Judgment :- 1. At the timeof filing of the Writ Petition in the year 2008, the petitioner was aged 60 years. In this Writ Petition, he has challenged (i) charge memo dated 30.07.2007 issued one day prior to his retirement; (ii) suspension order dated 31.07.2007, not permitting him to retire from service. Consequently, the petitioner has sought for a direction to permit him to retire from service with all attendant benefits. 2. Short facts leading to the present Writ Petition are as follows:- The petitioner was appointed as an Office Assistant by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Nagercoil on 011. 1969. He had put in 38 years of service and was due to retire on 31.07.2007. According to the petitioner, he was falsely implicated as accused No.2 in Crime No.389 of 1993 on the file of Boothapandy Police Station, Kanyakumari District and charged under Sections 353 and 506(ii) IPC. The alleged offence was said to have occurred on 14.08.1993 at 09.30 a.m. It was further alleged that when three lorries transporting raw rubber sheets were intercepted after chasing at Nantikuzhi Junction at Therisanamcope by one N.Subramanian, Superintendent of the Regulated Market, Kulasekaram and others, the petitioner along with another person named Mr.Samson came in a car and threatened the Superintendent and others with knife and let the lorries move with the rubber loads without payment of market fee due to the Market Committee. Pursuant to the registration of the crime, he was arrested on 17.08.1993 and detained in custody for 32 hours. Thereafter, he was released on bail by the learned First Class Judicial Magistrate, Boothapandy on 18.08.1993. Based on the criminal case, by proceedings dated 20.08.1993, the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Nagercoil, the second respondent herein suspended the petitioner from service under Rule 17(e) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. The said order was challenged in O.A.No.5859 of 1993 before the Tamil Nadu State Administrative Tribunal, Chennai and the Tribunal, by order dated 15.09.1993, granted interim stay. Thereafter, he was reinstated in service. Subsequently, after hearing both parties, by order dated 011. 1993, the interim stay granted was made absolute by the Tribunal. The said order has become final. 3. The petitioner continued to work for nearly 14 years without any blemish. Thereafter, he was reinstated in service. Subsequently, after hearing both parties, by order dated 011. 1993, the interim stay granted was made absolute by the Tribunal. The said order has become final. 3. The petitioner continued to work for nearly 14 years without any blemish. In the meanwhile, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Boothapandy, who tried the petitioner for the above said offences in C.C.No.15 of 2004, acquitted him, by judgment dated 17.08.2007. While the matter stood thus, on 30.07.2007, after a period of nearly 14 years, the second respondent issued a charge memorandum under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules based on the offences alleged to have been committed by the writ petitioner in Crime No.389 of 1993, which culminated in acquittal of the petitioner. Following the same, the second respondent also issued a consequential proceedings dated 31.07.2007 under Rule 56(1)(c) of Fundamental Rules and did not permit the petitioner to retire from service on attaining the age of superannuation on the afternoon of 31.07.2007, but retained the petitioner in service. In this regard, the petitioner submitted a detailed representation dated 13.08.2007 and requested the second respondent to withdraw the charge memo and the suspension order and also prayed for reinstatement in service. As there was no response, the petitioner submitted yet another representation dated 29.08.2007 together with a copy of the judgment of the Criminal Court in C.C.No.15 of 2004, dated 17.08.2007 acquitting the petitioner from the charges. Yet another reminder dated 05.09.2007 was also sent. In these circumstances, the petitioner has come forward to present the Writ Petition for the relief stated supra. 4. Assailingthe impugned charge memo and the suspension order, Mr.M.Ajmal Khan, learned counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that the action of the second respondent in initiating disciplinary proceedings, which was issued one day prior to the retirement of the petitioner from service and the consequential suspension order in not permitting him to retire from service, is prima facie without jurisdiction, illegal and the same has to be quashed on the sole ground of inordinate delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings, having regard to the fact that the alleged delinquency is said to have been committed by the petitioner as on 14.08.1993. .5. .5. Placing reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in P.V.Mahadevan v. M.D.Tamil Nadu Housing Board reported in AIR 2006 SC 207 , the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay, initiation of disciplinary proceedings is prima facie illegal and the same is liable to be set aside. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that when the trial of the alleged offences in Crime No.389 of 1993 on the file of Boothapandy Police Station has ended in acquittal, the second respondent ought to have considered that the offence alleged to have been committed against the petitioner, has not been made out, even by a Criminal Court, which requires strict proof of evidence and, therefore, the second respondent ought not to have initiated disciplinary proceedings and such action reflects mala fide intention on the part of the second respondent. 