Judgment U.C.Maheshwari, J. ( 1. ) The appellants- defendants have preferred this appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 9.10.04 passed by 1st Additional District Judge, Betul in Civil Regular Appeal No. 32-A/03 whereby setting aside the judgment and decree dated 23.10.03 passed by Civil Judge2 Class-II, Betul in Civil Original Suit No. 5-A/02 dismissing the eviction suit of the respondent, the same was decreed against the appellant on the ground under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Act 1961, in short the Act. ( 2. ) The facts giving rise to this appeal in short are that the respondents herein filed a suit against one Ramesh Soni, the principal defendant and the predecessor of the appellants, for eviction, arrears of rent and mesne profit with respect of a shop situated in Betul, contending that defendant being his tenant is in occupation of the same for non residential purposes @ Rs.500/- per month. The same was filed on the ground of bona fide genuine requirement of the respondent to open the cloth shop for which he did not possess any other suitable accommodation of his own in such town. As per further pleadings the available adjoining shop to the disputed shop is in occupation of his father who is using the same as godown. The same is also not suitable for the alleged need because a tube well is installed in the centre of such shop. The disputed shop being situated on the corner and facing both sides road is more convenient and suitable for the alleged business of the respondent. The suit was also filed on the ground of arrears of rent. In pendency of the suit principal defendant Ramesh Soni died and thereafter his widow , the appellant no. 1 Smt. Gayatri, being domestic woman and other appellants being minor are not doing any business in such premises and the same was given by them to one Sanjay Soni, the brother of Ramesh Soni, on sub tenancy. In such premises an additional ground of Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act was also taken by the respondent by way of amendment in the suit. ( 3. ) In written statements of the appellants, by admitting the tenancy it is stated that initially it was @ Rs.400/- per month. In such premises an additional ground of Section 12 (1) (b) of the Act was also taken by the respondent by way of amendment in the suit. ( 3. ) In written statements of the appellants, by admitting the tenancy it is stated that initially it was @ Rs.400/- per month. Subsequently it was enhanced @ Rs.500/- per month but after death of principal defendant by amendment it is stated that keeping in view such changed circumstances of the appellants family the rent was reduced by the respondent @ Rs.300/- per month. The respondent- plaintiff is doing the business of cloth and General Stores with his father since last ten years in his another shop situated near Sunita Lodge, Betulganj. The alleged need of the tenanted premises to the respondent is neither bona fide nor genuine. After inducting the principal defendant in disputed shop, the other three adjoining shops were given to different tenants by the respondents. The respondent wants to evict the appellants from such shop with some ulterior motive. So far his alleged need is concerned, it is said that the respondent can start his new business in the available alternate accommodation situated adjoining to the shop. In pendency of the suit some other shops also got vacated by the respondent. The same are lying vacant. Accordingly respondent is in possession of sufficient alternate suitable accommodation of bis own for the alleged need, in which he can start his alleged business. The other stated grounds of eviction are also denied in written statements and prayer for dismissal of the suit is made. ( 4. ) In view of pleadings of the parties after framing as many as five issues the trial was held. On appreciation of the evidence, in the first inning of litigation, vide judgment and decree dated 10th October 1998 the suit of the respondent was partly decreed for the sum of arrears of rent while on other grounds the same was dismissed. The same was challenged by the respondent in appeal, on consideration of such appeal by allowing the amendment application of the appellants after setting aside such judgment and decree of the trial court the case was remitted back to the trial court to decide afresh after extending opportunity of consequential amendment to other party and framing the additional issues on the amended pleadings. After remitting back the matter, in compliance of the direction of the appellate court after extending the opportunity of consequential amendment and framing the additional issues, the additional evidence of the parties was recorded and on fresh appreciation the suit was dismissed by the trial court. Such dismissal was challenged by the respondent before the appellate court. On consideration by allowing such appeal in part the suit of the respondent was decreed against the appellants for eviction on the ground enumerated under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act holding the respondent is in bona fide genuine need of the alleged accommodation for his own business, for which he did not possess any other suitable alternate accommodation of his own in Betul. Being