge, indicating that the two deaths had been caused by the acts committed by the members of the unlawful assembly of which the present appellant, Janardan Singh, was also a member. There appears clear evidence on trial Court record indicating amply the participation of this appellant in commission of the offence. 9. Thus, it could not be said that there was no evidence against the appellant about his participation and, above all, there was no evidence of commission of any overt act by him. The injured informant has named the present appellant Janardan Singh as his assailant as a result of which he received injuries in his mouth and teeth. 10. The contention of the appellant was that if the Court does not suspend his conviction his position shall become irreversible. A similar argument was forwarded before this Court in Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav (Supra) and that appears noticed and discussed in paragraph 16 of the judgment which reads as under : "While we were being addressed by learned two counsel of the appellant, Sri Memon placed before us a typed copy of a judgment, said to be delivered by the High Court of Allahabad in Cr. Misc. Application No. 907 of 2007 in Cr. Appeal No. 1044 of 2000 and it was contended that Allahabad High Court has also held that the power under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised only in exceptional and rare circumstances and where nongrant of stay would lead to injustice and irreversible consequence. Fighting an election may be a democratic right of a citizen but his wishes of being elected in the election cannot be categorized as any of his rights. In politics, one could not say that his position is irreversible. Fighting an election may be a democratic right of a citizen but his wishes of being elected in the election cannot be categorized as any of his rights. In politics, one could not say that his position is irreversible. A person could be holding the highest office of the executive one day but by sheer change in political circumstances, he might be finding himself out of that position and as a mere Member or even as no Member of the House of any Legislature or Parliament Likewise, one could have won and could have been elected as a Member of the Parliament in one particular election, but in the other, he might not be winning the elections or the worst of the possibility could be that if he is affiliated to any particular political party, then that party may not consider him to be fit for being fielded as its candidate in any constituency. Thus, the plea of irreversible consequence appears of no benefit to the appellant Injustice could not be said to be inflicted upon any one merely because the Court has a definite opinion on a particular issue under the special facts and circumstances of the case rather the Court could be justified in passing a particular order." The same reasoning and circumstances appear applying to the present appellant also as regards his grievance of being put to irreversible situation. 11 Besides the above argument, learned counsel appearing for the appellant was raising before us a very serious contention that the right to contest an election being a statutory right of a person, not suspending the order of conviction may amount to denying to him that statutory right. We want to consider the seriousness of the argument and for that we shall have to point out that a similar argument appears advanced in Peoples Union For Civil Liberties (PUCL) & Anr. V/s. Union of India & Anr., reported in (2003) 4 SCC 399 and by referring to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Jyoti Basu V/s. Debi Ghosal, reported in (1982) 1 SCC 691 the Supreme Court examined that contention which appears record in paragraph 56 of the judgment in Peoples Union For Civil Liberties (PUCL) & Anr. V/s. Union of India & Anr. (supra). V/s. Union of India & Anr. (supra). The ultimate finding has been recorded in paragraph 62 of the judgment but that remains confined to the right of a person to elect someone as his representative. It was held that right of a citizen to cast his vote and elect his representative in the elections either of the Lok Sabha or of a State Legislative Assembly was a fundamental right which flows from Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The reasoning for recording the above finding as regards the right to vote was that the voter by casting his vote was expressing his opinion about the candidate after having assessed his candidature from all angles. In spite of the above finding of the Supreme Court we want to point out that the right to vote of a citizen could not, in its entirety, be held to be a fundamental right on many reasons. The one reason which we have is that on account of being enrolled as an electorate in the electoral roll and having fulfilled the criteria which are set down by Article 326 of the Constitution of India read with Section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (R.P. Act, 1950 for short) a citizen of India is simply entitled to cast his vote. That right is merely a statutory right. So long as he had not cast his vote, he was not expressing his opinion about the candidates who could be contesting a particular seat for being elected either to the Lok Sabha or to a Legislative Assembly. Merely considering the antecedents of a candidate or considering his candidature as regards his manifesto about the development of the constituency could not be said to be the fundamental