6. Referring to G.O.Ms.No.144, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (N) Department, dated 08.06.2007, prohibiting suspension of the employees within three months before the date of retirement from service, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is a willful violation of the Government order, by suspending the petitioner from service for the second time on the date of his retirement from service on 31.07.2007. Therefore, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. Though some other grounds have also been raised, as the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings is inordinate and unexplained, this Court is not inclined to delve into the other aspects. 7. Per contra, on the basis of the counter-affidavit filed by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Nagercoil, Mr.Pala Ramasamy, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents submitted that in 1993, the petitioner was working as an Office Assistant in the office of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Nagercoil (Rural). On 14.08.1993, when the Superintendent of Tamil Nadu Regulated Marketing Committee, Kulasekaram was checking the lorries at 05.30 a.m., with his Office Assistant, three lorries were moving from Kulasekaram with rubber sheet load. The Superintendent along with his Office Assistant made an attempt to stop the vehicles for verification. But the above lorries rushed away without stopping at the checking point. The Superintendent chased those lorries with his jeep and caught hold of them at Nantikuzhi Villakku, near Therisanamcope, Kanyakumari District. The Superintendent along with his Office Assistant made an attempt to stop the vehicles for verification. But the above lorries rushed away without stopping at the checking point. The Superintendent chased those lorries with his jeep and caught hold of them at Nantikuzhi Villakku, near Therisanamcope, Kanyakumari District. He further submitted that on verification, they found that they had failed to pay the Marketing Committee Cess and obtained permission for transporting agricultural project i.e., rubber. Therefore, the Superintendent issued notices to all the drivers and instructed them to pay the Marketing Committee Fees within one hour. When the amount was not paid to the Committee, the Superintendent proposed to hand over the lorries to the Court, after making a complaint with the police station. In the meantime, one Mr.Samson representing himself as Manager of N.S.Traders along with the petitioner, came in a taxi to the spot and he did not let the officers to do his work and questioned his authority for detaining the vehicles. According to the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents, the petitioner had abetted Mr.Samson to remove all the lorries which were stopped by the officials of Marketing Committee, for checking. Thus, on the basis of the complaint of Thiru.Subramanian, Superintendent, a criminal case was registered at Boothapandy Police Station in Crime No.389 of 1993 under Sections 353 and 506(ii) IPC against Thiru.M.K.Meer Baskhan and five others. .8. The learned Special Government Pleader further submitted that merely because the petitioner is acquitted in a criminal case, that will not bar the department from taking departmental action for the delinquencies alleged to have been committed by a Government servant. In such view of the matter, he submitted that initiation of disciplinary proceedings cannot be said to be violative of any constitutional or statutory provisions. According to him, as long as Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules contemplates disciplinary action for minor and major charges said to have been committed by a Government servant, the impugned orders are valid and the objections regarding initiation are untenable. 9. Thelearned Special Government Pleader also submitted that G.O.Ms.No.144, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (N) Departmental, dated 08.06.2007, relied on by the writ petitioner, prohibiting suspension of the employees within three months before retirement will not apply to criminal cases, when a Government Servant is alleged to have involved in a criminal or vigilance case. 9. Thelearned Special Government Pleader also submitted that G.O.Ms.No.144, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (N) Departmental, dated 08.06.2007, relied on by the writ petitioner, prohibiting suspension of the employees within three months before retirement will not apply to criminal cases, when a Government Servant is alleged to have involved in a criminal or vigilance case. For the above said reasons, he prayed that the impugned orders be sustained and accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the Writ Petition. 10. Heard the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for both parties and perused the materials available on record. 