Judgment :- ( 1. The petitioner has come forward with the present writ petition challenging the suspension order dated 07.01.2009, the charge memo dated 07.03.2009 as well as the letter dated 30.04.2009 initiating departmental enquiry against the petitioner. 2. The facts, as set out in the writ petition, which are necessary to decide the issue involved in this case, are as follows: The petitioner is the General secretary of the Balmer Lawrie Group Assistant’s Association. On 02.02 1990, he joined the service of Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd., a Government of India Enterprises, as an officer (P & A) and was promoted as Senior Officer (P & A) in the year 1994 and then as Assistant Manager (P & A) and thereafter as Deputy Manager (P & A). While the petitioner was working as officer on Special Duty, he was placed under suspension on 07.03.2009 based on a charge memo dated 07.03.2009 on the allegation that the petitioner prevented the other officers from performing their duty and instigated them to join in the one day strike on 07.01.2009, which was declared by the oil Sector PSU Officers’ Association, of which Balmer Lawrie Group Assistants’ Association is a constituent. Since the allegations found in the said charge memo were not true, the petitioner gave a detailed explanation on 18.03.2009 denying the charges levelled against him. Not being satisfied with the same the 2nd respondent issued a letter dated 30.04.2009 initiating a departmental enquiry. Aggrieved over the order of suspension, the present writ petition is filed. 3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the reason for issuing the charge memo is only with regard to the participation of the petitioner in the one day strike declared by Balmer Lawrie Group Assistants’ Association on 07.01.2009 for making the demand of implementation of VI pay Commission’s recommendation with effect from 01.01.2006. There were no grave charges as against the petitioner in the charge memo. The person who was victimised in the strike was only the petitioner and excepting him, no other employee was served with any charge memo in connection with the aforesaid one day strike. By inviting the attention of this Court to the charge memo dated 07.03.2009 issued by the 2nd respondent the Learned senior counsel contended that the charges levelled in the said charge memo seem to be very evasive and not based on any material. By inviting the attention of this Court to the charge memo dated 07.03.2009 issued by the 2nd respondent the Learned senior counsel contended that the charges levelled in the said charge memo seem to be very evasive and not based on any material. Though in the charge memo it has been stated that the petitioner had prevented the other officers from reporting to duty in the general shift in view of the strike called by the Balmer Lawrie Group Assistant’s Association, none of the officers’ names was mentioned in the charge memo. Had the charges levelled against the petitioner been true, the charge memo must have contained the particulars about the officers, who were allegedly prevented by the petitioner. Since the allegations levelled against the petitioner are without any material particulars, the order of suspension and the charge memo are liable to be quashed. 4. In this regard, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner relied on Rule 31(B) (1) of the Conduct, Discipline Review Rules for officers and contended that if the & disciplinary authority, on the basis of the materials available has come to a provisional conclusion that a penalty as provided for under Rule 27(d) & (e) is to be imposed, he shall frame a charge. In the instant case, absolutely, no material particulars were available to frame the charges. Therefore, the charge memo issued by the 2nd respondent without any material is liable to be quashed. In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel relied upon a decision reported in the case of UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS …VS…GYAN CHAND CHATTAR (2009(8) SCALE 575. It was further submitted that the petitioner is under the prolonged suspension from 07.01.2009 and hence, the order of suspension is liable to be quashed. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the 1st respondent is a Government of India Enterprise, but it was not designated as a Government of India Undertaking and the Government of India is holding around 61% of shares and that too through a holding company, namely, the 1st Balmer Lawrie Investments Ltd. Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable as against the respondents company. The petitioner company cannot be termed as an instrumentality of the State. Moreover, the remedy sought by the petitioner is purely private in nature and the prayer cannot be termed as a public remedy. The petitioner company cannot be termed as an instrumentality of the State. Moreover, the remedy sought by the petitioner is purely private in nature and the prayer cannot be termed as a public remedy. Therefore, the writ under Article 226 is not maintainable. Further, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that it is a well settled principle that ordinarily no writ will lie against the charge sheet or a show cause notice and only when a charge memo is issued by a person without having no jurisdiction to do so, then only the show cause notice could be quashed. Therefore, on this ground also the writ is not maintainable. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that if the grievance of the petitioner is against the order of suspension, he can very well file a review under Rule 37 of the Conduct, Discipline and Review Rules for officers. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the decisions reported in (C. KRISHNAN ..VS.. THE DISTRICT EDUCATIONAL OFFICER & ANOTHER), (2006) 12 SCC 28 (UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER ..VS.. KUNISETTY SATYANARAYANA), (MRF LTD., REP.BY CHAIRMAN & M.D.,..VS..THOZHILALAR SANGAM, REP.BY ITS GENARAL SECRETARY AND OTHERS). 6. BY way of reply, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the majority of shares of the 1st respondent company are held by the Government of India through the President of India and the company is treated as part of the oil industry and it comes under the Min’stry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. Therefore, the 1st respondent company is an instrumentality of the Government of India and hence, an ‘authority’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution. Further, by inviting the attention of this Court to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent company in W.P.Nos.6415 and 2432 of 2009 filed by Balmer Lawrie Employees’ Union, the learned senior counsel contended that in the said counter affidavit it has been stated that “...the Managing Director.. and other Directors of the 4th respondent company are appointed by the Central Government in addition to the Managing Director and other whole time Directors, the Government of India has appointed two serving IAS officers as Government Nominee Directors. Further more, the Government of India has also appointed six independent Directors to the Board of the company. and other Directors of the 4th respondent company are appointed by the Central Government in addition to the Managing Director and other whole time Directors, the Government of India has appointed two serving IAS officers as Government Nominee Directors. Further more, the Government of India has also appointed six independent Directors to the Board of the company. The 4th respondent is a company under the administrative control of Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas…” and hence, the present writ petition is maintainable as against the 1st respondent company. Further, the charge memo was issued by the General Manager (Chennai) & Disciplinary Authority of the 1st respondent company, who is not a competent authority to issue such charge memo against the petitioner, who is the Deputy Manager (P & A) and on that account also, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. 