dissatisfied with the same, the appellants - defendants have come forward to this court with this appeal. ( 5. ) On earlier occasion vide order dated 19.7.06 this appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law:- "1. Whether the need of the plaintiff can still be said to be bona fide since after having obtained vacant possession of two shops adjoining to the suit shop, he has not started the business?" ( 6. ) Shri Adarshmuni Trivedi, learned Sr. Adv. assisted by Shri Ritesh Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants by referring the pleadings and the evidence adduced by the parties, said that the appellants had successfully proved that the respondent had sufficient alternate accommodation of hiw own with him for his alleged need, besides this, in pendency of the suit respondent also got vacated some shops adjoining to the disputed shop, situated in the same building from other tenants namely: (a) Tuteza Cloth Stores, (b) R.K. Traders and P.P. Sale, taking into consideration the same, the trial court rightly dismissed the suit but the appellate court contrary to such evidence and without taking into consideration that the entire account of available alternate accommodation of the shops adjoining to the disputed shop has not been put fourth by the respondent in his pleading only on the basis of inadmissible evidence in the lack of the pleadings explaining the unsuitability of such available alternate accommodation has decreed the suit on the ground under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. Such approach of the appellate court is not sustainable under the law. Such approach of the appellate court is not sustainable under the law. In support of his contention he placed his reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Hasmat Rai and other Vs. Raghunath Prasad reported in (1981) 3 SCC 103 and also of this court in the matter of Banarasi Devi Jain Vs. M.P. Transport Company and another reported in 2008 (2) M.P.L.J Page 155 and prayed for setting aside the judgment of the appellate court by restoring the judgment of the trial court dismissing the suit of the respondent. ( 7. ) Shri Avinash Jargar, learned counsel for the respondent while responding the aforesaid arguments justified the impugned judgment of the appellate court and said the same is based on proper appreciation of evidence and is in conformity with law. It does not require any interference at this stage. In continuation he argued that as per settled legal proposition the appellant is the only sole judge to decide the suitability of the place for opening his alleged business. The court is not having any authority to discard such wish of the respondent by holding the other alternate accommodation of his own is suitable for such need. As such the court can not insist the landlord like the respondent to open his business at some other adjoining place contrary to his wish. By referring the evidence adduced by the parties, he said that the disputed shop is the only suitable shop for opening the business of the respondent. The other available alternate shops are not suitable for the same. He also said that it is not necessary for the respondent to put fourth the entire account of available alternate vacant accommodation with him in the pleadings, specially when such facts have come on record in the depositions of the witnesses. In such premises, he said that the appellate court has not committed any error in passing the impugned decree of eviction on appreciation of the evidence and prayed for dismissal of this appeal. He also placed his reliance on some reported cases of the Apex Court as well as of this court. ( 8. ) Having heard the parties, after perusing the record in the available circumstances the court has to answer the aforesaid framed substantial question of law. He also placed his reliance on some reported cases of the Apex Court as well as of this court. ( 8. ) Having heard the parties, after perusing the record in the available circumstances the court has to answer the aforesaid framed substantial question of law. It is undisputed fact between the parties as stated by them in their depositions that in pendency of the suit the respondent has got vacant possession of two shops, of the same house situated near to the shop in dispute, from the different tenants namely Tuteja Cloth Stores and P.P. Sale. Ashish Kumar Jain, (PW-1), the plaintiff himself categorically stated in para 32 of his deposition that it is true that he has obtained the possession of the shops from Tuteja Cloth Stores, R.K. Traders and P.P. Sale and in such shops there is no tubewell in any of them. He also said in para 27 of his deposition that the shop got vacated from Tuteja Cloth Stores is under use as godown. It is apparent from the averments of the plaint that even after taking the possession of such shops from the other tenants during pendency of the suit the account of such available alternate accommodation how the same are not suitable has not been put fourth in the pleading by way of amendment. It is settled proposition of law that the landlord like the respondent is obliged under the law to put fourth the entire account with respect of available vacant alternate accommodation of his own with him stating how the same are not suitable for him. In absence of any pleadings in that regard in view of availability of such alternate accommodation with the landlord like the respondent, his alleged need for the disputed accommodation could not be held to be bona fide or genuine for passing the decree of eviction against the appellants under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. Long back on arising the occasion such question was answered by the Apex Court in the matter of Hasmat Rai and other Vs. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103 in which it was held as under: - "10. Long back on arising the occasion such question was answered by the Apex Court in the matter of Hasmat Rai and other Vs. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103 in which it was held as under: - "10. Section 12 starts with a non obstante clause thereby curtailing the right of the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant which he might have under any other law and the right of eviction is made subject to the overriding provision of Section 12. It is thus an enabling section. In order to avail of the benefit conferred by Section 12 to seek eviction of the tenant the landlord must satisfy the essential ingredients of the section. The landlord in this case seeks eviction of the tenant under S. 12 (l)(f). He must, therefore, establish (i) that he requires bona fide possession of a building let for non-residential purpose for continuing or starting his business; and (ii) that he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. The burden to establish both the requirements of S. 12(l)(f) is squarely on the landlord. And before an allegation of fact to obtain the relief required is permitted to be proved, the law of pleadings require that such facts have to be alleged and must be put in issue. Ordinarily, therefore, when a landlord seeks eviction under S. 12 (l)(f) the Court after satisfying itself that there are proper pleadings must frame two issue namely (i) whether the plaintiff landlord proves that he bona fide requires possession of a building let to the tenant for non-residential purpose for continuing or starting his business, and (ii) whether he proves that he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned. Without elaborating we must notice a well established proposition that any amount of proof offered without pleading is generally of no relevance." "14............................................................ The M. P. Act enables a landlord to seek eviction of a tenant and obtain possession under various circumstances set out in Section 12. If a landlord bona fide requires possession of a premises let for residential purpose for his own use he can sue and obtain possession. He is equally entitled to obtain possession of the premises let for non- residential purposes if he wants to continue or start his business. If a landlord bona fide requires possession of a premises let for residential purpose for his own use he can sue and obtain possession. He is equally entitled to obtain possession of the premises let for non- residential purposes if he wants to continue or start his business. If he commences the proceedings for eviction on the ground of personal requirement he must be able to allege and show the requirement on the date of initiation of action in the Court which would be his cause of action. But that is not sufficient. This requirement must continue throughout the progress of the litigation and must exist on the date of the decree and when we say decree we mean the decree of the final Court. Any other view would defeat the beneficial provisions of a welfare legislation like the Rent Restriction Act................................................If the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement no more exists because of subsequent events, it would be open to him to point out such events and the Court including the appellate Court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same. Otherwise the landlord would derive an unfair advantage. An illustration would clarify what we want to convey. A landlord was in a position to show that he needed possession of demised premises on the date of the suit as well as on the date of the decree of the trial Court. When the matter was pending in appeal at the instance of the tenant, the landlord built a house or bungalow which would fully satisfy his requirement. If this subsequent event is taken into consideration, the landlord would have to be non-suited. Can the Court shut its eyes and evict the tenant? Such is neither the spirit nor intendment of Rent Restriction Act which was enacted to fetter the unfettered right of re-entry. Therefore when an action is brought by the landlord under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, his need must not only be shown to exist at the date of the suit, but must exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date when a higher court deals with the matter. Therefore when an action is brought by the landlord under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, his need must not only be shown to exist at the date of the suit, but must exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date when a higher court deals with the matter. During the progress and passage of proceeding