right because that could simply be the application of the wisdom of an electorate to the competence of a candidate as regards his claim of being elected. The fundamental right of the citizen may be starting as soon as he has decided as to in whose favour or against whom he may be voting and in order to expressing that opinion of his he decided to go to polling station. His decision and action, accordingly, may be said to be exercising his fundamental right. The fundamental right of the citizen may be starting as soon as he has decided as to in whose favour or against whom he may be voting and in order to expressing that opinion of his he decided to go to polling station. His decision and action, accordingly, may be said to be exercising his fundamental right. The phenomenon of forming the opinion by the voter for or against the candidates who are in fray of the election and casting the vote could only be covered by his right to expression as enshrined under Article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution of India. This could be the reason, though it has not been elaborately expressed by any of the decisions of the Supreme Court, that in Jyoti Basu V/s. Debi Ghosal (supra) the Supreme Court was expressing its views as under: "8. A right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is, anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a common law right. It is pure and simple, a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute an election. Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation." Thus, it may appear that a right to be elected is of course a statutory right but as was pointed out by the Supreme Court in Jyoti Basu V/s. Debi Ghosal (supra), it was subject to statutory limitations. 12. What are those statutory limitations and how they could be identified is the questionwhich we want to decide now. 13. The preamble of the Constitution of India declares India a "Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, securing for its citizens justice-social, economic and political; liberty- of thought, expression, belief; faith and worship; equality- of status and of opportunity, besides promoting among people of India fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation". The words democratic republic, may sometimes cause confusion as to what does it really mean because a republic could never be said to be a democracy in the real sense of the term. A republic is a system of Government which has the participation of the citizens who could be governed in electing persons who have lastly to govern them. The words democratic republic, may sometimes cause confusion as to what does it really mean because a republic could never be said to be a democracy in the real sense of the term. A republic is a system of Government which has the participation of the citizens who could be governed in electing persons who have lastly to govern them. Thus, it may appear a system of governance by representatives of the citizens of the republic except a monarch. But. it, ultimately, has a single head of State who Rules the governed. Directly or indirectly, the peoples participation in the republic system of Government is to seek approval, consent or acclaim to proposed policies of the person who was likely to govern the citizens, as we find it in the United States of America. Democracy, in any of its fnrms, could not be said to be akin to a republic. Democracy which was ushered in by our Constitution, in sum and substance, speaks of a system of Government, which is wholly a representative democracy, where the powers of the majority are exercised within the framework of constitutional restraints designed to guarantee the citizens in the enjoyment of certain individual or collective rights. The individual or collective rights which have been created or guaranteed by our Constitution to the people of India are very much enlisted by the preamble and that gets further adumbrated in Part-Ill. Those special features distinguish our democratic republic from the other republic. In fact, the republican feature of one person ruling the people is reflected by our Constitution by recognizing the "People of India" as the supreme ruler. But again it hardly requires to be pointed out that right or liberties guaranteed by the Constitution are also not immune, they may be abridged, suspended or even snatched. 14. Our Constitution has established many democratic institutions, like, the Parliament or the State Legislature. It has created institution of the President, and has prescribed the mode of electing members of our Parliament and the State Legislatures. It has not directly recognized the multiparty democracy, but by virtue of the Tenth Schedule being added to it has indirectly done so. The Tenth Schedule relates to incurring disqualification of a member of the Parliament or the State Legislature on defecting from his party under certain circumstances as indicated by Para-2 of the Schedule. It has not directly recognized the multiparty democracy, but by virtue of the Tenth Schedule being added to it has indirectly done so. The Tenth Schedule relates to incurring disqualification of a member of the Parliament or the State Legislature on defecting from his party under certain circumstances as indicated by Para-2 of the Schedule. The Constitution has prescribed as to who may be a voter and who could be candidate in an election by setting down certain qualifications and disqualifications. Mult franchise