11. Indisputably, the allegation is of the year 1993 and on the basis of which, a prosecution was launched against the petitioner in the year 1993 in Crime No.389 of 1993 on the file of Boothapandy Police Station under Sections 353 and 506(ii) IPC. There is no dispute that the petitioner was acquitted of all the charges in C.C.No.15 of 2004 and acquitted on 17.08.2007 by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Boothapandy. The charges levelled against the petitioner and impugned in this Writ Petition are as follows:- "Charge No.1: That the said Thiru M.K.Meer Baskhan, Office Assistant, Office of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Nagercoil (Rural) was working as Office Assistant in the said office for the period from 1. 1992 to 20.93. On 18. 1993 he had abetted one Thiru Samson of Tvl.N.S.Traders in obstructing the regulated marketing committee officials in performing their legitimate duties with ulterior motive and had caused loss of revenue to the State exchequer. Charge No.2: That the said Thiru M.K.Meer Baskhan, Office Assistant, Office of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Nagercoil (Rural) by the above act of misconduct and dereliction of duties and responsibilities as a sincere Government servant had violated Rule 20(1) of Tamil Nadu Government Conduct Rules." .12. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that between 1993 and 2007, the date on which he attained the age of superannuation, the petitioner had rendered unblemished service, is not disputed. No material or averment has been placed before this Court, controverting the statement regarding the conduct of the writ petitioner. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that between 1993 and 2007, the date on which he attained the age of superannuation, the petitioner had rendered unblemished service, is not disputed. No material or averment has been placed before this Court, controverting the statement regarding the conduct of the writ petitioner. Further, the allegations do not involve any corruption or misappropriation, but what is alleged against the writ petitioner is that on 14.08.1993, he had abetted one Thiru.Samson of Tvl.N.S.Traders, in obstructing the Regulated Marketing Committee officials in performing their legitimate duties with ulterior motive and caused loss of revenue to the State exchequer. Charge No.2 relates to dereliction of duties and responsibilities as a Government servant. Though the correctness of the order is challenged on several grounds, this Court is of the considered view that in the absence of any reasonable and acceptable explanation for the inordinate delay, whether the disciplinary action taken against the petitioner under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules and the consequential order of suspension can be justified, in the light of the judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court as well as this Court. 13. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and another reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 738, the Supreme Court had come down heavily against the laches on the part of the employer in conducting departmental enquiry and after finding out that there was no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay, held that it would be unfair to order departmental enquiry to proceed further. .14. In State of Punjab and others Vs.Chaman Lal Goyal reported in 1995 (2) SCC 570 , the Honble Supreme Court held as follows: ."9. Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of five and a half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of pr oving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of pr oving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing... " 15. In M.Balakrishnan and 7 others Vs. The Corporation of Madurai and another reported in 1995 (II) CTC 589 for certain improper acts on the part of the petitioners therein, departmental proceedings were initiated after 14 years. While quashing the said proceedings, a learned single Judge has observed that such proceedings after a long period would result in great prejudice and amount to violation of the principles of natural justice. .16. In Commissioner, Sankarapuram Panchayat Union etc. Vs. S.A.Abdul Wahab and others reported in 1996 W.L.R.677, a Division Bench of this Court held that if there is unnecessary, unexplained and unjustifiably long delay in initiating departmental proceedings, it would result in causing great prejudice to the person against whom such a proceeding is initiated and it will be a ground for quashing the proceedings. .17. In State of Andhra Pradesh Vs.N.Radhakrishnan reported in AIR 1998 SCC 1833 : 1998 (4) SCC 154 , the Honble Supreme Court has considered the case of inordinate delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings and held as follows: ."19. It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the Court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings, in considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the fact of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse considerations. 