8. The petitioner, the General Secretary of Balmer Lawrie Group Assistants’ Association, was working as Deputy Manager (P & A), when the charge memo was served on him. The alleged reason for issuing the charge memo was that he prevented the other officers from performing their duty on the one day strike i.e. on 07.01.2009, declared by the oil sector PSU officers’ Association, of which Balme Lawrie Group Assistants’ Association is a constituent. It was the further allegation that the petitioner, during the strike, stood outside the office building at No.628, Anna salai, Teynampet, Chennai, and incited the officers reporting for duty in the general shift that in view of the strike called by the Balmer Lawrie Assistants’ Association, they should not go to the office and work and also he created hurdle in the main entrance to the office building, which prevented the tenants in the building and also the clients and customers of the company from entering the building. Since the company by its circular dated 05.01.2009 informed the officers that since action had already been initiated to implement the pay revision of the officers, there was no rational to proceed with the strike. 9. On a careful analysis of the charge memo, as contended by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, I find that the allegations made in the charge memo appear to be evasive, bald and vague. 9. On a careful analysis of the charge memo, as contended by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, I find that the allegations made in the charge memo appear to be evasive, bald and vague. It is the basic principle that there should be some materials to frame a charge. But, in the instant case, except the bald averment that the petitioner had prevented the other officers from discharging their duty, no other material was available to explain certain questions arising in this case, such as, who were all the officers prevented by the petitioner?, was there any complaint by such officer (s)?,who were the tenants prevented?, was there any complaint from the said tenants or clients, who visited the office on that date, etc. to substantiate the charges. Therefore, I find some force in the submission made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the memo is bereft of material particulars. 10. As contended by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, as per rule 31-B(1) of Conduct, Discipline and Review Rules for officers, the disciplinary authority shall frame a charge only on the basis of the material available. The said Rule reads thus: “On the basis of the material available with the disciplinary authority, if he comes to a provisional conclusion that a penalty as provided for under Rule 27 (d) & (e) is to be imposed on an officer he shall frame a charge sheet which would also indicate the allegations on which the charges are based along with such other material that he considers relevant to the various charges”. But in the instant case, a reading of the charge memo shows that it did not disclose the particulars as to how the disciplinary authority came to the conclusion that the petitioner has committed misconduct. 11. Though I find that the charge memo was without any material, the next question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is, whether the impugned charge memo and suspension order could be quashed merely for the reason that it was issued without any material. It is the well settled principle that even if the charge memo is issued without any material, such an issue can be agitated before the authority concerned. It is the well settled principle that even if the charge memo is issued without any material, such an issue can be agitated before the authority concerned. Ordinarily no writ lies against a charge memo or a show cause notice, but only when a show cause notice suffers from any material irregularity, the courts have power to quash such an order. But, in the instant case, though the petitioner has submitted that the charge memo has been issued by the General Manager, who is not a competent authority, such a ground has not been raised in the affidavit filed in support of the petition. Therefore, this court is not called upon to deal with such question. 12. With regard to the submission made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, relying on the decision reported in 2009(B) SCALE 575, that no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges, I am of the opinion that since it is the well settled principle that the defect, if any, in the charge memo, could be raised as one of the valid grounds before the Enquiry officer and hence, I am not inclined to accept the submission based on the said judgment. 13. It is appropriate to rely upon para 14 of the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondents in (cited supra), which reads as follows: “The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show cause notice or charge sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge sheet or show cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which effects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show cause notice or charge sheet does not infringed the right of any one. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show cause notice or charge sheet does not infringed the right of any one. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed that the said party can be said to have any grievance”. 14. With regard to the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents that the Government of India holds only around 61% of shares and that too through a holding company, namely, Balmer Lawrie Investments Limited, which is a Government of India Enterprise and not a Government of India Undertaking and hence, the writ petition is not maintainable, I find from the counter affidavit filed in W.P.Nos. 6415 and 2432 of 2009 that the 1st respondent company is an instrumentality of the Government of India and hence, an ‘authority’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, in my considered view, the 1st respondent company cannot take two different stands, one for the present writ petition and another for other writ petitions. Under such circumstances, I am not inclined to deal with the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition because except the statement made in the counter, no other substantial evidence are produced by way of documents before this Courts to deals with the submission made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner for maintainability. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that though the charge memo is devoid of merit and defective, the same could be agitated before the Enquiry officer by the petitioner. Further, as submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents, the Enquiry officer being the District Judge, there cannot be any impediment for the petitioner to put forth his case before him. Hence, the writ petition fails and, accordingly, the same is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected M. Ps. are closed.