from Court to Court if subsequent events occur which if noticed would non suit the plaintiff, the Court has to examine and evaluate the some and mould the decree accordingly." ( 9. ) Subsequently on arising the occasion the aforesaid principle laid down by the Apex Court is followed by this court also in the matter of Banarasi Devi Jain Vs. M.P. Transport Company and another reported in 2008 (2) M.P.L.J Page 155 in which it was held as under: - "12. Coming to the question of section 12(1) (f) of the Act regarding bona fide, genuine requirement of disputed premises to the appellant for business and godown of her son is concerned, it is apparent from the plaint that on the date of filing the suit or subsequent to it, at any point of time, the available alternate accommodation, was neither pleaded nor any application in this regard was moved by the appellant. Although in the written statement of the respondents, the plea regarding availability of alternate accommodation is taken by the respondent and on vacating the premises by the tenant of adjoining premises under execution of the decree from the tenant New Delhi- MP Transport Company, the written statement was amended and such alternate accommodation is also pleaded. In spite of such pleadings, the appellant did not take any steps to put forth the explanation and the accounts regarding unsustainability of such available accommodation by amending the suit. Although in support of the pleadings of alternate accommodation, the witnesses of the respondents did not state anything in their deposition but the witnesses of the appellant were cross - examined on this count. Jai Kumar Jain (PW-1) son of the appellant admitted in para-6 of his deposition that her mother has got possession of the adjoining premises from the other tenant. Jai Kumar Jain (PW-1) son of the appellant admitted in para-6 of his deposition that her mother has got possession of the adjoining premises from the other tenant. In view of the settled preposition of the law that the plaintiff like appellant is bound to built -up her case with all probabilities to get the decree she could not be benefited on the weakness of the respondent/defendant, the aforesaid admission is sufficient to draw an inference that the appellant has got adjoining alternate accommodation during pendency of the suit and as per available evidence in the lack of any evidence regarding unsuitability of such accommodation for the alleged need, the suit could not be decreed at this stage on this ground by setting aside the findings of the trial Court in this regard. My aforesaid view is fully fortified by the dictum of the Apex Court announced in the matter of Hasmat Rai and another Vs. Ragunath Prasad, 1981 MPLJ (SC) 610= AIR 1981 SC 1711 . ( 10. ) In view of the aforesaid dictum on examining the case at hand then the same are applicable in available circumstances. In such premises, the impugned judgment and decree of the appellate court could not be sustained. ( 11. ) Although the respondents counsel argued that the appellants have failed to prove by their evidence that any of the above said alternate accommodation is suitable and sufficient for the alleged need of the respondent, but I have found sufficient evidence in the deposition of Pawan, (DW-3) with respect of the available alternate accommodation with the respondent of his own for his alleged need. Even otherwise under the law the landlord like the respondent is obliged to discharge his duty to explain by way of the pleadings in the suit about non- suitability of the available alternate accommodation either it was available with him on the date of filing the suit or the same was got vacated during pendency of the suit. In view of the aforesaid discussion the respondent has failed to put fourth such account in the pleadings. In such circumstances merely on some weakness of the appellants-defendants, the respondent could not get the decree for eviction against the appellants on the ground of bona fide genuine requirement. ( 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion the respondent has failed to put fourth such account in the pleadings. In such circumstances merely on some weakness of the appellants-defendants, the respondent could not get the decree for eviction against the appellants on the ground of bona fide genuine requirement. ( 12. ) So far the case laws cited on behalf of the respondents counsel are concerned, the same are taken up for consideration one by one:- (a) In the matter of Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar (Mrs.) Vs. Traders and agencies and another reported in (1996) 5 SCC 344 is concerned, this court has no dispute with the principle laid down in this case, that it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and he is the best judge of his residential requirement. If the landlord desires to beneficially enjoy his own property when the other property occupied by him as a tenant or on any other basis is either insecure or inconvenient it is not for the courts to dictate to him to continue such premises. But in the case at hand the respondent-plaintiff has not pleaded how the available alternate accommodation, got vacated by him during pendency of the suit, is insecure or inconvenient for him, hence in the lack of such pleadings