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Allahabad High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 2305 (ALL)

SUDHIR KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF U. P.

2010-08-03

K.N.PANDEY, SUNIL AMBWANI

body2010
JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner claiming to be seniormost teacher in the college had earlier approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 54129 of 2009 claiming to be senior to Shri Kuldeep Bhargava to officiate as Principal of the college. The writ petition was disposed of with directions to approach the Vice-Chancellor under Statute 17.15 of the First Statutes of Agra University, for the matter to be decided by reasoned order and thereafter, if any person was aggrieved, to approach the Executive Council of the University within 60 days. 3. The Vice-Chancellor has decided and rejected the representation. He has found that Dr. Kuldeep Bhargava-respondent No. 5 is senior to Shri Sudhir Kumar Saxena-the petitioner and has given reasons in his order. 4. A preliminary objection has been taken that the order of Vice-Chancellor is appellable under Statute 17.15. 5. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that on the facts of the case Statute 17.14 and not Statute 17.15 is attracted, and thus an appeal is not maintainable to the Executive Council of the University. 6. The Statutes 17.14 and 17.15 of the First Statutes of the University are quoted as below : “17.14. All disputes regarding seniority of teachers (Other than the Principal) shall be decided by the Principal of the College who shall give reasons for the decision. Any teacher aggrieved by the decision of the Principal may prefer an appeal to the Vice-Chancellor within 60 days from the date of communication of such decision to the teacher concerned. If the Vice-Chancellor disagrees from the Principal, he shall give reasons for such disagreement. 17.15. All disputes regarding seniority of Principals of affiliated Colleges shall be decided by the Vice Chancellor who shall give reasons for the decision. Any Principal aggrieved by the decision of the Vice-Chancellor may prefer an appeal to the Executive Council within sixty days from the date of communication of such decision to the Principal concerned. If the Executive Council disagrees with the Vice-Chancellor, it shall give reasons for such disagreement.” 7. Statute 17.14 is applicable, when there is a dispute with regard to seniority of teachers. The Statute provides for the matter to be decided by the Principal by giving reasons, and thereafter an appeal to be decided by the Vice Chancellor. If the Executive Council disagrees with the Vice-Chancellor, it shall give reasons for such disagreement.” 7. Statute 17.14 is applicable, when there is a dispute with regard to seniority of teachers. The Statute provides for the matter to be decided by the Principal by giving reasons, and thereafter an appeal to be decided by the Vice Chancellor. In case of Statute 17.15 the decision in the matter of disputes regarding seniority of Principals of affiliated colleges is to be decided by the Vice Chancellor in the first instance and thereafter if any Principal is aggrieved, he may prefer an appeal to the Executive Council. 8. In this case the office of the Principal of the college is vacant. The dispute between the petitioner and respondent No. 5 regarding seniority as teachers, is for the purpose and will decide the right of either of the parties to officiate as Principal of the college. A contextual and purposive interpretation of Statutes 17.14 and 17.15 leads us to the conclusion that in such a case the dispute at the first instance has to be decided by the Vice Chancellor. His decision will necessarily fall within the ambit of Statute 17.15. The order passed by the Vice-Chancellor will thereafter be appellable within 60 days to the Executive Council. 9. The object of Statutes 17.14 and 17.15 is to provide an adjudicatory forum for deciding seniority disputes by a fact finding authority and to provide an appellate forum, to correct the mistakes, if any, by such authority. 10. If we accept the contention of the petitioner that the decision of the Vice Chancellor, at the first instance under Statute 17.14 attracted in case of seniority of the teachers, to officiate as Principal, a person such as the petitioner will loose a right of appeal to challenge the decision of the Vice-Chancellor, both on the questions of fact and law. 11. A right construction of the statute takes into consideration the whole scope and object together with an analysis of its wording and the circumstances in which it is enacted. In Bhagwan Baksh Singh (Raja) v. Secretary of State, AIR 1940 PC 82, followed in Prem Chandra Jain v. R.K. Chhobra, (1984) 4 SCC 302, it was held that the judicial interpretation in adapting such course does not go beyond inevitable minimum. In Bhagwan Baksh Singh (Raja) v. Secretary of State, AIR 1940 PC 82, followed in Prem Chandra Jain v. R.K. Chhobra, (1984) 4 SCC 302, it was held that the judicial interpretation in adapting such course does not go beyond inevitable minimum. The Courts can look into the real meaning of statute to new and unforeseen needs and situation, falling within the statutory provision. ‘Constructive intuition’ as held in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1480 , is a permissible mode of viewing the Acts. 12. It is contended by Shri M.K. Tiwari that the order of the Vice-Chancellor raises a pure question of law, which can be decided by the Court. The order of the Vice-Chancellor is based entirely on the facts, in which it has been found by him that the petitioner was appointed earlier but in a lower grade, and that he was a member of the committee, which prepared the seniority list dated 19.4.1998. He did not raise any objection to the longstanding seniority of respondent No. 5 for almost 12 years, since the seniority list was finalised. The challenge to these findings will require scrutiny of records. 13. The petitioner has a right to approach the Executive Council of the University in appeal. If such an appeal is filed within the period of limitation, the same may be decided very expeditiously and if possible within two months. 14. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. —————