18. In B.Loganathan Vs. The Union of India, rep. by the Secretary to Government of Union Territory of Pondicherry, Department of Local Administration, Pondicherry and another reported in 2000 (III) CTC 351 , for the allegations relating to the period of the year 1982, based on a vigilance report, a charge memo was issued in 1997 and the said proceedings were put to challenge. The Union of India, rep. by the Secretary to Government of Union Territory of Pondicherry, Department of Local Administration, Pondicherry and another reported in 2000 (III) CTC 351 , for the allegations relating to the period of the year 1982, based on a vigilance report, a charge memo was issued in 1997 and the said proceedings were put to challenge. While quashing the charge memo on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay, this Court has observed that the delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings constitutes denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself and that the same, violates principles of natural justice. At Paragraph 12 has held as follows: "12. Learned counsel appearing for the second respondent by relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in Secretary to Government, Prohibition and Excise Department v. L. Srinivasan , 1996 (3) S.C.C. 15 would contend that the scope of judicial review is very limited and sought to distinguish the above referred decisions. No doubt, in the said decision. Their Lordships have observed that it would not be open to the Tribunal or the court to quash the suspension order and charges even at the threshold. The perusal of the judgment does not show the details such as when the incident had taken place and when the Government have initiated action etc. In Union of India v. Ashok Kacker , 1995 Supp (1) S.C.C. 180, no doubt, Their Lordships have observed that it is open to the delinquent to file his reply to charge-sheet and raise all objections and also invite the decision of the disciplinary authority thereon. In this case also, no other details have been furnished such the date of occurrence, steps taken by the Government etc. In such circumstances, I am of the view that both the decisions relied on by the Government Pleader are not helpful to their case. I have already stated that even according to the 2nd respondent, the alleged irregularities had taken place in the year 1982 and even after receipt of the report from the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Pondicherry Government in the year 1993 the impugned charge memo was issued only on 97. The inordinate and unexplained delay vitiates the impugned charge memo and the same is liable to be quashed. The inordinate and unexplained delay vitiates the impugned charge memo and the same is liable to be quashed. As observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others v. Chaman Lal Goyal, 1995 (2) S.C.C. 570 , the disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated after a lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the charges. Here, in our case, the petitioner has raised a plea that the delay is likely to cause prejudice to him in defending himself. If such plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. I have already stated that the first charge states that the petitioner did hot disburse cash from January, 1982 and, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, not even the period is mentioned clearly and like-wise, the statement that cash book was not maintained properly is a bald statement. Further, the nature of the charges relate to day-to-day activities of disbursement of cash and maintenance of registers, which are routine affairs, hence the unexplained delay of 15 years cannot be accepted. It would be impossible for the petitioner to remember the identity of witnesses whom he could summon to appear before the enquiring authority to support his case. Even If he could summon their presence, it would be a doubtful proposition whether they would be in a position to remember that happened more than 15 years back and help him in his defence. Further more, the petitioner may not be in a position to effectively cross-examine the witnesses to be examined on the side of the second respondent in support of the charges. Practically, it would be a doubtful proposition that either the prosecution witnesses or the defence witnesses would be in a position to remember the facts of the case and advance the case of either the department or the petitioner. Practically, it would be a doubtful proposition that either the prosecution witnesses or the defence witnesses would be in a position to remember the facts of the case and advance the case of either the department or the petitioner. Under these circumstances and on the facts and circumstances disclosed, I hold that the unexplained inordinate delay will constitute denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself that it would amount to violation of principles of natural justice and as such, the impugned charge memo must be struck down on this ground alone. By weighing all the factors both for and against the petitioner/delinquent officer quashing the charge memo is just and proper in the circumstances". 19. In C.P.Harish Vs. The Central Warehousing, represented by its Managing Director, 4/1, Siri Institutiional Area, New Delhi reported in 2000 (IV) CTC 517 for the alleged lapses of the year 19821983, charge memos were issued on 20.06.1995 and 14.07.1998 respectively, nearly after 15 years. By observing that disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time, which would give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power and that it would be impossible for the delinquent to remember and identify the witnesses, this Court has held that delay constitutes denial of reasonable opportunity to defend herself and it also violates the principles of natural justice and quashed the charges impugned in the above writ petition. 