was to be the basis for registering a citizen of India as a voter for participating in elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assembly. Article 326 of the Constitution reads as under : "Elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assemblies of States to be on the basis of adult suffrage. The elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assembly of every State shall be on the basis of adult suffrage; that is to say, every person who is a citizen of India and who is not less that eighteen years of age on such date as may be fixed in that behalf by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature and is not otherwise disqualified under this Constitution or any law made by the appropriate Legislature on the ground of non-residence, unsoundness of mind, crime or corrupt or illegal practice, shall be entitled to be registered as a voter at any such election." A bare perusal of the above provision may point out that it was creating a right in every citizen of India who was not less than eighteen years of age and was not otherwise disqualified under the Constitution of India or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature on the grounds as pointed out by the above Article, such a crime, corrupt or illegal practices, was entitled to be registered as a voter for any such election. So, merely being a citizen of India could not be sufficient to enjoy and exercise the right to vote. So, merely being a citizen of India could not be sufficient to enjoy and exercise the right to vote. If the person is suffering from any of the disqualifications contained in Article 326 or any other law made by the Parliament in that behalf, then in spite of being a citizen of India, he could not be entitled to enjoy that right and to exercise it One of the reasons was the unsoundness of mind. Besides, the ground of crime, corrupt or illegal practices may also be reasons for disqualifying a person to be a voter. 15. The Representation of the People Act, 1950 (R.P. Act, 1950) contains the provision for preparation of electoral rolls for Parliamentary and Assembly constituencies. Part III of it contains the procedure for registering an electorate in preparing electoral rolls for Assembly constituencies. Section 13 D(2) appears in Part IIB of the R.P. Act, 1950. Section 13 D(2) adopts the provision of Part III as regards preparing the electoral rolls. Section-16 appearing in Part III speaks of disqualifications for a voter in being registered in an electoral roll as such. A perusal of the provision may indicate that the person who is not a citizen of India or is of unsound mind having been declared so by a competent Court or is for the time being disqualified from voting under the provisions of any law regarding corrupt practices and other offences in connection with election, may not be registered as an electorate in any electoral roll. Thus, the disqualifications which are enshrined in Article 326 of the Constitution of India appears extended in a very comprehensive manner by Section 16 of the R.P. Act, 1950 which is a law made by the Parliament for furthering the goals which were set down by the framers of our Constitution. If we have a glance also of various other Articles of the Constitution of India on Constitution of the Parliament or the State Legislatures, we could be more clear that the right of a person either to elect or to be elected could never be his unqualified right rather it is a pure statuary right within the limitations. 16. If we have a glance also of various other Articles of the Constitution of India on Constitution of the Parliament or the State Legislatures, we could be more clear that the right of a person either to elect or to be elected could never be his unqualified right rather it is a pure statuary right within the limitations. 16. Now, the limitations which could be discerned from the earlier discussions of Articles 326 of the Constitution of India and Section 16 of the Representation of the People Act may indicate that there are already some limitations existing in the Constitution of India and the R.P. Act, 1950 by virtue of the above noted relevant provisions. It may be pointed out at this stage itself that even if a person is a citizen of India by virtue of Article 5 of the Constitution of India, or on account of other constitutional provisions, he may not be registered as a voter and if he is not registered as a voter then he could not claim himself to be clothed with a right to jump into any election fray as a candidate because the basic qualification for being chosen as a Member of the Parliament or the Member of the State Legislature as may appear from Articles 84 and 173 respectively of the Constitution of India might be lost to him which is the first criteria for being chosen to fill a seat either of the Parliament or of a State Legislature. In addition, he should fulfil other criteria as are set down by the two Articles for a person who is desirous of jumping into the election fray. The Representation of the People Act, 1951, prescribes qualifications in the above behalf in its Part II. Besides qualifications, the Constitution of India also sets down the disqualifications for a person to be member of either of the houses of Parliament or those of the State Legislature. Those disqualifications are enlisted in Articles 102 and 191 of the Constitution. The perusal of the above two Articles, specially, Articles 102(2), and 191(2) may indicate that there could be a disqualification of the class and nature as may emanate from the 10th Schedule of the Constitution. The 10th Schedule of the Constitution is nothing but an attempt to prescribe the manner in which ante defection law could be implemented. The perusal of the above two Articles, specially, Articles 102(2), and 191(2) may indicate that there could be a disqualification of the class and nature as may emanate from the 10th Schedule of the Constitution. The 10th Schedule of the Constitution is nothing but an attempt to prescribe the manner in which ante defection law could be implemented. Thus, what we find is that by virtue of the above noted constitutional provisions on qualifications/disqualifications of a person a citizen of India could not be eligible to contest an election. 