JUDGMENT Hon’ble Imtiyaz Murtaza, J.—These are two petitions which have been heard together for being disposed of by a composite order. 2. The first writ petition has been filed seeking quashment of F.I.R dated 10.6.2010 lodged by respondent No. 4 in case crime No. 1005 of 2010 under Section 379 IPC and Section 3/21 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development)Act, 1957 under Rules, 3/57/70 of the U.P. Miner Mineral (Concession) Rules, 1953 and under Section 2/3 of the Gangsters Act. Similar is the prayer in the second writ petition and the petitioner in that writ petition is also one of the accused nominated in the self same F.I.R. 3. It is noticeable from the contents of the F.I.R aforesaid that the petitioner has been arraigned for offences under Section 379 IPC which are cognizable offences besides the offences under the Mines, Minerals (Concession) Rules. In connection with the submissions, we feel called to refer to the contents of the F.I.R. The F.I.R mentions Khasra No. 1, and Khasra No. 60/321 where the sand has been excavated by the accused persons including petitioner. It is further mentioned that the excavation has been done upto the depth of 2 meter and loss has been estimated to the extent of Rs. 6,63, 520.00. It is further mentioned in the F.I.R that the accused persons including petitioner have formed a gang and they have been carrying on the illegal excavation as Mines Mafia. It is further mentioned that the accused including petitioner have been carrying their illegal activities of excavating sands without valid license. On similar lines is the F.I.R in the second writ petition as well. 4. Assailing the action of the respondent No. 4 in lodging the F.I.R, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that the F.I.R has been lodged by the respondent No. 4 at the instance and in collusion with one M/S Mahrun Engineers and Consultants Pvt Ltd with which he further submitted, the petitioner was horn-locked due to business rivalry. 4. Assailing the action of the respondent No. 4 in lodging the F.I.R, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that the F.I.R has been lodged by the respondent No. 4 at the instance and in collusion with one M/S Mahrun Engineers and Consultants Pvt Ltd with which he further submitted, the petitioner was horn-locked due to business rivalry. The sheet anchor of the argument advanced across the bar by the learned counsel is that no F.I.R could be lodged and the only course open was to institute complaint and in this connection, he referred to the provisions of Section 67 and also Section 22 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development Act, 1957 and Rules 3/57/70 of the U.P. Miner, Mineral (Concession) Rules, 1953. The learned counsel also adverted attention to Rule 57 of the U. P. Minor Mineral (Concession) Rules, 1953. The learned counsel also addressed the Court on the question of cognizance and drew attention to Rule 74 of the Rules 1963 which envisages that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under these Rules except on a complaint in writing by the District officer or any officer authorized by him. 5. In the second limb of arguments, the learned counsel stated across the bar that the F.I.R has been lodged due to prejudices on account of filing of writ petition by the petitioner in the High Court at Lucknow in which the Hon. Court at Lucknow had been pleased to protect the interest of the petitioner by way of interim orders. 6. Section 67 of the U.P. Miner Mineral (Concession) Rules, 1953 envisages that no restriction etc. to be imposed by owner of land on mining operation except demand of compensation- (1) no person who has right in any capacity on the land covered by a mining lease or mining permit, shall be entitled to impose any prohibition or restriction on the mining operations by the holder of such lease or permit of such land or to demand any sum by way of premium or royalty for the removal of minor mineral provided that such person shall be entitled to get annual compensation from the said holder of mining lease or permit for the use of surface of the land for mining operations as may be agreed upon between them. (2) Where the holder of a mining lease or permit and the owner of the surface of the land could not agree upon the amount of annual compensation and a dispute arises in respect thereof, it shall be determined by the District Officer in such manner that; (a) In the case of agricultural land, the amount of annual compensation shall be worked out on the basis of the average annual net income from the cultivation of similar land for the past three years and (b) In the case of non agricultural land, the amount of annual compensation shall be worked out on the basis of average annual letting value of similar land for the previous three years.” 7. Section 22 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) act 1957 envisages that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act or any Rules made thereunder except upon complaint in writing made by a person authorized in this behalf by the Central Government or State Government. 