20. InA.Obaidullah Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, rep.by the Secretary to Government, Home Department, Secretariat, Chennai and another reported in 2005(5) CTC 380 , a Division Bench of this Court, after considering the decisions in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. N.Radhakishan reported in 1998 (4) SCC 154 and P.V.Mahadevean Vs. Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, 2005(4) CTC 403:2005 SCC (L&S) 861, quashed a disciplinary proceeding which was initiated after 12 years, holding that inordinate and unexplained delay defeats justice. 21. In Union of India v. Central Administrative Tribunal reported in 2005 (2) CTC 169 (DB), this Court held that, "The delay remains totally unexplained. Therefore, we have no hesitation at all in concluding that the ground of inordinate delay in proceeding with the departmental enquiry as referred to above by us, would come in the way of the Govt., to continue with the enquiry any further.............." 22. Therefore, we have no hesitation at all in concluding that the ground of inordinate delay in proceeding with the departmental enquiry as referred to above by us, would come in the way of the Govt., to continue with the enquiry any further.............." 22. InP.V.Mahadevan v. M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board reported in 2005 (4) CTC 403, this Court after referring to various decisions, held that, "The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore be avoided not only in the interest of the government employee but in public interests and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer. 15. We therefore, have no hesitation to quash the charge issued against the appellant. The appeal is allowed. The appellant will be entitled to all the retiral benefits in accordance with law. The retiral benefits shall be disbursed within three months from this date. No cost." 23. In the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chepauk v. N.Sivasamy reported in 2005 (5) CTC 451 , the Division Bench of this Court held as follows: "Though the alleged lapse occurred in the year 1995 and certain charges related to the period 199394, the charge memo was issued on 15.07.1997 and served on 23.07.1997, just 7 days before the date of retirement. The contention of the appellant that only with a view to cause hardship, agony and anguish, the charge memo was issued cannot be ignored.................. We have already pointed out that though the applicant failed Original Application No.6284/97, challenging the charge memo, dated 15.07.1997, admittedly, no stay was granted. Despite the above fact that the department had not proceeded with the disciplinary proceedings, there is an inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the department. According to the applicant, he is 67 years of age as on the date and had rendered 38 years of service in the department. Despite the above fact that the department had not proceeded with the disciplinary proceedings, there is an inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the department. According to the applicant, he is 67 years of age as on the date and had rendered 38 years of service in the department. He had undergone sufferings from mental worry, agony, anguish and hardship for all these years. We are satisfied that there is no need to pursue the charge memo, dated 15.07.1997." 24. In yet another decision in R.Tirupathy and others v. the District Collector, Madurai District and others reported in 2006 (2) CTC 574 , this Court was pleased to quash the charge memo, dated 02.02.2005 on the ground that the charges relate to purchase of uniforms during the year 1994-95 and 1995-96 and the inordinate delay on the part of the department in issuing a charge memo was not properly explained. 25. The Supreme Court in M.V.Bijlani v. Union of India and other reported in 2006 (5) SCC 88 , quashed the order of removal from service, confirmed by the appellate authority on various grounds particularly, on the ground that initiation of disciplinary proceedings after six years and continuance thereof, for a period of seven years prejudiced the delinquent officer. 26. InM.Elangovan v. The Trichy District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., reported in 2006 (2) CTC 635 , this Court, while quashing the second show cause notice on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay in initiating and completing the disciplinary proceedings, allowed the Writ Petitions holding that the petitioners therein were entitled to all the benefits in accordance with law. The same view has been expressed by this Court in yet another decision in Parameswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2006 (1) CTC 476 . 27. In G.Anand Vs. The Principal Commissioner and Commissioner of Revenue Administration, Chepauk, Chennai-5 and others reported in 2006(5) CTC 723 , the alleged lapses on the part of the petitioner therein was of the year 1994. Disciplinary action was initiated in the year 2005. Finding that the charge memo had been issued with an inordinate delay, this Court set aside the charge memo impugned in the said writ petition. 28. In A.Bommusamy Vs. Disciplinary action was initiated in the year 2005. Finding that the charge memo had been issued with an inordinate delay, this Court set aside the charge memo impugned in the said writ petition. 28. In A.Bommusamy Vs. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others reported in 2007 (3) CTC 518 , a Division Bench of this Court has considered a case where disciplinary proceedings was initiated on the verge of retirement. The petitioner was to retire on 31.03.1987. By proceedings dated, 27.02.1987, disciplinary proceedings were initiated under Rule 17-a of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules for imposing minor penalty. On receipt of the petitioners explanation, a revised charge memo dated 13.03.1987, involving a procedure for imposing major penalty was issued, just 17 days before retirement. Though, an enquiry was initiated as early as on 10.08.1987, the passing of an order of punishment was kept pending for about five years and finally a punishment was imposed on 21.01.1993. Having regard to the ratio decidendi of the Courts in the matter, where no reasonable explanation is offered, the Division Bench, at paragraph 13 observed as follows: "13. Further, there was inordinate delay in passing the order of punishment. Though the enquiry was initiated as early as on 8. 1987, the passing of the order of punishment was kept pending for about five years and finally the punishment was imposed on 21. 1993. There is no explanation for such an inordinate delay in passing the final order. Time and again, the Supreme Court and this Court has deprecated the initiation of Disciplinary Proceedings against an employee or the fag end of his retirement and keeping the matter pending for a long time by keeping the matter pending for a long time by keeping the employee under suspension. Further when the petitioner had pleaded that there was official prejudice and enmity between him and the third respondent in the matter of use and maintenance of the official vehicle, the Tribunal has failed to consider this aspect of the case in proper perspective while dismissing the Original Applications. The Disciplinary Proceedings were initiated against the petitioner when there was hardly fifteen days left for his retirement. More over, when his date of retirement is on 13. 1987 and the order of suspension was passed on 23. 1987 by invoking G.O. No. 173. The Disciplinary Proceedings were initiated against the petitioner when there was hardly fifteen days left for his retirement. More over, when his date of retirement is on 13. 1987 and the order of suspension was passed on 23. 1987 by invoking G.O. No. 173. Therefore, when once the petitioner has reached the age of superannuation on 13. 1987, the placing the petitioner under suspension after his date of superannuation is without authority and that when the relationship of master-servant ceased to exist, no Disciplinary Proceedings could be initiated against the petitioner. On this ground also, the impugned order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside." 29. InK.Kumaran Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu by Secretary to Government, Agricultural Department, Chennai and another reported in 2007(3) CTC 763 , the alleged lapses relate to the period 1987-1988. A charge memo was issued on 08.05.2004, after nearly 16 years. By observing that delay causes prejudice to the charged officer, unless it can be shown that he was to be blamed for the delay or when there was proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings, this Court quashed the charges, issued belatedly. 30. In Ranjeet Singh Vs. State of Haryana & others reported in 2008 (3) CTC 781, the Honble Supreme Court considered the correctness of a judgment made in a second appeal, dismissing the plea that there was no substantial question of law in interfering with the judgment and decree made by the District Court, which reversed a decree passed in a suit for declaration, declaring a show cause notice issued after a delay of 7 years after concluding the departmental enquiry, as illegal. There was also a delay of 9 years in initiating disciplinary proceedings. In the above reported case, for an allegation of the year 1974, a charge memo was issued in 1983, after 9 years. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 01.01.1985. After a delay of nearly 7 years, the department issued a show cause notice with a copy of the report, proposing to impose a penalty. After submission of the explanation, the Government servant preferred a suit to declare a show cause notice proposing to impose a punishment as invalid. The trial Court decreed the suit holding that the action of the employer imposing punishment as illegal. The State preferred an appeal to the District Court. After submission of the explanation, the Government servant preferred a suit to declare a show cause notice proposing to impose a punishment as invalid. The trial Court decreed the suit holding that the action of the employer imposing punishment as illegal. The State preferred an appeal to the District Court. The first appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the Government servant filed a second appeal to the High Court. The decision made by the District Court was confirmed. Testing the correctness of the judgment and decree and following the decision in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs.N.Radhakrishnan reported in AIR 1998 SCC 1833 : 1998 (4) SCC 154 and P.V.Mahadevan V.Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board reported in 2005 (4) CTC 403, the Honble Supreme Court, at paragraph 9 has held as follows: "We have extracted the charges against the appellant. These charges did not require any detailed investigation. In view of the unexplained delay of nine years the Trial Court was justified in holding that the entire enquiry was vitiated and in declaring that the order of punishment to be null and void. The Appellate Court did not have any justifiable reason to interfere with the said finding. In the circumstance, we are of the view that the High Court ought to have interfered in the matter as the Appeal involved a substantial question of law, i.e whether issue of charge sheet after nine years when there are no special circumstance to explain the delay vitiated the enquiry. As the matter is old and as we have already found that the delay vitiated the enquiry, no purpose will be served by remitting the matter. We propose to dispose of the Appeal on merits". The Honble Supreme Court reversed the judgment and decree of the High Court and the first appellate Court and consequently, restored the judgment of the decree of the trial Court, setting aside the penalty. 31. In S.Rathinavelu Vs. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board, 31, Chepauk, Chennai-5 and another reported in 2009(2) CTC 513 , for certain incidents alleged to have occurred in 1988-1989, disciplinary proceedings were initiated, after 10 years. After considering a catena of decisions, this Court set aside the punishment on the ground of inordinate delay of 10 years in initiating the disciplinary proceedings. 32. In Kootha Pillai Vs. After considering a catena of decisions, this Court set aside the punishment on the ground of inordinate delay of 10 years in initiating the disciplinary proceedings. 32. In Kootha Pillai Vs. Commissioner, Municipal Administration, Chennai and others reported in 2009(1) MLJ 761 , this Court has quashed the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of inordinate delay. 33. Following the ratio decidendi in N.Radhakrishnans case cited supra, a recent judgment reported in S.Sekar Vs. Commissioner of Social Welfare, Ezhilagam, Chennai reported in 2010 (1) MLJ 708 , a learned Judge at paragraph 11 has observed as follows: "11. Also, it is a settled proposition that while considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings, the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path, he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules; but then, delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officers unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse considerations". In the above reported case, there was a delay of 12 years in concluding the disciplinary proceedings and that there was no explanation for such delay. 34. In the case on hand, the occurrence is of the year 1993 and admittedly, the charges have been framed on 30.06.2007, after 14 years. There is no explanation for the inordinate delay in initiating the departmental proceedings. Merely because there is a power conferred on the authorities to initiate disciplinary proceedings, the same cannot be initiated at the whims and fancies of the disciplinary authority. When simultaneous proceedings are permissible in law, nothing prevented the authorities in initiating disciplinary proceedings even during the pendency of the criminal case registered against the petitioner. Merely because there is a power conferred on the authorities to initiate disciplinary proceedings, the same cannot be initiated at the whims and fancies of the disciplinary authority. When simultaneous proceedings are permissible in law, nothing prevented the authorities in initiating disciplinary proceedings even during the pendency of the criminal case registered against the petitioner. Power granted to the disciplinary authority should be exercised in a fair and reasonable manner and should not reflect his closed mind, that the department can prolong the matter for long time and initiate the disciplinary proceedings on the verge of retirement. It is in this context, the Government have issued G.O.Ms.No.144, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (N) Department, dated 08.06.2007, prohibiting suspension of the employee, within three months, before the date of retirement from service. The said Government Order may not in strict sense be applicable to a criminal or vigilance case, yet it is the duty of the disciplinary authority to see whether the delinquencies alleged to have been committed by the Government servant warrants immediate action and imposition of penalty. If the delinquencies warrant departmental action, the disciplinary authority need not wait till the criminal case is disposed of and take departmental action on the verge of his retirement. If that is allowed to be done, without any reasonable cause, the purpose of issuing the Government Order becomes nugatory and it would pave way for initiation of disciplinary proceedings at the whims and fancies of the authority at any time, he desires. The Government servant cannot be kept under Damocles sword till he peacefully retires from service. 35. In view of the settled proposition of law on the aspect of inordinate and unexplained delay in initiating or conducting disciplinary proceedings, on the part of the employer, as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, this Court is of the view that the initiation of departmental action against the petitioner after 14 years, would cause serious prejudice and hence, violative of the principles of natural justice. 36. For all these reasons stated above, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside. The Writ Petition is allowed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. No costs.