17. We want to revert back to Article 326 of the Constitution of India which creates a disability by virtue of a person being found criminal or corrupt or had been found indulging in corrupt practices. It hardly requires to be pointed out that criminality of a person or his being corrupt or having indulged in corrupt practices could be reasonably established as and when he has been found guilty and held as such by a Court of law or a Tribunal as envisaged by the Representation of the People Act, 1951, after full-fledged trial. Similar could be the procedure for holding a person corrupt as also using corrupt practices. Corrupt practices could also be established by virtue of the provision of R.P. Act, 1951, specially, those which are enumerated in Part III of the R.P. Act, 1951. Section 8 of the R.P. Act, 1951 enlists the disqualifications on conviction for certain offences whereas Section 8 A points out corrupt practices creating a disqualification to a person to contest an election for the membership of either of the houses of the Parliament or State Legislatures. Other disqualifications on account of other reasons. like, dismissal for corruption or in connection with Govt, contracts, etc. or in connection with Govt, company or failure to lodge the account of election expenses are broadly enlisted in Sections 9-A, 10 and 10-A of the R.P. Act, 1951. Those disqualifications have been prescribed by the Legislature in the light of constitutional provisions emanating from the provisions of Articles 326, 102 and 191 of the Constitution. If a person who has been found guilty of committing an offence and has been punished with imprisonment of the description as indicated by Section 8 of the R.P. Act, 1951 in its various sub-sections, then it could be a disqualification under that particular Act. If a person who has been found guilty of committing an offence and has been punished with imprisonment of the description as indicated by Section 8 of the R.P. Act, 1951 in its various sub-sections, then it could be a disqualification under that particular Act. In our considered view, the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is a creature of the Parliament by virtue of the constitutional requirements and those provisions may be considered only in the light of the relevant constitutional provisions. Once the constitution has prescribed some disqualifications and it has taken effect, then no one could claim that he has a statutory right, even a fraction thereof left in him, to contest an election. As such, what we find is that it is not an absolute statutory right. The limitations which have been prescribed by the Constitution of India and other law, i.e., R.P. Act, 1951 shall always come in way of a person to get elected to fill any vacancy in either of the houses of the Parliament or those of the State Legislature. The claim of the appellant that he had a statuary right which could not be aoridged or snatched from him by reading the provision of Section 8 of the R.P. Act, 1951 appears extremely hollow and fit to be rejected. 18. While discussing the provision of Constitution of India, we always have a clear inference arising in our minds that when the framers of the Constitution were speaking about disqualifications for a citizen of India to exercise the right to vote on account of his criminal records they were fully aware that the polity which they were ushering in our democracy and the administration which they were likely to create by introducing Parliamentary democracy of representative character, there might be some possibilities that criminal and corrupt persons of the society may vitiate the process of election. The above situation was visualized and recognized bv the framers of our Constitution on account of the composition of our society, which we had at the time of adopting our Constitution, The same almost continues today also after sixty odd years. As such, some of us attempt to subjugate the weaker sections among us so as to forcing them either not to vote or to vote in favour of a candidate who could be having a shady character. As such, some of us attempt to subjugate the weaker sections among us so as to forcing them either not to vote or to vote in favour of a candidate who could be having a shady character. This is too well known to be pointed out that criminal power along with money power has always been put into the electoral process to overawe and influence the voters so as to getting the candidates of shady and tainted character elected. The Constitution of the present Parliament reportedly also is such that many Members of Parliament or who could be sitting in different State Legislatures have criminal background. Many of them