8. Rule 57 of the Miner Mineral (Concession) Rules 1953 envisages that whosoever contravenes the provisions of Rule 3 shall, on conviction be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend upto six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 9. In connection with the submissions as aforesaid, we have our attention called to a decision of Division Bench of this Court in which one of us (Imtiyaz Murtaza) was member of the said Bench in Azad alias Azad Khan v. State of U.P and others, 2008(8) ADJ 441 (DB). Similar questions as are agitated in the present petition were also canvassed by the learned counsel for the parties in the case (supra). After scanning the provisions of the Cr.P.C and also the provisions of Mines and Minerals Rules cited across the bar, it was observed therein that the legal position on the point has been streamlined by legion of decisions and noticing certain decisions relevant on the point, it was held as under in para 8 of the said decision. After scanning the provisions of the Cr.P.C and also the provisions of Mines and Minerals Rules cited across the bar, it was observed therein that the legal position on the point has been streamlined by legion of decisions and noticing certain decisions relevant on the point, it was held as under in para 8 of the said decision. “From a perusal of the Rules 57 and 70 of the Rules, 1963, that the action contemplated in the Rules is in fact intended to eliminate private individuals or general public from initiating the prosecution (though the contention of the learned counsel was on the lines that the provisions of the Minor, Minerals (Concession) Rules 1963 purport to eliminate role of police from initiating the prosecution) and to insist that before cognizance is taken, the complaint must emanate from a public servant. In this connection we may refer to a decision of the Apex Court in Bhagwati Saran v. State of U.P., (1961) 2 SCR 563, in which the Apex Court explained the nature of a report under Section 11 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 which was a provision in the same words as in the case in hand. The Apex Court held that the purpose of Section 11 of the Essential Supplies Act, 1946 is to eliminate private individuals such as rival traders of general public from initiating the prosecution and to insist that before cognizance is taken, the complaint must emanate from a public servant. .............” It was further observed in the aforesaid decision as under: “The Apex Court observed that where the law requires a report in writing by a public servant the requirements of the law are satisfied when a report is filed by a public servant who is also a police officer. The Apex Court further observed that where the police officer cannot be investigate a non-cognizable offence without the permission of a Magistrate, he is not prevented by anything in the Code from investigating a non-cognizable offence alongwith a cognizable offence where the two arise from the same facts. The Apex Court also observed that police officer is a public servant.” 10. The aforesaid view finds its echo in Pravin Chandra Mody v. State of A.P., AIR 1965 SC 1185 and also in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. State, AIR 1958 Punjab 172. 11. The Apex Court also observed that police officer is a public servant.” 10. The aforesaid view finds its echo in Pravin Chandra Mody v. State of A.P., AIR 1965 SC 1185 and also in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. State, AIR 1958 Punjab 172. 11. We have also traversed upon Section 190 and also Section 155 of the Cr.P.C in juxtaposition of section 22 of the Mines Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 in connection with the submissions that the police was prevented from investigating the offences under 3/21 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 and and Rules 3/57/70 of the U.P. Miner Mineral (concession) Rules, 1953. To prop up the above submission, reliance was placed on a decision of Apex Court in State of Orissa v. Sharat Chandra Sahu, AIR 1997 SC 1 , in which the quintessence of what has been held is that under Section 155 (4) of the Cr.P.C the police can, in case of complaint of cognizable as well as non cognizable offences, investigate cognizable as well as non cognizable offences irrespective of the fact as to who filed it. 12. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is noticeable that the petitioner has been arraigned for offences under Section 379 IPC which are cognizable offences besides the offences under the Mines, Minerals (Concession) Rules. In connection with the submissions, we feel called to refer to the contents of the F.I.R all over again in this judgment. The F.I.R mentions Khasra No. 1, Khasra No. 60/321, where the sand has been excavated by the accused persons including petitioner. It is further mentioned that the excavation has been done upto the depth of 2 meter and loss has been estimated to the extent of Rs. 6,63, 520.00. It is further mentioned in the F.I.R that the accused persons including petitioner have formed a gang and they have been conducting the affairs of illegal excavation as Mines Mafia. It is further mentioned that the excavation has been done upto the depth of 2 meter and loss has been estimated to the extent of Rs. 6,63, 520.00. It is further mentioned in the F.I.R that the accused persons including petitioner have formed a gang and they have been conducting the affairs of illegal excavation as Mines Mafia. It is further mentioned that the accused including petitioner have been carrying their illegal activities of excavating sands without valid license and by this reckoning, regard being had to the decisions cited above and also the views expressed their in, it does not commend to us for acceptance that the police was not competent to investigate the case in view of the provisions of Rules 57 of the Mines, Minerals (Concession) Rules 1953, or Section 22 of the Act 1957 and also in view of Section 67 of the U.P. Miner Mineral (Concession Rules 1953. 