Sanjay Misra, J. - 1. Heard Sri B.N.Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner. List of old cases to be taken up at 2.00 p.m. has been revised. None appears on behalf of the respondent no.2, although counter and rejoinder affidavits are available on record. 2. The petitioner claims to have been appointed by the respondent no.2 as clerk and is aggrieved by the award dated 19.10.1994 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) passed in the Adjudication Case No. 81/82 by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, No. II U.P. Kanpur. 3. Sri B.N.Singh has submitted that a specific finding has been recorded by the Labour Court that the petitioner is a workman within the definition of Section 2(z) of the U.P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ' the U.P. Act') and further that the termination of service of the petitioner was illegal and invalid. He states that when such a finding of fact has been recorded and it was not challenged by the employer, the labour court ought to have granted reinstatement with full backwages to the petitioner and having not so done, the impugned award is illegal. According to him the labour court has only awarded compensation of 3.33 years wages to the petitioner without reinstating him. 4. He has referred to a decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division No.1, Panipat (Haryana) reported in (2005) 5 SCC 497 and refers to paragraphs 22 and 23 of the said judgement to submit that in case there is any retrenchment by an oral order or communication or he is simply asked not to come for duty, the employer will be required to lead tangible and substantive evidence to prove compliance with clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act. While making his submission, he submits that the provision of Section 6-N of the U.P. Act are para materia with Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore, he states that having not done so, the termination of the petitioner was illegal. 5. In the counter affidavit, the respondents have set up the case that the petitioner was engaged for a fixed one year term for training and when his work and conduct was not satisfactory, the period was extended from time to time in order to enable the petitioner to improve himself. 5. In the counter affidavit, the respondents have set up the case that the petitioner was engaged for a fixed one year term for training and when his work and conduct was not satisfactory, the period was extended from time to time in order to enable the petitioner to improve himself. They say that even after such opportunity, the petitioner did not improve himself and hence his engagement was not extended and it came to an end automatically. 6. Having considered the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record, the condition that the petitioner has completed more than one year as workman of the respondent no.2, which is the first condition of Section 6 N of the U.P. Act has been made out inasmuch as a workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer can be retrenched only on compliance of the Sub-clause (a), (b) and (c) of Section 6 N of the U.P. Act. There is nothing on record to indicate that the petitioner was given one month notice or wages in lieu thereof nor he has been given compensation which was to be equivalent to 15 days average pay for every year of service or part thereof. Consequently the termination of the petitioner was rightly held by the Labour Court to be illegal. 7. Insofar as the submission that the petitioner was required to be reinstated the Labour Court has recorded a finding that the work of the petitioner was found unsatisfactory by the employer and inspite of opportunities given, he did not improve himself. Therefore, the Labour Court was of the view that such an employee cannot be imposed upon the employer and hence reinstatement was not required to be granted in the present case. 8. There is no error in the view taken by the Labour Court more particularly in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. & another reported in JT 1998 (8) SC 585. Paragraphs 28 and 34 are quoted hereunder:- "28. In other words, it will be a case of motive if the master, after gathering some prima facie facts, does not really wish to go into their truth but decides merely not to continue a dubious employee. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. & another reported in JT 1998 (8) SC 585. Paragraphs 28 and 34 are quoted hereunder:- "28. In other words, it will be a case of motive if the master, after gathering some prima facie facts, does not really wish to go into their truth but decides merely not to continue a dubious employee. The master does not want to decide or to direct a decision about the truth of the allegations. But if he conducts an inquiry only for purpose proving the misconduct and the employee is not heard, it is a case where the inquiry is the foundation and the termination will be bad. 34. It will be noticed from the above decisions that the termination of the services of a temporary servant or one on probation, on the basis of adverse entries or on the basis of an assessment that his work is not satisfactory will not be punitive inasmuch as the above facts are merely the motive and not the foundation. The reason why they are the motive is that the assessment is not done with the object of finding out any misconduct on the part of the Officer, as stated by Shah, J. (as he then was) in Ram Narayan Das's case. It is done only with a view to decide whether he is to be retained or continued in service. The position is not different even if a preliminary inquiry is held because the purpose of a preliminary inquiry is to find out if there is prima facie evidence or material to initiate a regular departmental inquiry. It has been so decided in Champakalal's case. The purpose of the preliminary inquiry is not to find out misconduct on the part of the Officer and if a termination follows without giving an opportunity, it will not be bad. Even in a case where a regular departmental inquiry is started, a charge-memo issued, reply obtained, and an enquiry Officer is appointed- if at that point of time, the inquiry is dropped and a simple notice of termination is passed, the same will not be punitive because the enquiry Officer has not recorded evidence nor given any findings on the charges. That is what is held in Sukh Raj Bahadur's case and in Benjamin's case. That is what is held in Sukh Raj Bahadur's case and in Benjamin's case. In the latter case, the departmental inquiry was stopped because the employer was not sure of establishing the built of the employee. In all these cases the allegations against the employee merely raised a cloud on his conduct and as pointed by Krishna Iyer, J. in Gujarat Steel Tubes case, the employer was entitled to say that he would not continue an employee against whom allegations were made the truth of which the employer was not interested to ascertain. In fact, the employer, by opting to pass a simple order of termination as permitted by the terms of appointment or as permitted by the rules was conferring a benefit on the employee by passing a simple order of termination so that the employee would not suffer from any stigma which would attach to the rest of his career if a dismissal or other punitive order was passed. The above are all examples were the allegations whose truth has not been found, and were merely the motive." 9. In State of Punjab & others Vs. Bhagwan Singh reported in (2002) 9 SCC 636 it was held in paragraphs 4 and 5 as quoted below:- "4. This aforesaid order to the extent it stated that the officer was unlikely to prove a good police officer, was in terms of the relevant Rule 12.21 applicable to the respondent. In our view, when a probationer is discharged during the period of probation and if for the purpose of discharge, a particular assessment of his work is to be made, and the authorities referred to such an assessment of his work, while passing the order of discharge, that cannot be held to amount to stigma. 5. The other sentence in the impugned order is, that the performance of the officer on the whole was "not satisfactory". Even that does not amount to any stigma." 10. In the present case the petitioner was admittedly engaged for a fixed term. He may have a right to the benefits provided under Section 6 N of the U.P. Act and non compliance of the Section by the employer can render his removal as a violation thereof but for claiming re-instatement and full back wages it cannot be made an absolute right. He may have a right to the benefits provided under Section 6 N of the U.P. Act and non compliance of the Section by the employer can render his removal as a violation thereof but for claiming re-instatement and full back wages it cannot be made an absolute right. Where he was not granted extension of his engagement such engagement came to an automatic end. The employer had made an assessment of his performance to judge his suitability for the job. They found him unsuitable hence did not extend his engagement. The Labour Court therefore, took the view that it would not be proper to impose an unsuitable person on the employer. 11. Insofar as the award of wages of 3.33 years is concerned that would come within the discretion of Labour Court under Section 6 of the U.P. Act for the purpose of awarding compensation to the petitioner and therefore, even if there was violation of Section 6 N of the U.P. Act, the Labour Court was within its jurisdiction to award compensation to the petitioner which it has done. 12. For the aforementioned reasons there is no error or illegality in the impugned award. 13. The writ petition has no merit. It is accordingly dismissed. 14. No order is passed as to costs.