are, reportedly, lacing serious criminal charges. This was the reason that the Law Commission, in its report submitted in 1999, was recommending that in respect of offence except the offences mentioned in sub-section (1), mere framing of the charge should serve as a disqualification. This provision was sought to be made in addition to the existing provision providing for disqualification arising out of the Constitution. The reason for this proposal was that the persons committing the minor or serious offences under Sections 8(i) of the R.P. Act, 1951, are mostly persons having political clout and influence. The Law Commission further pointed out that very often these elements were supported by unsocial persons or group of persons with the result that no witness is prepared to come forward to depose against such persons. In such a situation, it was proving extremely difficult to obtain conviction of these persons. As such, the Commission suggested, as soon as charges were framed by a Court on the basis of materials placed before it by the prosecution including the material disclosed by the charge-sheet, providing for a disqualification on the ground of framing of charge would neither be unjust or unreasonable or arbitrary. The Cornmission was further taking note of mounting corruption to point out that the people were generally lured to enter politics or to Contest elections to become rich overnight. The people have a statutory right to know the antecedents of such persons. This was the reason that the Commission was recommending that the candidate seeking election should furnish the details of his assets (movable or immovable) possessed by him or her, wife/husband, and dependent relations, duly supported by an affidavit. 19. The people have a statutory right to know the antecedents of such persons. This was the reason that the Commission was recommending that the candidate seeking election should furnish the details of his assets (movable or immovable) possessed by him or her, wife/husband, and dependent relations, duly supported by an affidavit. 19. As regards the above issue as to whether the Election Commission could be within its rights to ask for those details including the past and present antecedents, the Apex Court decided them by rendering the judgment in Union of India V/s. Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr., reported in (2002) 5 S.C.C. 294 as a result of which some provisions were introduced in the R.P. Act, 1951 including the voters right to know the antecedent of the candidate by Section 33-A of R.P. Act. 20. We have pointed out the above background only to buttress our views that if this could be the scenario of the election and the conditions set down by the Constitution, then suspending the order of conviction could simply be unconstitutional and against the provisions of law. This might be the reason that the Supreme Court while passing judgment in Ravikant S. Patil V/s. Sarbabhouma S. Bagali (supra) was highlighting the necessity of not suspending conviction recorded by a Court in paragraph 16.3 which is as under: "16.3. In K.C. Sareen V/s. CBI, it was held that though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. It was further held that merely because the convicted person files an appeal to challenge his conviction, the Court should not suspend the operation of the conviction and the Court has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. The Bench also noted that the evil of corruption has reached a monstrous dimension. While deciding the prayer of the appellant for grant of an order of stay of conviction, the Bench observed that when conviction is on a corruption charge against a public servant, the Appellate Court should not suspend the order of conviction during the pendency of the appeal, even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended. While deciding the prayer of the appellant for grant of an order of stay of conviction, the Bench observed that when conviction is on a corruption charge against a public servant, the Appellate Court should not suspend the order of conviction during the pendency of the appeal, even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended. The Bench further observed that it would be a sublime public policy that the convicted public servant is kept under disability of the conviction in spite of keeping the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal or revision. These observations would equally apply when a prayer for stay of order of conviction is made so as to remove the disability to contest an election except, as already noted, in a very exceptional and rare case." 21. We find ourselves inclined only to add to the above views of the Apex Court, that suspending an order of conviction may tantamount to watering down the constitutional mandate on disqualification of a citizen not only on exercising right to adult franchise but also on contesting an election. 22. While we were hearing the present interlocutory application, an affidavit was filed by the wife of the appellant and it indicated that in spite of being convicted in the present appeal, the appellant was facing a trial for offences under Sections 302, 307, 326, etc. of the Indian Penal Code arising out of Wazirganj P.S. Case No. 79 of 2003. If this could be the history of the appellant then that further discourages us to suspend his conviction. 23. For the foregoing reasons. We do not find any merit in this interlocutor) application it is dismissed.