13. In the facts and circumstances stated above, since the petitioner has been charged with offence under Section 379 IPC besides the offences under Section 3/21 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, under Rules 3/57/70 of the U.P. Miner Mineral (Concession) Rules, 1953 and Section 2/3 of the U.P. Gangsters Act, which are cognizable offences, we have no reason to take a view different from the view taken by the Apex Court in State of Orissa (supra) and other decisions referred to infra. 14. The next question which is nothing but repetition of earlier arguments, canvassed before us is that the action pursuant to F.I.R would be fraught with detriment constituting infringement of the provisions of Section 22 of the Act of 1957. Few decisions of the Apex Court may be taken into reckoning. The first decision on the point is M. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka and others, (2003) 11 SCC 251 . In this case, the Apex Court held that power to quash must be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. It was a case in which suit for permanent injunction was filed by the appellant. Respondents 2 to 4 filed written statement in which they relied upon three documents. The appellant claiming that he never executed the said documents. Hence on his complaint, F.I R was lodged against the said respondents under Section 468, 470, 471 and 120 B IPC. It was a case in which suit for permanent injunction was filed by the appellant. Respondents 2 to 4 filed written statement in which they relied upon three documents. The appellant claiming that he never executed the said documents. Hence on his complaint, F.I R was lodged against the said respondents under Section 468, 470, 471 and 120 B IPC. The petition was filed for quashing of F.IR. The High Court examined the documents, compared the signatures and then concluded that the documents were not false or fabricated. In ultimate analysis, the High Court quashed the F.I.R. The question before the Apex Court was whether Sections 195 and 340 Cr.P.C. would affect the power of police to investigate into a cognizable offence. The Apex Court held that Section 195 and Section 340 Cr.P.C do not control or circumscribe the power of the police to investigate and once the investigation is completed, the Court would not be competent to take cognizance in view of the embargo in Section 195. The Apex Court however observed that the Court can file a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR and the material collected during investigation provided it follows the procedure laid down in Section 340. The Apex Court further held that complaint made would itself be no ground to discard the complaint which has to be tested and weighed after the evidence is collected. The Apex Court has also observed that question whether documents were forged prior to their being produced in Court, arises only after the Court takes cognizance and at the stage of investigation Section 195 Cr.P.C has no application. 15. The next decision on the point is State of Punjab v. Raj Singh and another, AIR 1998 SC 768 . On similar line has been the observation of the Apex Court and the same being relevant is quoted below. “ We are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court quashing the F.I.R. lodged against the respondents alleging commission of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468, I.P.C. by them in course of the proceeding of a civil suit, on the ground that Section 195 (1) (b) (ii), Cr. P. C. prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the same by the police. From a plain reading of Section 195, Cr. P. C. prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the same by the police. From a plain reading of Section 195, Cr. P. C. it is manifest that it comes into operation at the stage when the Court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190 (1), Cr. P. C.; and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an F.I.R. which discloses a cognizable offence, in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in Court. In other words, the statutory power of the Police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195, Cr. P. C. It is of course true that upon the charge-sheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the Court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1) (b), Cr. P. C., but nothing therein deters the Court from filing a complaint for the offence on the basis of the F.I.R. (filed by the aggrieved private party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in Section 340, Cr. P. C. The judgment of this Court in Gopal Krishna Menon v. D. Raja Reddy, AIR 1983 SC 1053 , on which the High Court relied, has no manner of application to the facts of the instant case for there cognizance was taken on a private complaint even though the offence of forgery was committed in respect of a money receipt produced in the Civil Court and hence it was held that the Court could not take cognizance on such a complaint in view of Section 195, Cr. P. C. “ 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not pressed into service any other point capable of convincing us that no cognizable offence is disclosed ex facie on the allegations contained in the F.I.R or that there was any statutory restriction operating on the police to investigate the case. 17. As a result of foregoing discussion, both the petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. —————