in the plaint the cited case is not helping to the appellant. It is settled proposition of law that in the lack of the proper pleadings the evidence in that regard if adduced could not be looked into. ( 13. ) The matter of Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinery and Co. reported in (2000) 1 SCC 679 was decided taking into consideration the amended pleadings of the plaint in para 6-A stating the explanation of the available alternative accommodation. In such case the landlord - plaintiffs were not having vacant possession of the alternate accommodation of his own and the suit premises was found to be suitable for his business which is not the situation here, hence the same is not helping to the respondent. ( 14. ) In the case of N.R. Narayan Swamy Vs. B. Francis Jagan reported in (2001) 6 SCC 473 , the question of maintainability of subsequent suit for bona fide genuine requirement after dismissing the earlier suit was decided. ( 14. ) In the case of N.R. Narayan Swamy Vs. B. Francis Jagan reported in (2001) 6 SCC 473 , the question of maintainability of subsequent suit for bona fide genuine requirement after dismissing the earlier suit was decided. In the case at hand no such question is involved, hence, the same is not helping to the respondent. ( 15. ) In the matter of Dr. Saroj Kumar Das Vs. Shri Arjun Prasad Jogani reported in AIR 1987SC2131, the concerning landlord was having the alternate accommodation with him in some other locality of Calcuttta, which was very far off from the place of working of the landlord and of his wife and taking into consideration such circumstance the suit was decreed, which is not the situation here. In the case at hand the alternate accommodation which has not been pleaded by the respondent-plaintiff is situated near to the disputed shop in the same building of the respondent and not in the different locality, therefore, the cited case is distinguishable on the factual matrix of the case at hand, hence the same is not helping to the respondent. ( 16. ) So far the case law in the matter of Sait Nagjee Purushotham and Co. Ltd. Vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal and others reported in (2005) 8 SCC 252 is concerned, the same was decided taking into consideration that the plaintiff company was having the business in some other city and at the place where the accommodation was situated, such plaintiff- company wanted to expand its business and in such premises it was held that it is always prerogative of the landlord to decide for what purpose he requires the premises in question. In this case for his bona fide use of extending his business, the same can not be a ground that the landlord is already having a business in other city, therefore, such need is not genuine need as such tenant can not dictate the terms and condition to the landlord and advise what he should do and what he should not. Such situation is not existing in the present case. In the present case the respondent is having the shops as alternate accommodation near the shop under disputed for the alleged need. Such situation is not existing in the present case. In the present case the respondent is having the shops as alternate accommodation near the shop under disputed for the alleged need. He has not come with the case that in some other town he is having the business and except disputed shop he does not have any other shop of his own for his alleged need in Betul. In such premises, this case law is not helping to the repsondent. ( 17. ) In the case of this court in the matter of Kailash Chandra Shankarlal Trivedi Vs. Punjab National Bank Ltd. and others reported in 2000 (3) M P.L.J. 343 the suit was decreed taking into consideration the requirement for opening offices of the members of the landlord family as the concerned plaintiff- family was in need to open the various offices for different members of the family which is not the situation in the case at hand. On the contrary in spite having three shops got vacant during pendency of the litigation the present respondent has neither opened nor started his business in any of the those shops, which are situated near or adjoining to the disputed shop. Therefore, such case law is also not helping to the respondent. ( 18. ) In view of the aforesaid discussion, the framed substantial question of law is answered accordingly in favour of the appellants holding that on obtaining the vacant possession of the two shops adjoining to the disputed shop the respondents alleged need is not subsisting. The same has come to and end. In pursuance of it the impugned judgment and decree of the appellate court directing eviction of the appellants from the disputed premises under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act deserves to be set aside. ( 19. ) Therefore, by allowing this appeal, the impugned judgment and decree of the appellate court is set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial court dismissing the suit of the respondent is hereby restored. The respondent by bearing his own cost throughout shall also afford the cost of the appellants throughout of this litigation. The cost of this appeal is quantified at Rs.5000/-. Decree be drawn up accordingly. ( 20. ) The appeal is allowed, as indicated above. Appeal allowed.